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不隨隨便便投資 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post_23.html

投資成功的關鍵在於挑選對的企業之後﹐在適當的時機﹐以便宜的價格買入後﹐只要企業還是經營妥當﹐就可以長期持有。要在股市賺錢﹐說易不易﹐說難不難。

急于讓自己手中的錢變成股票﹐再變成錢﹐其實是很難賺到錢。

對待投資應當像對待婚姻一樣慎重﹐像國與國之間的不輕易開戰﹐像愛護自己生命一樣。每個人必須自己承擔投資的風險。管理自己的組合和選擇喜歡的優秀公司都非常重要的﹔因為拿錢出來投資是為了致富﹐而不是想在股市中尋找刺激。

我在路上開車﹐明白[能]和[不能控制的風險]。不能控制的風險﹐例如公路品質﹑天氣﹑其他司機的駕駛態度﹐我是戒慎加虔誠禱告。能控制的風險﹐例如儘量在白天開車﹑恰當的速度﹑小心駕駛等等﹐我是百分百遵守和管理妥當。

投資也是一樣﹐要先要明白[能]和[不能控制的風險]。
我能做到的是﹕

• 挑選我明白業務的企業
• 挑選能繼續賺錢的企業
• 挑選經濟好壞都能賺錢的企業
  
• 挑選誠實的管理人
• 以便宜的價格買入
• 耐心等待價值成長
• 長期閱讀它的報告
• 長期觀察它的業績和財務
  
• 時常閱讀好書
  

至于[不能控制的風險]﹐以上我所做得已經把[不能控制的風險]降至低點﹐剩下的唯有戒慎加虔誠禱告。

分散投資風險是必要的﹐但是把它當成投資的主旨卻是不正確的。
降低風險的策略應該是小心謹慎地把資金分配在想要投資的企業上﹐要投資哪些企業以及用什麼價格買進。

以合理價買入經營卓越企業﹐能減少發生損失的機率。

絕不要隨隨便便投資﹐同時投資和持有時要慎重。

無題 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post_26.html

值投資有甚麼可能會死的？價值投資根本就是平買，正價賣。數學角度來看平買，正價賣永遠都是賺錢的。問題就是在分析員的strengths and personality。Many analysts/investors don't even stick to the value discipline of buying cheap. They just buy anything with some sort of speculative potential in hopes of earning more than the fair value they have paid. In fact a lot of them don't even know the value of what they are buying into! Value investing is hard, speculation is easy(in terms of difficulty, not money making potential)...no wonder most investors fail.

********
個人淺見﹐把價值投資的根本說是低買高賣﹐似乎不足夠。我認為應該擁有實業家的胸懷和眼光﹐即係要把自己當成是生意合伙人﹐對投資的生意當然要儘量去了解﹐前景和困境當然要儘量去了解﹐財務狀況當然要儘量去了解。

股價向上升﹐是很難分辨手中的股票哪一個是投資﹑哪一個是投機﹔唯有股價大跌﹐股市氣氛慘淡﹐我們心生恐懼的時候﹐這時候如果我們能夠冷靜克服心魔﹐冷靜分析手中的企業﹐你將發現真真了解的企業﹐其實是很少的。

所謂真了解﹕

• 財務數字(價值)
• 前景
• 困境仍然能賺錢
• 管理人誠實

如果你有勇氣進行資金分配﹐減少不了解的企業﹐增加了解企業的部位﹐你才算是擁有實業家的胸懷。

你了解的企業價值繼續成長﹐市值不斷增加﹐當世界恢復正常後﹐市值果然超越了你的成本﹐你你才算是擁有實業家的眼光。

當然﹐世界恢復正常後﹐不了解的企業的市值也有可能恢復﹐或者超越你了解的企業。你不應該感到懊惱或後悔﹐因為在最糟糕的時期﹐你已經準備要買掉全部股票﹐就是因為你保存了這種理智﹐留下了對的企業﹐甚至加重部位﹐現在你才能賺到錢。

胸懷和眼光並不是天生的﹐只要我們平時多用心學習是能夠培養的。

價值投資法是先難後易﹐其實[難]就在理智﹐如果我們能夠保持正確投資觀念﹐其實[難]只是在第一步罷了。

投機是先易後難﹐後續的操作和判斷上存有很大的失誤率。對我而言﹐我是十之八九會犯錯。

只要少錯多對﹐就有好成就。

2011年 Charlie and I 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/03/2011-charlie-and-i.html

http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2011ltr.pdf

In my early days I, too, rejoiced when the market rose. Then I read Chapter Eight of Ben
Graham’s The Intelligent Investor, the chapter dealing with how investors should view fluctuations in stock prices. Immediately the scales fell from my eyes, and low prices became my friend. Picking up that book was one of the luckiest moments in my life.

一只牛：
我是窮牛，當我已經全部買入，市場大升，我會很開心，然後我希望天價賣出。
人生不如意十之八九，哪有可能行運一條龍？尤其是一隻牛。
【The Intelligent Investor】--Investor and Market Fluactuation，並不難懂，平價是好朋友，波動是好朋友，人人都懂。為何大跌市，好股大平賣，卻不敢買入？這是不是似懂非懂？為何股價波動了幾 個%，就急着止賺/止蝕，我們是不是似懂非懂？我要多謝Graham，我才能接觸善知識。

In the end, the success of our IBM investment will be determined primarily by its future earnings. But an important secondary factor will be how many shares the company purchases with the substantial sums it is likely to devote to this activity. And if repurchases ever reduce the IBM shares outstanding to 63.9 million, I will abandon my famed frugality and give Berkshire employees a paid holiday.

一只牛：
企業的價值是建立在

• 未來盈利
• 聰明的管理股東權益（例如回購股份）

我發現，未來盈利：

• 獲利能力強
• 成長
• 差異化優勢
  

聰明的管理股東權益：

• excellent management
• 誠實（小股東能分享）
  

Insurance
In most years, including 2011, the industry’s premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some extraordinary insurance operations. Let me tell you about the major units.

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must
(1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses;
(2) conservatively evaluate the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does;
(3) set a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and
(4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that their competitors are eagerly writing.

一只牛：
如果保險公司是由傻仔打理，後果不堪想像。
就算是國內最大的保險商，由傻仔打理，後果也是不堪想像。

各行各業，哪有競爭不激烈的？
有哪一個上班族沒有壓力？
如果公司是傻仔打理，唯有自求多福。


Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

A key characteristic of both companies is the huge investment they have in very long-lived, regulated assets,

Both businesses have earning power that even under terrible business conditions amply
covers their interest requirements.
BNSF’s interest coverage was 9.5x.

At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two key factors ensure its ability to service debt under all
circumstances: The stability of earnings that is inherent in our exclusively offering an essential service and a diversity of earnings streams, which shield it from the actions of any single regulatory body.

Measured by ton-miles, rail moves 42% of America’s inter-city freight, and BNSF moves more than any other railroad – about 37% of the industry total. A little math will tell you that about 15% of all inter-city ton-miles of freight in the U.S. is transported by BNSF. It is no exaggeration to characterize railroads as the circulatory system of our economy. Your railroad is the largest artery.

Massive investments of the sort that BNSF is making would be foolish if it could not earn appropriate returns on the incremental sums it commits.

MidAmerican, 89.8% owned by Berkshire, supplies 2.5 million customers in the U.S. with electricity, operating as the largest supplier in Iowa, Utah and Wyoming and as an important provider in six other states as well. Our pipelines transport 8% of the country’s natural gas. Obviously, many millions of Americans depend on us every day. They haven’t been disappointed.

一只牛：
投資公用企業，就要預算它的龐大資本支出，隨時要有出差錯的準備。
所以利息保障比率，我們要懂得計。你看，BNSF’s interest coverage was 9.5x.

投資公用企業，就要選最厲害的，最厲害的才能形成壟斷局勢，才能成為強大。


Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business being purchased or the future economics of the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes my eyesight has been poor.

Overall, the intrinsic value of the businesses in this Berkshire sector significantly exceeds their book value. For many of the smaller companies, however, this is not true. I have made more than my share of mistakes buying small companies. Charlie long ago told me, “If something’s not worth doing at all, it’s not worth doing well,” and I should have listened harder. In any event, our large purchases have generally worked well – extraordinarily well in a few cases – and overall this sector is a winner for us.

一只牛：
原來，巴菲特也是時常犯錯，但是他的犯錯成本非常細小，做對的回報卻很大。

我個人認為，十強之內的企業，找到對的公司的機會很高（它們就是因為做對了，才能在十強之內）。

地產佬致股東函 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/03/blog-post.html
自中央政府長時間以多項市場及行政措施遏抑房價後，交易量終於在去年八月左右萎縮；其後不久，價格開始下跌。待至去年第四季時，許多房地產商均出現財困，包括小型及部分大型房地產公司。這是我們意料之內，但或許來得較我們預期為快。

對 此，我們還是感到欣喜，因為熊市到來之際，本集團仍坐擁豐厚財力。一直以來，我們是財力最強的地產公司之一。二零一零年十一月，集團配股集資港幣一百一十 億元， 其時頗多人質疑， 甚或譏諷說：「你們已有大量現金，還要那麼多錢幹啥？」提出此問題的人，明顯並非地產專家，至少不是好的地產專家，否則應知熊市遲早會重臨，而我們乃作好 準備以便趁低價買地。手頭有充裕的現金，可讓我們更放心出價。

一只牛：
經營環境轉壞，同行（競爭者）出現財困。
我們準備趁低價買地，因為我們已經作好準備了，手頭有充裕的現金，可讓我們更放心出價。

事 實正是如此。去年九月底，本集團在西南地區的最大城市昆明購入其中一幅地點最佳的黃金地塊。該幅土地於六月首次推出拍賣，當時有四家內地公司和包括本集團 在內的兩家外商參與競投。坦白說，我們認為勝算不高，因為我們從未在激烈競價中勝出。幸好，由於技術性原因，當地政府在開始前已取消有關拍賣。待至九月底 該幅土地再次推出時，所有內地地產商均消聲匿跡。市場開始下挫，融資轉趨緊張，僅有一家新加坡公司和本集團留在戰團。因此，我們知道勝算有望，但亦知道即 使成功投得地塊，價錢亦不算便宜。倘再遲一點，例如數個月後才舉行拍賣，那麼唯一的競爭對手亦可能會退出，該項交易會更加相宜。但賣地時間不由我們決定， 乃由擁有該幅土地的政府操控。

該幅土地其中一個吸引之處，就是不存在土地拆遷的風險。該處原為市政府辦公大樓， 現已他遷。再者，我們留意該地塊已有多年，對其所知甚詳。事實上，董事局兩年前在昆明開會時，本人亦曾向董事局成員介紹該地塊。昆明是一個經濟蓬勃的城 市，而該地塊堪稱瑰寶，倘我們不掌握時機，有可能永遠失之交臂。因此我們出價競投，並以可接受的價錢投得。

昆明除了是鐵路和公路的交匯點外，亦是一個航運中心。在全國最繁忙的機場中，昆明機場名列第七位；待新機場於今年稍後啟用時，其排名可望上升至第四位。據說，中央政府已把昆明劃定為中國四大國際空運樞紐城市之一，其餘三地為北京、上海及廣州。

一只牛：
10年前，管理人的策略就是以平價買入黃金地點並且建立最好的商場，然後持有收租至今。
公司的價值增長=地點的價值增長+租金增長+重複有效的策略
10年後的今天，管理人認為這個策略仍然有效，所以始終如一的奉行。


本集團不從事住房開發。我們至今仍強烈認為，傳統房地產商的思維和運作模式 — 買入大型的地塊、興建千萬計平方米的住宅，是一門講求規模和速度的遊戲，並非集團的強項，我們只希望在質量和高單位價格方面競爭。

倘為市中心的綜合發展項目，住宅則成為我們必然之選。試想想，如果一個豪宅項目建於世界級購物商場的上蓋或毗鄰，同時又鄰近市內最優質的高層辦公樓，其單位價格會是多少？答案是高踞市內最高之列。不管是出租的服務式寓所，還是銷售住宅， 我們也樂於做這門生意。

經 過多番內部討論後，我們至今一直恪守原則，專注本集團的強項，亦即商用物業項目，而增值利益留給他人享受。但時至今天，綜合發展項目已日漸成為政府規範， 趨使我們兼享這些潛在增值利益，我們當然樂於聽命！畢竟，愈多人在集團的購物商場毗鄰居住，愈可帶來更多零售銷量。無論從甚麽角度來看，我們都是贏家。

一只牛：
我們只希望在質量和高單位價格方面競爭，因為這是我們的強項。我們對量大利小的生意不感興趣。


我們只能把每項物業出售一次！一如既往，我們會耐心窺準適當時機以求取得最大利潤。

一只牛：
好企業的每一張股票只能出售一次！我們會耐心窺準適當時機以求取得最大利潤。


未來十年將每年平均落成二十九萬平方米的建築總面積（包括停車場），其面積相等於每年落成一幢美國帝國大廈有餘。部分人謂恒隆保守，但本人認為，此舉實在頗為進取！本集團堅持財政保守，但這絕不代表策略保守。

如何在財務上持盈保泰， 又同時在策略上積極進取地從迅速增長的市場中抓緊最佳機遇？ 這是一
個 有趣的問題。我們的做法是信守地產業老生常談的格言， 堅持「低買高賣」。這談何容易？大部分市場參與者均以高價買入以求更高價賣出， 我們不會自負如斯，皆因市道無常， 一旦暴挫便殆無緩衝。過去二十年， 我們不斷學習以求準確掌握市場時機， 至今成績斐然。再者， 我們一直奉行行內的金科玉律 — 「location，location，location」， 即只買最佳位置的地塊，這亦令我們有別於大部分競爭對手。能緊守兩大基本規則的發展商何其少， 這確實令人驚訝！

一只牛：
財務上持盈保泰， 策略上積極（精明理財）
堅持「低買高賣」
只買最佳位置的地塊（企業）


部分人士質疑我們財政保守，並建議我們派發特別現金股息回饋股東。基於多個原因，管理層不應這樣做。事實上，我對這些人說，倘我們這樣做，他們應沽售本集團的股票。集團處於優越地位 — 我們具備經驗，並擁有已建立好的團隊和品牌 — 這足以讓我們好好掌握本世紀初的一個最大商機，就是在中國的城市化和本地消費熱潮中大展拳腳。倘把資金回饋股東，意味著管理層不能抓緊機遇，這是沽售本集團股份的有力原因！

在美國，本地消費佔整體經濟活動逾七成；在中國則低於百分之三十五。鑑於中國經濟正在增長，若其消費所佔的份額與美國的距離能收窄一半，已可為本集團的購物商場業務帶來豐厚利潤。

從 數據上分析，倘有一天我們總額達港幣六百七十億元的新投資項目， 收益率能接近現時的上海項目， 其每年帶來的利潤將甚為可觀。上海兩個項目約於十二年前開業，現時每年的無槓桿收益率接近百分之四十，我相信這個回報率可以重演。倘如是，上述數字顯示， 隨著我們的商用物業逐一成功開業及錄得租金增長，本集團的前景將甚為輝煌。我認為，鮮有地產公司在可持續溢利增長方面，能有這樣的確定性或規模。

一只牛：
股價的動力不應該是止賺/蝕的念頭。
前景+盈利+管理，才是正念。


香港金鐘廊的租約及續訂管理合約招標中沒有中標。我們自一九八一年政府首次推出該項熱點物業開始，一直負責有關的物業管理。就財政而言，該物業帶來的收益對本集團微不足道。加上項目已老化，需斥資作出大量維修及翻新；而政府是次定出的合約租期乃歷來最短，並不值得
我們冒險和花功夫。

贊成也罷，反對也罷 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/03/blog-post_20.html
不要羨慕其他人，雖然他們忙著買進賣出，看起來獲利似乎還不錯。

我希望在質量和高利潤方面競爭，因為這是我的強項，我對量大利小的生意不感興趣。

買股票（企業）就是買它的前景（未來）。我們分析的數據雖然是過去的，難免會有人爭議說存在着一定的不確定，對未來的判斷存有很大的失誤。

我個人認為，緊守兩大金科玉律可以化險為夷
（1）質量
只買進在行業佔據最佳位置的企業。過去一百年，50年，10年，這家企業能夠產生高於平均水準的盈利，並且管理層是誠實和可靠的，營業額在十強之內。這樣的企業都可以歸納為好的企業。

當市道如過去兩年般放緩時，交易量會減少，但價格仍能保持堅實；而當市道暢旺時，價格會有很大的上調空間。如果以2011年末比較2009年初（熊市），事實的確是如此，

1. 渣打：2011年末（136港元），2009年初（大約是60港元）
2. 恒隆：2011年末（21港元），2009年初（大約是13港元）
3. 領匯：2011年末（22港元），2009年初（大約是11港元）
4. 激成：2011年末（2.8港元），2009年初（大約是2港元）

以上只是小部分的例子，還有許多的好企業等待你去發掘。

2011年末，有些企業的市值甚至低過2009年初，我認為這一類企業的數據存在着一定的不確定，對未來的判斷存有很大的失誤。

激成是一間細公司，獨特的優勢是管理人太保守了，2009年初至今，它買入美國的酒店，日本的出租物業和酒店。看來，這些產業都是平價買入，是否產生合理盈利，需要時間證明。我唯一能做的，就是收息和耐心等待。有時候，等得愈久，價格愈佳。

（2）高利潤
買入成本越低 = 利潤越高

股票市場往往甚為波動，價格下挫走勢可以既急且狠，故手持現金方可防患於未然。話雖如此，從資本結構來看，經常處於高現金狀況非最理想的做法，我們應審慎地運用以提升投資回報。成本大致上分為平--合理--貴，我們只要能夠平--合理買入好企業，通常都能跑贏大市。2009年初和2011年末，3年內出現了2次大平買，平均1年半，若能把握，應該可以笑傲江湖。平時多做功課，保持正確投資觀念不偏離，態度堅定，絕對可以及格。


然而，單靠緊守該兩大金科玉律並不足以長勝，還需精明理財。

適當的配置資金，在加上股息收入，我們將處於最佳的財政狀況，例如淨現金狀況，我們就能避免賣股買米的窘境發生。等得愈久，價格愈佳。【高手極少賣股買米，驚慌失措，棄股而逃】


別人贊成也罷，反對也罷，都不應該成為我們做對事或做錯事的理由。
我對現在的回報感到寫意。

派息的多少，不派息 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/03/blog-post_23.html
看到巴黎先生對派息的看法，我也來獻醜，莫笑。

巴黎先生說的“如果管理層是誠實的，派息少的，不應被低估”

我個人多加幾句：

1）這樣的理論的關鍵在於誠實，誠實可以數據化嗎？（價值人講的是data)
我認為是可以的。

如果我們的回報來源=增值+股息，
如果目標是20%（好像巴菲特），

派息少的，例如1%或者0%不派息，那麼就要19-20%的增值，才能達到目標。

派息少的，不派息的，如果它們從很久很久以前（10-20年）到現在，市值能夠做到每年增長19-20%，我認為管理層是誠實的。想想看，需要付出多麼大的毅力和關心才能把盈利搞得每年增長19-20%，長達10-20年，唯有對公司老實的管理人，才願意這麼拼命。

有這樣的例子，巴郡就是其一。

但是，10-20年到現在，巴郡的總舵主是巴菲特，如果他不在了，換成ABC先生，過去的數據就不可靠了，因為管理人變了。

或有人說，就算是巴菲特多活了10年，誰敢說巴菲特不會變的不老實。
我認為，人老了，會更愛護名聲。

2）最近，我看了一家企業的主席報告，他說：
“Some have questioned our financial conservatism and suggest that we return money to shareholders such as in the form of a special cash dividend. For several reasons management should not do that. In fact, I have told those proponents to sell our stock if we do that.
Conceptually speaking, we are in a privileged position- - having gained experience, and having built a team as well as a brand - - to take advantage of one of the biggest commercial opportunities mankind has seen in the beginning part of this century, namely to ride the wave of urbanization and domestic consumption in China. Returning money to shareholders means
that management is incapable of converting those opportunities, a great reason to dump our shares!”

“部 分人士質疑我們財政保守，並建議我們派發特別現金股息回饋股東。基於多個原因，管理層不應這樣做。事實上，我對這些人說，倘我們這樣做，他們應沽售本集團 的股票。集團處於優越地位 — 我們具備經驗，並擁有已建立好的團隊和品牌 — 這足以讓我們好好掌握本世紀初的一個最大商機，就是在中國的城市化和本地消費熱潮中大展拳腳。倘把資金回饋股東，意味著管理層不能抓緊機遇，這是沽售本集 團股份的有力原因！”


我知道，不管是在那一個國家，企業主席的報告，很多時候得個“講”字。有時候更是肉麻當有 趣。如果你看了以上這段，輕易跳過，不去追究這家企業在2003年已經在大陸發展，而且懂得高價賣香港樓房，低買大陸地建商場收租金，就認為它的股價在 29元已經無“動力”而賣出，是多麼可惜啊!(這位仁兄是動力-趨勢派的紅人，他買入的時間大約和我相同，所以我估計他的平均價和我一樣。）

話 說回來，這家企業的現在股價，反映了大約3%的股息率，也反映市場給它溢價。股息的數額已經等於它全部的租金收入，我說它派息高。如果你認為它賣香港樓房 的錢也應該派給你，你會認為它派息低。但是它用這些錢買大陸地建商場收租金，如此循環，租金收入年年增加10%，而且產業年年增值（因為租金年年增加）造 成企業的內在價值年年增加——超過10%。今年的內在價值增加了14%，如果你有膽識在別人恐懼的時候買入，那麼你的股息率可以超過3%，加上14%內在 價值增加，你的回報已經超過17%，市價也溢價反映它的價值，這樣的企業一生何求？

“從 數據上分析，倘有一天我們總額達港幣六百七十億元的新投資項目， 收益率能接近現時的上海項目， 其每年帶來的利潤將甚為可觀。上海兩個項目約於十二年前開業，現時每年的無槓桿收益率接近百分之四十，我相信這個回報率可以重演。倘如是，上述數字顯示， 隨著我們的商用物業逐一成功開業及錄得租金增長，本集團的前景將甚為輝煌。我認為，鮮有地產公司在可持續溢利增長方面，能有這樣的確定性或規模。”

用計算機計一計，你應該可以算到它【未來5年後】的租金收入。當然我不鼓勵你樂觀過頭，你可以用20%回報估計吧。

3）“如果管理層是誠實的，派息少的，不應被低估”——小企業可能不成立
我 以激成為例子，它的市值大約12億，長時期市值低於價值，2009年至今夠久吧。請問有誰人可以耐心等待？有誰人可以預測它何時可以市值回歸價 值？2010年的牛市也無法造成它市值回歸價值！它派息只佔盈利和現金流的20%，我認為它派息少。在這樣的情形，我會以good bond stock的股價才買入，以高利潤來補償我的耐心。當然，它市值回不回歸價值，that is GOD matter!所以買入小企業之前，要了解局限。

價值減少的例子之一 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/03/blog-post_29.html
回【對激成投資突然要交咁多稅點睇呀！小羊上】


1）財務報表關於所得稅的附註(今年和過去的披露比較)
2011年
本 集團一間附屬公司正就由於角子機經營業務及管理費用而應付之稅務撥備之查詢與越南當地稅務機關進行磋商。僅就能可靠計量之稅務風險作出撥備。在二零一一年 計提66,110,000 港元(二零一零年:4,662,000 港元)以彌補部分所得稅不足撥備金額。然而，最終結果仍有不確定因素，其所產生之負債可能超過或未超過該撥備。

2010年
本 集團一間附屬公司正就由於管理費用而應付的稅務撥備的查詢與越南當地的稅務機關進行磋商。僅就能可靠計量的稅務風險作出撥備。在二零一零年已計提 4,662,000 港元以彌補部分所得稅不足撥備金額。然而，最終結果仍有不確定因素，其所產生之負債可能超過或未超過該撥備。

2009年
越 南之公司所得稅（「公司所得稅」）乃就本年度之估計應課稅溢利按15%（二零零八年：15%）之稅率計提撥備。根據本集團一間於越南註冊成立之附屬公司所 持投資牌照之條款，該附屬公司須於二零零三年首個營運年度起計之首十二年內就應課稅收入按15%之稅率繳付公司所得稅，隨後則就應課稅收入按25%之稅率 繳付公司所得稅。此外，根據該附屬公司所持投資牌照之條款，該附屬公司符合資格於其錄得應課稅溢利之首年起計之兩年內獲豁免繳納公司所得稅（即截至二零零 四年及二零零五年十二月三十一日止各財務年度），隨後三年則按適用所得稅稅率之50%繳納公司所得稅，直至截至二零零八年十二月三十一日止年度為止。

2008年的披露和2009年相同

我的了解是管理人在2010年已經知道給政府的所得稅不足。
但是根據2009年的披露，估計要到2015年才需要交足25%。

但是到了2011年的披露，想法不一樣了。

根據2011年的披露，我的估計是越南酒店業務之角子機經營業務及管理費用而應付之稅在過去幾年都沒有交付足夠的稅，所以現在被追稅。角子機是屬於賭博業，需要繳交稅率應該比較高，不排除未來公司需要繳交更高的所得稅。


2）角子機業務的收入

越南酒店業務（千港元）
	對外營業額	所得稅	溢利		角子機收入
2008	617,960	-14,088	191,399		288,021
2009	601,814	-25,520	155,924		339,549
2010	616,955	-30,303	172,118		321,683
2011	628,957	-105,595	102,693		?

3）
從這事件來看，越南政府應該是不同意酒店業務賬目，認為角子機的收入需要分開呈報，並且對過去的收入一次過追回。

總而言之，可以聯想到

1. 如果越南酒店業務之賬目有錯誤，間接聯想到整盤賬目是否有問題？
2. 公司的名譽受損

未來公司需要繳交更高的所得稅，無疑將永久損害了公司的價值，但是更可怕的是名譽受損。

股票投資人最重要的事 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/04/blog-post_22.html
投資成功的關鍵在於

• 做你很容易就可以做好的簡單事情
• 學會選擇與避開

 簡單不代表無用或無腦。
2009年，我閱讀【Security Analysis】，看到書中提到，如果租金是1元，那麼這個資產的價值是20元 ，即係租金的20倍。書中也有提到，買入之前，必需確定：

• 盈利的素質 ：即係不容易走樣，有保障的收入(guarantee income)，
• 企業的前景：即係這個生意永遠有的做，盈利會陸續增長

有人說盡信書不如無書，這是勸人要思考，不要盲目相信，要詳細了解並且善用。

收入同樣是租金，可是層次可能不同，即係不同【地點+用途】的產業，它的價值可以大不同。

以領匯為例，我在2009年買入，就是考慮到它的盈利不會容易走樣，這個生意永遠有的做，盈利會陸續增長。但是，這不代表買入後就立刻賺錢，我可是坐過艇。而且，那個時候，市值並沒有達到租金的20倍，我曾懷疑作者的理論是否成立。

領匯upgrade商場， 用的是股東的權益，值不值得？3年前，恐怕很多人都會懷疑效果。所以，我們必須依賴數字來判斷。幸好，每年的數字都是正面的（租金+股息增加）。當時間到了，相信的人開始增加，最美好的時光也就到了，股價升到你跌眼鏡。

我個人的觀察，生意是需要時間來培養，例如1年或2年或3年。所以，股票投資人最重要的事就是 ：

• 開始就是買入對的企業。
• 即係買入【合理+未來盈利（價值）長升】的企業，
• 你需要等1-3年，才能得到合理的回報。
• 如果你買入【便宜+未來盈利（價值）長升】的企業。當時辰到，股價升到你跌眼鏡。
• 如果發覺買錯了企業，就必須承認立刻離開，不要浪費時間，因為時間寶貴。所以檢查業績，勤勞考察企業的行業前景，是我的工作，而且要樂在其中。

因為顧客群的關係（公屋，地點)，領匯的租金水平低於其他A級商場。可是發展的機遇到了，以前差的地點可以變成好的地點，這個時候upgrade商場可以改變顧客群，最重要是這些因素都是租金增長的推動力。只要市場改變看法，這些磚頭就變黃金。

 但是，我必須同意，終有一日領匯的租金會和A級商場相等， 以後就會隨著通膨的速度了。

值得再三反覆細讀（一） 一隻牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/04/blog-post_24.html
再讀2011年巴郡致股東信， 個人認為以下這篇值得再三反覆細讀，
××××××××××××××××××××××
 The Basic Choices for Investors and the One We Strongly Prefer

Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.

（1）
Investments that are denominated in a given currency include money-market funds, bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and other instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as 「safe.」 In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta may be zero, but their risk is huge.

Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing power of investors in many countries, even as the holders continued to receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly result, moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin out of control.

Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as 「income.」

For tax-paying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-yearperiod, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7%（一隻牛的計算：5.7%x75%=4.275% ，after tax）return would have yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor's visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. It's noteworthy that the implicit inflation 「tax」 was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. 「In God We Trust」 may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our government's printing press has been all too human.

High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments – and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.

Under today's conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.

Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchase currency-related securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain – either because a particular credit is mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we've exploited both opportunities in the past – and may do so again – we are now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: 「Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free risk.」


（2）
The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer's hope that someone else – who also knows that the assets will be forever unproductive – will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.

This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce – it will remain lifeless forever – but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.

The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.

What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As 「bandwagon」 investors join any party, they create their own truth – for a while.

Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the 「proof」 delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers – for a time – expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: 「What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end.」

Today the world's gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $1,750 per ounce – gold's price as I write this – its value would be $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.

Let's now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world's most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?（$9.6 trillion美金，可以買多少家新鴻基？，長江？，九龍倉？，總而言之，所有的龍頭藍籌企業？）

Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices make today's annual production of gold command about $160 billion. Buyers – whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened individuals, or speculators – must continually absorb this additional supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.

A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops – and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.（以上所買入的龍頭藍籌企業，可以派發多少的股息？）

Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it's likely many will still rush to gold. I'm
confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.


（3）
Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard 「cash is king」 in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard 「cash is trash」 in the early 1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.

My own preference – and you knew this was coming – is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola, IBM and our own See's Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies – think of our regulated utilities, for example – fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.

Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See's peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.

Our country's businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial 「cows」 will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of 「milk」 to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as well). Berkshire's goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own them in their entirety – but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway winner among the three we've examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.

值得再三反覆細讀（二） 一隻牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/04/blog-post_6061.html
1）
Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably
certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.

• 股價會波動，這是正常的。
• 經歷無數次景氣循環，雖然盈利在不景氣時少許倒退，但是以10年或更久的經營歷史數據排列，盈利仍然能夠不斷增加，這樣的企業可以被稱為【對的企業】
• 找到【對的企業】，也要能夠瞭解它的業務，知道如何經營（例如performance keypoint)，才能買入，
• 找到【對的企業】， 也要配合便宜/合理價，才能買入，
• 如果【對的企業】，繼續以對的方式經營，才可以繼續持有

例子：渣打(2888)

	股票數目	股價的波動	每股盈利	景氣循環	價值
	（百萬）	（每股港元）	（每股港元）		PE=10
2003	1,207	82-126	6.33	SARS	63
2004	1,210	116-149	9.78		98
2005	1,309	99-175	11.15		111
2006	1,349	182-231	12.66		127
2007	1,615	211-304	13.19		132
2008	1,638	88-287	14.54	金融風暴	145
2009	1,984	75-217	12.78		128
2010	2,192	176-244	14.82		148
2011	2,395	141-216	15.18	歐債風暴	152

以上，可以發覺：

• 如果已經找到【對的企業】，如果不充分瞭解它的業務，就算是買入，恐怕很快的就會被股價波動震走。
• 雖然股價會波動，但是價值是走在上升的軌道。市值+股息的增幅，如果無法超過通膨，也不能被稱為【對的企業】。所以，買入價非常重要。
• 每一天的市價，不代表是便宜/合理價，尤其是【對的企業】，都是溢價出售。
• 天上掉黃金，可遇不可求，一定要用大卡車來裝

（這是為了表達我的看法而舉的例子，可能某個事故，這家企業可以變樣）
（而且，PE=10，只是我的估計，不代表是對，也不代表所有企業都適合）

2）
Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably
certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.

～a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power.

 巴老是說他的通膨數據是4.3%，如果【市值+股息】的增幅，無法超過通膨，應該是危險的投資。但是，以極便宜的價格買入，造成股息回報超過10%，就可以扭轉乾坤，化危為安。

3）
Under today's conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.

• 這小段，說明了流動性的重要。好的企業，有哪一個不是流動性穩定？出問題的企業，那一個不是因為流動性乾枯？
• 反省自己，要成為成功的股票投資人，就必須學會理財，時時保持著充裕的生活費用，就算是超級金融風暴再來，也可以繼續持有投資部位，不必賣股買米，甚至股息再投資超值得的企業。 
• 保持著充裕的生活費用，才不會過度在意股價的波動，才能專注於企業的價值增長。

4）
High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments – and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.

• 太美妙了，如果能擁有超越10%利息收入的【AAA級債券，匯豐的定期存款】。如果遇上，記得用大卡車去裝。
• 【AAA級債券，匯豐的定期存款】只是代名詞，表示超級穩定和不違約。只要用心，市場內多得是。

 5）

• investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment.
• people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for【】
• Berkshire's goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses.
• I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to
  be the runaway winner among the three we've examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.