值得再三反覆細讀(一) 一隻牛的投資日記
http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/04/blog-post_24.html再讀2011年巴郡致股東信, 個人認為以下這篇值得再三反覆細讀,
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The Basic Choices for Investors and the One We Strongly Prefer
Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they
are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their
holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden
with risk.
(1)
Investments that are denominated in a given currency include
money-market funds, bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and other
instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as
「safe.」 In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta
may be zero, but their risk is huge.
Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing
power of investors in many countries, even as the holders continued to
receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly result,
moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value
of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to
policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin
out of control.
Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the
dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over
management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1
did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed
4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply
maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding
themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as 「income.」
For tax-paying investors like you and me, the picture has been far
worse. During the same 47-yearperiod, continuous rolling of U.S.
Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if
an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging
25%, this 5.7%(一隻牛的計算:5.7%x75%=4.275% ,after tax)return would have
yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor's visible
income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield,
and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3
points. It's noteworthy that the implicit inflation 「tax」 was more than
triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as
his main burden. 「In God We Trust」 may be imprinted on our currency, but
the hand that activates our government's printing press has been all
too human.
High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the
inflation risk they face with currency-based investments – and indeed,
rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do
not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors
assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.
Under today's conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based
investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them,
primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample
liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however
inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S.
Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for
liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working
level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.
Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we
will purchase currency-related securities only if they offer the
possibility of unusual gain – either because a particular credit is
mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates
rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial
capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we've
exploited both opportunities in the past – and may do so again – we are
now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that
Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: 「Bonds
promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver
return-free risk.」
(2)
The second major category of investments involves assets that will never
produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer's hope that
someone else – who also knows that the assets will be forever
unproductive – will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all
things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.
This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in
turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still
further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce –
it will remain lifeless forever – but rather by the belief that others
will desire it even more avidly in the future.
The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of
investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of
whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has
two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor
procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but
the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking
up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an
eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.
What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of
the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved
correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated
additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as
validating an investment thesis. As 「bandwagon」 investors join any
party, they create their own truth – for a while.
Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have
demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining
an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In
these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to
the 「proof」 delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers – for a time
– expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles
blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed
once again: 「What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in
the end.」
Today the world's gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of
this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet
per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At
$1,750 per ounce – gold's price as I write this – its value would be
$9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.
Let's now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could
buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200
billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world's most profitable
company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these
purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around
money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you
imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile
B?($9.6 trillion美金,可以買多少家新鴻基?,長江?,九龍倉?,總而言之,所有的龍頭藍籌企業?)
Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold,
current prices make today's annual production of gold command about $160
billion. Buyers – whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened
individuals, or speculators – must continually absorb this additional
supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.
A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced
staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops – and will
continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be.
Exxon Mobil will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in
dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more
trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold
will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You
can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.(以上所買入的龍頭藍籌企業,可以派發多少的股息?)
Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it's likely many will still rush to gold. I'm
confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A
will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved
by pile B.
(3)
Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear:
Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based
assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency
collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard 「cash
is king」 in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather
than held. Similarly, we heard 「cash is trash」 in the early 1980s just
when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in
memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd
paid dearly for that comfort.
My own preference – and you knew this was coming – is our third
category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or
real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in
inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its
purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital
investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola,
IBM and our own See's Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain
other companies – think of our regulated utilities, for example – fail
it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn
more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will
remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.
Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells,
shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to
exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or
some See's peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move
more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it
does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others
produce.
Our country's businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and
services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial 「cows」
will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of 「milk」 to
boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but
rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the
milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during
the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid
loads of dividends as well). Berkshire's goal will be to increase its
ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own
them in their entirety – but we will also be owners by way of holding
sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended
period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway
winner among the three we've examined. More important, it will be by far
the safest.