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引語——彼得·林奇曾說：「如果你在分析經濟和預測市場上花的時間超過13分鐘，那麼你就浪費了10分鐘。」

在2008年之前，經濟學家的工作從來不貼近市場交易。但是，在金融危機後，有些經濟學家卻變成了「超級明星」。突然之間，經濟學家們開始在媒體上呼籲買入或賣出股票。

經濟學家們的工作很重要。我們所有市場參與者能夠從他們的報告中學到很多東西。但是，當他們給交易員或基金經理的報告中開始包括一些市場警告的時候，事情開始變得有點奇怪。

經濟學家能夠幫助我們理解市場和現實世界的相互影響，但是他們得把握好尺度。

經濟學家在幫助我們理解真實世界方面極其重要，但是在市場交易中直接應用經濟理論則非常危險。比如，GDP增速疲軟意味著股市回報下降。如果你按照這種邏輯進行市場操作，那麼你就會錯過前幾年的大牛市，也會錯過歐洲股市探底。它還會使你相信中國股市將有很好的表現（因為中國GDP增速一直非常高）。

實際上，在任何國家，經濟數據和股市之間就沒有這種正相關的聯繫。

另外，短期經濟數據和股市走勢一樣難以琢磨，因此你把對股市的預測建立在同樣難以琢磨的經濟數據上，這本身就不大合理。

市場和經濟數據之間的聯繫不是很大，這種觀點也有一些研究支撐：

倫敦商學院的研究顯示，根據有利的經濟因素做出的投資決策實際上得到更差的結果。研究員Dimson，Marsh和Staunton稱，「他們研究了83個國家1972-2009年的數據，並按過去5年的GDP增速進行排列。GDP增速最高國家股票投資回報的均值為18.4%，但是最低GDP增速國家股票投資的均值為25.1%。」

紐約梅隆銀行也對1970-2012年的標普500指數和美國經濟增速進行了研究，結果顯示兩者無論如何也不存在聯繫。

一個例子就是希臘股市。希臘股市曾是全球最不受歡迎的市場，但是從價值上看它處於極端被低估的水平。但是，它的走勢只有一個方向（截止2012年6月份，希臘股市從2007年峰值下跌了90%）。

然而，PIMCO給我們提供了完美的案例。他們每年匯聚全球幾百個最聰明的人召開會議，然後公佈一份報告，其中包括他們對經濟和市場的預測。好消息是，自「後金融危機」開始以來，他們對經濟的預測一直非常準確。Mohamed El-Erian稱，問題是他們對經濟的預測非常正確，但是對市場的預測完全錯誤。如果你根據PIMCO經濟學家的預測，然後才進行相反的市場操作，那麼你就會得到非常好的投資收益。

總結，經濟學家在「指點」股市與評論經濟之間存在很大不同。

股票交易基於三種因素，即市場情緒、價值和趨勢。是的，經濟數據能夠影響這三個因素。但是，這應該讓交易員和投資者來做出選擇，而不是一個經濟學家。

投資者應該始終觀察經濟，分析數據和市場流行的觀點。但是，這樣做目的是為更好的幫我們瞭解周圍的世界，而非幫助我們取得投資收益。

11月24日，伊朗與伊核問題六國（美國、英國、法國、俄羅斯、中國和德國）就限制伊核計劃並放寬對伊制裁達成協議。協議自稱，

對伊朗核項目的介入監控和透明度前所未有。

西方國家官員稱，這份協議將制止伊朗繼續發展核項目，打擊伊朗建立核設施關鍵組成部分，對伊進行監控，使伊朗生產武器用核燃料的時間延長。

伊朗稱，協議打破了經濟制裁，表明國際社會認同伊朗追求開發民用核項目。

協議賦予雙方哪些權利？讓我們看看華爾街日報歸納的協議要點：

鈾濃縮：

   · 伊朗承諾終止所有提取純度5%以上濃縮鈾的活動。

   · 伊核問題六國承認伊朗人民有權使用和平用途的核能源。

鈾庫存

   · 伊朗將開始將目前存貯的純度20%濃縮鈾轉變為無法適用於武器的氧化物，或者降低其純度。

華爾街見聞註：純度達到20%即可用於武器，原子彈需要的核原料純度達到90%。

   · 伊朗不得增加低濃縮鈾。

離心機

   · 可生產純度高於5%的濃縮鈾的離心機都將停工。

   · 伊朗不會安裝任何新的離心機，不會用新設備替代老設備。伊朗不得增加國內濃縮設施數量。

   · 如長期談判破裂，伊朗不會大批裝備可迅速使用就位的離心機。

審查

   · 對進行和濃縮作業的納坦茲（Natanz）研究發展基地與福爾多（Fordow）地下基地，將增加審查頻率，首次由每週檢查改為每日檢查。新增檢查地區包括離心機生產場所、鈾礦和鈾冶廠，檢查還將收集阿拉克（Arak）重水核反應堆的信息。

   · 伊朗同意與聯合國觀察機構國際原子能組織（IAEA）達成協議。應該協議要求，伊朗將提供更多的信息，披露核反應堆及生產場所相關計劃。

阿拉克核反應堆

   · 實施中期協議期間，該核電站不會進一步開展工作。

   · 實施中期協議期間，伊朗不會開始拆除阿拉克反應堆，今後也不會拆除。

制裁

   · 實施中期協議期間解除的對伊制裁合計規模相當於60-70億美元.

   · 如要進行人道活動，伊朗會得到更好的渠道動用自己的資金。

   · 伊朗出口石化產品的制裁暫停。

   · 伊朗交易黃金及其他貴金屬的制裁暫停。

   · 大多數影響伊朗汽車業的制裁暫停。

   · 對一些飛機零部件的制裁解除，包括保證航空安全的零部件，但不包括軍用雷達使用的部件。

   · 解除一切對伊朗購買醫療設備的資金限制。西方國家將監督這類採購，以保證設備來自得到認可的公司，並非動機可疑的公司。

   · 所有解除制裁的規定都是短期的有限解除，均可撤銷。銀行和石油的核心制裁都將維持不變。如伊朗未履行承諾，則任何解除規定都會撤銷。

新制裁

   · 如伊朗違反協議規定，西方國家保留施加新制裁的權力。

「突襲」效果

西方官員稱，實施中期協議後，如伊朗迅速生產武器級材料所需的時間將從幾週延長到幾個月。

這意味著伊朗擁有的高純度濃縮鈾和離心機更少了，面對的審查員更多了，國際社會將得到更多的時間和必要手段發起突然襲擊。

以下為白宮發佈的核協議內容：

First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program

The P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, and China, facilitated by the European Union) has been engaged in serious and substantive negotiations with Iran with the goal of reaching a verifiable diplomatic resolution that would prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

President Obama has been clear that achieving a peaceful resolution that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is in America's national security interest. Today, the P5+1 and Iran reached a set of initial understandings that halts the progress of Iran's nuclear program and rolls it back in key respects. These are the first meaningful limits that Iran has accepted on its nuclear program in close to a decade. The initial, six month step includes significant limits on Iran's nuclear program and begins to address our most urgent concerns including Iran's enrichment capabilities; its existing stockpiles of enriched uranium; the number and capabilities of its centrifuges; and its ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium using the Arak reactor. The concessions Iran has committed to make as part of this first step will also provide us with increased transparency and intrusive monitoring of its nuclear program. In the past, the concern has been expressed that Iran will use negotiations to buy time to advance their program. Taken together, these first step measures will help prevent Iran from using the cover of negotiations to continue advancing its nuclear program as we seek to negotiate a long-term, comprehensive solution that addresses all of the international community's concerns.

In return, as part of this initial step, the P5+1 will provide limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible relief to Iran. This relief is structured so that the overwhelming majority of the sanctions regime, including the key oil, banking, and financial sanctions architecture, remains in place. The P5+1 will continue to enforce these sanctions vigorously. If Iran fails to meet its commitments, we will revoke the limited relief and impose additional sanctions on Iran.

The P5+1 and Iran also discussed the general parameters of a comprehensive solution that would constrain Iran's nuclear program over the long term, provide verifiable assurances to the international community that Iran's nuclear activities will be exclusively peaceful, and ensure that any attempt by Iran to pursue a nuclear weapon would be promptly detected. The set of understandings also includes an acknowledgment by Iran that it must address all United Nations Security Council resolutions – which Iran has long claimed are illegal – as well as past and present issues with Iran's nuclear program that have been identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This would include resolution of questions concerning the possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear program, including Iran's activities at Parchin. As part of a comprehensive solution, Iran must also come into full compliance with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its obligations to the IAEA. With respect to the comprehensive solution, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Put simply, this first step expires in six months, and does not represent an acceptable end state to the United States or our P5+1 partners.

Halting the Progress of Iran's Program and Rolling Back Key Elements

Iran has committed to halt enrichment above 5%:

· Halt all enrichment above 5% and dismantle the technical connections required to enrich above 5%.

Iran has committed to neutralize its stockpile of near-20% uranium:

· Dilute below 5% or convert to a form not suitable for further enrichment its entire stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium before the end of the initial phase.

Iran has committed to halt progress on its enrichment capacity:

· Not install additional centrifuges of any type.

· Not install or use any next-generation centrifuges to enrich uranium.

· Leave inoperable roughly half of installed centrifuges at Natanz and three-quarters of installed centrifuges at Fordow, so they cannot be used to enrich uranium.

· Limit its centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines, so Iran cannot use the six months to stockpile centrifuges.

· Not construct additional enrichment facilities.

Iran has committed to halt progress on the growth of its 3.5% stockpile:

· Not increase its stockpile of 3.5% low enriched uranium, so that the amount is not greater at the end of the six months than it is at the beginning, and any newly enriched 3.5% enriched uranium is converted into oxide.

Iran has committed to no further advances of its activities at Arak and to halt progress on its plutonium track. Iran has committed to:

· Not commission the Arak reactor.

· Not fuel the Arak reactor.

· Halt the production of fuel for the Arak reactor.

· No additional testing of fuel for the Arak reactor.

· Not install any additional reactor components at Arak.

· Not transfer fuel and heavy water to the reactor site.

· Not construct a facility capable of reprocessing. Without reprocessing, Iran cannot separate plutonium from spent fuel.

Unprecedented transparency and intrusive monitoring of Iran's nuclear program

Iran has committed to:

· Provide daily access by IAEA inspectors at Natanz and Fordow. This daily access will permit inspectors to review surveillance camera footage to ensure comprehensive monitoring. This access will provide even greater transparency into enrichment at these sites and shorten detection time for any non-compliance.

· Provide IAEA access to centrifuge assembly facilities.

· Provide IAEA access to centrifuge rotor component production and storage facilities.

· Provide IAEA access to uranium mines and mills.

· Provide long-sought design information for the Arak reactor. This will provide critical insight into the reactor that has not previously been available.

· Provide more frequent inspector access to the Arak reactor.

· Provide certain key data and information called for in the Additional Protocol to Iran's IAEA Safeguards Agreement and Modified Code 3.1.

Verification Mechanism

The IAEA will be called upon to perform many of these verification steps, consistent with their ongoing inspection role in Iran. In addition, the P5+1 and Iran have committed to establishing a Joint Commission to work with the IAEA to monitor implementation and address issues that may arise. The Joint Commission will also work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present concerns with respect to Iran's nuclear program, including the possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear program and Iran's activities at Parchin.

Limited, Temporary, Reversible Relief

In return for these steps, the P5+1 is to provide limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible relief while maintaining the vast bulk of our sanctions, including the oil, finance, and banking sanctions architecture. If Iran fails to meet its commitments, we will revoke the relief. Specifically the P5+1 has committed to:

· Not impose new nuclear-related sanctions for six months, if Iran abides by its commitments under this deal, to the extent permissible within their political systems.

· Suspend certain sanctions on gold and precious metals, Iran's auto sector, and Iran's petrochemical exports, potentially providing Iran approximately $1.5 billion in revenue.

· License safety-related repairs and inspections inside Iran for certain Iranian airlines.

· Allow purchases of Iranian oil to remain at their currently significantly reduced levels – levels that are 60% less than two years ago. $4.2 billion from these sales will be allowed to be transferred in installments if, and as, Iran fulfills its commitments.

· Allow $400 million in governmental tuition assistance to be transferred from restricted Iranian funds directly to recognized educational institutions in third countries to defray the tuition costs of Iranian students.

Humanitarian Transactions

Facilitate humanitarian transactions that are already allowed by U.S. law. Humanitarian transactions have been explicitly exempted from sanctions by Congress so this channel will not provide Iran access to any new source of funds. Humanitarian transactions are those related to Iran's purchase of food, agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices; we would also facilitate transactions for medical expenses incurred abroad. We will establish this channel for the benefit of the Iranian people.

Putting Limited Relief in Perspective

In total, the approximately $7 billion in relief is a fraction of the costs that Iran will continue to incur during this first phase under the sanctions that will remain in place. The vast majority of Iran's approximately $100 billion in foreign exchange holdings are inaccessible or restricted by sanctions.

In the next six months, Iran's crude oil sales cannot increase. Oil sanctions alone will result in approximately $30 billion in lost revenues to Iran – or roughly $5 billion per month – compared to what Iran earned in a six month period in 2011, before these sanctions took effect. While Iran will be allowed access to $4.2 billion of its oil sales, nearly $15 billion of its revenues during this period will go into restricted overseas accounts. In summary, we expect the balance of Iran's money in restricted accounts overseas will actually increase, not decrease, under the terms of this deal.

Maintaining Economic Pressure on Iran and Preserving Our Sanctions Architecture

During the first phase, we will continue to vigorously enforce our sanctions against Iran, including by taking action against those who seek to evade or circumvent our sanctions.

· Sanctions affecting crude oil sales will continue to impose pressure on Iran's government. Working with our international partners, we have cut Iran's oil sales from 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) in early 2012 to 1 million bpd today, denying Iran the ability to sell almost 1.5 million bpd. That's a loss of more than $80 billion since the beginning of 2012 that Iran will never be able to recoup. Under this first step, the EU crude oil ban will remain in effect and Iran will be held to approximately 1 million bpd in sales, resulting in continuing lost sales worth an additional $4 billion per month, every month, going forward.

· Sanctions affecting petroleum product exports to Iran, which result in billions of dollars of lost revenue, will remain in effect.

· The vast majority of Iran's approximately $100 billion in foreign exchange holdings remain inaccessible or restricted by our sanctions.

· Other significant parts of our sanctions regime remain intact, including:

o Sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran and approximately two dozen other major Iranian banks and financial actors;

o Secondary sanctions, pursuant to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) as amended and other laws, on banks that do business with U.S.-designated individuals and entities;

o Sanctions on those who provide a broad range of other financial services to Iran, such as many types of insurance; and,

 Restricted access to the U.S. financial system.

· All sanctions on over 600 individuals and entities targeted for supporting Iran's nuclear or ballistic missile program remain in effect.

· Sanctions on several sectors of Iran's economy, including shipping and shipbuilding, remain in effect.

· Sanctions on long-term investment in and provision of technical services to Iran's energy sector remain in effect.

· Sanctions on Iran's military program remain in effect.

· Broad U.S. restrictions on trade with Iran remain in effect, depriving Iran of access to virtually all dealings with the world's biggest economy.

· All UN Security Council sanctions remain in effect.

· All of our targeted sanctions related to Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism, its destabilizing role in the Syrian conflict, and its abysmal human rights record, among other concerns, remain in effect.

投資銀行家很重要的一個能力是學會說「不」。客戶或其他銀行家有時會說，「我們可以做這個荒唐的事情嗎？」，這時就要以「不」，或者「這是個有趣的想法，讓我在團隊裡討論一下」——用任何不同版本的「不」來拒絕。

但這在投行業務上可行不通。原因之一是很多投資銀行業務賺的錢在以往的經歷中都是通過聽起來荒唐的事情得來的。比如「我們將按揭貸款打包成債券怎麼樣？」。儘管這樣的成功率很低，但是成功後的回報卻非常高，所以人們才會認真地對待每一個機會，儘管它可能有些傻。

原因之二是，投資銀行有一種「文化」，讓你在做客戶服務前和忙季中讓自己清醒的文化。這就是為什麼銀行家每週工作120小時而且永遠做好準備接電話：因為一個客戶想要什麼，你就要放下手頭所有事情竭力來幫她實現，並在某種程度上超出她的預期。「今天我的股票收盤價格多少？」一個CEO問道，兩分鐘後你就要回覆她一封20頁PPT的郵件，包括她股票表現的圖表，同其他公司的比較，和一份槓桿併購的分析。然後她會說，「嗯謝謝，其實我只想要那個價格，但我在這裡看見了。」

當然，你不能就這份PPT向她收費。邏輯在於，當你經常在客戶面前頻繁而熱情地「表現」，你就會贏得她的尊重（或是同情），這樣她就會在某天雇你做些簡單的事情，如管理她的公司IPO。然後她會付給你一部分錢——數額較大、和管理IPO所需付出的努力完全不相等。你並不是因為IPO而賺到了錢，而是因為這段關係。

這就是投行盈利的模式！——做很多毫無意義的工作，偶爾得到大額的回報。為客戶做的任何事情都可以看做是在建立關係。你也許會問，「為什麼在過去整整十年內他們從沒為我們的服務付出過一分錢？！」這是因為你們之間的關係還不夠強大。

所以當你問一個典型的資深銀行家，「你是不是會把高價值客戶放在第一位？」，他會說，「對！」然後自認為他很聰明。然後你問他，「我們應該做一些精密的數據分析來考慮我們提供哪一種服務才真正對我們有利可得嗎？」他會說，「是的，你當然應該這樣做，早晨前放到我的桌子上，但是別期望我們會停止那些沒有利潤的服務。」

對於麥肯錫那份報告，麥肯錫總歸是麥肯錫，不是一個銀行，所以麥肯錫人更傾向於高效做事、告訴其他公司如何運營他們的業務，而並非做很多沒有回報的工作。他們擔心全球大投行，因為他們的股本回報率比資本成本要低，而且在變的越來越低。他們的建議在某種程度上是，你應該思考的是你正在做的是什麼，而非做完所有事情。

所以報告說，稀缺資源應該被分配給那些有潛力產生高回報的客戶，減少對那些低回報客戶的注意力。

效率、利潤和ROE對於諮詢公司來說都很重要，但是國際銀行需要更高的東西。

另一方面，我們很難說麥肯錫是錯的。尤其在過去幾年，大的國際銀行按比例縮減了他們的很多業務，比如JPMorgan撤出了學生貸款業務，UBS撤出了投資銀行業務，摩根士丹利轉向資產管理。

最有趣的大概是高盛的決定——讓年輕的銀行家注意休息。無論這樣的決定反映了交易量的下滑還是招聘的競爭，它都標誌著一次文化大轉移——告訴銀行家有時是可以說「不」的：可以說「這是必須的嗎？」或「這是有利潤的嗎？」而不僅僅是「有人讓我這麼做了嗎？」這樣的文化轉換看起來還很飄渺：高盛正在試圖回答那些分析師的問題，就如同麥肯錫認為大銀行應該先開始問他們自己這樣的問題。