2012-11-16 工作記錄 Fanny 濟南實習
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_9ad4e2650101ddkz.html今天上午都在翻譯了。下午就是raphael和曉豔姐幫我們講了一下公司模板。好多內容，從頭開始，肯定會遇到很多很多問題，做的時候也會很生疏。告訴自己：莫急，慢慢來。
還看了《旁觀者》的懷恩師的一部分。艾爾莎小姐所倡導的的教學方式，個性化的學習和指導其實一直都是我國教育所缺乏的。她分析每個學生的優勢劣勢，指導每個人制定不同的計劃，並監督其實行。而且鼓勵每個人發展自己的優勢，比方說德魯克的寫作能力（或許這已經為他未來這麼多優秀的著作打了些基礎）。一位令學生崇拜的女士。而蘇菲則非常親切友好，對學生是慈母般的關懷，而她獨特的教育理念——教育學生掌握基本的生存技能（包括讓男生鍛鍊補襪子，讓女生學習當時社會普遍認為較為低下的工作「烹飪」）要超前許多。很明顯，這種教育方式跟目前美國的教育方式極為相似。而德魯克之所以最這兩位老師記憶猶新，最為感激也就比較好理解了。
附：巴菲特致股東的信1985年D部分
Today, corporate instability is an inevitable consequenceof widely-diffused ownership of voting stock. Atany time a major holder can surface, usually mouthing reassuringrhetoric but frequently harboring uncivilintentions. By circumscribing our blocks of stockas we often do, we intend to promote stability where it otherwisemight be lacking. That kind of certainty,combined with a good manager and a good business, providesexcellent soil for a rich financial harvest. That』s the economic case for our arrangements.
如今，企業的不穩定性是股權分散的必然結果。經常會有大股東浮出水面，滿口仁義道德但卻心懷鬼胎。通過像往常一樣限制我們的股權，我們傾向於促進公司的穩定。公司的穩定性、傑出的管理層以及優秀的企業相結合，才能夠讓企業收穫厚利。這就是我們這項安排的經濟動機。
The human side is just asimportant. We don』t want managers we like and admire - and who havewelcomed a major financial commitment by us - to ever lose anysleep wondering whether surprises might occur because of our largeownership. I have told them there will be nosurprises, and these agreements put Berkshire』s signature where my mouth is. That signature also means the managers have a corporate commitmentand therefore need not worry if my personal participation inBerkshire』s affairs ends prematurely (a term I define as anyage short of three digits).
人這一方面也很重要。我不想讓我們欣賞的管理人，在歡迎我們加入之後，因為擔心我們是否會因股權太大而帶來一些「驚喜」。我已經告訴他們這不會發生，並且也已經簽了字。簽字也意味著管理人有了承諾，因而也就不再需要擔心我發生什麼意外（我意思是我活不到一百就掛了）。
Our Cap Cities purchase wasmade at a full price, reflecting the very considerable enthusiasmfor both media stocks and media properties that has developed inrecent years (and that, in the case of some property purchases, hasapproached a mania). It』s no field for bargains. However,our Cap Cities investment allies us with an exceptional combinationof properties and people - and we like the opportunity toparticipate in size.
我們購買大都會公司並沒有佔到什麼便宜，這反映了近年來媒體事業的蓬勃發展（當然，媒體事業的收購已經到了狂熱的地步）。這已經很難討價還價了。然而我們這項投資使我們有機會和最優秀的企業和管理人共事，我們珍惜這個參與大規模企業的機會。
Of course, some of you probablywonder why we are now buying Cap Cities at $172.50 per share giventhat your Chairman, in a characteristic burst of brilliance, soldBerkshire』s holdings in the same company at $43 per share in1978-80. Anticipating your question, I spent muchof 1985 working on a snappy answer that would reconcile these acts.A little more time, please.
當然，你們中的某些人可能奇怪為什麼你們才華橫溢的董事長1978年-80年以43美元的價格賣掉大都會公司的股票，而現今卻以172.5美元的價格買回來。料想到你們的這一問題，1985年我花了不少時間來想怎麼給你們解釋這二者之間的一致性。請再給我一點兒時間。
Acquisition of Scott &Fetzer
收購斯科特費則公司
Right after yearend we acquiredThe Scott &Fetzer Company(「ScottFetzer」) of Cleveland for about $320 million. (Inaddition, about $90 million of pre-existing Scott Fetzer debtremains in place.) In the next section of this report I describethe sort of businesses that we wish to buy forBerkshire. Scott Fetzer is a prototype -understandable, large, well-managed, a goodearner.
就在年後我們以3.2億美元收購了克里蘭夫的斯科特費則公司。（另外，斯科特費則公司大約0.9億美元的債務依然存在）。在下一部分我們講述公司的收購標準。斯科特費則就是一個典型——易懂，規模大，管理好，盈利高。
Thecompany has sales of about $700 million derived from 17 businesses,many leaders in their fields. Return on invested capital is good to excellent for mostof thesebusinesses. Some well-known products are Kirby home-care systems CampbellHausfeld air compressors, and Wayne burners and waterpumps.
這家公司有17項業務，營業額達7億美元。很多都是該行業的領導者。該公司的資本報酬率很高。一些知名的產品有卡比家庭護理系統，坎貝爾空氣壓縮機，韋恩燃燒器以及水泵等。
World Book, Inc. - accountingfor about 40% of Scott Fetter』s sales and a bit more of its income - is by far thecompany』s largest operation. It also is byfar the leader in its industry, selling more than twice as manyencyclopedia sets annually as its nearestcompetitor. In fact, it sells more sets in theU.S. than its four biggest competitors combined.
世界百科全書，佔了斯科特費則公司40%的銷售額和更大份額的收入，是目前為止該公司最大的一項業務。它也是該行業而對龍頭老大。每年百科全書銷量為其最強競爭者的兩倍。事實上，在美國它銷售量要比它最大的四個競爭對手總量還多。
Charlie and I have a particularinterest in the World Book operation because we regard itsencyclopedia as something special. I』ve been a fan (and user) for 25 years, and now havegrandchildren consulting the sets just as my childrendid. World Book is regularly rated the mostuseful encyclopedia by teachers, librarians and consumer buyingguides. Yet it sells for less than any of itsmajor competitors. Child craft, another World Book, Inc. product,offers similar value. This combination ofexceptional products and modest prices at World Book, Inc. helpedmake us willing to pay the price demanded for Scott Fetzer, despitedeclining results for many companies in the direct-sellingindustry.
Charlie和我對世界百科全書這項事業都非常感興趣，我們認為它很特別。事實上我讀他們的書已經有25年了，並且也讓我孩子以及孫子們都讀它。世界百科全書經常被老師、圖書管理員以及導購員評為最有用的百科全書。然而它售價要比它的最大的競爭對手的書便宜很多。這種物美價廉的產品優勢讓我們願意支付斯科特費則所提出的價格，儘管直銷行業許多企業銷售量都在下滑。
An equal attraction at ScottFetzer is Ralph Schey, its CEO for nine years. When Ralph took charge, the company had 31 businesses, the resultof an acquisition spree in the 1960s. He disposed of many that did not fit or hadlimited profit potential, but his focus on rationalizing theoriginal potpourri was not so intense that he passed by World Bookwhen it became available for purchase in 1978. Ralph』s operating and capital-allocation record is superb,and we are delighted to be associated with him.
同樣的吸引力還來自於斯科特費則的任職九年的CEO，拉夫爾·蘇依。當拉夫爾接管公司時，由於20世紀六十年代的併購風潮，公司有31項事業。他處理了許多不合適的或者不盈利的事業，而並沒有格外的關注原始業務並由此在1978年百科全書正需要時推出了世界百科全書。拉夫爾的資本分配和運用能力非常傑出，我們很高興可以與他合作。
Thehistory of the Scott Fetzer acquisition is interesting, marked bysome zigs and zags before we became involved. The company had been an announced candidate for purchase sinceearly 1984. A major investment banking firm spent many months canvassing scoresof prospects, evoking interest from several. Finally, in mid-1985 a plan of sale, featuring heavy participationby an ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan), was approved byshareholders. However, as difficulty in closing followed, the plan wasscuttled.
併購斯科特費則公司的過程極為有趣，在我們參與之前就有一些小插曲。公司早在1984年就提出要出售公司。一家大銀行花了很了幾個月編織了公司美好的前景，吸引了幾家公司的興趣。而在1985年中期，一項具有員工持股計劃特徵的收購案獲得通過，但因接下來的一些小麻煩，計劃開了天窗。
I hadfollowed this corporate odyssey through thenewspapers. On October 10, well after the ESOPdeal had fallen through, I wrote a short letter to Ralph, whom Idid not know. I said we admired thecompany』s record and asked if he might like totalk. Charlie and I met Ralph for dinner inChicago on October 22 and signed an acquisition contract thefollowing week.
我從報紙上看到了這件事。10月10日，在股東持股銷售方案失敗之後，給拉夫爾寫了一封信，雖然我並不認識他。我說我們很欣賞公司的經營歷史並問他是否有興趣和我談談。Charlie和我在10月22日與拉夫爾在芝加哥共進午餐，並在之後一週簽署了收購合同。
TheScott Fetzer acquisition, plus major growth in our insurancebusiness, should push revenues above $2 billion in 1986, more thandouble those of 1985.
收購斯科特費則公司，加上我們保險公司的增長，將使得1986年的收入達到20億美元，比1985年的兩倍還多。
Miscellaneous
其他項目：
TheScott Fetzer purchase illustrates our somewhat haphazard approachto acquisitions. We have no master strategy, no corporate planners delivering usinsights about socioeconomic trends, and no staff to investigate amultitude of ideas presented by promoters andintermediaries. Instead, we simply hope that something sensible comes along - and,when it does, we act.
斯科特費則的併購顯示了我們公司收購具有一定的隨意性。我們沒有收購計劃，也沒有專門的規劃師研究企業的經濟趨勢，也沒有工作人員調查出售企業和中介人的意圖。相反，我們就只是順其自然，事情發生了，我們就做。
To give fate a helping hand, we again repeat ourregular 「business wanted」 ad. The only change from lastyear』s copy is in (1): because we continue to want anyacquisition we make to have a measurable impact onBerkshire』s financial results, we have raised our minimumprofit requirement.
為了對命運有所幫助，我們再次重申我們的「收購企業」廣告。跟去年相比唯一的變化是在第一項：由於我們希望我們的收購能夠對伯克希爾的財務結構有顯著的影響，我們提高了收購公司的最小收益標準。
Here』s what we』re looking for:
(1) largepurchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
(2) demonstrated consistentearning power (future projections are of little interest to us, norare「turn-around」 situations),
(3) businesses earning goodreturns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(4)management in place (we can』t supply it),
(5)simple businesses (if there』s lots of technology, wewon』t understand it),
(6) anoffering price (we don』t want to waste our time or that of the seller bytalking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price isunknown).
這是我們要找的公司：
(1)巨額交易（至少每年稅後盈餘1000萬美元）
(2)持續的盈利能力（前景預期或者我轉型期我們都不感興趣）
(3)高股東報酬率(並甚少舉債)
(4)具備管理階層（我們無法提供）
(5)簡單的企業（若涉及到太多高科技，我們弄不懂）
(6)主動報價（在確定交易價格之前，我們不希望浪費太多時間談判）
We will not engage in unfriendlytakeovers. We can promise completeconfidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within fiveminutes - as to whether we』re interested. We prefer to buyfor cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we receive asmuch in intrinsic business value as we give. Indeed, following recent advances in the price of Berkshire stock,transactions involving stock issuance may be quitefeasible. We invite potential sellers to check usout by contacting people with whom we have done business in thepast. For the right business - and the rightpeople - we can provide a good home.
我們不會惡意收購。我們能夠保證對此保密並盡快回覆我們是否感興趣（通常不超過五分鐘）。我們希望現金收購，除非我們換的的內含價值和我們付出的一樣多，否則不考慮發行股票。我們歡迎那些有意向的公司向我們過去收購的公司打聽。對於那些好的企業和好的管理者，我們能夠提供一個好的歸屬。
On the other hand, we frequentlyget approached about acquisitions that don』t come close to meeting our tests: new ventures,turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular (amongbrokers) 「I』m-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-people--get-to-know-each-other」. None of these attracts us inthe least.
相反，經常有人要求我們收購不符合我們要求的公司：新事業、轉機股、拍賣案以及中介中很流行的「如果你瞭解了肯定會覺得這個收購很好」，這些我們都不感興趣。
Besidesbeing interested in the purchases of entire businesses as describedabove, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large,but not controlling, blocks of stock, as in our Cap Citiespurchase. Such purchases appeal to us only when we are very comfortable withboth the economics of the business and the ability and integrity ofthe people running the operation. We prefer large transactions: in the unusual case we might dosomething as small as $50 million (or even smaller), but ourpreference is for commitments many times that size.
除了對上面所述公司的整體併購感興趣，我們也對一些像之前講到的大都會收購案一樣的對大公司無控制權的大額股票收購感興趣。只有我們對這家公司及其管理層都較為滿意的時候這項收購才對我們有吸引力。我們喜歡大額交易：在一般情況下可能最小5000億美元（或者小點兒），當然越多越好。
About 96.8% of all eligibleshares participated in Berkshire』s 1985 shareholder-designated contributionsprogram. Total contributions made through theprogram were $4 million, and 1,724 charities wererecipients. We conducted a plebiscite last yearin order to get your views about this program, as well as about ourdividend policy. (Recognizing thatit』s possible to influence the answers to a question bythe framing of it, we attempted to make the wording of ours asneutral as possible.) We present the ballot and the results in theAppendix on page 69. I think it』s fair to summarize your response as highlysupportive of present policies and your group preference - allowingfor the tendency of people to vote for the status quo - to be forincreasing the annual charitable commitment as our asset valuesbuild.
大約有96.8%的合格股東參與了伯克希爾1985年的股東指定捐款項目。總共有400萬美元捐給了1724家慈善機構。去年為瞭解你們對該項目的態度以及股利政策的想法我們發起了一項投票表決（由於意識到問題本身就可能對你們的答案有一定的引導性，我們在設計問題時儘量中立）。我們在附錄69頁展示投票結果。我認為可以合理的概括為你們高度支持公司目前的策略，並且你們也支持現在的每年捐款數量隨公司資產狀況決定的政策。
We urge new shareholders to readthe description of our shareholder-designated contributions programthat appears on pages 66 and 67. If you wish toparticipate in future programs, we strongly urge that youimmediately make sure that your shares are registered in the nameof the actual owner, not in 「street」 name or nominee name. Shares notso registered on September 30, 1986 will be ineligible for the 1986program.
我們敦促新的股東閱讀66頁和67頁的股東指定捐款計劃的項目說明。並且你想參加這個項目的話，我們強烈建議你把股權從經紀人那兒改到登記於自己名下。1986年9月30號之前未登記的無權參與這一項目。
Five years ago we were requiredby the Bank Holding Company Act of 1969 to dispose of our holdingsin The Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford,Illinois. Our method of doing so was unusual: weannounced an exchange ratio between stock of Rockford Bancorp Inc.(the Illinois National』s holding company) and stock of Berkshire, and thenlet each of our shareholders - except me - make the decision as towhether to exchange all, part, or none of his Berkshire shares forRockford shares. I took the Rockford stock thatwas left over and thus my own holding in Rockford was determined byyour decisions. At the time I said,「This technique embodies the world』s oldest and most elementary system of fairlydividing an object. Just as when you were a childand one person cut the cake and the other got first choice, I havetried to cut the company fairly, but you get first choice as towhich piece you want」.
5年之前1969年的銀行控股公司法要求我們披露我們在伊利諾斯國民銀行和證券公司的股份。我們處理這件事的方法與眾不同：我們公佈了洛克福銀行和伯克希爾公司的換股比例，並且讓每一位股東（除了我自己）決定是否把自己伯克希爾的部分或全部股票轉化成獨立的洛克福銀行的股票。洛克福剩下的股票將由我來接手，所以我在洛克福的股份是由你們決定的。那時我曾說「這是一種最古老的最有效的劃分事物的方法。這就好像是你們小時候一個人切蛋糕但是讓另一個人首先選擇。我儘量公平的分割公司，然後你們再自由選擇。
Last fall Illinois National wassold. When Rockford』s liquidation is completed, its shareholders willhave received per-share proceeds about equal toBerkshire』s per-share intrinsic value at the time of thebank』s sale. I』m pleased that this five-year result indicates thatthe division of the cake was reasonably equitable.
去年秋天伊利諾斯國民銀行被正式出售，當洛克福清算結束時，它的股東獲得的每股收益和伯克希爾的每股的內在價值相當。我很高興這個五年之後的結果顯示蛋糕劃分的很公平。
Last year I put in a plug forour annual meeting, and you took me up on theinvitation. Over 250 of our more than 3,000registered shareholders showed up. Thoseattending behaved just as those present in previous years, askingthe sort of questions you would expect from intelligent andinterested owners. You can attend a great many annual meetingswithout running into a crowd like ours. (LesterMaddox, when Governor of Georgia , was criticized regarding thestate』s abysmal prison system. 「The solution」, he said, is simple. All we need is abetter class of prisoners.」 Upgrading annual meetings works the sameway.)
去年我插入了一段年會的事情，並且你們也接受了我的邀請。3000名股東中有超過250名參與了會議。你們和之前的股東表現的一樣好，提出的問題顯示你們都是有智慧和對公司感興趣的股東。你們很難再遇到我們這樣的會議。（Lester Maddox在擔任喬治亞州州長時，曾因該州混亂的獄政體系遭受批評，他說解決的方法很簡單：我們需要的是更好的犯人團體。「提高年會水平也是類似道理）
I hope you come to thisyear』s meeting, which will be held on May 20 inOmaha. There will be only one change: after 48years of allegiance to another soft drink, your Chairman, in anunprecedented display of behavioral flexibility, has converted tothe new Cherry Coke. Henceforth, it will be theOfficial Drink of the Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting.
我希望你們能夠參加今年的年會，會議將於5月20日在奧馬哈市舉行。只有一個變化：經過48年的堅持之後，本人將做出一個前所未有的改變，將經常喝的飲料轉變成一種新的櫻桃味的可口可樂。因此，伯克希爾的年會上它將是指定飲料。
Andbring money: Mrs. B promises to have bargains galore if you willpay her a visit at The Nebraska Furniture Mart after themeeting.
最後記得帶來錢，B太太承諾你們在會後去參觀Nebraska家具城的話給你們大量的折扣。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman ofthe Board
March 4, 1986
董事長 華倫·巴菲特
1986年3月4日
應該佔個位了。