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Yes We Can 蔡東豪

2008-11-13  NextMagazine


過 去一週，我身心被兩件事深深吸引︰奧巴馬當選和毅行者。我屬於政治浪漫派，相信政治領袖可改變很多事情，包括造就更美好世界，我信奧巴馬擁有偉大領袖的質 素，他將會改變世界的政治、人文、環境面貌。我至今未忘奧巴馬今年夏天在德國的演說會，有逾二十萬人出席，當時他只是美國總統候選人。至於毅行者，我對它 的着迷，推動我寫一本關於毅行者人與情的書。當奧巴馬硬碰毅行者，這星期本欄沒可能有其他題材。本文章我特別送給精電的同事。

今年是精 電第三年派隊參加毅行者，我屬於B隊。去年B隊隊員Maggie在今年初結婚後退出，餘下的隊員Tommy墮入愛河，跟女友難捨難離，每次操練完畢要立即 交人，他看似身心俱疲。Nelson經過一年的河源美食，肚皮脹了起來。我的狀態算較穩定︰沒有女朋友，身形沒變樣，只是年紀大了一歲。B隊狀態七零八 落，不被看好，但新加入的隊員改變了一切。

新隊員是TC周達智，他是拙作《毅行者》其中一章的主角，訪問做了兩年，做到書都出版了，仍未做完。TC是「超級毅行者」（18小時內完成），近幾年退居幕後做支援。TC願意出山，明顯是想幫我們達成24小時行完的願望。

毅 行者賽例是48小時完成100公里路程，今年的冠軍隊伍不用12小時就完成全程，可是47小時30分到達終點大不乏人。由12至48小時的光譜上分布着不 同類型隊伍。我屬於認真、肯俾心機，體能普通，不能付出太多時間操練的參賽者，過去幾年我曾參加過的隊伍的平均完成時間是30小時。在客觀環境沒有明顯改 進下，怎樣由30小時變成24小時？

24小時這目標是我們半開玩笑定下來，無人深究怎樣才能達標。TC參與過我們幾次操練後，認為我們有可能做到，我們開始對自己改觀。有了目標後便開始訓練紀律，不再七嘴八舌、各師各法。在出發點的精電B隊，信心十足，目標是24小時。Yes We Can。

今 年毅行者天氣之熱是往年少見（衷心希望奧巴馬正視Global Warming）。經過西灣山和雞公山，精電B隊的表現潰不成軍，TC賽前吩咐我們不准戴手錶，用心用腳來量度時間。到了水浪窩，我偷偷問了時間，我們比 預定時間慢了40分鐘，我知道餘下賽程不用再問時間，行得完也是一種成就。

TC賽前提醒我們要留前鬥後。大多參賽者頭段心情興奮，走得太快，後段失去戰鬥力，最後一拐一拐捱過終點。神奇地，入夜後天氣轉涼，我們的身體和信心開始恢復。前段我們沒有跟天氣硬碰，保留能量，狀態漸入佳境。

今 年毅行者我學到一句終生受用的說話，是TC提醒我們︰「疲倦，都可以行得好快。」這句恍似「廢話」違反邏輯︰我都好想行得快，但做不到。在訓練期間，TC 跟我們說大家已倦，但速度其實很快。我們開始相信他這句話，也開始相信自信和紀律，疲倦身軀不是障礙。Yes We Can。

「疲倦，都可 以行得好快。」這句話充滿戰略和哲理。邏輯告訴我們，人疲倦便會拖慢腳步。毅行者根本並非完全符合邏輯的事，不要說行30小時，對普通人來說，要企或坐 30小時也不容易。「邏輯」由誰定？挑戰邏輯可能有意想不到結果。例如說留前鬥後，要做到談何容易，可是長途賽往往在最後一段路程決定勝負。在長跑比賽， 最後一圈被人過頭的選手是沒可能勝出，原因除了是被對手的速度擊倒，更重要是信心崩潰了。我們參加毅行者只跟時間競賽，但假如可在後段保持速度，信心便得 以保持。逆境中勝出的原因是靠全程維持自信和守紀律。精電B隊最後達到24小時目標；第九段和第十段（路程20公里）時間是3小時8分，比去年快1.5小 時。

24小時行畢全程這目標終於實現，令我有很深感受，藉此經歷寄意給全體精電成員︰「經濟差，生意都可以做得好。」這句 並非廢話，此時大多數企業在抱怨和擔心，能走出困境將會是有自信和守紀律的一小撮企業。公司現有生意難免受影響，趁對手失去焦點的時候，正是我們表現身手 的機會。現有10元生意明年可能變成8元，我們佔市場份額有限，假如可從外掙到3元新生意，增長算是不俗。我相信公司身處的行業整體不會萎縮，短期挫折不 應打擊大家的自信和紀律，我們怕什麼？

Yes We Can。

蔡東豪Tony Tsoi

現任上市公司精電國際行政總裁，港交所上市委員會副主席。他曾任職投資銀行，在《信報》以筆名原復生撰寫財經專欄，對投資及求知有無限渴求，習慣早上四時起床寫作找樂趣。

CAN SLIM 強勢股所具備的基本條件 goldone

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/goldone04/article?mid=515


前三篇文章提到CAN SLIM投資法中關鍵點的應用，不過仍然只屬於技術層面的研究，實際操作上仍顯不足。

在升市裏，要提高捕捉到每次最少15%以上的升幅機率，還需要基本分析的幫助。網友見到「基本分析」四字不用害怕，因為 O'Neil 已經為了大眾提供了清晰的選股框架，簡單易明，只要你肯花少許時間做功課，多加練習吸取經驗，人人都做得到。

究竟甚麼是強勢股呢？就是乎合"C" "A" "N" "S" "L" "I" "M" 的七個法則：

「C」urrent quarterly earnings per share - 每季度每股純益成長率必需達到 20%+

「A」nnual earnings per share - 年度每股純益成長率，在近三年必需達到20%+，在成長大勢上，如果在三至五年內，每股純益成長率是「一年比一年高」的話，更屬佳品

「N」ew Things - 即新發明 / 新產品 / 新需求 / 新管理方式，造成供不應求，新收入源源不絕，股價自然水漲船高。

「S 」hares outstanding：股票流通規模要屬中小型。這是因為明日之星，多是由中小型公司成長而來，由於管理優異，機構投資者便會鯨吞優質成長股，由於股票流通不多，造成供求失衝，形成股票颷升的現象。

「L」eaders：只選擇升勢領導股，而放棄買入弱勢落後股 (不要便宜貨)

「I」nstitutional sponsorship﹕強者就是機構投資者，颷升現象就是他們鯨吞股票所造成。不過要避免「人多擠逼」的股票，如果一隻股票已經有非常多個機構投資者持 有，那麼還會餘下多少強者能夠鯨吞股票，造成供求失衡的颷升現象呢？所以，當人人都說買某某股票會發達的時候，人人都買入了，還剩下多少需求的力量呢？

「M」arket﹕只有大市有運行，股票才有運行。熊市裏不是買入股市的時機，只宜觀察那一隻是強勢股

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當網友選股的時候，所選擇的公司，符合得越多以上CAN SLIM的條件，越容易成為颷升股。經驗所得，不用100%跟足以上要點，在於盈利考慮方面，如果你有把握公司未來連續兩年都會有優秀的增長表現，已經可以取代「C」同「A」，當然，當中盈利水分越少越好。

例如筆者2010年的股票組合中，1177、829、906、590就是運用類似CAN SLIM選股法選出來的，當中亦有不少失敗例子，例如勝利管道、金鷹商貿、玖紙等等，不過，由於嚴守止蝕法則，因此組合表現仍然不錯。

 

在2009年中，之前仍然是「死牛派」的我，盡棄國壽 (~34，成本28) 中移動  (~75，成本90) ，決心絕地反擊，先後採用同樣方式，靠買入京信國藥新奧建行食大浪 (網誌有記錄，當然有很多錯誤的買入決定，但肯止蝕)，五個月內收復失地，而且有可觀的利潤。假使我仍然是「死牛派」，今天，國壽依然是36.45元，中移動是75.35元。

只要你下定決心去試，一定都可以

(** 後記：小弟的國壽與家人的中移動，就是於2007至2009年初兩年半間，採取「捨身式無懼股災價值投資平均買入法」而累積的，為數不少，可是，兩年後平均價依是28元與90元，你看，買入股票的時機，對回報的影響多重要。因此，自己戶口的數字最誠實，不是高呼「乜乜股票十年後值一百蚊」就代表投資方法可取。)

You Can Still Make It In The Market CUP

http://nodeadcow.blogspot.com/2011/07/you-can-still-make-it-in-market.html

又係時候推介第二季的投資好書。

今次推薦的是 Nicolas Darvas 的 "You Can Still Make It In The Market"　－－下圖，在五窮六絕的市況中，這個書名可謂應景：

這本1976年的作品 Nicholas Darvas 主要是透過敍述自己繼續用自創的 Box Theory 如何在50-60年代搵了$2M 、在1973-74的大熊市後，繼續贏大錢，以表示自己並非撞彩，自己所定的操作系統之重要性，以及歷久不衰。並藉此再解釋 Box Theory 的用法、持續有效性、以及如何切合市場的本質和實用性，並講及市場諸多普遍輸錢的錯誤以及股票市場的真相究竟是什麼。在 "You Can......" 一書中，作者把 Box Theory 稱為 DAR-CARD，不過都是一樣的，名稱並不重要。

此書其實很短，基本上英語水平不差的話，半天已可看完。以上兩書看似傻下傻下，但短小兼淺白，看完也有很大得著。比坊間大量超圾財經書藉，以及大而無當的 所謂經典有用得多。

以下是一些書中節錄，可供大家欣賞一下：

• Stocks don't like to be taken for granted. In some perverse way they have a habit of springing surprises and delivering a hearty slap in the face to anyone who is arrogant enough to think he has mastered them.
• A business acquainance of mine once bought a stock at 18, saw it rise to 44, then drop to 4 and then rise to 17 and drop again. I have told him many times to sell at 17 -- after all, what is a loss of a point? But no -- he refuses to sell it until it reaches his purchase price of 18. He is determined to teach that damn stock a lesson and get even with it. He has now been holding it for ten years waiting for that opportunity! The stock's price is now 9 and it shows no sign of ever reaching 18.
• Was the information true or false , reliable or planted, solidly based or completely unfounded? There was no way in which I or any other outsider like me could have found out with certainty. But I did not need to -- the behavior of the stock told me all I wanted to know.
• I had no idea of course that the company was having troubles at its plant. My actions had been governed purely by the behavior of the stock in the market. I had behaved like an insider without actually being one!
• A company may have the most wonderful fundamentals in the world, but if people do not buy the company's stock its share price will not go up one cent. Similarly, what is the point of buying a stock that is "cheap" if it then proceeds to get cheaper?
• When you buy a stock keep in forefront of your mind, not the great killing you are going to make, but the possibility that your stock could drop 50 percent in value very quickly. Never ever let this happen to you. Set a stop-loss, even if only a mental one.
• It is possible to misinterpret a stock's moves and end up picking a stock that does not behave as you thought it would. That can't be helped. There's no sure thing in the market -- that is why you must always have a stop loss.
• You must have some system, some rules of behavior when you buy stocks. Any system is better than none at all. And everyone must include a stop-loss.
• You must know your stock. By that I don't mean that you must know the company, its products, its history etc. I mean literally that you must know the personality of the stock you are buying, its idiosyncrasies, its moods, its mode of behavior. Some are slow, lethargic, and almost apathetic. Others are volatile, fidgety, and nervous and jump at the slightest happening.
• I did not give up my daily routine of scouring the stock-market tables for promising stocks. I habitually spend at least half an hour a day doing this. I regard it as absolutely essential. It is only by such regular scanning of stock tables that one can train one's eyes to observe significant changes.
• There's no sure thing in the market. Despite the most painstaking analysis, the most reliable information, and no matter how impeachable the source, stocks have the annoying habit of doing exactly the opposite of what you expect. The price of safety is eternal vigilance. You must keep a constant eye on your stocks.
• You've got to keep an eye on your stocks -- hold on to them while they are rising, sell them if they decline badly, and never be married to a stock.
• Not everyone is temperamentally suited to the stock market. Anyone who is unwilling or unable to devote some time to it is probably better off out of the game altogether.
• When you realize that share prices are determined not by company earnings, dividends, assets, etc., as so many people fondly believe, but by investors' future expectations, emotions, sentiments, and even wishful thinking . A company in the red and with no earnings can thus find its share price climbing purely and simply because an improvement in its earnings is anticipated in the future, even though these expectations are never realized.
• It is what the market thinks the share is worth and not its theoretical worth that determines its price. Whether the market is "right" or  "wrong" in its conclusion is irrelevant.

CAN SLIM 2012(三) goldone

http://goldone2011.blogspot.com/2012/03/can-slim-2012.html

CAN SLIM選股法則，"N"為「新」，可理解為股價上升(下跌)的新催化劑。

經數年操作，發覺推動股價上升的誘因，遠比書中複雜，嘗試歸類如下；

1) 新產品 - 例子如兩年前的Apple(iphone, ipad), Google, Amazon, 數年前的百度、騰訊等。要留意新產品需要是否強大，具競爭力，及最多人忽略的產品壽命等。

凡有革命性、需求大的產品推出，此類型的高增長公司，勢必昂貴，因股價在牛市反映極高增長預期，買入時要克服恐懼，只有限注投入，或是TA入TA出的方式操作。經驗所得，他們的升勢可能銳目，但實際對組合可能沒多大供獻，買入還要承受一定的心理壓力，打亂操作節奏。

2) 新需求 - 公司提供的服務提升，又或是有新市場。服務提升的最佳例子為一年前的數碼通(0315)、和電(215)；不少本港零售公司上年都有新市場的概念(自由行需求上升、公司往內地拓展等)。而內地同胞收入增加，多了過大海，也令近兩年的澳門股水漲船高。

跟「新產品」道理一樣，要推敲新需求的籌命，在數據反映真相前離場。從技術走勢、群眾狂熱程度、公司要員最近買賣紀錄等，有機會得出一點端倪。

4) 新概念 - 例如上年新浪(SINA)、優酷(YOKU)，數據不堪入目，勝在有FB及微博無限概念，就能夠將股價不斷放大。當然，由概念變成實在，自然成為騰訊股王，但實際有多少概念不是虛幻泡沫呢？

此類公司不論大升大插都很驚人，買得多，要食驚風散；買得少，又是老問題 - 好睇唔好食。炒作概念股，可能用期權最好，正股... ...勸君留給高手吧。

3) 沈悶公司出現驚喜 - 一些令人失望，又或是增長從來沒給人期望的公司，突然出現增長亮點(或概念)，又或是舊有瘕疵有解決跡象，都可能推動沈睡已久的股價。例如年多前的和黃 (013)，3G失血改善，股價可由低位一口氣上升50%；中石化(0386)換CEO，有望提升營運效率，於大跌市至牛市初段表現頑強；甚至是廢到不堪 的中移動(0941)，4G幻想可以抄完又抄等等；小型股 則想起兩年前的星島(1105)，免費報令沈悶業務再現生氣 (當然今天則不行了)。

至於公用股重新出現增長動力，派息隨之增多，亦是股價上升催化劑之一。

不過用此準則買入股票，選大型股、往績四平八穩的公司操作較佳，反而從小型公司著手，中伏機會較高。

「can slim」投資策略點評 黃曉航

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_55669833010143pg.html
  最近一直在試驗新的投資方法，有朋友介紹歐奈爾的《笑傲股市》，看到歐奈爾的can slim方法好像和我的方法很相近，於是從網上趕緊買了一本歐奈爾的《笑傲股市》，昨天晚上回去看了一會，發現上當了，其實歐奈爾的「can slim」方法的核心一頁紙就可以說清楚，其他很多什麼類似看圖說話的東西，作者也把他當做can slim方法的一部分，好像can slim是個筐，什麼亂七八糟的都能往裡裝一樣，其實和can slim一點關係沒有，甚至八竿子都打不著。     C：代表目前的每股季度盈餘，其每股盈餘通常要比前一年同期的水準增加20％以上。

You Can be a Stock Market Genius 讀書摘錄 米可

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5834cdc101016gih.html

中國版catch me if you can

近日喜歡每天看看蕭若元先生的《最新蕭析》，很撮要地能了解到國際及香港大事與他的分析，比起聽電台更有興趣。近日蕭生談起郭文貴事件，當我與身邊朋友討論時，發現大多數人都沒有聽過這個人的名字，或許這與大眾傳媒的報導選擇有關，蕭生眼中的大事於他們眼中都不算什麼，又或者刻意不報導吧。



事源是這位內地富豪郭文貴近日上美國傳媒《美國之音》接受訪問，原定三個小時的現場直播，播出八十多分鐘之後突然被腰斬，節目疑受指令中斷，引起遐想，懷疑因為郭文貴爆料揭政治局常委內幕太嚴重所致。

之前實在不清楚郭文貴是什麼來頭，訪問內容談及中共最高政權對政治局常委的調查指令，又講述萬億資產的海航集團其背後的控制組織，近日又爆料指香港被內地企業高價搶地的內幕。無論是什麼人也好，中央出到紅色通緝令去捉拿一個非中國公民，這人一定不是善男信女。

蕭生談了很多集，一直跟蹤事情的發展，有興趣的blog友不妨看看。我最感興趣了解這個人的財富是如何得來的，這個自稱內地特工的人，其發跡故事聽起來會令我想起外國真人真事的catch me if you can。

其中一個極速致富的事件，是有關郭文貴如何向銀行借到27億元。那是由圈地開始，之後每一步都是不見得光的。

首先透過關係在城中圈一塊地皮，然後拿地皮抵押予銀行借錢發展。本身的公司已經一身債，怎可能向銀行錢呢？還要向農行借27億元，這些國有銀行借出資金理應有多重防範，規條更多。

郭文貴的公司先做一份財務報表，當然是造假數的，顯示公司連續三年有盈利。單是盈利是不足夠的，還需要有納稅證明，於是再做三年稅務記錄，更要取得稅務局證明，這些靠關係都能解決。

向地皮發展項目作估值，本來連50億元也不到，但輕鬆找個測量師就能估到100億元。公司本來有50億元欠債，又造個假帳出來，把債務減至4億多。最後成功取得農行批准貸款，借予公司進行精裝修。

農行規則也不少，例如這筆貸款，農行不會直接向公司借出資金，而是需要公司有真正的精裝修工程合約，農行方會把資金交到承辦商手上，直接找數，錢不會過公司手。

這找數過程需要有工程監理署監管工程進度，更需要工程公司發出發票，這些發票在中央應該有記錄的，農行要見發票才付款。數額達35億元的發票，更要繳稅，實不容易，但這也能造出來，最後成功向農行提供到35億元的假發票，取得資金。

最後，那工程公司怎可以把數十億調回那公司呢？又是製造一張假合約，指本來郭文貴公司請了這家工程公司，後來取消合約，因此該工程公司就能理直氣壯地把三十億元的款項退還給郭文貴那家公司去。之後他再把資金以一些財務公司放出貸款，轉了一大圈把資金交回自己手上。

每一個步驟都是假文件、靠關係去完成，前後只需要十多年，成為富甲一方的大富豪，實在嘆為觀止。蕭生反問，內地有多少這類公司呢？除了早年做廠的一班，或近年搞科網的一群，如騰訊、阿里巴巴之外，今天大部分的內地富豪都是這樣出來的，由圈地開始、造假帳、與官鈎結、向銀行貸款等等。

外國的catch me if you can只是個人扮下機師，騙得好幾百萬元，而內地的故事，動不動數十億，聽起來令人心寒。難怪不時都有走資潮，這樣賺來的資金不走，怎能解釋呢？我對內地民企實在沒有信心。


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jiXcK99PxkM&list=PL2FflE5xSM4SB9vazF_dcYmop-HiucsPD

How China Small-Caps Can Come Clean

1 : GS(14)@2011-01-23 15:04:56

http://www.thestreet.com/story/10952955/1/how-china-small-caps-can-come-clean.html?cm_ven=RSSFeed

Rick Pearson is a Beijing-based private investor focusing on U.S.-listed China small-cap stocks. He is a contributing writer to TheStreet whose views on these stocks are independent of TheStreet's news coverage.

BEIJING (TheStreet) -- On Nov. 19, a certain company listed in the U.S. issued the following press release: (the "Company") today announced that it will restate its previously issued financial statements for fiscal years 2007, 2008 and 2009 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2010 (including the quarterly data for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 and its selected financial data for the relevant periods), due to errors identified in these financial statements. This decision was made by the Company's board of directors, upon the recommendation of the audit committee and in consultation with management. As a result of this decision, investors should no longer rely upon the Company's previously released financial statements for these periods and any earnings releases or other communications relating to these periods. If this were a Chinese small-cap, the consequences would be predictable: widespread allegations of fraud, the stock would plummet 30%-50% and the usual five to 10 lawsuits would roll in within one week. But it wasn't a China small-cap. It was Green Mountain Coffee(GMCR_), and instead of falling, the stock price rose 11% on the day because the restatement was somehow perceived to be not all that bad. So almost four full years of finanicals can no longer be relied upon, and it's "not all that bad!?"

2010 was a rough year for Chinese small-caps, with a number of earnings restatements, allegations of fraud and confirmed outright fraud cases. Companies who have been (rightly or wrongly) impacted include Fuqi International(FUQI_), Rino International(RINO_) Northeast Petroleum(NEP_), China Sky One Medical(CSKI_), China Biotics(CHBT_), China Marine Food Group(CMFO_), China Education Alliance(CEU_) and Orient Paper(ONP_).
I provide additional detail below, but the key conclusion is simple. Obviously, there does exist fraud in some portions of U.S.- listed China stocks. However, the real problem for the larger space as a whole is that these companies are immature in the U.S. capital markets and leave themselves very vulnerable to speculation of fraud even when none exists. As a result, valuations for the entire space have been depressed.
In my opinion, this immaturity in the capital markets can be witnessed in numerous areas including: lack of emphasis on submitting correct domestic State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) filings, use of unknown auditors, inaccurate and outdated websites, unprofessional reliance on free email services (such as Yahoo! or Gmail), as well as a lack of responsiveness to investors. None of these things are an absolute indication of fraud, but they do weaken general investor confidence and leave companies vulnerable to speculation by short-sellers. The good news is that many companies (the smart ones) are starting to realize these weaknesses and are beginning to change accordingly.
I address each of these points below.
Lack of emphasis on submitting correct domestic filings
By now, anyone who is familiar with the recent spate of short attacks is well aware that the first line of attack by shorts is to cite the fact that a company's SAIC filings do not match its SEC filings. At first, many investors fell for this ruse blindly and viewed it as concrete evidence of fraud causing massive selloffs in a number of small-cap names.

The issue is actually more complicated than that. Much has been recently written about the significance of discrepancies between SAIC and SEC filings. My experience in dealing with many China small-caps leads me to several conclusions.


1. Minor discrepancies in SAIC filings are no cause for concern due to differences in accounting treatment as well as differences in revenue and income recognition for subsidiaries and international sales.
2. Large discrepancies can be (but are not guaranteed to be) a cause for concern. I have spoken with many Chinese CFOs, and many of them have never even paid attention to their SAIC filings. The filings are a perfunctory administrative filing that is often delegated to junior non-financial staff or even outsourced to third-party filing agents. In addition, these statements are not audited by U.S. or Chinese auditors.
Therefore, in many cases they may have no relation to the legitimate profitability of the company. I do, however, view large discrepancies as a red flag and a cause for concern, partly because it reflects sloppiness on the part of management and partly because it opens up the company to short speculation or an outright short attack
3. The real filings that matter are the SAT (Tax) filings of the Chinese company. The Chinese government is focused on collecting tax revenue, and senior management does pay attention to these filings. As a result, if SAT filings do not match, it can be a cause for significant concern. Unfortunately, unlike SAIC filings, these documents are not public and in fact are almost unobtainable. It is possible to get them in some circumstances and can be a very clear indicator of the presence or absence of fraud.
4. The conclusion is a bit complicated, and many investors miss this important nuance. There are two types of corporate structure for Chinese small-caps, variable interest entities (VIEs) and foreign invested enterprises (FIEs). Getting into all of the details is beyond the scope of this particular article, but I hope to do so later. The relevant point to consider here is that for an FIE structured company, the SAIC and SAT financials are reconciled and audited in China and should definitely match. If they do not, then there exists a high probability of either SEC fraud in the U.S. or tax fraud in China. Neither of these things is good. But if the filings do all match up, then much concern can be alleviated.

The good news going forward is that companies are starting to see the havoc that SAIC filings can wreak upon their company. I am increasingly hearing that going forward, companies will make it a priority to file SAIC filings themselves with attention from senior management and that they will make sure that the filings do indeed reflect the profitability of the business which should therefore also match the SEC filings. What we will see going forward is that historical SAIC filings do not match, but 2010 and onward filings will be largely correct. Also, in my dialogue with Chinese companies, I am strongly suggesting that they make an effort to make their own SAIC and SAT filings public (disclosed on their Web sites). Whether or not this actually happens remains to be seen.

Use of unknown auditors
Many Chinese small-caps began their public existence as tiny micro-cap reverse mergers. They therefore engaged small unknown accounting firms who were cheap and willing to do the work. As the firms grow, it is obviously appropriate to switch to a top 10 auditor, or perhaps even a big four auditor. Large companies who use no-name (or even shady) auditors are a major red flag for me and there have been many times where I avoided a company that had great financials simply due to its choice of auditor.
Again, the good news for 2011 is that this is already starting to change and in this area, Chinese small-caps clearly "get it."
Based on recent discussions with China small-cap companies, I expect to see a wave of auditor upgrades during early 2011; hopefully some will be in time to process 2010 10Ks due out in March or early April. This will greatly enhance investor confidence in the space, and I believe it will help separate the good companies from the bad. Companies who are unwilling to upgrade to a reputable auditor will see their share prices suffer.
Recent examples of auditor upgrades that have recently occurred include:
It should be noted that there are more than 500 Chinese companies that trade in the U.S., and it is simply not feasible for all of them to be using big four auditors. For most of the smaller companies, I am perfectly happy with the selection of a top 10 auditor, including auditors such as BDO or Grant Thornton which have a strong and reputable China practice.

Inaccurate and outdated Web sites

It is important to remember that with many of these companies, senior management is not fluent in English and therefore does not focus on their English language website. This is often delegated to an outside firm to design on a one-time basis, and Web sites are not updated. Clearly, this is unacceptable. I have invested in companies that I felt were very solid, and in my discussions with management, I emphasized that their Web sites (which are often downright pathetic) can be a deterrent to other investors and can therefore impact the stock price.
In my experience, many Chinese companies still don't get it, and I still see many terrible Web sites even at companies that are performing very well financially. Typically, companies that use a solid IR firm will have a better-looking Web site, but that is still no guarantee that it will be updated on a regular basis. I am hopeful that this will start to change, and in some instances, I see progress, but in 2011, I still expect to see many pathetic Web sites for Chinese companies.
Also, stating the obvious, even while a great company may have a terrible Web site, a fraudulent company may have a fantastic Web site. The point is that a bad Web site is unacceptable for a company that wants to be shareholder-friendly and, despite being a triviality, it can have an impact on investor demand for the shares, thus affecting the share price.
Unprofessional reliance on free email services
When an investor tries to email the CFO of a NYSE, Nasdaq or Amex-listed company (with a market cap of perhaps several hundred million dollars) and the CFO can only be reached at wang1634@ yahoo.com, it certainly does not inspire confidence. In fact, it immediately conjures up the image of a fraudulent company operating out of someone's basement. With one company, I was so adamant about it changing to professional emails that I even bought a domain name for the company and signed it up for email. The company's excuse was that it had been using the existing Yahoo! email so long that it was reluctant to change. Ultimately, it did acquire a real domain name and now they use professional emails. It took more than a year.
Again, this is very common in China at companies big and small, public and private. It does not raise any eyebrows with investors in China at all, but for companies listed in the U.S., it is not acceptable simply due to the negative image it creates among investors. That said, even a fraudulent company (or perhaps especially a fraudulent company) can have a very professional-looking email address and not be legitimate. My point is that this is just a cosmetic issue that companies need to pay attention to.

Lack of responsiveness to investors


There is a wide gap between Chinese small-caps in terms of their responsiveness to investors. Yesterday, I sent an email to a Chinese small-cap company's internal IR person; he called me within an hour and he was very well informed. In other cases, companies are slow to respond, if they respond at all. Some of this can again be blamed on the language gap, but for larger companies, they either need to be able to respond to investors on a timely basis or cough up some money and hire an external IR firm. The ones who figure this out will trade much better than the ones who don't and as a rule I make it a point to not invest in companies who are not responsive.
The conclusion I reach from all of this is that, while there are frauds in Chinese small caps, the very widespread lack of confidence and depressed valuations for the space as a whole are a crisis of their own making. Some companies will figure this out and make the right changes and will see a benefit to their share price, others will not and will continue to languish.
My goal in 2011 will be to distinguish between the companies that can make these changes on a rapid basis and restore investor confidence. Obviously, the most important changes will be the switch to focusing on filing correct SAIC documents (and hopefully disclosing them) as well as the upgrading of auditors. I am hopeful that we will see significant progress in this area in the first quarter of 2011 and I will be sure to highlight companies that are making the right moves.
Disclosure: The author is long ONP.
The author can be reached at [url=mailto:[email protected]]comments @ pearsoninvestment.com. [/url]

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2 : GS(14)@2011-01-23 15:05:31

中国在美上市“问题”公司如何自我救赎？
imeigu.com　2010-12-23 22:46:37　来源：i美股　原文链接　作者：　共 7 条跟贴
一位专注于中国概念股研究的美国投资者Pic Pearson 近日在TheStreet撰文表示：在中国在美上市的有些小公司确实存在欺诈行为，而投资者对整个中国概念股的信心不足和估值偏低，其实是这些公司一手造成的。如果这些公司能知错就改，立即采取有效地措施，他们的股价也会随之上涨。而那些执迷不悟的公司只能被投资者遗弃。

(i美股讯）今年11月19日，一家在美国上市的公司公布了一则消息：

“根据公司审计委员会的建议以及在跟管理层商议后，公司董事会做出以下决定：本公司将重新公布2007财年，2008财年、 2009财年及2010财年前三个季度的财务报表，原因是在这些财报中发现了错误。在公布这一决定后，投资者将不要再依赖公司之前所公布的错误财报信息。”

如果这是一家市值比较小的中国公司，我们很容易预测到可能出现的结果：纷至而来的欺诈控告将会使该公司的股价大跌30%-50%，在未来一周之内，该公司将会面临5至10起诉讼。但这家公司不是中国公司，她是绿山咖啡公司（美国一家知名特种咖啡生产商）。奇怪的是，该公司的股价没跌反而一日大涨10%，因为投资者认为他们校对后的财报看起来还不错。

2010年，对在美上市的中国小公司来说是一个“多事之年”：频繁的修改财报数据和收到欺诈指控（甚至被确认为明目张胆的欺诈）。其中涉及到的公司（无论结果是好还是坏）包括福麒国际（FUQI，5.56，-1.24%），绿诺科技（RINO，2.72，-11.11%）、东北石油（NEP，5.90，-3.44%），天一药业（CSKI，6.38，-3.33%），中国生物（CHBT，15.38，+2.33%），海洋食品、中国教育集团和东方纸业（ONP，5.53，-1.95%）。

至于原因我将会在下文作详细说明，但得出的结论很简单——很明显，确实有一些在美上市的中国公司存在着欺诈行为；由于这些公司在美国资本市场上显得比较稚嫩，使得他们很容易成为人们质疑的对象（即使他们根本就没做过任何欺诈行为）。因此，投资者这种以偏概全的思维也使得在美上市的中国概念股普遍被低估。

在我看来，这些中国公司在美国资本市场上表现出的不成熟体现在以下方面：

1）不重视提交给中国工商管理总局（下文统称为“SAIC”）的文件；

2）使用不知名的财务审计机构；

3）公司网站信息不准确或者已经过时；

4）不专业地使用的电子邮件服务（如yahoo和Gmail）；

5）对投资者不负责

尽管这些都不能被绝对指控为欺诈，但他们确实消弱了投资者对公司的信心，并且使公司容易被卖空者“盯”上。

不重视提交给中国工商管理总局的文件

最近卖空者“围攻”了几家被指控存在欺诈行为的公司，任何熟悉这几起案例的人都知道，卖空者发起的第一波攻击就是举证这些公司向中国SAIC提交的文件跟美国SEC文件不匹配。起初，许多投资者盲目地相信了卖空者的这种“伎俩”，认为这就是证明这些公司实施欺诈的证据，并随后大量抛售这些公司的股票。但这一问题事实上绝非像我们所看到的那么简单，有关SAIC文件和SEC文件之间存在差异的报道很多，但根据我的经验，我做了以下结论：

1）由于中美会计计算方面的不同和子公司和国际业务在营收、利润方面会计计算方面不同所导致SAIC文件上财务信息的细微差异不应该成为我们“担心”这些公司的理由。

2）如果上述差异过大，我们的担心就是有必要的。我曾跟许多中国公司的CFO打过交道，他们表示，他们从未对SAIC文件太过在意，因为在他们看来这些文件只是一个繁衍了事的行政文件，经常会会被分配到非财务职员手中，甚至外包到第三方代理机构。除此之外，这些文件都未受美国或者中国审计机构的审查。

在我看来，如果这些文件中的财务信息偏差很大，投资者就会给予这类公司红色警告，自然他们也就会成为被“关注”的对象。部分原因是这种偏差会反映出公司管理层的草率，而另一方面这个公司将会因此成为猎头（短期投机者或者直接做空者）“攻击”的对象，

真正至关紧要的文件是这些公司提交给中国国家税务局（下文统称为“SAT”）的文件。中国政府比较关心财政税收，因此这些公司的高官也就比较重视这类文件。如果SAT文件和SEC文件不匹配，一般会引起市场的极大“关注”。不幸的是，不像SAIC文件，SAT文件不对外公布，实际上想要得到这些文件是很困难的，不过在有些情况下，还是有机会看到这些文件，这类文件将会是判断公司是否存在欺诈行为的一个明确指标。

结论有点复杂，许多投资者都忽视了这一重要的细微差别。中国这类小型公司的组织形式分为两种，即外商投资企业和可变利益实体（是指没有持投票权的股本投资者或未能向这些实体提供足够的财务资源的公司）。需要指出的是，属于外商投资企业结构的公司向SAIC和SAT所提交的财务信息是要在中国进行核对和审查的，并且彼此之间要求绝对相匹配。如果他们存在偏差，极有可能会在美国遭到欺诈指控，或者在中国遭到骗税指控。这两个结果对公司来说都不是什么好事。而如果他们相匹配，外界对这类公司的质疑可能大大减少。

另一个好消息是，现在有许多公司的管理层已经开始认真地做起他们的SAIC文件，从而确保这些文件可以真实的反映出公司的财务盈利能力，当然也必须跟 SEC文件相匹配。我在跟这些公司管理层交谈时，我也强烈建议他们作自己的SAIC和SAT公开文件（在其网站上披露）。不过这种建议到底是否可行还有待观察。

聘用不知名的审计机构

许多中国小型公司都是通过反向收购的方式在美成功上市。因此，他们会雇用一些不知名的、便宜的、规模较小并且愿意为他们工作的会计公司。随着这些公司的不断成长，他们会重新聘用知名的会计事务所，其中就包括我们通常所提及的“四大” ，而那些仍然在聘用不知名的会计事务所的公司现在已经曝露出危险的信号。

不过可喜的是， 这些公司已经清楚地认识这一问题的严重性，他们现在已经开始做出一些变化。 我希望在2011年初，我们能看到一波更换公司财务审计机构的浪潮，并希望在明年3月份或者4月初，这些公司能在2010-10Ks中公布这些信息。届时必将大大提高投资者对整个中国概念股的信心，并将“好”“坏”公司区分开来。那些不愿更换审计机构的公司到时只能坐等股价大跌了。

在最近一段时间内，有几家公司已经付之行动更换了他们财务审计机构，如西安宝润（CBEH，6.47，+0.15%）聘用毕马威会计事务所，万得汽车（WATG，7.56，-1.05%）、UT斯达康（UTSI，2.32，+0.43%）、中汽系统（CAAS，13.87，-2.12%）三家公司聘用普华永道。

需要指出的是，在美国交易的中国公司超过500家，不要指望所有公司都能聘用四大会计事务所来充当他们的审计机构。对于那些小型中国公司来说，我想“top 10”会计事务所是一个不错的选择，如德豪会计师事务所、何均富会计师事务所等，他们在中国都有着不错的口碑。

公司网站信息不准确或者已过时

我们必须牢记，许多这类公司的管理层英语都不咋地，因此他们一般不会太在意公司英文版网站。通常他们会将设计公司网站的工作外包给其他代理公司来做，而且都是一次性的工作，网站信息一般很难更新。这是让人无法接受的，事实上我也投资了这类公司。在和这些公司管理层交谈时，我也强调，他们糟糕的网站让他们错失了许多投资者，这样会对他们的股价不利。

根据我的经验，很多中国公司仍然没有认识到这一点。我也看到，一些财务数据很好的公司，他们的网站却看起来很糟糕。通常情况下，公司会聘用一个固定的公关公司来“美化”公司的网站，但由于都是一次性的工作，无法保证网站信息的更新。我希望在2011年，这种情况能有所改变。

当然，一些知名公司的网站是看起来也是很糟糕的，同样，也有一些“有问题”的公司的网站看起来却很“赏心悦目”。但有一点需要指出的，如果公司想要讨好股东，糟糕的网站是无法被接受的。糟糕的网站会影响投资者对公司股票的需求，进而影响公司的股价。

不专业的使用免费的电子邮件服务

如果投资者想要向给在纽交所、纳斯达克或者美交所上市的中国公司CFO发送电子邮件时，只能发到如[email protected]这类地址，这势必会消弱投资者对公司的信心。通常，人们提及“欺诈”首先想到的是就是公司在地下室经营的场景。我是极力主张公司向专业邮件依赖的转变，我甚至恨不得给这些公司买一个域名，通过它来向公司发送电子邮件。但这些公司给出的理由是：他们的管理层已经使用yahoo邮件很长时间了，因此他们不愿做出变化。

这种现象在中国各类大中型企业中很常见，中国的投资者对这种事也习惯了。但对于在美上市的公司，这是投资者无法接受的，因为它会损害公司在投资者的形象。我的观点是这是一个面子工程，公司应该注意一下。

中国中小企业对投资者的反应差别很大。昨天，我给一家中小企业的投资者关系负责人发了电子邮件，他在一个小时内就给我打电话，而且很多东西都讲得很清楚。但也有些公司反应就很慢。有些可能是因为语言的缘故。但是对绝大多数公司来说，他们应该对投资者询问做出快速回复，或者可以花点钱雇佣专门的公关公司来处理。

我得出的结论是，中国在美上市的有些小公司确实存在欺诈行为，而投资者对整个中国概念股的信心不足和估值偏低其实是这些公司一手造成的。如果这些公司能“知错就改”并立即采取有效措施，他们的股价也会随之上涨。而那些“执迷不悟”的公司最终只能被投资者所“遗弃”。

本文作者为Pic Pearson 是一位专注于在美上市中国公司股票研究的投资者，目前持有东方纸业的多单。

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What we are reading： What Money Can\'t Buy

1 : GS(14)@2012-05-19 11:46:48

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/financeestate/art/20120518/16347870

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樂香園：Catch me if you can 海迪

1 : GS(14)@2013-08-06 23:35:50

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/financeestate/art/20130806/18365580

                證監會上周出咗張「溫馨提示」，令一眾投行人士牙痛咁聲。一般上市公司配售舊股，或者做俗稱「先舊後新」的top-up placement時，認購的投資者一直「自我感覺良好」地認為，只要獲確認分配通知，肯定自己有貨分，就算未到T+2股票正式交收日，配股後都可以即刻沽空去lock up利潤。只要趕及兩日後有貨到手，咁就無有怕啦！點知打虎越打越勇的證監，決心要掃清呢個「灰色地帶」，上周就警告大家要正式有貨到手先short得，講明會嚴打呢類偷步沽空活動。
有投行經紀就話，近月證監真係嚴到嚇親人，甚至派員入投行駐場check單。賓架慨嘆，市況差deal flow本來就少得可憐，而家生意亦只會越來越難做。事關咁event driven的市況，如果接貨後無得即沽，仲邊有客肯接？在證監緊盯之下，以後三、四線公司要批股會難上加難。又或者，要畀好大discount先做到。
至於buy side反應？坦白講，有芬佬仍抱住一種「Catch me if you can」的心態，事關芬佬們有多個投行account，在A行接貨在B行沽空，其實很難查，此外亦有很多「張良計」可技術性地避開呢個問題。如果證監真係要杜絕呢類活動，睇怕難免要來一招「殺一儆百」，方可收阻嚇之效了。

                  海迪

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