📖 ZKIZ Archives

一隻「保險箱」海外併購之路

http://slamnow.blog.163.com/blog/static/1993182362011101632610466/

利人利己之投資 一隻牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2011/12/blog-post.html

我最近看到一篇文章﹐我摘錄它的重點﹐和各位分享﹕

************************************

• 買股票就是買公司的股份
• 買股份就是參股做生意
• 做生意就是生產產品，或是提供某種服務
• 供應產品或提供服務，都使人受惠，都有助於提供社會福祉
• 廣大人民，都能以合理的價格買到產品或服務，提升了他們的生活素質，這樣有助於增加社會的福祉
• 公司取得了可觀的利潤，將利潤以股息的方式派給股東，股東是賺到錢。一方面得到股息，一方面股票又增值，股東取得雙重的利益。

例如銀行業，銀行收集了公眾人士的存款，轉借給企業家開工廠，存款人取得定期存款利息，是贏家；銀行賺取存款和放貸之利息差額，是二贏家；企業家取得所需的資金，開設工廠，生產產品，從中賺取利潤，是三贏家，有此「三贏」，銀行業乃能持久經營。

例如屋業發展公司收集投資者的資金，買地建屋出售，買屋人有屋可住，是一贏家；發展商取得利潤，是二贏家，投資者分到紅利，是三贏家，故屋業能長存。

我們作為股票投資者，將資金交給公司、銀行、工業家，就是委託他們代我們去從事利人利己，大家都受惠，大家都是贏家的事業，作為上市公司的股東，我們其實都是在做事業，只是我們把經營權和管理權，交給董事部去執行，我們沒有直接參與經營和管理事業而已。

作為上市公司股東，我們的回酬，是來自公司的盈利，由於有盈利，股份才會增值，使股東的財富與日俱增，通過這種途徑賺錢，沒有『損人，故能長久投資。

投資能創造價值，故能長久，投機只是股份的轉讓，並非生產行為，不能創造價值，故不能持久。

創造價值，利人利己，人人都是贏家，故能長久經營，你才可以長期投資，長期投資才能賺錢。

新年(二)﹕任公子釣魚 一隻牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/01/blog-post_18.html

莊子「外物篇」有這樣的一則寓言：

【原文】
任公子為大鉤巨緇，五十犗以為餌餌，蹲乎會稽，投竿東海，旦旦而釣，期年不得魚。已而 大魚食之，牽巨鉤，錎沒而下，鶩揚而奮鬐，白波如山，海水震盪，聲侔鬼神，憚赫千里。任公得若魚，離而臘之，自制河以東 ，蒼梧已北，莫不厭若魚者。已而後世輇才諷說之徒，皆驚而相告也。夫揭竿累(，趣灌瀆，守鯢鮒， 其於得大魚難矣。飾小說以干縣令﹐其於大達亦遠矣，是以未嘗聞任氏之風俗，其不可與輕於世亦遠矣。


意思大約是﹕

很 久以前﹐有個年青人姓任﹐所以街坊叫他作任公子。任公子最厲害的手藝就是釣魚。真的很厲害﹗他的釣餌是五十頭牛﹐用巨鉤穿住﹐然後用大繩索綁住。那時候﹐ 最深的海是東海﹐最高的山是會稽。所以﹐任公子就在會稽山頂﹐把釣竿投向東海。一日復一日﹐每天都這樣釣魚，整整一年一條魚也沒釣到。有一天﹐終於有魚上 釣了。你看﹗非常大的魚﹐它拉著釣鉤急速沉沒海底﹐又迅急地揚起脊背騰身而起，，掀起如山的白浪，海水劇烈震盪，吼聲猶如鬼神，震驚千里之外。任公子釣得 這樣 一條大魚，將它剖開製成魚乾，從浙江以東，到蒼梧以北，沒有誰不飽飽地吃上這條魚的。那些淺薄之人和喜好品評議論之士，都大為吃驚奔走相告。他們舉著釣竿 絲繩，奔跑在山溝小渠旁，守候小魚上釣，至於想得到大魚那就很難很難了。


*******
這個寓言的啟發是如果想要在股市賺錢，當務之急﹐就是先學投資﹑培養正確投資原則。
要到什麼程度呢﹖就看你想得到什麼成就﹗舉著釣竿絲繩，奔跑在山溝小渠旁，守候小魚上釣。還是大鉤巨緇，五十犗以為餌餌﹖
何為投資原則﹖就是可以成功的方法﹐你願意用盡生命去耕耘。當你運用這個原則﹐已經到了胸有成竹﹑上下縱橫皆如意的境界。你就懂得運用巨鉤和地點﹐懂得選大魚而釣。

要有耐心﹐故投資宜長期，長期才能累積財富，並無捷徑可循。

藝高才能膽大﹐學習是永遠的﹐行動是即刻的。買進了對的企業﹐不要怕股價波動。
(大魚食之，牽巨鉤，錎沒而下，鶩揚而奮鬐，白波如山，海水震盪，聲侔鬼神，憚赫千里)
肯拚搏的蛤蟆﹐就有吃天鵝的希望。肯拚搏的烏鴉﹐就有變鳳凰的希望。

身為凡夫俗子，只要堅持一些原則，腳踏實地進行投資，不投機，不取巧，就可以取得可觀的投資成績。投資30年，到退休時就可以做到「財務自主」，做個有尊嚴的樂齡人。


****
2011年8-12月﹐在這段時間釣到大魚﹐如果能夠像任公子一樣﹐大魚食之，牽巨鉤，錎沒而下，鶩揚而奮鬐，白波如山，海水震盪，聲侔鬼神，憚赫千里。那麼﹐你今天有大魚吃鉤了。

****
祝福所有價值法的同門﹐一定要努力﹐這是對的正確投資原則。

學投資﹐明白投資 一隻牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post_22.html

值得再三反覆細讀（一） 一隻牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/04/blog-post_24.html
再讀2011年巴郡致股東信， 個人認為以下這篇值得再三反覆細讀，
××××××××××××××××××××××
 The Basic Choices for Investors and the One We Strongly Prefer

Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.

（1）
Investments that are denominated in a given currency include money-market funds, bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and other instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as 「safe.」 In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta may be zero, but their risk is huge.

Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing power of investors in many countries, even as the holders continued to receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly result, moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin out of control.

Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as 「income.」

For tax-paying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-yearperiod, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7%（一隻牛的計算：5.7%x75%=4.275% ，after tax）return would have yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor's visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. It's noteworthy that the implicit inflation 「tax」 was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. 「In God We Trust」 may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our government's printing press has been all too human.

High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments – and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.

Under today's conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.

Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchase currency-related securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain – either because a particular credit is mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we've exploited both opportunities in the past – and may do so again – we are now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: 「Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free risk.」


（2）
The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer's hope that someone else – who also knows that the assets will be forever unproductive – will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.

This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce – it will remain lifeless forever – but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.

The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.

What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As 「bandwagon」 investors join any party, they create their own truth – for a while.

Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the 「proof」 delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers – for a time – expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: 「What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end.」

Today the world's gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $1,750 per ounce – gold's price as I write this – its value would be $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.

Let's now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world's most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?（$9.6 trillion美金，可以買多少家新鴻基？，長江？，九龍倉？，總而言之，所有的龍頭藍籌企業？）

Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices make today's annual production of gold command about $160 billion. Buyers – whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened individuals, or speculators – must continually absorb this additional supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.

A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops – and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.（以上所買入的龍頭藍籌企業，可以派發多少的股息？）

Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it's likely many will still rush to gold. I'm
confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.


（3）
Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard 「cash is king」 in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard 「cash is trash」 in the early 1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.

My own preference – and you knew this was coming – is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola, IBM and our own See's Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies – think of our regulated utilities, for example – fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.

Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See's peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.

Our country's businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial 「cows」 will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of 「milk」 to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as well). Berkshire's goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own them in their entirety – but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway winner among the three we've examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.

值得再三反覆細讀（二） 一隻牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/04/blog-post_6061.html
1）
Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably
certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.

• 股價會波動，這是正常的。
• 經歷無數次景氣循環，雖然盈利在不景氣時少許倒退，但是以10年或更久的經營歷史數據排列，盈利仍然能夠不斷增加，這樣的企業可以被稱為【對的企業】
• 找到【對的企業】，也要能夠瞭解它的業務，知道如何經營（例如performance keypoint)，才能買入，
• 找到【對的企業】， 也要配合便宜/合理價，才能買入，
• 如果【對的企業】，繼續以對的方式經營，才可以繼續持有

例子：渣打(2888)

	股票數目	股價的波動	每股盈利	景氣循環	價值
	（百萬）	（每股港元）	（每股港元）		PE=10
2003	1,207	82-126	6.33	SARS	63
2004	1,210	116-149	9.78		98
2005	1,309	99-175	11.15		111
2006	1,349	182-231	12.66		127
2007	1,615	211-304	13.19		132
2008	1,638	88-287	14.54	金融風暴	145
2009	1,984	75-217	12.78		128
2010	2,192	176-244	14.82		148
2011	2,395	141-216	15.18	歐債風暴	152

以上，可以發覺：

• 如果已經找到【對的企業】，如果不充分瞭解它的業務，就算是買入，恐怕很快的就會被股價波動震走。
• 雖然股價會波動，但是價值是走在上升的軌道。市值+股息的增幅，如果無法超過通膨，也不能被稱為【對的企業】。所以，買入價非常重要。
• 每一天的市價，不代表是便宜/合理價，尤其是【對的企業】，都是溢價出售。
• 天上掉黃金，可遇不可求，一定要用大卡車來裝

（這是為了表達我的看法而舉的例子，可能某個事故，這家企業可以變樣）
（而且，PE=10，只是我的估計，不代表是對，也不代表所有企業都適合）

2）
Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably
certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.

～a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power.

 巴老是說他的通膨數據是4.3%，如果【市值+股息】的增幅，無法超過通膨，應該是危險的投資。但是，以極便宜的價格買入，造成股息回報超過10%，就可以扭轉乾坤，化危為安。

3）
Under today's conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.

• 這小段，說明了流動性的重要。好的企業，有哪一個不是流動性穩定？出問題的企業，那一個不是因為流動性乾枯？
• 反省自己，要成為成功的股票投資人，就必須學會理財，時時保持著充裕的生活費用，就算是超級金融風暴再來，也可以繼續持有投資部位，不必賣股買米，甚至股息再投資超值得的企業。 
• 保持著充裕的生活費用，才不會過度在意股價的波動，才能專注於企業的價值增長。

4）
High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments – and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.

• 太美妙了，如果能擁有超越10%利息收入的【AAA級債券，匯豐的定期存款】。如果遇上，記得用大卡車去裝。
• 【AAA級債券，匯豐的定期存款】只是代名詞，表示超級穩定和不違約。只要用心，市場內多得是。

 5）

• investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment.
• people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for【】
• Berkshire's goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses.
• I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to
  be the runaway winner among the three we've examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.

00703佳景集團簡要分析（2011年7月版） 屎殼螂一隻

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4ae218c7010128z6.html

歷史：

2004年1月現大股東陳澤武買殼，隨後處理過去債務關係

2007年3月/8月 大股東陳志武向上市公司注入餐飲業務

2008年7月改名佳景集團

2010年6月3000萬收購日美食品貿易（餐飲供貨商）

2010年10月2.63億以20PE購入澳門收租物業

 

（年報從2007年翻起）

2007年營業額9529萬，但巨虧，因對過往應收做減值。

食物及飲品業務： 營業額7019萬   EBITDA  2929萬

遊樂園業務：     營業額2510萬   EBITDA  -1228萬

 

2008

食物及飲品業務： 營業額16200萬  EBITDA  3845萬

遊樂園業務：     營業額255萬    EBITDA  -2599萬

 

2009

食物及飲品業務： 營業額23500萬  EBITDA  5050萬

遊樂園業務：     營業額 停運     EBITDA  -789萬

 

2010

食物及飲品業務： 營業額37600萬  EBITDA  8694萬（當年開始派息）

遊樂園業務：     已停運

 

 

業務介紹：

http://www.futurebrightgroup.com.mo/branch_show.php?getid=11

以VIP用戶為特點，目前有1.2萬用戶，口碑很好，東西一般比較貴。

 

二零一零年十一月在廣州開設1間總建築面積合共為20,708平方呎的大型日式餐廳。集中其資源藉進行日式餐廳業務進軍廣州市場將對本集團較為有利，並已於二零一零年十一月退出廣州及珠海的Pacific Coffee特許經營業務。其後，本集團管理層已集中鞏固澳門Pacific Coffee業務，並將於二零一一年在澳門開設更多PacificCoffee 店。

 

管理層預期將於二零一一年七月前在澳門開設3間餐廳╱咖啡店，並於二零一一年底前在澳門威尼斯人酒店另開設2間餐廳╱咖啡店及1間美食廣場櫃位。（2010年報）

 

於澳門及廣州多處優越成點經營19間食肆及10個美食廣場櫃位，合共佔地107,627平方呎：9間日式餐廳、3 間茶座╱酒廊、5 間中式酒樓、1間意大利餐廳、1間葡萄牙餐廳及10間多國美食廣場櫃位。（2010年報）

 

本集團於澳門共有16家食肆，分佈市內多處優越地點，共佔地54,733平方呎，包括7間日式餐廳、3間咖啡室╱酒廊、4間中式酒樓、1間意大利餐廳及1間葡國餐廳。（2009年報）

 

於二零零八年，本集團審慎地擴大其餐廳數目，位於澳門黃金地段的七家餐廳中，三家位於葡京酒店，另四家位於澳門威尼斯人度假村大運河購物中心。該年簽下Pacific Coffee（2008年報）

 

本集團現時擁有兩家日式餐廳、一家葡式餐廳及兩家中式餐廳，並有豐富經驗的管理隊伍及208名員工於澳門的餐廳工作。（2007年報）

 

該日本餐廳名為江戶壽司，員工56名，供應傳統日式食品，包括壽司及刺身，以及單點食品，堂食座位48個。該中國餐廳名為龜盅補，員工19名，專售龜盅補品，堂食座位20個。兩間餐廳均位於澳門葡京酒店內。（2007年注入時披露）

 

（這家公司在餐飲業的執行力很強，基本說到就做到，這是看了4年財報的主要感受。）

 

 

最近的物業收購：

佳景集團（703）宣佈，斥資2.628億元收購好運集團全部權益及股東貸款，好運集團持澳門3項物業，為澳門一幢6層高（包括3層地庫）商業樓宇，鄰近澳門旅遊景點大三巴牌坊。該物業於1999年落成，總實用面積約為21985平方呎，可用作商店及餐廳等商業用途，並為澳門相關法例下之具歷史價值建築物。董事相信，該物業現時每年帶來租金收入1320萬澳門元（1281.5萬港元），若能更有效善用該物業之空間，每年之租金收入有望增加。公司股份今復牌，停牌前報0.43元。（2010年10月）

 

管理層相信，此幢商業樓宇位於極之優越的旅遊旺點，人流不絕，且可賺取年租金收入約14,097,000港元（相當於14,520,000澳門幣）。根據本集團截至二零一零年十二月三十一日止年度之綜合財務報表計算，本集團於二零一零年十二月三十一日之資產總額及負債總額分別約429,200,000 港元及208,300,000 港元。假設收購已於二零一零年十二月三十一日完成，則本集團於二零一零年十二月三十一日因收購此幢商業樓宇經擴大之未經審核備考資產總額及負債總額將分別增加約43.7%及89.5%至約616,800,000港元及約394,700,000港元， 有關數字乃來自本集團於二零一零年十二月三十一日之經審核綜合財務報表所載者。若能更佳利用此幢商業樓宇的空間，應可賺取更高年租金收入。倘此商業樓宇不 予租出，則本集團應可將其部分空間出租，餘下空間則可供本集團的新食肆所佔用。是項收購可擴闊本集團的收入來源兼提升其長線增長潛力，故對本集團而言屬上 乘投資項目。

20PE收購，後續資產負債表會比較弱，需要時間恢復元氣。

 

佳景集團宣佈，按每股0.41元配售9,230萬股新股，集資約3,784萬元，估計淨額3,679萬元，擬用作一般營運資金。配售價較股份昨日(11月2日)收市價0.46元折讓10.87%，配售股份佔擴大後股本約16.66%。（2010年11月）

相當於以2010年業績的5倍PE賣股，對原有股東很不利，但可以理解為為之前收購籌集資金，也有可能是給一些關聯人士送禮，年報中披露了訂金有7800多萬。

 

估值：

老闆陳澤武訪談：

http://www.bizintelligenceonline.com/content/view/626/lang,/

 

初步結論：是個做事的。陳澤武選擇買殼上市，個人認為是一大失誤，原上市公司的虧損業務拖累他好多年發展。（當然他可能也沒料到餐飲注入上市公司後這幾年來的飛速成長。）

 

網上發現大部分都是該公司的招聘廣告，看來確實生意好到不行，人手不夠了。回到正題

 

2010年年報EPS 0.086，未計入攤薄影響。實際股本被攤薄後 EPS實際為0.073。

 

從大股東07年注入餐飲資產以來，其餐飲分部3年（07到10年）的銷售額增長了535.7%，年復合成長率在70%以上，而利潤也保持了大致同比的增幅。而一直虧損的遊樂園業務在2010年終於被完全卸下。

 

由於2010年新開了3家店以及10個美食廣場歸位，銷售面積增加一倍，54,733平方呎到107,627平方呎（2010年底廣州新開的20,708平方呎，我瞭解到生意比較差，扣除後，則可視為增長到86919平方尺），增長率58.8%，我相信大部分新店到2011年才開始真正發力。而2011年上半年還將新開3家店，故料2011下半年的增長亦會有保證。

 

澳門賭業2011年維持高度景氣，金沙中國1，2季度的同比利潤增長率都在100%以上。料佳景2011年增速可維持在50%。但其日本料理店佔了相當比重，這部分在2011年3月的日本核洩漏事件發生後至少短期受到較大影響；同時佳景還面臨澳門租金持續上漲的壓力，其利潤率預計會略有下降，故將盈利增速預測保守調低至30%。中報的盈喜可能說明我過於保守了，但即使按下限30%考慮，其EPS依然接近10港仙。

 

至於非餐飲業務，也就是去年底收購的物業提供的租金收入，每年可佔EPS在 2港仙以上，但也正因為此次收購，其資產負債表大大變弱（原來就不好，因為遊樂園的長期虧損，不過其餐飲業務的現金流一直是極好的），料負債提升後的財務開支會影響EPS 在2港仙左右。故該部分相抵消。相信幾年後隨著餐飲與收租業務持續正現金流的流入，其負債表會有所改善，負債率也會降低，該收購的正面影響會開始體現。

 

注1：抽水記錄

原公司06年已經資不抵債，而07年的先合股後配股是大股東買殼後向上市公司注入自己的餐飲業務，並將原公司負債資本化。實際配給第三方為2億股，每股作價0.5，集資1億港幣。（從那以後公司新生，但在4年後，公司主業成長了5.35倍，原虧損業務在這幾年中陸續剝離，股價卻依然在0.48！）

 

10年又以0.41配了9230萬股，目的應該是為收購物業籌集資金，我覺得有利益輸送之嫌，顯然賣的太便宜了，而收購的物業卻只能說價格合理。（具體配給誰，查不到資料。）

 

除此沒有其他抽水記錄。

 

 

注2：背景八卦（他們家能在賭場做餐飲，基本可以想像到）

陳澤武原是澳門娛樂公司總經理，即十姑娘何婉琪的契仔。

 

2012年4月更新，分析完成後2011年的中報和年報依然靚麗，超過了我預期，而股價經過8個月的等待，也終於在近期有所表現。

註：筆者持有0703，利益關聯，本文僅供學習交流，不作為推薦，投資者請自行注意風險。

低估值才是王道！ 一隻理性且獨行的豬

http://xueqiu.com/5545011370/21762390

實證案例：各個週期內引領銀行股龍頭分析

05-07年那一輪週期，其實銀行股中漲幅最大的不是人們印象中的招商銀行，而是浦發銀行；

08年底-09年的小周期中，引領銀行股的大家應該清楚是興業銀行；

10-12年中，是被幾乎所有「價值投資者」罵的狗血噴頭的民生銀行；

而這其中的秘訣就是低估值：

06年，浦發銀行市盈率為10.20倍，市淨率為1.81倍；而同時期招商和民生的市盈率分別為12倍、16倍，動態市淨率為2.2倍與2.3倍。

08年底由於房地產崩盤，被市場認為是半個地產股的興業跌至了5倍PE、1倍PB；

而由於民生銀行從07-09年主動地調整，促使了其業績低於同行，而使得轉型成功後業績增速幾乎為股份制銀行的龍頭，但仍被市場虎視，估值成為最低。

然後，我們擴展到指數，你就會發現這兩年被市場看到的「成長」板塊——中小板以及創業板成為了殺跌的主力，而上證50——指數中最低估值卻在默默的遠遠超過其他板塊，今年已經累計上漲了15%，而創業板下跌5%並且還有繼續殺跌的動力。

人 們總是喜歡慣性思維：認為上一輪牛市的龍頭必然也是下一輪的，但是我個人認為均值回歸才是王道，任何一種商業模式不是在任何環境下都能大放異彩，這也就是 為什麼這幾年被幾乎所有「價值投資者」罵的狗血噴頭的民生成了銀行股中的龍頭，被幾乎所有「價值投資者」捧上了天並且整天和富國相提並論的招商爛到了 家......

招商在我看來歷史並不夠光彩，只是上個週期在負債端完成了成功轉型，被稱為零售銀行；而這幾年民生的轉型已經相當成功，但卻被很多媒體解讀為龐氏騙局。龐雜的分析文章太多了，很多只是為了進一步印證他之前的觀點而已。

Nike+的進化史：一隻鞋的社交網絡

http://www.yicai.com/news/2012/06/1818619.html

觀察管理人的能力和誠信 一隻牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.hk/2012/08/blog-post_9.html
 渣打被紐約州釘牌，我不知道影響有多大。

巴菲特買美國運通的過程，是可以借鏡。

未來，我想渣打的net interest income業務（屋子貸款，消費貸款）應該照常，信用卡（年費收入）照樣用吧。
至於money transaction的業務會更謹慎 ，不要違法。

很多被美國稱為邪惡國家，這裡的民生市場，還是可以找到很多善良的商業活動，他們都需要銀行的服務。這件事，新的銀行應該不會想在這裡插旗，舊的但市場小的很可能因此離開，對渣打應該是好事。

渣打會被罰款多少？暫時無數字， 這個時候最是變化多端。但是，沒有變化，何來機會？

這是個好機會，可以觀察管理人的能力和誠信。
渣打將控狀公開，讓所有股東過目，雖然這不能證明它沒有違法，如果比較同行，顯然強烈分明，值得讚賞。