Shutdown of Textile Business
關閉紡織業
In July we decided to close our textile operation, and by yearend this unpleasant job was largely completed. The history of this business is instructive.
七月份的時候我們決定關閉紡織運營，而在年底之前這項不愉快的工作也大致完成了。回顧這一產業的歷史具有一定的啟發性。
When Buffett Partnership, Ltd., an investment partnership of which I was general partner, bought control of Berkshire Hathaway 21 years ago, it had an accounting net worth of $22 million, all devoted to the textile business. The company's intrinsic business value, however, was considerably less because the textile assets were unable to earn returns commensurate with their accounting value. Indeed, during the previous nine years (the period in which Berkshire and Hathaway operated as a merged company) aggregate sales of $530 million had produced an aggregate loss of $10 million. Profits had been reported from time to time but the net effect was always one step forward, two steps back.
當Buffet Partnership有限公司，是我擔任普通合夥人時的投資合作夥伴，在21年前控股Berkshire Hathaway，那是賬面價值為兩千兩百萬美元，全部集中在防止業務。然而公司的內在價值卻相當低因為紡織業的資產無法創造與賬面價值相當的回報。事實上，在過去的九年中（在此期間，Berkshire和Hathaway合併為一個公司）總計5億三千萬美元的銷售額產生了總共一千萬美元的損失。雖然有時可以獲利但是淨值卻總是在前進一步的同時後退兩步。
At the time we made our purchase, southern textile plants - largely non-union - were believed to have an important competitive advantage. Most northern textile operations had closed and many people thought we would liquidate our business as well.
在我們買下公司的時候，南方紡織工廠由於沒有大型的工會而被認為是具有強大的競爭力。大部分北方紡織業已經關閉了而很多人認為我們也會清算這家公司。
We felt, however, that the business would be run much better by a long-time employee whom we immediately selected to be president, Ken Chace. In this respect we were 100% correct: Ken and his recent successor, Garry Morrison, have been excellent managers, every bit the equal of managers at our more profitable businesses.
然而我們卻覺得這家公司會運行良好，得益於長期在Ken Chace的管理之下，當時他立即被選舉為主席。在這方面我們完全正確：Ken以及他最近的接任者，Garry Morrison，都是非常優秀的經理人，同獲利更高的經理人相比一點也不遜色。
In early 1967 cash generated by the textile operation was used to fund our entry into insurance via the purchase of National Indemnity Company. Some of the money came from earnings and some from reduced investment in textile inventories, receivables, and fixed assets. This pullback proved wise: although much improved by Ken's management, the textile business never became a good earner, not even in cyclical upturns.
在1967年初，紡織業創造的現金被用於購買NationalIndemnity公司而使我們進入保險業。部分現金來自於收益，而部分來自減少紡織存貨、應收賬款以及固定資產。這一資金的撤回證明是非常明智的：儘管通過Ken的管理公司已經大大改善，但是紡織業務從未賺到什麼錢，即便是在經濟週期頂峰之時。
Further diversification for Berkshire followed, and gradually the textile operation's depressing effect on our overall return diminished as the business became a progressively smaller portion of the corporation. We remained in the business for reasons that I stated in the 1978 annual report (and summarized at other times also): 「(1) our textile businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2) management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in attacking them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems, and (4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to investment.」 I further said, 「As long as these conditions prevail - and we expect that they will - we intend to continue to support our textile business despite more attractive alternative uses for capital.」
Berkshire後來持續多元化戰略，而紡織業對我們總體收益的負面影響逐漸減輕，逐漸成為公司業務中一小部分。如我在1978年年報中所所言我們繼續保護這項業務的原因是：「（1）紡織公司在當地是大僱主；（2）管理層直面報告中所指出的問題並有動力攻克它們；（3）工人們非常的團結並且對我們所面臨的問題表示理解；（4）相對於投資而言公司尚且能夠產生平均而言少量的現金收益。」我需要進一步說明的是：「只要這些條件都還滿足，我們期望這種情況，我們就會繼續經營紡織業不管投資於其他產業是多麼的誘人。」
It turned out that I was very wrong about (4). Though 1979 was moderately profitable, the business thereafter consumed major amounts of cash. By mid-1985 it became clear, even to me, that this condition was almost sure to continue. Could we have found a buyer who would continue operations, I would have certainly preferred to sell the business rather than liquidate it, even if that meant somewhat lower proceeds for us. But the economics that were finally obvious to me were also obvious to others, and interest was nil.
但事實證明關於第四點我是錯的，雖然1979年獲益不錯，但之後卻耗用大量現金。在1985年年中這種情況愈發清楚，而且在我看來這種情況多數會持續下去。如果我們能夠找到一個買主繼續經營，我們肯定傾向於出售而非清算。但是我們清楚這一點，別人也清楚，沒有人會對此感興趣。
I won't close down businesses of sub-normal profitability merely to add a fraction of a point to our corporate rate of return. However, I also feel it inappropriate for even an exceptionally profitable company to fund an operation once it appears to have unending losses in prospect. Adam Smith would disagree with my first proposition, and Karl Marx would disagree with my second; the middle ground is the only position that leaves me comfortable.
我們不會因為想要增加企業收益水平的一個百分點而去關閉收益較差的公司。然而我同時覺得即使對於一個非常賺錢的公司而言去投資一項未來很有可能無休止損失的業務是不正確的。Adam Smith可能不會同意我的第一個觀點，而Karl Marx可能不會同意我的第二個觀點。站在中立的角度可能會對我最有利。
I should reemphasize that Ken and Garry have been resourceful, energetic and imaginative in attempting to make our textile operation a success. Trying to achieve sustainable profitability, they reworked product lines, machinery configurations and distribution arrangements. We also made a major acquisition, Waumbec Mills, with the expectation of important synergy (a term widely used in business to explain an acquisition that otherwise makes no sense). But in the end nothing worked and I should be faulted for not quitting sooner. A recent Business Week article stated that 250 textile mills have closed since 1980. Their owners were not privy to any information that was unknown to me; they simply processed it more objectively. I ignored Comte's advice - 「the intellect should be the servant of the heart, but not its slave」 - and believed what I preferred to believe.
我必須再次強調的是Ken和Garry都試圖讓我們的紡織業務取得成功，足智多謀、極具幹勁與想像力。為了獲得持續盈利，他們重建了生產線、生產流程以及營銷渠道。我們也進行了重大的收購，如Waumbec Mills，期望能夠發揮重大的合併效應（一個廣泛運用於企業合併的術語，否則沒有什麼意義）。但是最終沒有任何結果而我應該為沒有早點放棄而承認錯誤。最近Business Week的一篇報導寫到自1980年有250家紡織廠關閉。這些工廠的老闆所收到的消息我全都明白，只是他們能夠客觀看待事實。我忽略了Comte的建議：「智者應該是心靈的僕役，而不是他的奴隸。」相信我所相信的。
The domestic textile industry operates in a commodity business, competing in a world market in which substantial excess capacity exists. Much of the trouble we experienced was attributable, both directly and indirectly, to competition from foreign countries whose workers are paid a small fraction of the U.S. minimum wage. But that in no way means that our labor force deserves any blame for our closing. In fact, in comparison with employees of American industry generally, our workers were poorly paid, as has been the case throughout the textile business. In contract negotiations, union leaders and members were sensitive to our disadvantageous cost position and did not push for unrealistic wage increases or unproductive work practices. To the contrary, they tried just as hard as we did to keep us competitive. Even during our liquidation period they performed superbly. (Ironically, we would have been better off financially if our union had behaved unreasonably some years ago; we then would have recognized the impossible future that we faced, promptly closed down, and avoided significant future losses.)
國內的紡織行業是一個商品化產業，在世界市場上因大量的資本過剩而競爭激烈。很大的問題直接或間接來自於國外市場低廉勞動力成本的競爭。但關閉公司絕不是本國勞動力的錯，事實上，比起美國其他產業的勞動力來說，紡織業的工資水平低的可憐。在協商合同時候，工會的領導與成員充分認識到這個產業所面臨的困境，從未做出吧不合理的提薪要求或不符合生產效益的要求，相反地，大家都努力維持競爭力，而即使到了公司最後清算的時刻，他們仍舊非常配合。（可笑的是，如果我們的工會在前些年表現不這麼理智的話我們的財務狀況可能更好；因為那樣的話我們會意識到我們所面臨著不可能的未來，而選擇關閉公司以避免巨額的損失。）
Over the years, we had the option of making large capital expenditures in the textile operation that would have allowed us to somewhat reduce variable costs. Each proposal to do so looked like an immediate winner. Measured by standard return-on-investment tests, in fact, these proposals usually promised greater economic benefits than would have resulted from comparable expenditures in our highly-profitable candy and newspaper businesses.
長年以來，我們一再面臨資本的大量投入以降低變動成本的選擇。每次提出的意見看上去都像是即刻的贏家。通過與標準投資回報測試的衡量，事實上，這些建議通常給出的經濟收益的預期與我們高收益的糖果和報業相比都甚至更好。
But the promised benefits from these textile investments were illusory. Many of our competitors, both domestic and foreign, were stepping up to the same kind of expenditures and, once enough companies did so, their reduced costs became the baseline for reduced prices industrywide. Viewed individually, each company's capital investment decision appeared cost-effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions neutralized each other and were irrational (just as happens when each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if he stands on tiptoes). After each round of investment, all the players had more money in the game and returns remained anemic.
但這些紡織投資所預期的收益通常都是假象。我們很多的競爭者，無論是國內還是國外的，全部勇於投入相同的資本支出，而一旦有足夠多的公司這樣做，降低的成本就使得整個產業價格下降。從個人的角度來看，每個公司的資本投資決策看上去都是成本節約且合理的，但是總體來看，這些決定就相互抵消且不合理了（就像每個去看遊行隊伍的觀眾，以為自己只要抬起腳就可以看得更清楚一樣，每多投入一次，所有的競爭者投注的金額就越高，但投資報酬卻一點也不見起色。）