2013-3-29 工作記錄 Joey 濟南實習
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_9ad4e2650101j9aj.html整理完了深機的財務報表以及收入情況，看起來很容易的活幹起來好費勁的說，還好有cece的耐心解答。
換了新版的Adobe Reader效率一下子提高很多，很多時候細節處理好了可以事倍功半。
今天沒有看《聰明的投資者》，前兩天的筆記也沒有細作，明天趕工~
聽cece她們討論股票的事，覺得要做個真正的價值投資者實在不易，這可能也是為什麼我們要不斷加強對價值投資的理解的原因吧，對大多數人而言，時間越來越成為一個奢侈的東西，似乎什麼都等不得。
聽steel談起投資風格，暗自想了想如果換成自己，會是怎樣，不過這個可能一定要真金白銀砸下去了才能檢驗的出來吧~
翻譯部分
Buffalo Evening News
Buffalo晚報
Profits at the News in 1984 were considerably greater than we expected. As at See's, excellent progress was made in controlling costs. Excluding hours worked in the newsroom, total hours worked decreased by about 2.8%. With this productivity improvement, overall costs increased only 4.9%. This performance by Stan Lipsey and his management team was one of the best in the industry.
1984年這家報紙的獲利超過我們的預期，和See』s糖果一樣，其在成本控制方面取得了很好的成效。除了編輯室，整體的工作時數下降了約2.8%。由於生產力的改進，整體成本僅僅上升了4.9%。Stan Lipsey和他的管理團隊是業界的佼佼者之一。
However, we now face an acceleration in costs. In mid-1984 we entered into new multi-year union contracts that provided for a large 「catch-up」 wage increase. This catch-up is entirely appropriate: the cooperative spirit of our unions during the unprofitable 1977—1982 period was an important factor in our success in remaining cost competitive with The Courier-Express. Had we not kept costs down, the outcome of that struggle might well have been different.
但是，我們現在面臨成本加速上升的問題。1984年中我們與工會新簽訂了一項數年的合同，是的工資成本大幅上。這種上漲是合理的，在1988-1982年該報虧損時，正是工會的合作態度，使我們戰勝了Courier-express。如果當初沒有及時降低成本，當時垂死掙扎的結果可能完全不同。
Because our new union contracts took effect at varying dates, little of the catch-up increase was reflected in our 1984 costs. But the increase will be almost totally effective in 1985 and, therefore, our unit labor costs will rise this year at a rate considerably greater than that of the industry. We expect to mitigate this increase by continued small gains in productivity, but we cannot avoid significantly higher wage costs this year. Newsprint price trends also are less favorable now than they were in 1984. Primarily because of these two factors, we expect at least a minor contraction in margins at the News.
由於我們新的工會合同分階段生效，所以1984年成本上漲有限。但是1985年將會顯現效應，勞動力成本將會大幅提高。雖然我們會在明年努力提高生產力水平，但是我們很難避免高額的工資成本。而新聞印刷業成本較1984年而言會有所增加，由於這兩項不利因素明年的毛利將會下降。
Working in our favor at the News are two factors of major economic importance:
但另外兩點對公司是有利的：
(1) Our circulation is concentrated to an unusual degree in the area of maximum utility to our advertisers. 「Regional」 newspapers with wide-ranging circulation, on the other hand, have a significant portion of their circulation in areas that are of negligible utility to most advertisers. A subscriber several hundred miles away is not much of a prospect for the puppy you are offering to sell via a classified ad - nor for the grocer with stores only in the metropolitan area. 「Wasted」 circulation - as the advertisers call it - hurts profitability: expenses of a newspaper are determined largely by gross circulation while advertising revenues (usually 70%—80% of total revenues) are responsive only to useful circulation; (2) Our penetration of the Buffalo retail market is exceptional; advertisers can reach almost all of their potential customers using only the News.（2）
（1）該報紙的流通發行集中在一個廣告效用極高的地區。而地區性報紙雖然在一定地區發行量極大，但是廣告效用卻是極為有限的。幾百英里之遙的訂報者不可能購買在報紙廣告上刊登出售的小狗，所以對本地的雜貨店來說一點效用也沒有。對於一家報社來說，報紙的成本主要取決於總發行量，而廣告收入（一般佔總收入的70%-80%）僅僅在有效發行時有效果。（2）Buffalo報業零售業績尤其突出，廣告商只要通過這份報紙便能將信息傳遞到所有潛在的客戶手中。
Last year I told you about this unusual reader acceptance: among the 100 largest newspapers in the country, we were then number one, daily, and number three, Sunday, in penetration. The most recent figures show us number one in penetration on weekdays and number two on Sunday. (Even so, the number of households in Buffalo has declined, so our current weekday circulation is down slightly; on Sundays it is unchanged.)
去年我曾告訴每個該報優秀的讀者接受度（在全美前一百100報紙中，我們在平時位列第一，而節假日則位列第三），最新的統計數字顯示平日排名依然維持第一，而後者則上升到第二位。（不過我們的訂戶數卻減少，主要是在日常訂購部分，假日部分沒有變化。）
I told you also that one of the major reasons for this unusual acceptance by readers was the unusual quantity of news that we delivered to them: a greater percentage of our paper is devoted to news than is the case at any other dominant paper in our size range. In 1984 our 「news hole」 ratio was 50.9%, (versus 50.4% in 1983), a level far above the typical 35% - 40%. We will continue to maintain this ratio in the 50% area. Also, though we last year reduced total hours worked in other departments, we maintained the level of employment in the newsroom and, again, will continue to do so. Newsroom costs advanced 9.1% in 1984, a rise far exceeding our overall cost increase of 4.9%.
我曾說過，擁有如此高的接受度一個重要的原因就是我們的報紙所呈現給讀者的豐富的內容：新聞佔據了我們報紙的大部分版面，與同規模的幾家主要報紙相比而言更是如此。在1984年我們的新聞率為50.9%（1983年為50.4%），這一比例遠高於通常的35%—40%。我們將這一比例保持在50%左右的範圍。同樣的，儘管我們去年降低了其他部門的工作時數，我們維持了新聞部的員工數量，而我們也會繼續堅持。新聞部的成本在1984年提高了9.1%，這一比例遠高於總成本4.9%的上升速度。
Our news hole policy costs us significant extra money for newsprint. As a result, our news costs (newsprint for the news hole plus payroll and expenses of the newsroom) as a percentage of revenue run higher than those of most dominant papers of our size. There is adequate room, however, for our paper or any other dominant paper to sustain these costs: the difference between 「high」 and 「low」 news costs at papers of comparable size runs perhaps three percentage points while pre-tax profit margins are often ten times that amount.
我們的新聞率策略花費了我們大量額外的資金用於印刷。結果我們的新聞成本（每一條新聞的印刷費以及新聞部的工資和費用）佔收入比例較大多數同行而言都高。然而我們有足夠的空間，因為我們的報紙以及其他任何一家大的報紙都必須承受這種成本：同規模的報紙，新聞成本每相差三個百分點，稅前利潤就會有十倍的差距。（沒懂什麼意思？）
The economics of a dominant newspaper are excellent, among the very best in the business world. Owners, naturally, would like to believe that their wonderful profitability is achieved only because they unfailingly turn out a wonderful product. That comfortable theory wilts before an uncomfortable fact. While first-class newspapers make excellent profits, the profits of third-rate papers are as good or better - as long as either class of paper is dominant within its community. Of course, product quality may have been crucial to the paper in achieving dominance. We believe this was the case at the News, in very large part because of people such as Alfred Kirchhofer who preceded us.
在商業社會中，一家報紙的優勢是極為明顯的。老闆通常相信只有努力推出最好的產品才能維持高利，但是這種令人信服的理論卻被事實打敗。三流報紙可以賺取的高利與一流報紙相比絲毫不遜色甚至更多。只要報紙在當地夠流行，當然產品的品質對於一家報紙提高市場份額來說也至關重要。而我們相信我們的報紙就是如此，而且向Alfred這樣的人能領先我們的原因也是如此。
Once dominant, the newspaper itself, not the marketplace, determines just how good or how bad the paper will be. Good or bad, it will prosper. That is not true of most businesses: inferior quality generally produces inferior economics. But even a poor newspaper is a bargain to most citizens simply because of its 「bulletin board」 value. Other things being equal, a poor product will not achieve quite the level of readership achieved by a first-class product. A poor product, however, will still remain essential to most citizens, and what commands their attention will command the attention of advertisers.
一旦佔市場主導地位，報紙本身而非市場將會決定這份報紙有多好還是有多壞。而不管好壞，都會興旺發展。而在大多數行業這是不正確的：質量低劣的生意一般不好，但即便一份內容貧乏的報紙對大多數討價還價的平民百姓而言仍然有廣告欄的意義。其他條件相同時，一份爛報紙當然無法像一份一流報紙那樣擁有大量的讀者，但對於一般市民卻仍然有用，這可以間接是廣告商認同其存在的價值。
Since high standards are not imposed by the marketplace, management must impose its own. Our commitment to an above-average expenditure for news represents an important quantitative standard. We have confidence that Stan Lipsey and Murray Light will continue to apply the far-more important qualitative standards. Charlie and I believe that newspapers are very special institutions in society. We are proud of the News, and intend an even greater pride to be justified in the years ahead.
由於市場對報紙質量的要求水平並不高，因此管理層必須加強自我管理。在新聞呈現量上，我們承諾其成本高於平均水平。我們也有信心Stan Lipsey和Murray Light會繼續在質量方面提高要求。Charlie和我也相信報業是社會中一個特殊機構。我們以它為傲，期待在未來的日子能夠感到更加的驕傲。
Insurance Operations
保險經營
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table listing two key figures for the insurance industry:
以表是升級版的常用表，列出保險業關鍵的兩個費率：
Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%) | Combined Ratio after Policy-holder Dividends |
1972 | 10.2 | 96.2 |
1973 | 8 | 99.2 |
1974 | 6.2 | 105.4 |
1975 | 11 | 107.9 |
1976 | 21.9 | 102.4 |
1977 | 19.8 | 97.2 |
1978 | 12.8 | 97.5 |
1979 | 10.3 | 100.6 |
1980 | 6 | 103.1 |
1981 | 3.9 | 106 |
1982 | 4.4 | 109.7 |
1983 (Revised) | 4.5 | 111.9 |
1984 (Estimated) | 8.1 | 117.7 |
Source: Best's Aggregates and Averages
來源：Best's Aggregates and Averages
Best's data reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual, and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.
上面數據充分反映了整個保險業的實際情況，包括股票、共同基金以及互惠公司，同保費收入相比，綜合比例（損失加費用）反映了整個保險業成本，若比例低於100則反映承保利潤，反之。
For a number of years, we have told you that an annual increase by the industry of about 10% per year in premiums written is necessary for the combined ratio to remain roughly unchanged. We assumed in making that assertion that expenses as a percentage of premium volume would stay relatively stable and that losses would grow at about 10% annually because of the combined influence of unit volume increases, inflation, and judicial rulings that expand what is covered by the insurance policy.
在過去數年，大約10%的保費年增長率對於保持綜合比率基本不變是非常有必要的。我們假設費用佔保費收入比例不變，而損失則以10%每年的速度增長，這結合了單量增長、通脹以及法院判決擴大理賠範圍政策等因素的影響。
Our opinion is proving dismayingly accurate: a premium increase of 10% per year since 1979 would have produced an aggregate increase through 1984 of 61% and a combined ratio in 1984 almost identical to the 100.6 of 1979. Instead, the industry had only a 30% increase in premiums and a 1984 combined ratio of 117.7. Today, we continue to believe that the key index to the trend of underwriting profitability is the year-to-year percentage change in industry premium volume.
而我們的觀點令人驚奇地被證明是準確的：自1979年保費收入每年以10％的速動上升，這導致至1984年保費收入總共約增加61%，而該年綜合比例差不多為100.6，是1979年的水平。相反，整個行業僅有30%的保費收入增長率，而1984年綜合比例為117.7。今天我們仍舊相信，保費收入的年變動率是反映承包獲利趨勢的關鍵指標。
It now appears that premium volume in 1985 will grow well over 10%. Therefore, assuming that catastrophes are at a 「normal」 level, we would expect the combined ratio to begin easing downward toward the end of the year. However, under our industrywide loss assumptions (i.e., increases of 10% annually), five years of 15%-per-year increases in premiums would be required to get the combined ratio back to 100. This would mean a doubling of industry volume by 1989, an outcome that seems highly unlikely to us. Instead, we expect several years of premium gains somewhat above the 10% level, followed by highly-competitive pricing that generally will produce combined ratios in the 108-113 range.
現在看來1985年的保費增長將超過10％。因此假設不會發生什麼大的災難，我們預期綜合比率將會下降。但是如果根據目前行業損失的估計（即每年增加10％）保費收入必須年連續5年成長15%，才能將綜合比率降到100。這意味著到1989年保費必須增一倍，這似乎不大可能。相反，我們預計幾年的保費收入略高於10％的水平，而在行業競爭激烈的情況下，綜合比率一般會維持在108-113的範圍內。
Our own combined ratio in 1984 was a humbling 134. (Here, as throughout this report, we exclude structured settlements and the assumption of loss reserves in reporting this ratio. Much additional detail, including the effect of discontinued operations on the ratio, appears on pages 42-43). This is the third year in a row that our underwriting performance has been far poorer than that of the industry. We expect an improvement in the combined ratio in 1985, and also expect our improvement to be substantially greater than that of the industry. Mike Goldberg has corrected many of the mistakes I made before he took over insurance operations. Moreover, our business is concentrated in lines that have experienced poorer-than-average results during the past several years, and that circumstance has begun to subdue many of our competitors and even eliminate some. With the competition shaken, we were able during the last half of 1984 to raise prices significantly in certain important lines with little loss of business.
我們自己的綜合比率在1984年是可憐的134。（在這裡不包括結構化安排以及損失準備金的假設。更多的細節包括已終止經營業務比例詳見42—43頁）。我們的承保業務表現已經連續第三個年頭次於行業水平。但我們預計1985年綜合成本率將會有所改善，也希望這種改善能大大超過業界水平。在Mike Goldberg接受保險業前，就已經糾正了很多我犯下的錯誤。此外，我們的業務在過去數年中一直集中在表現不如平均水平的保單上。此外，我們的業務主要集中在線，在過去的幾年裡經歷了較差的高於平均水平的結果，而這種情況有助於擊敗我們的競爭對手甚至是使他們出局。一旦競爭被打破，我們就能夠在1984年下半年顯著提高保費價格而面臨較少的損失。
2013-3-29 工作記錄 Romney 濟南實習
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_9ad4e2650101j7n9.html 主要時間在看書，晚上回到宿舍，做飛亞達歷史的利潤表數據。
手賤刷了一下微博上的年報提示。
看到中信銀行的年報提示可恥的笑了。
中信銀行(601998)28日晚間發佈年報，2012年，公司在審慎增提撥備基礎上，實現淨利潤310.32億元，比上年增長0.69%，撥備前利潤547.13億元，比上年增長12.12%；實現利息淨收入754.86億元，比上年增長15.94%；實現非利息淨收入139.49億元，比上年增長17.79%。
稍微一算，就知道中信銀行提取了128億元貸款減值準備,較去年翻倍。扣除該因素影響後,撥備前利潤同比增速12.12%,仍在已發佈年報的銀行股中最低。
這純是洗澡了，不過想想也是難免的事情。銀監會清理理財產品的規定一出來，正好乘機洗個澡吧。
看到這個消息順手搜索了一點點數據，想起之前讀過的一些論文，有一些很不成熟的想法，在這裡寫一寫。對於銀行股我是大外行，如果說錯了話，大家不要見怪。我所引用的數據也不是我親手做的，所以錯了是正常的。。。。，這裡純粹是一個消遣性質的東西。
1、理財產品的規模
中信證券研究所對於各行理財產品規模的一個估算如下：
上圖雖然看不太清楚，不過大家湊合著看吧，表外理財業務佔比最高的是興業銀行，今天興業銀行跌停板，恩，大家都懂得。
至於工農中建麼，表外理財/資產規模連5%都不到。
負債端上有優勢的銀行，表外理財業務做的一般不會那麼兇猛，至於招行，他的特色業務就是所謂高淨值客戶，啥東西都敢賣，啥東西都能賣。表外理財/資產規模高一點，倒也在意料之中，不過裡頭風險多大，倒是看不太明白了。
由上倒是容易看出，證監會這次板子，是衝著股份制商業銀行下的，股份制商業銀行素來進取心十足，刀頭舔血的事情，也是敢幹的。此次清理理財產品，估摸也是興業華夏這種銀行受到衝擊更大。
至於四大行，估計這一點衝擊還是能消化的了的。
2、理財產品的收入效應和替代效應
年末銀行股大漲，有些人將此事頗歸功於銀監會清理理財產品，這個邏輯也對，理財產品收益率太高，那誰還買股票啊。何況這個風險，表面上遠比股市小了。所以年末銀監會一清理理財產品，很可能原本買理財產品的資金就入了股市了，於是就把A股做上去了。是為清理理財產品的替代效應。
但是這次8號清理理財產品的新規出來，大夥又說暴跌又怪理財產品，這則是因為理財產品的收入效應。畢竟對於銀行來說，理財產品這一塊是大肥肉，尤其是中小股份制銀行，理財產品怕是收入的重要來源吧。
當然，怎麼說都是那些股評家有理，但是有一點或許是對的，理財產品對於股市而言，肯定既有收入效應，也有替代效應。
3、期限結構還是規模——關於銀行業的系統性風險
我想負債的總量當然是一個問題，但是更加要緊的問題是負債的結構。如果負債當中短期負債居多，爆發銀行危機的可能性將大大加大。美帝和日本，為啥負債高企倒是還是沒有出事?人家的負債多是長期負債，這個拖一拖，賬還是能還，一時半會死不了（當然美元的全球貨幣地位更是主因了）。
對於銀行業而言，負債的規模的意義可能不如期限結構的意義來的緊迫，2010年云南城投債那個事情，重點倒不是在於規模，而在於一起到期，城投債的到期的高峰期分別是2011、2012和2013年。
根據徐建國的測算（參見：http://www.cenet.org.cn/article.asp?articleid=60244，《公共債務，資本回報與宏觀經濟基礎》）
有上圖知，2011年出事不足為奇，25%左右的地方債在那裡到期，熬過2013，基本上地方平台貸的風險就會大大下降了。之後隨著經濟總量上去，這點債倒也好說了。
當年四大行的壞賬也是嚇死人，但是經濟總量一上去，加上貨幣超發，一下子就沒那麼嚇人了。
債務這種東西怕的是短期債務，那是鋒利的小刀，可以殺人的。長期債務猶如鈍刀，一時半會殺不了人，當然，搞久了，也可以壓死人了。