📖 ZKIZ Archives

企業分析 vs 證券分析 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/01/vs.html

2000 Berkshire Chairman's Letter :

Our main business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand
Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.


******
萬法歸宗﹐以上巴老的原則﹐其實可以作為企業分析的原則﹐不局限於保險股。

(1) the amount of float that the business generates;
我們可以把它想像成企業的盈利

(2) its cost;
企業付出的成本(原料﹑員工﹑管理﹑資本等等)

(3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
以上兩個項目的未來變化(即係企業的前景)


證券分析﹐亦是如此
(1) the amount of float that the business generates;
盈利和股息 (公司表現佳﹐經營團隊杰出﹐它的股價遲早會反映其價值)

(2) its cost;
預留安全的價格空間﹐以合理價格買進好公司﹐比好價錢買進平庸公司好多了。決定要靠邏輯和理性。

(3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
把注意力放在可預期前景的公司上。長期一貫營業歷史﹑前景看好﹑基本上生產同樣產品給同樣市場的公司﹐就可以知道這些公司的未來如何。


安全空間﹑承諾﹑低價﹑良好的前景。

A Framework for Investment Success 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/01/framework-for-investment-success.html

不認識Seth Klarman﹖無所謂﹐只要知道他是價值法中的猛人之一就可以了﹐是絕版書“Margin of Safety”之作者﹐是Baupost Group之渣fit人。當然﹐他也是我的老師。

他認為投資勝利之道﹐在於﹕

• 了解自己
• 了解其他人

先了解自己是股海中最卑微的參與者﹐其他人都是勤勞能幹而且是精英中的天才。要在這樣的圈子出人頭地﹐“你”的絕世武器是﹕

1. 能夠長期投資的資金
2. 確立你的投資哲理
3. 重量級的知識
4. 人脈關係
5. 對價值法原則瞭如指掌
   

這個世界根本沒有十全十美的投資秘訣﹐證券的回報好像零和游戲﹐你的回報超越大市是因為你犯的錯誤比別人少。所以股市賺錢之路﹐在於做到賺多虧少，對多錯少，就可以達到累計財富的終極目標。所以要做到“有把握”﹐首先就要避免自犯錯誤。

這是能夠長期保留在股市的資金﹐是不怕被生活所逼而需要賣股。沒有參與高杠杆投機﹐就沒有被逼斬倉的可能。很多錯誤是自找的﹐並不是別人硬推給你﹐正所謂自做孽不可恕。

步行于濃密的森林中，船只航行於茫茫的大海上，飛機在黑夜中穿洲越洋，假如没有指南針或方向儀的引導，都會迷失方向，无法達到目的地。缺乏明确的投資哲理作为引導﹐在股市中搶進殺出，表面上是很努力，實際上是在兜圈子，最後是徒勞無功。這種投資方式，犯錯誤的機率很大。

廣泛的人脈關係﹐是為了方便了解各行業經營的特點和週期循環﹐再加上自修﹐才能建立重量級的知識。有深度的知識﹐才能協助我們分辨是非﹐減少犯錯誤的機率。

我相信價值投資法﹐所以我的投資策略雖然更新﹐但是仍然以價值作為根本。

先了解然後管理好自己﹐就已經站在不敗(不可勝)。
那麼接下來能做的是了解其他人﹐如果他們犯錯﹐我們是否能趁機而入。
所以決定勝負的是EQ﹐而不是IQ。

************
By Seth Klarman :

Two elements are vital in designing an investment approach for long-term success. First, answer the question, ''what's your edge?" In highly competitive financial markets, with thousands of very smart, hardworking participants, what will enable you to reliably outperform the field? Your toolkit is critically important: truly long-term capital; a flexible approach that enables you to move opportunistically across a broad array of markets, securities, and asset classes; deep industry knowledge; strong sourcing relationships; and a solid grounding in value investing principles.

But because investing is, in many ways, a zero-sum activity in which your returns above the market indices are derived from the mistakes, overreactions or inattention of others as much as from your own clever insights, there is a second element in designing a sound investment approach: you must consider the competitive landscape and the behavior of other market participants. As in football, you are well-advised to take advantage of what your opponents give you: if they are defending the run, passing is probably your best option, even if you have a star running back. If scores of other investors are rigidly committed to fast-growing technology stocks, your brilliant tech analyst may not be able to help you outperform. If your competitors are not paying attention to, or indeed are dumping, Greek equities or U.S. housing debt, these asset classes may be worth your attention, regardless of the currently poor fundamentals that are driving others' decisions. Where to best apply your focus and skills depends partially on where others are applying theirs.

When observing your competitors, your focus should be on their approach and process, not their results. Short-term performance envy causes many of the shortcomings that lock most investors into a perpetual cycle of underachievement. You should watch your competitors not out of jealousy, but out of respect, and focus your efforts not on replicating others' portfolios, but on looking for opportunities where they are not.

Much of the investment business is centered around asset-gathering activities. In a field dominated by a short-term, relative performance orientation, significant underperformance is disastrous for retention of assets, while mediocre performance is not. Thus, because protracted periods of underperformance can threaten one's business, most investment firms aim for assured, trend-following mediocrity while shunning the potential achievement of strong outperformance. The only way for investors to significantly outperform is to periodically stand far apart from the crowd, something few are willing or able to do.

In addition, most traditional investors are limited by a variety of constraints: narrow skill-sets, legal restrictions contained in investment prospectuses or partnership agreements, or psychological inhibitions. High-grade bond funds can only purchase investment-grade bonds; when a bond falls below BBB, they are typically forced to sell (or think that they should), regardless of price. When a mortgage security is downgraded because it will not return par to its holders, a large swath of potential purchasers will not even consider buying it, and many must purge it. When a company omits a cash dividend, some equity funds are obliged to sell that stock. And, of course, when a stock is deleted from an index, it must immediately be dumped by many. Sometimes, a drop in a stock's price is reason enough for some holders to sell. Such behavior often creates supply-demand imbalances where bargains can be found. The dimly lit comers and crevasses existing outside of mainstream mandates may contain opportunity. Given that time is often an investor's scarcest resource, filling one’s in-box with the most compelling potential opportunities that others are forced to or choose to sell (or are constrained from buying) makes great sense.

Price is perhaps the single most important criterion in sound investment decision making. Every security or asset is a "buy" at one price, a “hold” at a higher price, and a "sell" at some still higher price. Yet most investors in all asset classes love simplicity, rosy outlooks, and the prospect of smooth sailing. They prefer what is performing well to what has recently lagged, often regardless of price. They prefer full buildings and trophy properties to fixer-uppers that need to be filled, even though empty or unloved buildings may be the far more compelling, and even safer, investments. Because investors are not usually penalized for adhering to conventional practices, doing so is the less professionally risky strategy, even though it virtually guarantees against superior performance.

Finally, most investors feel compelled to be fully invested at all times – principally because evaluation of their performance is both frequent and relative. For them, it is almost as if investing were merely a game and no client's hardearned money was at risk. To require full investment all the time is to remove an important tool from investors' toolkits: the ability to wait patiently for compelling opportunities that may arise in the future. Moreover, an investor who is too worried about missing out on the upside of a potential investment may be exposing himself to substantial downside risk precisely when valuation is extended. A thoughtful investment approach focuses at least as much on risk as on return. But in the moment-by-moment frenzy of the markets, all the pressure is on generating returns, risk be damned.

What drives long-term investment success? In the Internet era, everyone has a voluminous amount of information but not everyone knows how to use it. A well-considered investment process – thoughtful, intellectually honest, team oriented, and single-mindedly focused on making good investment decisions at every turn – can make all of the difference. Investors with short time horizons are oblivious to kernels of information that may influence investment outcomes years from now. Everyone can ask questions, but not everyone can identify the right questions to ask. Everyone searches for opportunity, but most look only where the searching is straightforward even if undeniably highly competitive.

In the markets of late 2008, everything was for sale as investors were caught in a contagion of selling due to panic, margin calls, and investor redemptions. Even while modeling very conservative scenarios, many securities could have been purchased at extremely attractive prices – if one had capital with which to buy them and the stamina to hold them in the face of falling prices. By late 2010, froth had returned to the markets, as investors with short-term relative performance orientations sought to keep up with the herd. Exuberant buying had replaced frenzied selling, as investors purchased securities offering limited returns even on far rosier economic assumptions.

Most investors take comfort from calm, steadily rising markets; roiling markets can drive investor panic. But these conventional reactions are inverted. When all feels calm and prices surge, the markets may feel safe; but, in fact, they are dangerous because few investors are focusing on risk. When one feels in the pit of one's stomach the fear that accompanies plunging market prices, risk-taking becomes considerably less risky, because risk is often priced into an asset's lower market valuation. Investment success requires standing apart from the frenzy – the short-term, relative performance game played by most investors.

Investment success also requires remembering that securities prices are not blips on a Bloomberg terminal but are fractional interests in – or claims on – companies. Business fundamentals, not price quotations, convey useful information. With so many market participants fixated on short-term investment performance, successful investing requires a focus not on how one is doing, but on corporate balance sheets and income and cash flow statements.

旺鋪﹑靚企業 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/01/blog-post_16.html

我的資金是有限的，所以，除了比較各種投資的回酬率，然后將資金投注在回酬較高及增值較快的資產，更需要加上股息再投資﹐才有機會提早財務自主。

復 利增长具有創造財富的神奇力量。不要小看數目微小的股息﹐小錢一樣是錢。从短期来说，并不会有明顯的數目，但在十年、二十年之后，總數可能增加一倍。復利 的神奇力量，是在后期才發揮出来的。我非常喜歡股息高﹑股息穩定﹑股息每年有成長的企業。我只要能把股息再投資在幾家這樣的公司﹐是可以加速財富的累計速 度。我不需要自掏錢包﹐但是未來收入反而越大。


你會購買没有租金﹑租不出去的店鋪嗎？
購買了一間店鋪，長期租不出去，反而每個月要負担分期付款。

同樣的情形，購買股票如果没有股息收入的話，將使我的收支不平衡。
試想將大筆資金投注在没有入息的資產，生活變得捉襟見肘，壓力至生病﹐即使將来能賺到大錢，也是不值得﹐畢竟健康最重要。

如果有穩定的股息收入的话，我們可以把股票視為店鋪，股息視為租金，這樣才可以長期收藏，就好像長期持有店鋪一樣。

必须重視的因素﹕

1. 合理的股息，太低的話﹐表示我們付出太大的代價
2. 股息波動太大而且沒有連續增加的股票﹐不够資格被視为店鋪﹐
3. 旺鋪才可能年年加租。股息年年增加﹐可能就是靚企業

養成好習慣 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post.html

天堂還是地獄，只是一念之間而已。

股票是金礦還是墳墓﹐只是一念之間而已。

好習慣生好念頭﹐壞習慣生壞念頭。

多閱讀與善知識有關的書﹐就能明辨習慣的好壞。明辨習慣的好壞﹐就是瞭解自己的強弱之處﹐才不會做出以卵擊石﹑飛蛾撲火的事情。

改掉壞習慣，從養成好習慣開始。

• 把投資股票當成投資事業﹐在市場波動中找尋有利可圖的機會﹐並預留安全的價格空間。買股票就是買進事業。
• 投資行為是經過嚴謹的分析之後﹐在保證本金安全前提下追求滿意的報酬﹐而不符這個要求的操作方式便稱為投機。
• 決定價值的因素是「未來賺錢的能力」﹐預估收益並乘以一個恰當的倍數﹐就可以找出價值。但是收入的穩定﹑資產﹑股息﹐以及財務狀況都會有影響﹐這個倍數的大小。
• 以合理價格買進好公司﹐比好價錢買進平庸公司好多了。
• 市場時常打亂股價﹐通常由人的恐懼與貪婪情緒主導。
• 不因為群眾不認同﹐而左右你的判斷﹐你對了是因為你的資料和理由正確。
• 我想要的事業必須是我懂的﹑由我喜歡的人經營﹐而且價格與公司的前景相對能吸引人。
• 即使是笨蛋經營也能賺錢。
• 在你的能力範圍內投資﹐重點不在範圍要多大﹐而是你如何界定範圍。
• 只要避免犯大錯﹐投資人並不需要做什麼事。投資能夠優於平均﹐多半是來自做些平常的事。關鍵是要把平常事做得極好。
• 重點在於穩定一致﹐避免基本方面常改變的公司。
• 最重要是明白環繞公司的護城河有多大。當然是座大城堡﹐還有養著食人魚與鱷魚的護城河。
• 不要和壞人合股做事。
• 資金的運用將決定股東的價值﹐決定要靠邏輯和理性。
• 會計報告的原則﹐是幫助我們理解﹕公司的價值﹑償債能力﹑管理人的能力。報告的品質反映了管理人的品格﹐我們應該慎重看待。
• 評估人時﹐要看三種品質﹕品格﹑智慧﹑活力。少了品格﹐另兩項會害死你。
• 讀我屬意的公司的年報﹐也看競爭同業的年報。這是主要的資訊來源。
• 付出的是價格﹐得到的是價值。
• 把注意力放在可預期前景的公司上。長期一貫營業歷史﹑前景看好﹑基本上生產同樣產品給同樣市場的公司﹐就可以知道這些公司的未來如何。
• 專著於經營得當的公司﹐通常這些公司未來成功的機率比較高。
• 安全空間﹑承諾﹑低價(拆扣)﹑良好的前景。
• 如果你是懂一點的投資人﹐看得懂公司的經濟狀況並找出5到10家股價合理的公司﹐握有重要的長期競爭優勢﹐你根本不用理會人雲亦雲的分散投資。
• 公司表現佳﹐經營團隊傑出﹐它的股價遲早會反映其價值。

以上是我認同的好習慣﹐可以成為在股市生存的利器。這種利器需要慢﹑定﹑觀﹑長﹐才能法力無邊。

• 慢是指不玩短線﹑不短期預測﹑動作少。不涉及這些﹐就等於不賭﹐無形中就不會九輸。
• 定是指投資要像任公子釣魚﹐長年培養投資能力﹑等待的耐心﹑拚搏大魚的膽量。
• 觀是指觀察﹐每一個企業都有價值﹐是否會兌現﹖是否變樣﹖長期細心觀察是必要的功夫。
• 長 是指長期﹐價值需要時間去創造，不能一蹴即成。果子需要時間成熟，樹木需要時間成長，同樣的，生意需要時間去完成。生意是一種過程，從買原料，製成產品、 銷售、收 帳，每個環節都需要時間去完成，需要按步就班進行，絕無魔術可變。你必須給時間讓你所投資的公司去完成這個過程，為你創造價值。

可長期持有的三類股票 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post_11.html

可長期持有股票分為三大類﹐即﹕

• 獲利能力強的企業
• 成長型的企業
• 具有差異化優勢的企業

不以股價上漲或下跌的幅度作為判斷是否應該持有或是賣出的標準﹐應該取決於經營的業績。賣出的唯一標準是獲利能力的持續﹐而不是股價上漲或下跌。

這樣的方式將會迫使投資人思考企業長期遠景而不是短期的股價表現﹐而且進行這種思考有助於改善投資組合的績效。

就長期而言﹐投資的回報取決於企業未來的獲利能力。
如果企業的獲利能力發生暫時性變化﹐但不影響它的長期獲利能力﹐是可以繼續持有它的股份。
如果發生根本性變化﹐應該豪不猶豫賣出。

以九流價錢投資這三類企業的股票﹐必然獲得豐厚的回報﹐不僅保證本金的安全﹐也有益身心的健康。

這三類企業的股票有一個共同點就是﹕
回報隨著歲月增加﹐雖然發生暫時性變化﹐可是很快的又追上來。
如果發現有這樣現像﹐意味著買對企業了。

我個人歷淺﹐認為渣打﹑領匯﹑恆隆屬於以上三類股票。

對於激成﹐我認為它在管制方面需要做出更多的改善﹐就能讓它的價值更快釋放出來。

長期持有﹐不是永遠持有 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post_13.html

長期持有﹐不是永遠持有

對某個企業的股票選擇長期持股不買﹐關鍵在於

• 了解它的收入來源﹑資產﹑財務
• 對它的前景有強烈的信心
• 管理層對股東老實
• 已經便宜買入
  
• 投資的回報中上﹐隨着歲月增加﹐雖然發生暫時性變化﹐可是很快的又追上來。

所以繼續持有的強烈信心是建立在理性的基礎。


一時的暴利並不代表長期的盈利﹐而經常的微利卻可以轉化成長期的巨大收益。

長期持有的前提是
隨時關注企業的基本面及盈利狀況﹐如果會嚴重惡化﹐就應當及時賣出手中的股票了。


長期持有並非永久持有

• 因為在持有的過程中﹐可以不斷觀察和了解企業的發展狀況﹐以決定持股的期限
• 因此有些暫時持有的股票很有可能會變成長期持有﹐而原來長期持有的股票也可能會被賣出。

不隨隨便便投資 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post_23.html

投資成功的關鍵在於挑選對的企業之後﹐在適當的時機﹐以便宜的價格買入後﹐只要企業還是經營妥當﹐就可以長期持有。要在股市賺錢﹐說易不易﹐說難不難。

急于讓自己手中的錢變成股票﹐再變成錢﹐其實是很難賺到錢。

對待投資應當像對待婚姻一樣慎重﹐像國與國之間的不輕易開戰﹐像愛護自己生命一樣。每個人必須自己承擔投資的風險。管理自己的組合和選擇喜歡的優秀公司都非常重要的﹔因為拿錢出來投資是為了致富﹐而不是想在股市中尋找刺激。

我在路上開車﹐明白[能]和[不能控制的風險]。不能控制的風險﹐例如公路品質﹑天氣﹑其他司機的駕駛態度﹐我是戒慎加虔誠禱告。能控制的風險﹐例如儘量在白天開車﹑恰當的速度﹑小心駕駛等等﹐我是百分百遵守和管理妥當。

投資也是一樣﹐要先要明白[能]和[不能控制的風險]。
我能做到的是﹕

• 挑選我明白業務的企業
• 挑選能繼續賺錢的企業
• 挑選經濟好壞都能賺錢的企業
  
• 挑選誠實的管理人
• 以便宜的價格買入
• 耐心等待價值成長
• 長期閱讀它的報告
• 長期觀察它的業績和財務
  
• 時常閱讀好書
  

至于[不能控制的風險]﹐以上我所做得已經把[不能控制的風險]降至低點﹐剩下的唯有戒慎加虔誠禱告。

分散投資風險是必要的﹐但是把它當成投資的主旨卻是不正確的。
降低風險的策略應該是小心謹慎地把資金分配在想要投資的企業上﹐要投資哪些企業以及用什麼價格買進。

以合理價買入經營卓越企業﹐能減少發生損失的機率。

絕不要隨隨便便投資﹐同時投資和持有時要慎重。

無題 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post_26.html

值投資有甚麼可能會死的？價值投資根本就是平買，正價賣。數學角度來看平買，正價賣永遠都是賺錢的。問題就是在分析員的strengths and personality。Many analysts/investors don't even stick to the value discipline of buying cheap. They just buy anything with some sort of speculative potential in hopes of earning more than the fair value they have paid. In fact a lot of them don't even know the value of what they are buying into! Value investing is hard, speculation is easy(in terms of difficulty, not money making potential)...no wonder most investors fail.

********
個人淺見﹐把價值投資的根本說是低買高賣﹐似乎不足夠。我認為應該擁有實業家的胸懷和眼光﹐即係要把自己當成是生意合伙人﹐對投資的生意當然要儘量去了解﹐前景和困境當然要儘量去了解﹐財務狀況當然要儘量去了解。

股價向上升﹐是很難分辨手中的股票哪一個是投資﹑哪一個是投機﹔唯有股價大跌﹐股市氣氛慘淡﹐我們心生恐懼的時候﹐這時候如果我們能夠冷靜克服心魔﹐冷靜分析手中的企業﹐你將發現真真了解的企業﹐其實是很少的。

所謂真了解﹕

• 財務數字(價值)
• 前景
• 困境仍然能賺錢
• 管理人誠實

如果你有勇氣進行資金分配﹐減少不了解的企業﹐增加了解企業的部位﹐你才算是擁有實業家的胸懷。

你了解的企業價值繼續成長﹐市值不斷增加﹐當世界恢復正常後﹐市值果然超越了你的成本﹐你你才算是擁有實業家的眼光。

當然﹐世界恢復正常後﹐不了解的企業的市值也有可能恢復﹐或者超越你了解的企業。你不應該感到懊惱或後悔﹐因為在最糟糕的時期﹐你已經準備要買掉全部股票﹐就是因為你保存了這種理智﹐留下了對的企業﹐甚至加重部位﹐現在你才能賺到錢。

胸懷和眼光並不是天生的﹐只要我們平時多用心學習是能夠培養的。

價值投資法是先難後易﹐其實[難]就在理智﹐如果我們能夠保持正確投資觀念﹐其實[難]只是在第一步罷了。

投機是先易後難﹐後續的操作和判斷上存有很大的失誤率。對我而言﹐我是十之八九會犯錯。

只要少錯多對﹐就有好成就。

2011年 Charlie and I 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/03/2011-charlie-and-i.html

http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2011ltr.pdf

In my early days I, too, rejoiced when the market rose. Then I read Chapter Eight of Ben
Graham’s The Intelligent Investor, the chapter dealing with how investors should view fluctuations in stock prices. Immediately the scales fell from my eyes, and low prices became my friend. Picking up that book was one of the luckiest moments in my life.

一只牛：
我是窮牛，當我已經全部買入，市場大升，我會很開心，然後我希望天價賣出。
人生不如意十之八九，哪有可能行運一條龍？尤其是一隻牛。
【The Intelligent Investor】--Investor and Market Fluactuation，並不難懂，平價是好朋友，波動是好朋友，人人都懂。為何大跌市，好股大平賣，卻不敢買入？這是不是似懂非懂？為何股價波動了幾 個%，就急着止賺/止蝕，我們是不是似懂非懂？我要多謝Graham，我才能接觸善知識。

In the end, the success of our IBM investment will be determined primarily by its future earnings. But an important secondary factor will be how many shares the company purchases with the substantial sums it is likely to devote to this activity. And if repurchases ever reduce the IBM shares outstanding to 63.9 million, I will abandon my famed frugality and give Berkshire employees a paid holiday.

一只牛：
企業的價值是建立在

• 未來盈利
• 聰明的管理股東權益（例如回購股份）

我發現，未來盈利：

• 獲利能力強
• 成長
• 差異化優勢
  

聰明的管理股東權益：

• excellent management
• 誠實（小股東能分享）
  

Insurance
In most years, including 2011, the industry’s premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some extraordinary insurance operations. Let me tell you about the major units.

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must
(1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses;
(2) conservatively evaluate the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does;
(3) set a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and
(4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that their competitors are eagerly writing.

一只牛：
如果保險公司是由傻仔打理，後果不堪想像。
就算是國內最大的保險商，由傻仔打理，後果也是不堪想像。

各行各業，哪有競爭不激烈的？
有哪一個上班族沒有壓力？
如果公司是傻仔打理，唯有自求多福。


Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

A key characteristic of both companies is the huge investment they have in very long-lived, regulated assets,

Both businesses have earning power that even under terrible business conditions amply
covers their interest requirements.
BNSF’s interest coverage was 9.5x.

At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two key factors ensure its ability to service debt under all
circumstances: The stability of earnings that is inherent in our exclusively offering an essential service and a diversity of earnings streams, which shield it from the actions of any single regulatory body.

Measured by ton-miles, rail moves 42% of America’s inter-city freight, and BNSF moves more than any other railroad – about 37% of the industry total. A little math will tell you that about 15% of all inter-city ton-miles of freight in the U.S. is transported by BNSF. It is no exaggeration to characterize railroads as the circulatory system of our economy. Your railroad is the largest artery.

Massive investments of the sort that BNSF is making would be foolish if it could not earn appropriate returns on the incremental sums it commits.

MidAmerican, 89.8% owned by Berkshire, supplies 2.5 million customers in the U.S. with electricity, operating as the largest supplier in Iowa, Utah and Wyoming and as an important provider in six other states as well. Our pipelines transport 8% of the country’s natural gas. Obviously, many millions of Americans depend on us every day. They haven’t been disappointed.

一只牛：
投資公用企業，就要預算它的龐大資本支出，隨時要有出差錯的準備。
所以利息保障比率，我們要懂得計。你看，BNSF’s interest coverage was 9.5x.

投資公用企業，就要選最厲害的，最厲害的才能形成壟斷局勢，才能成為強大。


Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business being purchased or the future economics of the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes my eyesight has been poor.

Overall, the intrinsic value of the businesses in this Berkshire sector significantly exceeds their book value. For many of the smaller companies, however, this is not true. I have made more than my share of mistakes buying small companies. Charlie long ago told me, “If something’s not worth doing at all, it’s not worth doing well,” and I should have listened harder. In any event, our large purchases have generally worked well – extraordinarily well in a few cases – and overall this sector is a winner for us.

一只牛：
原來，巴菲特也是時常犯錯，但是他的犯錯成本非常細小，做對的回報卻很大。

我個人認為，十強之內的企業，找到對的公司的機會很高（它們就是因為做對了，才能在十強之內）。

地產佬致股東函 一只牛的投資日記

http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/03/blog-post.html
自中央政府長時間以多項市場及行政措施遏抑房價後，交易量終於在去年八月左右萎縮；其後不久，價格開始下跌。待至去年第四季時，許多房地產商均出現財困，包括小型及部分大型房地產公司。這是我們意料之內，但或許來得較我們預期為快。

對 此，我們還是感到欣喜，因為熊市到來之際，本集團仍坐擁豐厚財力。一直以來，我們是財力最強的地產公司之一。二零一零年十一月，集團配股集資港幣一百一十 億元， 其時頗多人質疑， 甚或譏諷說：「你們已有大量現金，還要那麼多錢幹啥？」提出此問題的人，明顯並非地產專家，至少不是好的地產專家，否則應知熊市遲早會重臨，而我們乃作好 準備以便趁低價買地。手頭有充裕的現金，可讓我們更放心出價。

一只牛：
經營環境轉壞，同行（競爭者）出現財困。
我們準備趁低價買地，因為我們已經作好準備了，手頭有充裕的現金，可讓我們更放心出價。

事 實正是如此。去年九月底，本集團在西南地區的最大城市昆明購入其中一幅地點最佳的黃金地塊。該幅土地於六月首次推出拍賣，當時有四家內地公司和包括本集團 在內的兩家外商參與競投。坦白說，我們認為勝算不高，因為我們從未在激烈競價中勝出。幸好，由於技術性原因，當地政府在開始前已取消有關拍賣。待至九月底 該幅土地再次推出時，所有內地地產商均消聲匿跡。市場開始下挫，融資轉趨緊張，僅有一家新加坡公司和本集團留在戰團。因此，我們知道勝算有望，但亦知道即 使成功投得地塊，價錢亦不算便宜。倘再遲一點，例如數個月後才舉行拍賣，那麼唯一的競爭對手亦可能會退出，該項交易會更加相宜。但賣地時間不由我們決定， 乃由擁有該幅土地的政府操控。

該幅土地其中一個吸引之處，就是不存在土地拆遷的風險。該處原為市政府辦公大樓， 現已他遷。再者，我們留意該地塊已有多年，對其所知甚詳。事實上，董事局兩年前在昆明開會時，本人亦曾向董事局成員介紹該地塊。昆明是一個經濟蓬勃的城 市，而該地塊堪稱瑰寶，倘我們不掌握時機，有可能永遠失之交臂。因此我們出價競投，並以可接受的價錢投得。

昆明除了是鐵路和公路的交匯點外，亦是一個航運中心。在全國最繁忙的機場中，昆明機場名列第七位；待新機場於今年稍後啟用時，其排名可望上升至第四位。據說，中央政府已把昆明劃定為中國四大國際空運樞紐城市之一，其餘三地為北京、上海及廣州。

一只牛：
10年前，管理人的策略就是以平價買入黃金地點並且建立最好的商場，然後持有收租至今。
公司的價值增長=地點的價值增長+租金增長+重複有效的策略
10年後的今天，管理人認為這個策略仍然有效，所以始終如一的奉行。


本集團不從事住房開發。我們至今仍強烈認為，傳統房地產商的思維和運作模式 — 買入大型的地塊、興建千萬計平方米的住宅，是一門講求規模和速度的遊戲，並非集團的強項，我們只希望在質量和高單位價格方面競爭。

倘為市中心的綜合發展項目，住宅則成為我們必然之選。試想想，如果一個豪宅項目建於世界級購物商場的上蓋或毗鄰，同時又鄰近市內最優質的高層辦公樓，其單位價格會是多少？答案是高踞市內最高之列。不管是出租的服務式寓所，還是銷售住宅， 我們也樂於做這門生意。

經 過多番內部討論後，我們至今一直恪守原則，專注本集團的強項，亦即商用物業項目，而增值利益留給他人享受。但時至今天，綜合發展項目已日漸成為政府規範， 趨使我們兼享這些潛在增值利益，我們當然樂於聽命！畢竟，愈多人在集團的購物商場毗鄰居住，愈可帶來更多零售銷量。無論從甚麽角度來看，我們都是贏家。

一只牛：
我們只希望在質量和高單位價格方面競爭，因為這是我們的強項。我們對量大利小的生意不感興趣。


我們只能把每項物業出售一次！一如既往，我們會耐心窺準適當時機以求取得最大利潤。

一只牛：
好企業的每一張股票只能出售一次！我們會耐心窺準適當時機以求取得最大利潤。


未來十年將每年平均落成二十九萬平方米的建築總面積（包括停車場），其面積相等於每年落成一幢美國帝國大廈有餘。部分人謂恒隆保守，但本人認為，此舉實在頗為進取！本集團堅持財政保守，但這絕不代表策略保守。

如何在財務上持盈保泰， 又同時在策略上積極進取地從迅速增長的市場中抓緊最佳機遇？ 這是一
個 有趣的問題。我們的做法是信守地產業老生常談的格言， 堅持「低買高賣」。這談何容易？大部分市場參與者均以高價買入以求更高價賣出， 我們不會自負如斯，皆因市道無常， 一旦暴挫便殆無緩衝。過去二十年， 我們不斷學習以求準確掌握市場時機， 至今成績斐然。再者， 我們一直奉行行內的金科玉律 — 「location，location，location」， 即只買最佳位置的地塊，這亦令我們有別於大部分競爭對手。能緊守兩大基本規則的發展商何其少， 這確實令人驚訝！

一只牛：
財務上持盈保泰， 策略上積極（精明理財）
堅持「低買高賣」
只買最佳位置的地塊（企業）


部分人士質疑我們財政保守，並建議我們派發特別現金股息回饋股東。基於多個原因，管理層不應這樣做。事實上，我對這些人說，倘我們這樣做，他們應沽售本集團的股票。集團處於優越地位 — 我們具備經驗，並擁有已建立好的團隊和品牌 — 這足以讓我們好好掌握本世紀初的一個最大商機，就是在中國的城市化和本地消費熱潮中大展拳腳。倘把資金回饋股東，意味著管理層不能抓緊機遇，這是沽售本集團股份的有力原因！

在美國，本地消費佔整體經濟活動逾七成；在中國則低於百分之三十五。鑑於中國經濟正在增長，若其消費所佔的份額與美國的距離能收窄一半，已可為本集團的購物商場業務帶來豐厚利潤。

從 數據上分析，倘有一天我們總額達港幣六百七十億元的新投資項目， 收益率能接近現時的上海項目， 其每年帶來的利潤將甚為可觀。上海兩個項目約於十二年前開業，現時每年的無槓桿收益率接近百分之四十，我相信這個回報率可以重演。倘如是，上述數字顯示， 隨著我們的商用物業逐一成功開業及錄得租金增長，本集團的前景將甚為輝煌。我認為，鮮有地產公司在可持續溢利增長方面，能有這樣的確定性或規模。

一只牛：
股價的動力不應該是止賺/蝕的念頭。
前景+盈利+管理，才是正念。


香港金鐘廊的租約及續訂管理合約招標中沒有中標。我們自一九八一年政府首次推出該項熱點物業開始，一直負責有關的物業管理。就財政而言，該物業帶來的收益對本集團微不足道。加上項目已老化，需斥資作出大量維修及翻新；而政府是次定出的合約租期乃歷來最短，並不值得
我們冒險和花功夫。