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Private bank夢想折戟 「女王銀行」RBS入華四年盛衰

http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2011-8-5/4NMDcyXzM1NTI4Ng.html

蘇格蘭皇家銀行(The Royal Bank of Scotland,RBS)總部設在愛丁堡,不僅是英國最大的銀行,在整個歐洲,也堪稱大鱷。她的歷史,足夠輝煌。

2000年,RBS耗資210億英鎊,將比自己資本規模大3倍的國民西敏寺銀行(National Westminster Bank,NatWest)納入麾下,這單收購也讓RBS獲得了NatWest旗下著名私人銀行Coutts及其海外分支。

Coutts創建於1692年,由於為英國皇室提供服務,又被稱為「女王銀行」,擁有超過300年的私人銀行運作經驗。

2003 年10月,RBS以2.28億英鎊的對價,通過子公司Coutts收購德國裕寶聯合銀行(Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG)旗下私人銀行Bank von Ernst Cie AG(下稱Bank von Ernst)。Bank von Ernst於1869年成立,總部位於蘇黎世。

2008年1月,Coutts國際業務正式更名為蘇格蘭皇家顧資銀行(RBS Coutts)。現在,蘇格蘭皇家顧資銀行(RBS Coutts)凝聚了歐洲兩家最資深的私人銀行所積累的專業知識和數個世紀的私人銀行運作經驗,其亞洲業務則在新加坡和香港紮根。

以 NatWest在中國的首筆業務來計算,RBS在中國的歷史已經有100多年。2004年1月,蘇格蘭皇家銀行上海代表處成功升級為分行,之後北京代表處 也於2007年8月升級為分行。截至 2010 年底,RBS在中國境內共設立5家分行10家支行,但其業務主要優勢主要集中於批發銀行及投資銀行業務。

然而,「女王銀行」在中國大陸的發展卻一路坎坷。

小試牛刀

2007年3月,RBS與中行合作,在上海開設私人銀行。這在當時被看做是銀行業的一次新的變革和轉型,為私人銀行的發展提供了一種新的策略模式。

RBS 派出旗下的私人銀行分支Coutts為中行提供技術指導。但根據協議,雙方只是進行低層次的契約型合作,RBS僅負責中行私人銀行的招聘培訓、薪酬等級確 定、組織架構、運營模式等各項事宜,中行的私人銀行也並未涉及RBS的後台產品設計的合作,儘管產品的規劃、設計才是私人銀行的核心競爭力之一。

按 照最初的合作意向,RBS希望與中行成立專門的私人銀行合資公司,但因RBS收購荷蘭銀行而致使談判暫時擱置。2007年底,雙方的合作開始出現問題,在 私人理財業務方面,RBS與中行的合作模式僅限於RBS向中行派顧問進行指導,原先設想的私人銀行合資公司,一直沒有成行。

2009年1月,RBS開始拋售其所持有的108億股中行H股,2個月後,中行對外宣佈,雙方仍保持正常的銀行合作,但戰略合作夥伴關係已經結束。Coutts則繼續在香港提供離岸私人銀行服務。

荷銀,不能承受之重

2007年10月,RBS財團完成一項重要收購——以約710億歐元的對價買下荷蘭銀行(ABN AMRO,下稱荷銀)。RBS集團財報指,通過此項收購,RBS獲得370萬新的零售客戶。

收 購完成後,RBS接收了荷銀的亞洲業務,包括荷銀在中國的13家分支機構、員工以及客戶和市場。RBS中國承繼了原荷銀(中國)業務條線結構,分設環球銀 行與市場部、環球現金管理及貿易融資部、工商金融服務部、零售金融服務部四大業務部門。在零售銀行方面,荷銀持有衍生產品執照、是合格境外機構投資者 (QFII),可投資國內股票市場、同時為中國外匯交易中心系統中的做市商。

然而,幾個月後,整合中的RBS就受到了金融危機的嚴重打擊。2008年度財報顯示,RBS集團當年稅前虧損高達407億美元。反思之後,2009年2月,RBS宣佈其戰略重整計劃,決定在中國逐步退出零售及中小企業金融業務。

2010 年12月,RBS與星展銀行簽署「零元受讓」協議,將RBS在上海、北京和深圳三地的零售及中小企業金融業務的客戶群、業務組合和相關員工轉移至星展銀行 (中國),但不涉及RBS在這三地的分支行轉讓。這項協議為業務轉移協議,並非兼併收購,不涉及任何現金投資,也不存在任何代償性補充協議。根據協 議,RBS約25000戶客戶及價值約9億美元的存款和理財產品將由星展銀行(中國)接收。

2010年底,星展銀行(中國)正式啟動接手蘇格蘭皇家銀行(RBS)在華零售及中小企業業務。

如今,這家老牌英資銀行在中國內地,僅經營批發業務及投行業務——4年後,RBS私人銀行業務又重新回到了起點。

Private bank 夢想 折戟 女王 銀行 RBS 入華 華四 四年 盛衰
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China's private sector still in shadow of the state 張化橋

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_50c88c400101o93k.html

China's private sector still in the shadow of the state

   South China Morning Post,19 Dec. 2013

In an essay published eight years ago (Financial Times;October 5, 2005), I said that China's private sector was in theshadow of the state.

I can make the same argument today with one significantdifference: the state sector's dominance in China has grownconsiderably in the last eight years.

The last decade has almost completely undone the reforms of thetwo previous decades.

The consensus in the West is that China's state sector iscorrupt, inefficient and ideologically inferior, so it must belosing ground against private enterprise which is steadily chippingaway at the communist, state-backed old guard.

That is just not the case.

The playing field is unfair andaligned against the private sector. Moreover, there are many hybridjoint venture companies in China that blur the distinctions betweenthe two sectors

Nicholas Lardy, in a recent Bloomberg Brief piece,compared the financial performance of China's state sector with theprivate sector. Citing the National Statistics Bureau, his numberswere predictable: last year, the state sector return on assets(ROA) was merely 4.6 per cent and well below the private sector's12.4 per cent.

I think those numbers are biased and wrong.

The biggest components of the state sector are the banks, whichaccount for almost half of the domestic stock market valuation, andabout half of the total net profit of all the listed companies.Other big components in the stock market, or in the unlisteduniverse for that matter, are state-controlled big insurancecompanies, big oil corporations and telecommunicationsoperators.

Chinese banks have an average return on equity (ROE) of about 20per cent – twice the level of their global peers. Insurancecompanies do well in general, and telecoms operators enjoyexorbitant privileges. How can the state sector underperform theprivate sector in financial terms?

Of course, you can argue that the banks' profits are entirelydue to the government's control of interest rates. That is a trueand fair assessment, but the fact remains that the state sector hasa much higher ROE than the private sector.

Lardy's use of ROA is meaningless because banks by definitionare highly-geared business and their ROAs are low in nature (around2-3 per cent). The nature of the banking business is such that youcannot usefully compare bank ROA with other sectors. ROE is theappropriate benchmark.

The other problem with Lardy's comparison is that tens ofthousands of private sector companies go bankrupt, or voluntarilyclose each year. Once that happens, they exit from the statistics.So there is a 「survival basis」. But you do not hear any state-ownedenterprise being shut down.

Uneven playing field
The state sector not only benefits from the economies of scale, butalso from the economies of scope. The state sector as a whole islike a giant conglomerate company that benefits fromdiversification, the low cost of plentiful funding and politicalfavours.

The playing field is unfair and aligned against the privatesector.

Moreover, there are many hybrid joint venture companies in Chinathat blur the distinctions between the two sectors.

Finally, the state sector takes on many social functions, andtheir existence and activities provide a positive spillover effectfor the whole economy and society.

While liberal commentators may disagree with this, the statesector is designed to achieve more than just financial ratios.

Utilities, (power, water, natural gas and public transportation)for example, where the state sector dominates, are not charged atfull price because of affordability and other social reasons. Thatdrags down their financial returns, but the financial ratios do notreflect their efficiency.

More stateinvolvement

It is wrong for liberal economists to say that the dominance ofthe state sector goes against the public's wishes.

In China, the public wants more, not less, involvement by thestate sector. The public wants a bigger state sector to tackle themany challenges China faces, even if many of these challenges areby-products of the state sector (inequality, overpopulation andpollution).

Even the recent third plenum does not mention the privatesector, a point Lardy acknowledges.

The official data shows that the government tax revenue as apercentage of gross domestic product almost doubled from 12 percent a decade ago to 22.3 per cent last year. This is almost awholesale reversal of the economic liberalisation of the previoustwo decades.

But Western economists do not mention this uncomfortablefact.

The state dominates strategically important sectors – essentialinfrastructure and sectors with pricing power – while the privatesector is left to fight it out in fiercely competitive sectors suchas low-end manufacturing, retail, service industries and (some)real estate.

The writing is on the wall: the score of the past decade's matchof the private sector versus the state sector in China is 「privatesector - zero」 and 「state sector - one」.

Joe Zhang is a corporate adviser based in Hong Kong, and theauthor of Inside China's Shadow Banking: The Next SubprimeCrisis?

China's private sector still in shadow of the state 張化 化橋
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