一切似曾相識—–有關蕭條的讀書筆記
http://barrons.blog.caixin.com/archives/45779
在此我推薦Murray Rothbard的《美國大蕭條》（America's GreatDepression)與《經濟蕭條：成因與治癒》(Economic Depressions: Their Cause andCure)。閱讀歷史，傾聽分析，讓人清醒。因為歷史不相信「這次真的不一樣」。
西部的「鬼城」，鐵路的大躍進，城市化促進發展，出口帶動經濟，資本資產及房地產強勁上漲而消費品價格相對穩定。高儲蓄率與高投資加速經濟的發展。在這些一切的背後是銀行信用的大規模擴張，貧富差距加大，腐敗盛行。這是美國發展早期，尤其是1920年代的狀況。
美國在1920年代經濟持續繁榮，處於著名的「RoaringTwenties」時期。而在繁榮的背後，是美國信貸的大規模擴張。從1921年到1929年，美國的M2增加了46%，由於同期流通的貨幣量保持穩定，所以增加的大部分是信用。美國1920年代信貸擴張的一個重要原因是出口導向，支持農產品的出口及農業的就業。胡佛積極支持補貼對外國的貸款，認為即使這些貸款變成壞帳也能幫助美國的出口，是一種廉價的穩定就業的方式。在此時期，美國大量購買外國政府債券，尤其是德國地方政府債券。另一方面，美國實行貿易保護主義，高進口關稅阻礙進口，對外貸款支持出口，造成大量順差。由於美國存在巨額貿易順差，在金本位下黃金大量流入。為了防止黃金大量從國外流入而削弱國外對美國商品的購買能力，美國大量借貸給外國，以支持他們購買自己出口的農產品。美國還與英國協調，用自己本國的通脹來支持英國恢復金本位。
由於大量廉價的信用，極大的促進了美國的經濟發展。從1920年到1929年，美國的真實GNP平均每年增長4.2%，真實人均GNP平均每年增長2.7%，汽車大量普及，軌道交通大發展，城鎮化快速發展，人們的生活水平快速提高。與此同時，美國的物價保持了穩定，CPI的變化一直不大。在此期間，美國經歷了強勁的經濟增長。
但是，大規模的信貸擴張帶來長時間的大繁榮之後，便是可怕的大蕭條。
美國大蕭條對美國，乃至世界的影響巨大，至今仍然讓人膽寒。而歷史上基於對經濟蕭條的分析而產生的理論與決策，無論對錯，都曾經影響了幾十億人的命運。《經濟蕭條：成因與治癒》一文，則回顧了經濟學家，尤其是奧地利學派對蕭條的分析及解決方案。
馬克思是研究經濟週期的先驅。他的很多理論就建立在他對經濟週期，尤其是蕭條的分析之上。馬克思很早就觀察到了經濟週期的現象。他發現在工業革命之前，除了外部因素的衝擊，並沒有反覆出現的有規律的經濟繁榮與蕭條。由於這些經濟週期的現象出現在進入現代工業社會之後，馬克思認為這種經濟週期是資本主義市場經濟內在固有的。他認為資本主義定期發生的蕭條將會越來越嚴重，最終導致資本主義的滅亡，從而進入生產資料公有制及計劃經濟的社會。他對蕭條的分析，以及提出的解決辦法，影響了世界。
與馬克思的觀點不同，奧地利學派不認為經濟週期是市場經濟固有的。如果把一個完整的研究分為提出問題，分析問題，解決問題三個部分，那麼提出問題是最重要的一個開始。對於經濟蕭條，奧地利學派提出了三個問題：
1.為什麼從繁榮到蕭條的經濟週期反覆出現？
2.在經濟蕭條時，為什麼幾乎所有的企業家都同時作出了錯誤的判斷？
3.為什麼在繁榮和蕭條時期，生產者貨物的波動遠遠大於消費品？
奧地利學派對經濟週期的理論始於蘇格蘭哲學家大衛·休謨(DavidHume)和英格蘭經濟學家大衛·李嘉圖(DavidRicardo)。他們發現，在18世紀中期，與工業系統同時出現的，還有一個重要的機構，那就是銀行。他們認為商業銀行由於具有信用擴張和增加貨幣供給的能力，因此在反覆出現的經濟週期中具有至關重要的作用。
李嘉圖對經濟週期的分析認為，在金銀本位的制度下，銀行可以超過所擁有的金銀數量來擴張信用。信用擴張的越多，銀行的利潤越高。信用擴張帶來貨幣供應增加，造成物價上漲，帶來繁榮。但是，當人們用新增的貨幣去購買國外的產品時，黃金或白銀就隨之流出國境，造成這個國家作為貨幣基礎的金銀數量萎縮。由於銀行有義務兌現貨幣所代表的金銀，為了避免擠兌，他們在這種情況下不得不收縮信用。由於信用收縮，蕭條隨之而來。但信用收縮讓價格下跌，促進出口，讓金銀重新回流。這樣以來，銀行用來信用擴張的金銀基礎重新增加，銀行又可以開始下一輪信用擴張。這樣週而復始，造成了經濟週期。
但是，這種最初的分析並不能解釋奧地利學派所提出的第二個和第三個問題。在一個市場經濟裡，企業家的工作就是預測並應對未來。市場經濟的優勝劣汰，讓富有遠見，能夠準確預見未來的企業家發展壯大，而讓無法預見到未來變化的企業家被迫退出競爭。為什麼在這樣的機制下，大量的企業家仍然無法預測反覆出現的週期，同時做出了錯誤的判斷？為什麼在繁榮與蕭條時資本貨物與消費貨物的波動相差如此之大？
基於李嘉圖的理論，奧地利學派的經濟學家米塞斯（Ludwig vonMises）提出了他的經濟週期理論。他認為如果沒有銀行的信用擴張，就不會有經濟的週期起伏。政府通過中央銀行，刺激銀行信用擴張，增加貨幣，推高價格，造成通脹。但是，更險惡的是，大量的信用傾瀉到經濟體中，人為壓低了利率，使利率低於自然的自由市場利率水平。在自由市場中，利率是由人們的時間偏好決定的。「一鳥在手勝過雙鳥在林。」由於人們偏好當前勝過未來，今天拿走現金卻在未來償還的貸款就必須支付利息。但是，如果利率被人為壓低，麻煩就來了。由於利率很低，生意人大量投資於資本資產和貨物，那些之前無法盈利的長期項目也變得有利可圖。資本資產，耐用設備，工業原材料方面的投資快速增加，超過了對消費品產出的投入。資本資產的投資具有自我實現的正反饋，與資本資產相關的價格不斷上漲，進一步推動投資。在這些行業的工作的人們也獲得更多報酬。企業家們被人為壓低的利率所迷惑，集體做出了錯誤的決定。
但是，當人們把多得到的錢花出去時，問題就來了。雖然政府可以人為壓低利率，卻無法改變人們的時間偏好，也就無法改變人們消費/儲蓄的比例。人們把增加的收入更多地投入消費，而不是進行儲蓄。這樣一來儲蓄不足，造成投資不足。沒有了更多的投資，企業也就無法購買那些新產出的機器設備、資本資產和工業原材料。突然間，人們發現產能過剩了，過去的很多投資實際上是不良投資。由於過剩，價格必須下降進行調節。但是，由於成本在信貸膨脹的繁榮時期已經變得過高，大規模的虧損就不可避免。但是，有人會問，人們收入的增長很快就會見效，為什麼信用膨脹帶來的繁榮能持續很久呢？這是因為信貸膨脹不是一次性的，而是不斷進行的。這就如同給賽馬不斷注射興奮劑。「藥不能停！」一旦信用膨脹停止，危機就來臨了。經濟必須進行痛苦的調整，為以前的錯誤付出代價。而在繁榮時期的大量不良投資則暴露無遺，必須進行清理。
蕭條令人不快但卻又是必須的。只有把那些在信用膨脹時期過剩的和扭曲的東西清除掉，經濟才能打下堅實的基礎，繁榮才能重新到來。
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我的幾點思考：
從控制論的角度看，在沒有外部輸入擾動的情況下，一個系統如果進入週期性的震盪，那麼這個系統很有可能存在正反饋。作為一個複雜系統，經濟體系的自組織有可能造成這種正反饋。在市場經濟條件下，優勝劣汰，用價格信號調節供需，這樣的經濟系統更像是有著自適應的負反饋調節，是穩定的。如果由於某種原因，讓系統產生了正反饋，那麼這個系統就會變得不穩定，產生巨幅震盪，甚至崩潰。這時候需要找到產生正反饋的原因，改變正反饋，讓系統重新回到負反饋的穩定狀態。從奧地利學派的分析看，人為壓低利率到低於自由市場利率似乎是開啟整個經濟系統正反饋的關鍵。低利率讓市場經濟參與者行為趨於一致，形成複雜系統的自組織，產生正反饋作用，讓系統發生震盪。在系統延時很長，正反饋作用強烈的子系統，比如需要長期投入大量資金的資本資產投資，震盪強烈。在系統延時不長，正反饋作用不那麼強烈，甚至仍然以負反饋為主的子系統，比如只需要短期投入較少資金的消費品生產，震盪相對較弱。對整個經濟系統來說，由於整個系統的巨大延時作用，系統整體震盪的週期較長，如幾年，甚至幾十年，在上升階段人們感覺不到正反饋的作用，而誤以為是經濟自然的增長與繁榮。當震盪的下降週期到來，正反饋讓下降的幅度非常劇烈，由於大多數市場經濟的參與者都只善於在自己的子系統內進行短週期調節，長週期的震盪讓所有人都措手不及。這就從控制論的角度回答了奧地利學派所提出的三個問題。
而如果重新設計一個系統，不參考反饋信號（如價格），完全靠人為的預測與計劃調節，這相當於一個開環系統。這樣的系統不會有反饋，也就不會有週期震盪。但是，開環系統只能用於非常簡單的控制，控制粗糙，無法自適應，對於複雜的系統，外界的擾動等完全無能為力。這樣的系統總會處於超調或不足狀態，遠遠比不上具有負反饋的系統。
附錄：
美國1920年代統計數據： http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab1901-1950.htm
Economic Depressions:Their Cause and Cure
by Murray N. Rothbard
We live in a world of euphemism. Undertakers havebecome "morticians," press agents are now "public relationscounsellors" and janitors have all been transformed into"superintendents." In every walk of life, plain facts have beenwrapped in cloudy camouflage.
No less has this been true of economics. In theold days, we used to suffer nearly periodic economic crises, thesudden onset of which was called a "panic," and the lingeringtrough period after the panic was called"depression."
The most famous depression in modern times, ofcourse, was the one that began in a typical financial panic in 1929and lasted until the advent of World War II. After the disaster of1929, economists and politicians resolved that this must neverhappen again. The easiest way of succeeding at this resolve was,simply to define "depressions" out of existence. From that pointon, America was to suffer no further depressions. For when the nextsharp depression came along, in 1937–38, the economists simplyrefused to use the dread name, and came up with a new, muchsofter-sounding word: "recession." From that point on, we have beenthrough quite a few recessions, but not a singledepression.
But pretty soon the word "recession" also becametoo harsh for the delicate sensibilities of the American public. Itnow seems that we had our last recession in 1957–58. For sincethen, we have only had "downturns," or, even better, "slowdowns,"or "sidewise movements." So be of good cheer; from now on,depressions and even recessions have been outlawed by the semanticfiat of economists; from now on, the worst that can possibly happento us are "slowdowns." Such are the wonders of the "NewEconomics."
For 30 years, our nation's economists haveadopted the view of the business cycle held by the late Britisheconomist, John Maynard Keynes, who created the Keynesian, or the"New," Economics in his book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, andMoney, published in 1936. Beneath their diagrams,mathematics, and inchoate jargon, the attitude of Keynesians towardbooms and bust is simplicity, even naïveté, itself. If there isinflation, then the cause is supposed to be "excessive spending" onthe part of the public; the alleged cure is for the government, theself-appointed stabilizer and regulator of the nation's economy, tostep in and force people to spend less, "sopping up their excesspurchasing power" through increased taxation. If there is arecession, on the other hand, this has been caused by insufficientprivate spending, and the cure now is for the government toincrease its own spending, preferably through deficits, therebyadding to the nation's aggregate spending stream.
The idea that increased government spending oreasy money is "good for business" and that budget cuts or hardermoney is "bad" permeates even the most conservative newspapers andmagazines. These journals will also take for granted that it is thesacred task of the federal government to steer the economic systemon the narrow road between the abysses of depression on the onehand and inflation on the other, for the free-market economy issupposed to be ever liable to succumb to one of theseevils.
All current schools of economists have the sameattitude. Note, for example, the viewpoint of Dr. Paul W.McCracken, the incoming chairman of President Nixon's Council ofEconomic Advisers. In an interview with the New YorkTimes shortly after taking office [January 24, 1969], Dr.McCracken asserted that one of the major economic problems facingthe new Administration is "how you cool down this inflationaryeconomy without at the same time tripping off unacceptably highlevels of unemployment. In other words, if the only thing we wantto do is cool off the inflation, it could be done. But our socialtolerances on unemployment are narrow." And again: "I think we haveto feel our way along here. We don't really have much experience intrying to cool an economy in orderly fashion. We slammed on thebrakes in 1957, but, of course, we got substantial slack in theeconomy."
Note the fundamental attitude of Dr. McCracken toward the economy –remarkable only in that it is shared by almost all economists ofthe present day. The economy is treated as a potentially workable,but always troublesome and recalcitrant patient, with a continualtendency to hive off into greater inflation or unemployment. Thefunction of the government is to be the wise old manager andphysician, ever watchful, ever tinkering to keep the economicpatient in good working order. In any case, here the economicpatient is clearly supposed to be the subject, and the governmentas "physician" the master.
It was not so long ago that this kind of attitudeand policy was called "socialism"; but we live in a world ofeuphemism, and now we call it by far less harsh labels, such as"moderation" or "enlightened free enterprise." We live andlearn.
What, then, are the causes of periodicdepressions? Must we always remain agnostic about the causes ofbooms and busts? Is it really true that business cycles are rooteddeep within the free-market economy, and that therefore some formof government planning is needed if we wish to keep the economywithin some kind of stable bounds? Do booms and then busts justsimply happen, or does one phase of the cycle flow logically fromthe other?
The currently fashionable attitude toward thebusiness cycle stems, actually, from Karl Marx. Marx saw that,before the Industrial Revolution in approximately the lateeighteenth century, there were no regularly recurring booms anddepressions. There would be a sudden economic crisis whenever someking made war or confiscated the property of his subject; but therewas no sign of the peculiarly modern phenomena of general andfairly regular swings in business fortunes, of expansions andcontractions. Since these cycles also appeared on the scene atabout the same time as modern industry, Marx concluded thatbusiness cycles were an inherent feature of the capitalist marketeconomy. All the various current schools of economic thought,regardless of their other differences and the different causes thatthey attribute to the cycle, agree on this vital point: That thesebusiness cycles originate somewhere deep within the free-marketeconomy. The market economy is to blame. Karl Marx believed thatthe periodic depressions would get worse and worse, until themasses would be moved to revolt and destroy the system, while themodern economists believe that the government can successfullystabilize depressions and the cycle. But all parties agree that thefault lies deep within the market economy and that if anything cansave the day, it must be some form of massive governmentintervention.
There are, however, some critical problems in theassumption that the market economy is the culprit. For "generaleconomic theory" teaches us that supply and demand always tend tobe in equilibrium in the market and that therefore prices ofproducts as well as of the factors that contribute to productionare always tending toward some equilibrium point. Even thoughchanges of data, which are always taking place, prevent equilibriumfrom ever being reached, there is nothing in the general theory ofthe market system that would account for regular and recurringboom-and-bust phases of the business cycle. Modern economists"solve" this problem by simply keeping their general price andmarket theory and their business cycle theory in separate,tightly-sealed compartments, with never the twain meeting, muchless integrated with each other. Economists, unfortunately, haveforgotten that there is only one economy and therefore only oneintegrated economic theory. Neither economic life nor the structureof theory can or should be in watertight compartments; ourknowledge of the economy is either one integrated whole or it isnothing. Yet most economists are content to apply totally separateand, indeed, mutually exclusive, theories for general priceanalysis and for business cycles. They cannot be genuine economicscientists so long as they are content to keep operating in thisprimitive way.
But there are still graver problems with thecurrently fashionable approach. Economists also do not see oneparticularly critical problem because they do not bother to squaretheir business cycle and general price theories: the peculiarbreakdown of the entrepreneurial function at times of economiccrisis and depression. In the market economy, one of the most vitalfunctions of the businessman is to be an "entrepreneur," a man whoinvests in productive methods, who buys equipment and hires laborto produce something which he is not sure will reap him any return.In short, the entrepreneurial function is the function offorecasting the uncertain future. Before embarking on anyinvestment or line of production, the entrepreneur, or"enterpriser," must estimate present and future costs and futurerevenues and therefore estimate whether and how much profits hewill earn from the investment. If he forecasts well andsignificantly better than his business competitors, he will reapprofits from his investment. The better his forecasting, the higherthe profits he will earn. If, on the other hand, he is a poorforecaster and overestimates the demand for his product, he willsuffer losses and pretty soon be forced out of thebusiness.
The market economy, then, is a profit-and-losseconomy, in which the acumen and ability of business entrepreneursis gauged by the profits and losses they reap. The market economy,moreover, contains a built-in mechanism, a kind of naturalselection, that ensures the survival and the flourishing of thesuperior forecaster and the weeding-out of the inferior ones. Forthe more profits reaped by the better forecasters, the greaterbecome their business responsibilities, and the more they will haveavailable to invest in the productive system. On the other hand, afew years of making losses will drive the poorer forecasters andentrepreneurs out of business altogether and push them into theranks of salaried employees.
If, then, the market economy has a built-in natural selectionmechanism for good entrepreneurs, this means that, generally, wewould expect not many business firms to be making losses. And, infact, if we look around at the economy on an average day or year,we will find that losses are not very widespread. But, in thatcase, the odd fact that needs explaining is this: How is it that,periodically, in times of the onset of recessions and especially insteep depressions, the business world suddenly experiences amassive cluster of severe losses? A moment arrives when businessfirms, previously highly astute entrepreneurs in their ability tomake profits and avoid losses, suddenly and dismayingly findthemselves, almost all of them, suffering severe and unaccountablelosses – How come? Here is a momentous fact that any theory ofdepressions must explain. An explanation such as "underconsumption"– a drop in total consumer spending – is not sufficient, for onething, because what needs to be explained is why businessmen, ableto forecast all manner of previous economic changes anddevelopments, proved themselves totally and catastrophically unableto forecast this alleged drop in consumer demand. Why this suddenfailure in forecasting ability?
An adequate theory of depressions, then, mustaccount for the tendency of the economy to move through successivebooms and busts, showing no sign of settling into any sort ofsmoothly moving, or quietly progressive, approximation of anequilibrium situation. In particular, a theory of depression mustaccount for the mammoth cluster of errors which appears swiftly andsuddenly at a moment of economic crisis, and lingers through thedepression period until recovery. And there is a third universalfact that a theory of the cycle must account for. Invariably, thebooms and busts are much more intense and severe in the "capitalgoods industries" – the industries making machines and equipment,the ones producing industrial raw materials or constructingindustrial plants – than in the industries making consumers' goods.Here is another fact of business cycle life that must be explained– and obviously can't be explained by such theories of depressionas the popular underconsumption doctrine: That consumers aren'tspending enough on consumer goods. For if insufficient spending isthe culprit, then how is it that retail sales are the last and theleast to fall in any depression, and thatdepression really hits such industries as machine tools,capital equipment, construction, and raw materials? Conversely, itis these industries that really take off in the inflationary boomphases of the business cycle, and not those businesses serving theconsumer. An adequate theory of the business cycle, then, must alsoexplain the far greater intensity of booms and busts in thenon-consumer goods, or "producers' goods,"industries.
Fortunately, a correct theory of depression andof the business cycle does exist, even though it isuniversally neglected in present-day economics. It, too, has a longtradition in economic thought. This theory began with theeighteenth century Scottish philosopher and economist David Hume,and with the eminent early nineteenth century English classicaleconomist David Ricardo. Essentially, these theorists saw thatanother crucial institution had developed in the mid-eighteenthcentury, alongside the industrial system. This was the institutionof banking, with its capacity to expand credit and the money supply(first, in the form of paper money, or bank notes, and later in theform of demand deposits, or checking accounts, that are instantlyredeemable in cash at the banks). It was the operations of thesecommercial banks which, these economists saw, held the key to themysterious recurrent cycles of expansion and contraction, of boomand bust, that had puzzled observers since the mid-eighteenthcentury.
The Ricardian analysis of the business cycle wentsomething as follows: The natural moneys emerging as such on theworld free market are useful commodities, generally gold andsilver. If money were confined simply to these commodities, thenthe economy would work in the aggregate as it does in particularmarkets: A smooth adjustment of supply and demand, and therefore nocycles of boom and bust. But the injection of bank credit addsanother crucial and disruptive element. For the banks expand creditand therefore bank money in the form of notes or deposits which aretheoretically redeemable on demand in gold, but in practice clearlyare not. For example, if a bank has 1000 ounces of gold in itsvaults, and it issues instantly redeemable warehouse receipts for2500 ounces of gold, then it clearly has issued 1500 ounces morethan it can possibly redeem. But so long as there is no concerted"run" on the bank to cash in these receipts, its warehouse-receiptsfunction on the market as equivalent to gold, and therefore thebank has been able to expand the money supply of the country by1500 gold ounces.
The banks, then, happily begin to expand credit,for the more they expand credit the greater will be their profits.This results in the expansion of the money supply within a country,say England. As the supply of paper and bank money in Englandincreases, the money incomes and expenditures of Englishmen rise,and the increased money bids up prices of English goods. The resultis inflation and a boom within the country. But this inflationaryboom, while it proceeds on its merry way, sows the seeds of its owndemise. For as English money supply and incomes increase,Englishmen proceed to purchase more goods from abroad. Furthermore,as English prices go up, English goods begin to lose theircompetitiveness with the products of other countries which have notinflated, or have been inflating to a lesser degree. Englishmenbegin to buy less at home and more abroad, while foreigners buyless in England and more at home; the result is a deficit in theEnglish balance of payments, with English exports falling sharplybehind imports. But if imports exceed exports, this means thatmoney must flow out of England to foreign countries. And what moneywill this be? Surely not English bank notes or deposits, forFrenchmen or Germans or Italians have little or no interest inkeeping their funds locked up in English banks. These foreignerswill therefore take their bank notes and deposits and present themto the English banks for redemption in gold – and gold will be thetype of money that will tend to flow persistently out of thecountry as the English inflation proceeds on its way. But thismeans that English bank credit money will be, more and more,pyramiding on top of a dwindling gold base in the English bankvaults. As the boom proceeds, our hypothetical bank will expand itswarehouse receipts issued from, say 2500 ounces to 4000 ounces,while its gold base dwindles to, say, 800. As this processintensifies, the banks will eventually become frightened. For thebanks, after all, are obligated to redeem their liabilities incash, and their cash is flowing out rapidly as their liabilitiespile up. Hence, the banks will eventually lose their nerve, stoptheir credit expansion, and in order to save themselves, contracttheir bank loans outstanding. Often, this retreat is precipitatedby bankrupting runs on the banks touched off by the public, who hadalso been getting increasingly nervous about the ever more shakycondition of the nation's banks.
The bank contraction reverses the economic picture; contraction andbust follow boom. The banks pull in their horns, and businessessuffer as the pressure mounts for debt repayment and contraction.The fall in the supply of bank money, in turn, leads to a generalfall in English prices. As money supply and incomes fall, andEnglish prices collapse, English goods become relatively moreattractive in terms of foreign products, and the balance ofpayments reverses itself, with exports exceeding imports. As goldflows into the country, and as bank money contracts on top of anexpanding gold base, the condition of the banks becomes muchsounder.
This, then, is the meaning of the depressionphase of the business cycle. Note that it is a phase that comes outof, and inevitably comes out of, the preceding expansionary boom.It is the preceding inflation that makes the depression phasenecessary. We can see, for example, that the depression is theprocess by which the market economy adjusts, throws off theexcesses and distortions of the previous inflationary boom, andreestablishes a sound economic condition. The depression is theunpleasant but necessary reaction to the distortions and excessesof the previous boom.
Why, then, does the next cycle begin? Why dobusiness cycles tend to be recurrent and continuous? Because whenthe banks have pretty well recovered, and are in a soundercondition, they are then in a confident position to proceed totheir natural path of bank credit expansion, and the next boomproceeds on its way, sowing the seeds for the next inevitablebust.
But if banking is the cause of the businesscycle, aren't the banks also a part of the private market economy,and can't we therefore say that the free marketis still the culprit, if only in the banking segment ofthat free market? The answer is No, for the banks, for one thing,would never be able to expand credit in concert were it not for theintervention and encouragement of government. For if banks weretruly competitive, any expansion of credit by one bank wouldquickly pile up the debts of that bank in its competitors, and itscompetitors would quickly call upon the expanding bank forredemption in cash. In short, a bank's rivals will call upon it forredemption in gold or cash in the same way as do foreigners, exceptthat the process is much faster and would nip any incipientinflation in the bud before it got started. Banks can only expandcomfortably in unison when a Central Bank exists, essentially agovernmental bank, enjoying a monopoly of government business, anda privileged position imposed by government over the entire bankingsystem. It is only when central banking got established that thebanks were able to expand for any length of time and the familiarbusiness cycle got underway in the modern world.
The central bank acquires its control over thebanking system by such governmental measures as: Making its ownliabilities legal tender for all debts and receivable in taxes;granting the central bank monopoly of the issue ofbank notes, as contrasted to deposits (in England the Bankof England, the governmentally established central bank, had alegal monopoly of bank notes in the London area); or through theoutright forcing of banks to use the central bank as their clientfor keeping their reserves of cash (as in the United States and itsFederal Reserve System). Not that the banks complain about thisintervention; for it is the establishment of central banking thatmakes long-term bank credit expansion possible, since the expansionof Central Bank notes provides added cash reserves for the entirebanking system and permits all the commercial banks to expand theircredit together. Central banking works like a cozy compulsory bankcartel to expand the banks' liabilities; and the banks are now ableto expand on a larger base of cash in the form of central banknotes as well as gold.
So now we see, at last, that the business cycle is brought about,not by any mysterious failings of the free market economy, butquite the opposite: By systematic intervention by government in themarket process. Government intervention brings about bank expansionand inflation, and, when the inflation comes to an end, thesubsequent depression-adjustment comes into play.
The Ricardian theory of the business cyclegrasped the essentials of a correct cycle theory: The recurrentnature of the phases of the cycle, depression as adjustmentintervention in the market rather than from the free-marketeconomy. But two problems were as yet unexplained: Why the suddencluster of business error, the sudden failure of theentrepreneurial function, and why the vastly greater fluctuationsin the producers' goods than in the consumers' goods industries?The Ricardian theory only explained movements in the price level,in general business; there was no hint of explanation of the vastlydifferent reactions in the capital and consumers' goodsindustries.
The correct and fully developed theory of thebusiness cycle was finally discovered and set forth by the Austrianeconomist Ludwig von Mises, when he was a professor at theUniversity of Vienna. Mises developed hints of his solution to thevital problem of the business cycle in his monumental Theory of Money and Credit, publishedin 1912, and still, nearly 60 years later, the best book on thetheory of money and banking. Mises developed his cycle theoryduring the 1920s, and it was brought to the English-speaking worldby Mises's leading follower, Friedrich A. von Hayek, who came fromVienna to teach at the London School of Economics in the early1930s, and who published, in German and in English, two books whichapplied and elaborated the Mises cycle theory: Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle,and Prices and Production. Since Mises andHayek were Austrians, and also since they were in the tradition ofthe great nineteenth-century Austrian economists, this theory hasbecome known in the literature as the "Austrian" (or the "monetaryover-investment") theory of the business cycle.
Building on the Ricardians, on general "Austrian"theory, and on his own creative genius, Mises developed thefollowing theory of the business cycle:
Without bank credit expansion, supply and demandtend to be equilibrated through the free price system, and nocumulative booms or busts can then develop. But then governmentthrough its central bank stimulates bank credit expansion byexpanding central bank liabilities and therefore the cash reservesof all the nation's commercial banks. The banks then proceed toexpand credit and hence the nation's money supply in the form ofcheck deposits. As the Ricardians saw, this expansion of bank moneydrives up the prices of goods and hence causes inflation. But,Mises showed, it does something else, and something even moresinister. Bank credit expansion, by pouring new loan funds into thebusiness world, artificially lowers the rate of interest in theeconomy below its free market level.
On the free and unhampered market, the interestrate is determined purely by the "time-preferences" of all theindividuals that make up the market economy. For the essence of aloan is that a "present good" (money which can be used at present)is being exchanged for a "future good" (an IOU which can only beused at some point in the future). Since people always prefer moneyright now to the prospect of getting the same amount of money sometime in the future, the present good always commands a premium inthe market over the future. This premium is the interest rate, andits height will vary according to the degree to which people preferthe present to the future, i.e., the degree of theirtime-preferences.
People's time-preferences also determine theextent to which people will save and invest, as compared to howmuch they will consume. If people's time-preferences should fall,i.e., if their degree of preference for present over future falls,then people will tend to consume less now and save and invest more;at the same time, and for the same reason, the rate of interest,the rate of time-discount, will also fall. Economic growth comesabout largely as the result of falling rates of time-preference,which lead to an increase in the proportion of saving andinvestment to consumption, and also to a falling rate ofinterest.
But what happens when the rate of interest falls,not because of lower time-preferences and higher savings, but fromgovernment interference that promotes the expansion of bank credit?In other words, if the rate of interest falls artificially, due tointervention, rather than naturally, as a result of changes in thevaluations and preferences of the consumingpublic?
What happens is trouble. For businessmen, seeingthe rate of interest fall, react as they always would and must tosuch a change of market signals: They invest more in capital andproducers' goods. Investments, particularly in lengthy andtime-consuming projects, which previously looked unprofitable nowseem profitable, because of the fall of the interest charge. Inshort, businessmen react as they would react if savingshad genuinely increased: They expand their investment indurable equipment, in capital goods, in industrial raw material, inconstruction as compared to their direct production of consumergoods.
Businesses, in short, happily borrow the newlyexpanded bank money that is coming to them at cheaper rates; theyuse the money to invest in capital goods, and eventually this moneygets paid out in higher rents to land, and higher wages to workersin the capital goods industries. The increased business demand bidsup labor costs, but businesses think they can pay these highercosts because they have been fooled by the government-and-bankintervention in the loan market and its decisively importanttampering with the interest-rate signal of themarketplace.
The problem comes as soon as the workers andlandlords – largely the former, since most gross business income ispaid out in wages – begin to spend the new bank money that theyhave received in the form of higher wages. For the time-preferencesof the public have not really gotten lower; the publicdoesn't wantto save more than it has. So the workers setabout to consume most of their new income, in short to reestablishthe old consumer/saving proportions. This means that they redirectthe spending back to the consumer goods industries, and they don'tsave and invest enough to buy the newly-produced machines, capitalequipment, industrial raw materials, etc. This all reveals itselfas a sudden sharp and continuing depression in the producers'goods industries. Once the consumers reestablished theirdesired consumption/investment proportions, it is thus revealedthat business had invested too much in capital goods and hadunderinvested in consumer goods. Business had been seduced by thegovernmental tampering and artificial lowering of the rate ofinterest, and acted as if more savings were available to investthan were really there. As soon as the new bank money filteredthrough the system and the consumers reestablished their oldproportions, it became clear that there were not enough savings tobuy all the producers' goods, and that business had misinvested thelimited savings available. Business had overinvested in capitalgoods and underinvested in consumer products.
The inflationary boom thus leads to distortions of the pricing andproduction system. Prices of labor and raw materials in the capitalgoods industries had been bid up during the boom too high to beprofitable once the consumers reassert their oldconsumption/investment preferences. The "depression" is then seenas the necessary and healthy phase by which the market economysloughs off and liquidates the unsound, uneconomic investments ofthe boom, and reestablishes those proportions between consumptionand investment that are truly desired by the consumers. Thedepression is the painful but necessary process by which the freemarket sloughs off the excesses and errors of the boom andreestablishes the market economy in its function of efficientservice to the mass of consumers. Since prices of factors ofproduction have been bid too high in the boom, this means thatprices of labor and goods in these capital goods industries must beallowed to fall until proper market relations areresumed.
Since the workers receive the increased money inthe form of higher wages fairly rapidly, how is it that booms cango on for years without having their unsound investments revealed,their errors due to tampering with market signals become evident,and the depression-adjustment process begins its work? The answeris that booms would be very short lived if the bank creditexpansion and subsequent pushing of the rate of interest below thefree market level were a one-shot affair. But the point is that thecredit expansion is not one-shot; it proceeds on and on,never giving consumers the chance to reestablish their preferredproportions of consumption and saving, never allowing the rise incosts in the capital goods industries to catch up to theinflationary rise in prices. Like the repeated doping of a horse,the boom is kept on its way and ahead of its inevitablecomeuppance, by repeated doses of the stimulant of bank credit. Itis only when bank credit expansion must finally stop, eitherbecause the banks are getting into a shaky condition or because thepublic begins to balk at the continuing inflation, that retributionfinally catches up with the boom. As soon as credit expansionstops, then the piper must be paid, and the inevitablereadjustments liquidate the unsound over-investments of the boom,with the reassertion of a greater proportionate emphasis onconsumers' goods production.
Thus, the Misesian theory of the business cycleaccounts for all of our puzzles: The repeated and recurrent natureof the cycle, the massive cluster of entrepreneurial error, the fargreater intensity of the boom and bust in the producers' goodsindustries.
Mises, then, pinpoints the blame for the cycle oninflationary bank credit expansion propelled by the intervention ofgovernment and its central bank. What does Mises say should bedone, say by government, once the depression arrives? What is thegovernmental role in the cure of depression? In the first place,government must cease inflating as soon as possible. It is truethat this will, inevitably, bring the inflationary boom abruptly toan end, and commence the inevitable recession or depression. Butthe longer the government waits for this, the worse the necessaryreadjustments will have to be. The sooner thedepression-readjustment is gotten over with, the better. Thismeans, also, that the government must never try to prop up unsoundbusiness situations; it must never bail out or lend money tobusiness firms in trouble. Doing this will simply prolong the agonyand convert a sharp and quick depression phase into a lingering andchronic disease. The government must never try to prop up wagerates or prices of producers' goods; doing so will prolong anddelay indefinitely the completion of the depression-adjustmentprocess; it will cause indefinite and prolonged depression and massunemployment in the vital capital goods industries. The governmentmust not try to inflate again, in order to get out of thedepression. For even if this reinflation succeeds, it will only sowgreater trouble later on. The government must do nothing toencourage consumption, and it must not increase its ownexpenditures, for this will further increase the socialconsumption/investment ratio. In fact, cutting the governmentbudget will improve the ratio. What the economy needs is not moreconsumption spending but more saving, in order to validate some ofthe excessive investments of the boom.
Thus, what the government should do, according tothe Misesian analysis of the depression, is absolutely nothing. Itshould, from the point of view of economic health and ending thedepression as quickly as possible, maintain a strict hands off,"laissez-faire" policy. Anything it does will delay andobstruct the adjustment process of the market; the less it does,the more rapidly will the market adjustment process do its work,and sound economic recovery ensue.
The Misesian prescription is thus the exact opposite of theKeynesian: It is for the government to keep absolute hands off theeconomy and to confine itself to stopping its own inflation and tocutting its own budget.
It has today been completely forgotten, evenamong economists, that the Misesian explanation and analysis of thedepression gained great headway precisely during the GreatDepression of the 1930s – the very depression that is always heldup to advocates of the free market economy as the greatest singleand catastrophic failure of laissez-faire capitalism. Itwas no such thing. 1929 was made inevitable by the vast bank creditexpansion throughout the Western world during the 1920s: A policydeliberately adopted by the Western governments, and mostimportantly by the Federal Reserve System in the United States. Itwas made possible by the failure of the Western world to return toa genuine gold standard after World War I, and thus allowing moreroom for inflationary policies by government. Everyone now thinksof President Coolidge as a believer in laissez-faire andan unhampered market economy; he was not, and tragically, nowhereless so than in the field of money and credit. Unfortunately, thesins and errors of the Coolidge intervention were laid to the doorof a non-existent free market economy.
If Coolidge made 1929 inevitable, it wasPresident Hoover who prolonged and deepened the depression,transforming it from a typically sharp but swiftly-disappearingdepression into a lingering and near-fatal malady, a malady "cured"only by the holocaust of World War II. Hoover, not FranklinRoosevelt, was the founder of the policy of the "New Deal":essentially the massive use of the State to do exactly whatMisesian theory would most warn against – to prop up wage ratesabove their free-market levels, prop up prices, inflate credit, andlend money to shaky business positions. Roosevelt only advanced, toa greater degree, what Hoover had pioneered. The result for thefirst time in American history, was a nearly perpetual depressionand nearly permanent mass unemployment. The Coolidge crisis hadbecome the unprecedentedly prolonged Hoover-Rooseveltdepression.
Ludwig von Mises had predicted the depressionduring the heyday of the great boom of the 1920s – a time, justlike today, when economists and politicians, armed with a "neweconomics" of perpetual inflation, and with new "tools" provided bythe Federal Reserve System, proclaimed a perpetual "New Era" ofpermanent prosperity guaranteed by our wise economic doctors inWashington. Ludwig von Mises, alone armed with a correct theory ofthe business cycle, was one of the very few economists to predictthe Great Depression, and hence the economic world was forced tolisten to him with respect. F. A. Hayek spread the word in England,and the younger English economists were all, in the early 1930s,beginning to adopt the Misesian cycle theory for their analysis ofthe depression – and also to adopt, of course, the strictlyfree-market policy prescription that flowed with this theory.Unfortunately, economists have now adopted the historical notion ofLord Keynes: That no "classical economists" had a theory of thebusiness cycle until Keynes came along in 1936.There was a theory of the depression; it was the classicaleconomic tradition; its prescription was strict hard moneyand laissez-faire; and it was rapidly being adopted, inEngland and even in the United States, as the accepted theory ofthe business cycle. (A particular irony is that the major"Austrian" proponent in the United States in the early andmid-1930s was none other than Professor Alvin Hansen, very soon tomake his mark as the outstanding Keynesian disciple in thiscountry.)
What swamped the growing acceptance of Misesiancycle theory was simply the "Keynesian Revolution" – the amazingsweep that Keynesian theory made of the economic world shortlyafter the publication of the General Theory in 1936. It isnot that Misesian theory was refuted successfully; it wasjust forgotten in the rush to climb on the suddenlyfashionable Keynesian bandwagon. Some of the leading adherents ofthe Mises theory – who clearly knew better – succumbed to the newlyestablished winds of doctrine, and won leading American universityposts as a consequence.
But now the once arch-KeynesianLondon Economist has recently proclaimed that "Keynes isDead." After over a decade of facing trenchant theoreticalcritiques and refutation by stubborn economic facts, the Keynesiansare now in general and massive retreat. Once again, the moneysupply and bank credit are being grudgingly acknowledged to play aleading role in the cycle. The time is ripe – for a rediscovery, arenaissance, of the Mises theory of the business cycle. It can comenone too soon; if it ever does, the whole concept of a Council ofEconomic Advisors would be swept away, and we would see a massiveretreat of government from the economic sphere. But for all this tohappen, the world of economics, and the public at large, must bemade aware of the existence of an explanation of the business cyclethat has lain neglected on the shelf for all too many tragicyears.
This essay was originally published as aminibook by the Constitutional Alliance of Lansing, Michigan,1969.
我會知道一切 ---- 未來數百元FACEBOOK的無敵壁壘 立春
http://xueqiu.com/9428236477/25774806我認為：IWILL KNOW EVERYTHING將是扎克伯格領導的FACEBOOK事業成就的巔峰，並將無人可以超越，它甚至可能是歷史上第一個市值達到萬億美元的企業！
當年美國出了一個谷歌，很快中國就跟進了一個百度，儘管在很多方面後者比不上前者，但基本上可以定義為複製，並也取得了很大的商業成就；
2004年自FACEBOOK誕生以來，它就不斷的以難以置信的速度增長再增長，像一個永不停歇的氣旋，不斷的渦流轉動，越來越大，那些早於它數年並已有相當積累的交友網站，如MY SPACE，也在這個後起的氣旋面前很快式弱，乃至多年後基本消失，截至今日，在美國乃至世界上多數地區，它已成為一家獨大的社交類網站，實際上，FACEBOOK用將近十年的時間締造了一個世界上最大的「社區」，一個打破了國家限制的新社會，許多人以為，這就是一切了，觸碰到企業發展的天花板了，但實際上，這僅僅是開始，而且，再也無人可以像百度複製谷歌那樣迅速跟進了，因為締造FACEBOOK基石的時間成本是將近十年。
之所以給FACEBOOK那麼高的預期是因為：從現在開始，谷歌能做的，FACEBOOK都能做，而FACEBOOK能做的，谷歌已經做不了了。
不論是中國的武俠小說還是西方的神話故事，都有這樣的情節橋段，就是一件超能力的兵器或者神器，隱匿在某處，等待一個資質稟賦特異的人去駕馭它，一旦二者合一，必將縱橫天下，今天，這個想像中的情節在現實中出現了，所不同是，那個神器並不像阿拉丁神燈或者指環王中的戒指那樣從一開始就有控制世界的神力，FACEBOOK將要把握的神器將會和FACEBOOK本身的壯大形成互為增益的正反饋效應，他們的起點是當FACEBOOK 聚攏的活躍人群達到一個巨大的量級，比如目前的數字十億，然後開始逐步發力，一旦開始，它的巨大功效和實用性將會讓人們的使用頻率大為增加，從而增強客戶粘性和企業渦流的吸引力，會再次擴大FACEBOOK的影響力和使用的普遍性，其活躍人口將進一步加大，而人口基數與使用頻次的提升，又將再次增強這個神器的功力，這個神器，被美國媒體賦予三個定義詞：大膽、可怕、迷人，它就是谷歌最懼怕的，在年初開始試運營，很快將正式上線的新一代搜索王者：GRAPH SEARCH，譜系搜索。
迄今為止大部分認定FACEBOOK只是一個交友網站，這是極大的誤讀，扎克伯格所想所作的遠遠不止如此，這位年輕的企業家在寫給投資者的公開信中所強調的：Facebook原本並非為了成為一家公司而創建。它的誕生旨在完成一個社會任務——讓世界更加開放，聯繫更加緊密。讓Facebook的每一個投資者理解這個任務對我們的意義，理解我們如何做決定，理解我們為什麼做我們所做的事情，我們相信這是非常重要的。
這段話是深刻理解FACEBOOK的鑰匙，越往後人們將越能體會到這段話的意義不凡，他的超前不是一點點，已經超越了一般企業發展和競爭的層面，這一點讓經常與之比較的騰訊都完全失色了。
在馬克的終極理想面前，今天的FACEBOOK僅僅才搭建了一個基礎而已，要預見它的未來，取決於人們對GRAPH SEARCH的理解能有多深。
谷歌依靠網頁搜索成為互聯網之王，上週五股價首次突破四位數，成為科技行業的不二王者，但是顛覆者緊隨其後，FACEBOOK 將攜其GRAPH SEARCH（譜系搜索）重塑整個世界而不僅僅是互聯網界的商業架構。
下面，讓我們來仔細觸摸一下這個未來的神器，對我來說，能否把理解到的精髓表達清楚，也是一項不易的挑戰。
GRAPH SEARCH，中文被譯作圖譜搜索，是一個很大的誤解，也成為阻止我深入理解這一神器的第一障礙，從這名字看到想到的東西，無法提起人們的熱情，因為圖譜一詞的歧義很多，強調了圖而弱化了譜，很不精確；溯源到英文原意，才開始逐漸打破錯誤的第一認識，然後用半年時間慢慢的消化理解，對我這個笨人來說完全是必要的，作為成果，我想首先要對譯文做一個修改，GRAPH SEARCH的中文應該譯作譜系搜索或者是離散搜索更正確一些，譜系、離散數學以及相關的大數據處理是這項新技術的精髓。
谷歌和百度的成功，根本上來自數學，佩奇和布林研究的排序算法讓谷歌脫穎而出，他們找到了一個含義合理， 而且數學上嚴謹的網頁排序算法，它的特別之處在於其矩陣的算法，它不以關鍵詞羅列的多少為排序依據，而是以關鍵詞在網頁鏈接出現的多少為依據，這就解決了兩個問題，一是內容的精準性，與以往那種憑藉關鍵詞出現次數所作的排序不同， 這種由所有網頁的相互鏈接所確定的排序是很難做假的， 如果沒有真正吸引人的內容，關鍵詞出現的頻次再高，別人不鏈接它，它的影響力和排序也很低，經過谷歌的搜索，這種內容就不可能因為僅靠出現頻次高排列在前面，那些被大量引用的鏈接排名才會很靠前；二是查詢速度，谷歌算法只與互聯網的結構有關， 與用戶具體搜索的東西無關。 這意味著排序計算可以單獨進行， 而無需在用戶鍵入搜索指令後才臨時進行，這是谷歌搜索速度奇快的原因。
作為互聯網第一代，不論是佩奇和布林的谷歌算法，還是的李彥宏的百度算法，他們所要應對和處理的都是網頁信息，數據雖然浩瀚，但相對搜尋標的而言，都是平面的，一維的，排序統計不難，難在如何在基本統計的基礎上最快找出最貼近被搜索詞本真的那些信息，這個問題的解決造就了一個偉大的企業。
經過十多年的發展，互聯網開始逐漸步入了它的第二代，我個人的理解，這兩個代際的差別在於主體和客體的角色變化上，在第一代互聯網裡，我們把互聯網稱作虛擬世界，我們是實體世界，真實的社會是主體，網絡是客體，互聯網只是個虛擬的世界，它只是個圖書館或資料館，是個遊樂場或新聞媒介，而人們只是一個外圍的參觀者，或者資料調用者，互聯網更多只是信息傳遞，它好玩，但也實在「虛」的很，對與第一代互聯網，有一句名言很有意思，那就是：「在互聯網上， 沒人知道你是一條狗」（On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog）。
但是世界終究還是進入了二代互聯網，它的特徵就是，整個社會和個人開始以真實身份，真實角色，真實功能進入了互聯網，互聯網不再是虛擬的了，它將越來越真實，可觸可摸，甚至平常到開門七件事，由於真實，二代互聯網將會迸發出比一代互聯網更為可怕和顛覆性的商業潛力，因為在一代互聯網時代，網絡還只是實體商業的輔助性角色，只是在特定行業才成為主角，比如信息傳媒，但是到了二代，實體商業已經開始全方位滲入了，互聯網金融，互聯網商店，互聯網影視與傳播，互聯網政務，互聯網交通，互聯網點評系統，如此等等，真正的互聯網革命正在發生，而在這場深層次的互聯網革命中，最值錢的企業，最有發展前景和巨大潛能的企業，就是掌握了最多真實個人信息的互聯網企業，當全社會都在逐漸醒悟中想以真實身份進入新一代互聯網應用中時，突然發現，最快捷，成本最低，最具備迅速發起新商業活動和整合力的，原來就是FACEBOO搭建的社交網絡，確切的說，這已經不是簡單的社交網絡，而是真實社會的網絡化了，而且它所聚集的，正是整個社會最具活力，最具創造力和消費能量的中堅群體。
互聯網從虛擬的平面走向了真實的立體，人們從過去的外圍看客成為了網上的真實個體，這個個體是多元和多維度的，平面的互聯網已經長成了一個離散的，多節點的，又密不可分的大網，這個大網的締造者正是FACEBOOK ，目前看，它好像只是一個示範，可以這樣來比喻，全球互聯網就像一個巨大的平面蜘蛛網，在這張網的局部，已經豎起來外觀像鳥巢那樣的立體網，雖然它還是局部的，但是經過近十年的增長，它已經是如此突兀，如此顯眼，成為一個絕對無法忽視的存在，在這張平面大網上，谷歌縱橫捭闔多年，並無所不在，但是對這個立體的突起，谷歌也有了觸摸不到的盲點，對於新的立體網狀多元多維的架構，谷歌獨步天下的利器----谷歌搜索，失去用武之地了。
這才是FACEBOOK，第二代互聯網王者最貼切的寫照。
FACEBOOK重構了互聯網，在第一代互聯網世界，其基本單元是網頁，；在第二代互聯網世界，其基本單元是「人」，而且是和現實世界一一對應的含有多個真實信息的人，它肯定不是互聯網的全部，但它代表了商業想要的全部，因為所有的商業基礎元素都是人，這個二代互聯網的最典型代表就是FACEBOOK。
第一代互聯網，其基本元素締造了偉大的谷歌，第二代互聯網，能不能讓FACEBOOK戴上偉大的光環？擁有指環王那樣的威力，這個促成的關鍵，就在GRAPH SEARCH。
傳統網頁搜索，人們可以知道那些靜態的，客觀存在的，即時發生的消息或者是知識，但他無法即時得到這些消息和知識的多維視角與提煉，而所謂的多維視角和提升、提煉，只能是由每一個鮮活的，思維跳動的「人」來給出，比如今天人們最為關心的蘋果電腦2013年新品發佈會，谷歌可以給你很多即時的，最新鮮的信息，但你即使坐在場內，也無法立即知道這款新品受關注的程度，市場的反應，商家的態度，玩家的看法，你自己將會根據「什麼」做何種打算等等，以推特為代表的微博可以彌補這一缺口，但是它的智能性和提升能力顯然是不夠的，你看到的還是平面鋪陳的東西，泛泛的，就一個話題千百張嘴在呱呱，你要的是以自己需求為出發點的意見和知識，當你提出問題後，立即可以從千萬條信息中獲得自己最想要的那一個，FACEBOOK要做的搜索，就是滿足人麼這種需求的。
做為生活在離散又呈網狀互聯的FACEBOOK網絡世界裡的「個人」，他想搜索，「誰和我興趣相投」「誰能提供給我要去應聘那家企業的內部信息」「誰可能十天後與我同城出差」「某城土生土長的本地人最常去的飯館」「哪些新的影視作品將是我最欣賞的」「我小學校友近況」，如此等等，這些偏鑽古怪，極度個性化的問題是谷歌完全不能應對的，儘管谷歌也做了谷歌+,但是遠遠不及FACEBOOK所能聚集的人氣，自然也就沒有了發展立體和個性化搜索的基礎。
GRAPH SEARCH的數學模型依據，是離散數學，是研究離散量的結構及其相互關係的數學學科，在這個學科裡，GRAPH指圖論中的鏈接一個個點的圖譜，這正像FACEBOOK的基礎元素----「真實個人」在FACEBOOK的網絡世界所處的狀態那樣，一個人就是一個鏈接點，這個點本身就一個多元和多維度的基礎元素，它既是搜索指令的發起者，也是搜索內容的片斷之一；它有多個維度，複雜性是幾何層級的；它發出的問題極具個性又極具普遍性更具有多元性，因此其難度比谷歌處理連續變量的網頁搜索要大很多，需要很多條件的預先佈置，甚至需要所有參與者的共同努力，FACEBOOK的「like」按鈕，為GRAPH SEARCH的起步奠定了很好的基礎。
FACEBOOK的搜索技術難度更大，但智能程度更高，要想做到完美非常困難，但是做成了其壁壘會非常高，高到非常難以超越，因為沒有龐大的「真實個人」網鏈基礎，更重要的是沒有這些真實個人的積極參與，GRAPH SEARCH便無用武之地，而聚攏人氣與培養其行為方式並鼓勵開放共享這三點，都不是任何一個企業可以在短期內能夠做到的。
有意思的是，組建GRAPH SEARCH團隊的兩位靈魂人物，都來自谷歌，其中一位的得意作品是「谷歌地圖」，另一位曾是谷歌旅行搜索的產品主管，他們來了FACEBOOK後，扎克伯格頻繁的與這兩人交流，最終給出了產品研發的目標，那就是：「讓一切信息都可以被搜索、被發現。」
這個產品將是FACEBOOK的涅磐之作，將對目前幾乎所有重要的互聯網公司造成強烈衝擊，為此，FACEBOOK高層團隊很快達成一致意見，全方位圍繞這個產品的目標來調整公司戰略，2013年年初，初具模型的GRAPH SEARCH開始小範圍測試，不久，它將迎來正式上線的日子，現在，我們可以提前來分辨一下，這個搜索界新貴和傳統的谷歌搜索有什麼不同。
1.搜索對象不同：
谷歌的搜索對象是網頁，Facebook的搜索對象不再是網頁，而是真實世界在網上的虛擬對應符號：可以是人，地方或者其他的事物。
2.搜索維度不同：
Facebook搜索的精細程度和多元性遠高於谷歌。
對於一家企業，谷歌可以給出其概況，發展史，現狀，人員組成，業務結構等等內容，但無法給出諸如朋友圈裡面在其內部工作的員工的真實評價，無法給出自己在這家企業工作與否的職業建議。
對於一家位於芝加哥的餐館，谷歌可以給出方位，空間視圖，是否受歡迎等信息；無法給出諸如，「當地人的評價」，「最好的廚師何時當班」，「什麼時候去最合適」等信息。
諸如此類，對任何一類問題，譜系搜索相對傳統的谷歌搜索都顯得更具體，更準確，更刁鑽，更有實用性。
3.搜索結果的高智能性
搜索的最高境界可能是一個智人的狀態，你問他什麼，他都能從容應答，而且答案一定是最好的，最準確的，達到這個終極狀態要走的路還很長，但是FACEBOOK的譜系搜索邁出了向這個狀態前進的步子，谷歌雖然一直在努力，但是沒有FACEBOOK這樣的龐大真實社會網絡化的基礎，谷歌再有才能也無法用力，這也是谷歌的精英分子中很多人投身FACEBOOK的根本原因。
如此，一個「可怕、大膽、迷人」的新搜索工具將會出現，現在還很難給它下定義，只能片段式解讀，盲人摸像那般知其一二，它是一個：
* 搜索關鍵詞越複雜，得出的結果就越精確的工具
* 用戶會忘記以往使用搜索引擎的方式，即關鍵詞搜索法，
他們可以準確表達希望獲得什麼。
* 搜索結果可以匹配搜索者的年齡段與喜好。
* 搜索的延伸性極其強大，與問題發起者的關聯度極高
這樣的工具所能帶來的首先是廣告業的一次革命，廣告將向專門化，具體化，精確化這個方向上發展，由於Graph Search搜索結果極高的精確性和關聯度，又能夠界定使用者的年齡段與興趣點，它所帶給商家的用戶信息具有非常高的商業價值，發展趨勢上，一定程度上可以完全摒棄傳統廣告業那種天女散花亂撒錢的做法，可以迅速提升目標客戶被擊中的準確率，大大降低產品營銷成本，提升整體商業運作的效率。
綜合來看，用高智能性來概括FACEBOOK的搜索工具比較貼切，別家企業並非沒有等同的技術實力來競爭，問題的關鍵在於他們都沒有龐大的人數基礎，自然也就沒有浩瀚如宇宙天文數字般的數據，而這個數據是成就這一神器的基礎。
一旦GRAPH SEARCH全面上線應用並不斷完善，它將衝擊目前幾乎所有的重磅互聯網企業：
1、谷歌：Graph Search做了谷歌做不了的事情，一旦人們需要知道什麼首先想到Graph Search，谷歌的地位就將被撼動，未來，谷歌的「知識網頁」類搜索很可能成為用戶使用搜索的一個後備和補充。
2、Yelp：憑著遍佈全球的用戶關係網和龐大的信息庫，Facebook可以輕鬆打敗這家點評巨頭，因為看自己朋友圈的評論感覺要比看各種陌生人的評論更令人信服。
3、Foursquare：這家基於用戶地理位置信息（LBS）的手機服務網站受到的威脅可能更大，Graph Search的出現可能會把它逼向絕路。
4、Pinterest：FACEBOOK收購了Instagram 後，平抑了Pinterest 的部分威脅，但是Pinterest依然發展很快，尤其受到女性的青睞，已發展成數家零售商的大流量轉介服務商，而Graph Search的上線，搜索+精準廣告，加上Facebook自己強大的用戶基數將會為在線零售商帶去流量和營收，並以此獲得分成。如此一來Pinterest就會顯得十分尷尬。
5、雅虎：梅耶爾還沒有把雅虎拯救過來，Facebook又給了它一記直拳，曾一度有傳言說FACEBOOK有必要收了雅虎，只是扎克伯格不想涉足媒體業務而做罷。
6、Twitter：隨著Graph Search向更深層次的搜索服務拓展，Twitter的地位會因此遭到威脅，因為僅僅停留在淺層次上的交流，不能深入和延展的話，長遠看是沒有持久的客戶吸引力的。
7、維基百科：如果Graph Search不斷深入和變革，Facebook可能會推出一站式搜索結果的服務，用戶再也不必點擊鏈接轉入第三方網站了，維基的光環也頓失光彩。
8、微軟：儘管目前微軟的必應是作為Graph Search的備案，當Graph Search不能滿足用戶時會自動轉入必應，但隨著Graph Search的不斷成熟，必應的份額會受到強烈的挑戰。
9、LinkedIn：儘管在建立職業檔案方面，這家公司做的足夠專業，但Graph Search將會彌補FACEBOOK在這方面的不足，因為它可以提供很多求職方面其他企業無法提供的信息。
當然，除了對許多競爭對手的威脅，也會有更多的合作，亞馬遜和EBAY將與Facebook深度合作，其Graph Search系統將讓企業對用戶的真實需求知曉更多，雙方現在就已經在實時廣告交易服務上有長期合作。
事實上，當下與FACEBOOK合作的企業已經數不勝數，尤其是中小型企業，FACEBOOK的滲透率已經非常高，從另一個角度證明，在現實參與度上面，FACEBOOK已經是第二代互聯網當仁不讓的第一標誌，儘管業界對Graph Search出台後可能帶來的問題和要跨越的屏障還有疑問，其中被爭議最多的要屬如何應對隱私和開放的界限，因為這取決於用戶個人，企業在功能上是做到了充分考慮用戶的自主權的，個人能多大程度開放自己是Graph Search能否最大化發揮效力的關鍵，不過FACEBOOK對此並不擔心，因為它自己的發展史已經證明了多數人選擇了的開放態度，而且，統計結果表明，80%的成功歸因於積極展示自我。
FACEBOOK將不再僅僅是一個交友網站，它正在走向扎克伯格所說的那個狀態-------完成一個讓世界更加開放，聯繫更加緊密的社會任務，社會的基本架構就是人際交往和關係經營，它實現了這一基本架構的虛擬化，又在虛擬空間內更加真實，更加有效率，它平移了現實世界，但同時又打破了現實社會人們交流交往的各種屏障，前所未有的、極大的提升了社會生產效率，並且，它所建立的新體系，不是針對某一國，而是全世界，它是全球化進行到今天最顯著的標誌，在這個企業要達成的終極使命上，目前沒有任何一家企業可以望其項背。
當然，一個沒有隱私和秘密的世界是可怕的，這也是人們質疑Graph Search能否最大化發揮效應的痛點，但這取決於網絡新世界公民們的態度，控制權在他們自己手裡，雖然在技術手段上，這個企業完全可以做到無所不知。
許家印：發生在足球之前的一切
http://www.yicai.com/news/2013/11/3099140.html昨晚的亞冠，不僅帶給廣州一個聲勢浩大的夜晚，更是讓頹唐了多年的中國球迷過癮地high了一場。「恆大」這個詞，大有被寫入歷史一頁的趨勢，而他的幕後最大推手、恆大集團的老闆許家印，也因此再度吸引了無數關注的目光。
他是「根正苗紅」的革命後代、他也曾是個不到1歲就失去了母親的不幸男孩；他沒有資本「拼爹」，靠自己白手起家，也毫無意外地吃過很多苦。人們熟悉他的名字是因為恆大和足球，但在這個傳奇開始之前，還有另一個更貼近現實生活的許家印。
他幼年喪母
奶奶一手把他帶大
許家印的父親是老革命，16歲就參軍入黨，參加過八年抗戰，做過抗日部隊騎兵連的連長，負傷後復員回老家在村子裡當倉庫保管員，負責拿鑰匙、記工分等事務。「他父親是個很細心的人，對這些工作很負責。」許家印的表叔評價說，許的父親正義、耿直、認真，對年幼的許家印有不小的影響。
還不到1歲，一個對許家印影響巨大的事件遽然而至———母親得了敗血症，因家貧無錢就醫，匆匆撒手而去，許家印從此成了「半個孤兒」。一個私下場合，許家印曾坦言，自己的性格獨立和倔強，可能與從小就缺少母愛有關。「你們這些從小有母親看著長大的人，多幸福呵！」很多次，望著年輕的下屬，許家印都這樣感嘆。
許家印母親去世後，奶奶承擔起照看他的任務。許家已是連續多代單傳，奶奶非常疼愛幼年喪母的許家印。她之於許家印，就如同一位老母親。奶奶脾氣也很大，如果小家印不聽話，她生氣了也會「動粗」打人。四五歲的小家印很倔，挨打時會坐在地上哭一天，拉都拉不起來。
「以前家門口有塊石頭，奶奶就坐在石頭上等我放學回家。」多年之後，許家印仍能清晰回憶起這樣的場景：上小學的第一天，當他把剛學會的那句「我愛北京天安門」唸給奶奶聽時，年邁的奶奶興奮得忘乎所以。
許家正房的北面牆壁上，至今仍掛著一幅老太太的素描畫。在農村掛著這種畫作，著實有點兀然。這幅畫出自少年許家印之手，畫中的老太太正是他的奶奶。村子裡的幼年夥伴說，許家印不僅給奶奶畫過像，還畫過下山虎、老公雞。據說，沒看過美術教材的許家印無師自通，用的是很規整的「方格法」：把一張白紙打上格，按照比例一格格地畫出來。
他當過保安
所以恆大的保安待遇很高
這個泥地裡滾打長大的孩子，還有個愛好是倒騰「科技」。小學時，他用塊鐵片做開關，把破電線、鐵絲連成一起，連到被丟棄的手電筒電池上，就能製作出一個照明的「小家電」。
許家印曾和比他大幾歲的本家親戚許家讓一起嘗試做生意賺錢。那時，販賣是當時農村比較通行的「打工」方式，比如把石灰、煤炭、大米、稻草等物資從一個地方運到另一個地方，賺取其中的差價。這種 「打工」的方式不需要很多成本，但需要體力。拉一趟，僅能賺幾塊錢。
看到很多人都去，高中剛畢業的許家印也動了心思。奶奶不同意，他還是去了。他用的是單人在前面拉的兩軲轆拖車，下山的時候，這種拖車要使勁往後壓才能控制速度，因為沒經驗，下坡的時候只會拚命往下跑……結果人倒車翻，販賣的石灰撒了一地。許家印坐在路邊，既無助又心酸。
這是1974年，許家印人生中的第一單生意。
與他交往頗多的老同學高正富透露：許家印上大學後，因為家庭依然困難，他還曾跟幾個同學合夥，計劃運一車家鄉的蘋果到武漢賣。當時都是用袋子裝，而不是現在的紙箱。還是因為缺乏經驗，蘋果還沒運到武漢，就已經腐壞了。可想而知，「做本錢的錢都是借的，全賠了！」
許家印有個鄰居的舅舅，在周口市公安局工作，這人當時是他心目中的偶像：「公安局裡工作，那應該是多大的官啊！」許家印大著膽子給他寫了封信，信中大意是，想請您幫幫忙，在城裡給自己找臨時工。在那個年代，臨時工一個月能掙10到15塊錢，是個讓人豔羨的差事。但此信寄出之後就石沉大海。
「那時候還是太單純了啊。一個農村孩子隨便給人寫封信，怎麼就可能找到城裡的工作？」許多年後，許家印如此感慨。
許家印做過農村裡的保安，那時候叫「大隊自保員」。幾十個人，住在大隊部的房子裡，在地上鋪上草，弄個通鋪，就在那睡。平時負責維護村裡的治安，誰家的豬羊把別人的田地搞壞了，就要抓回去。
直到現在，許家印看到公司裡的保安，就如同看到當年的自己。「農村孩子在城裡打工，不容易。」恆大的很多保安都是退伍軍人出身，每年到「八一」建軍節公司都會慰問，這已是慣例。一位公司高層對記者說，在地產圈裡，恆大保安的待遇是最高的。
他崇拜「鐵鎯頭」
於是有了「恆大女排」
1976年，許家印聽到恢復高考的消息，馬上興奮地報了名。不過，因為時間倉促，準備不充分，第一次他沒有考上。
第二年，許家印花了近半年時間準備，回到高中的學校複習補課。因為回校複習的學生太多，學校沒有住宿的地方，許家印就通過個人關係在學校附近的拖拉機站找到了一間破房子，拿了一床打滿補丁的被子住了進去。
零下15度的冬天，北風從早已破碎的窗子灌進去，凍得人瑟瑟發抖，他用紙糊了糊，硬是挺了過去。
吃得更差。許家印記憶裡最深刻的一個場景，是自己帶到學校的饅頭和地瓜餅，過了3天就變黴長毛了，也舍不得扔，洗掉黴菌以後繼續吃。因為營養不良，高中畢業一米七六的許家印，體重僅90斤。
1978年，許家印終於如願考入大學，在人口達1000萬的周口市，他的成績位列前三。他也收到了父親允諾的一份珍貴禮物———梅花表。十年前的一個晚上，還在讀小學的許家印突然對父親說，如果自己能考上大學，能不能送他一塊當時很時興的梅花表？為了激勵兒子，父親咬牙應允。
在武漢鋼鐵學院（現武漢科技大學），許家印曾住到學生會的辦公室去看管公共財物，其中最重要的「寶貝」是一台14吋的黑白電視機。當時，學生們看電視需要統一組織，時間一般是星期六，如果有其他「重要事情」需要收看，就要向系裡申請。這類「重要事情」，就包括收看「鐵鎯頭」郎平率領的中國女排比賽。
與女排有關的，不僅是比賽。許家印的大學同學俞斌回憶說，當時學校一個月會安排一場露天電影，放的比較多的電影是《閃閃紅星》、《歸心似箭》等。「《排球女將》就是那個時候看的，許家印很崇拜鐵鎯頭嘛！」
多年之後，一支名為「恆大女排」的排球新軍，在2009年度叱咤於中國排球職業賽，以12戰全勝的戰績提前衝入甲A，其主教練正是鼎鼎大名的「鐵鎯頭」郎平。
這支投資2000萬成立的恆大女排，也為恆大地產做了一系列效果極佳的品牌廣告。僅以簽約郎平、吸引全國數百家媒體到場的那次發佈會為例，曾有人測算，如果單以廣告版面計，恆大地產要達到同樣的宣傳效果，花費至少以數億計。
如此性價比，可見許家印的營銷策略之一斑。這當然沒有錯，但他內心深處對「鐵鎯頭」的私人情感和汪洋恣肆的青春回憶，恐怕就很少有人能聆聽得到。
他的「三級跳」
從深圳到廣州
1982年，從冶金系的「金屬材料及熱處理」專業畢業的許家印被分配到河南舞陽鋼鐵廠，對這個結果，他很不情願。在他的眼裡，上大學是為了離開農村，而舞陽不過是另一個「小山溝「罷了。
在家裡磨蹭了一個月後，他還是去報到了。連他自己也沒想到，短短幾年裡，他成就了舞鋼最有活力的車間，自己也獲得了一個外號「小皇帝」。這個外號，包含著許家印在這個300多人大車間中的權威：技術上過硬，管理上言出必行，又善於處理跟下屬的關係。
1992年，許家印放棄舞鋼的處級幹部職位，選擇下海。除了與當時的大環境有關外，許家印後來對身邊人還透露了一個個人原因：在他的潛意識裡，一直覺得舞鋼不過是自己走出了小山溝以後，又走入的另一個大山溝罷了，「四面都是山，一直有離開闖蕩的想法。」
許家印揣著一份三十幾頁紙的簡歷，在深圳的各個招聘市場奔波。半個月後，依然找不到一家願意接受他的單位。那時候的許家印好似虎落平川，難掩心裡的巨大失落：在舞鋼也算是處級幹部了，在這裡竟然「混」到沒有工作，甚至連住的地方都難尋覓。
後來，一位好友向他指點迷津：你把原來厚厚得那疊簡歷，變得簡單點試試吧！許家印隨後就做了只有兩頁的新簡歷，很快，有3家公司願意聘任他。
他選擇了其中一家貿易公司，名叫中達。「從第一眼我就覺得遇上了好老闆，我從他身上學到了很多管理公司的經驗，非常非常感謝他。」若干年後回憶起第一個老闆，許家印仍是充滿感激。
到深圳後的第3個年頭，也就是1994年的國慶節，許家印終於寫下了他人生轉折前的重要伏筆———來到廣州，涉水剛剛興起的房地產業。他帶著一部標緻車，車上除了司機和他，還有一個出納和一個業務人員，總共4個人，躊躇滿志地來到了廣州，成立了一家名為鵬達的房地產公司。
公司生意興旺發達，到了1997年，許家印就自己創業了。他的人生，從此與這家名為「恆大」的公司牢牢捆綁在一起。
他有愧妻子
但兩人感情是「模範夫妻」
許家印與太太是在舞鋼工作期間認識的，兩人感情篤定，是恆大集團的「模範夫妻」。
他們也是對標準的、共患難過的夫妻。許家印在深圳打工期間，岳父高血壓住院，傳來病危消息，他立刻坐火車回到河南漯河，夜裡沒有車了，又坐了好長時間的三輪車。回到家，岳父對他說的最後一個願望是「從河南舞鋼回安徽老家」。沒辦法，他又找了輛貨車，在寒風刺骨的冬天，他抱著岳父的頭，坐了12個小時的車才趕到安徽。到家的時候，他一動沒敢動的手徹底僵掉了，岳父也只剩下最後一口氣。
妻子抱著6個月兒子，看到丈夫凍僵的樣子，愴然大哭。
「她有學歷，有自己的事業，但是為了照顧我，都放棄了。」許家印一直記得，1995年，太太因為宮外孕被送進了急救室，生命危險。「為了不打擾我工作，她硬是沒讓醫生給我打電話。我是第二天才從朋友口中得知的。」
在深圳那段時間，作為一個男人和丈夫，許家印並沒有驕傲的資本。初做業務員的時候，他在朋友家的走廊住了3個月。後來當了辦公室負責人，條件有所改善，公司裡一間不用的廚房成了他的臥室。不過房間太小，床放好後，門就再也閉不上了。一年四季，許家印就住在這間敞開門的「臥室」裡。
直到1993年，許家印已是深圳中達的老總，他還被迫跟妻子兩地分居。後來看不過的中達老闆說，一直分居怎麼行，公司出錢，你去租套房吧。
於是，許家印就跟人合租了個兩室兩廳。合租的人住一間，許家印和太太以及2個兒子，還有岳母、父親、朋友，一共7口人住在剩下的廳室。房子裡只有合租人的那間臥室有空調，許家印的兒子怕熱，夏天就躺在合租人門口的地上「沾沾冷氣」，口裡嚷著「這裡涼快」。
這些經歷，許家印並不願對外人多提起。
「我欠她太多，婚後這麼多年，我們有吵架但從沒真正翻過臉。別的我不敢說是公司第一，但我們夫妻的感情，不自誇的說，一直是恆大人學習的榜樣。」
多年之後，許家印在香港打工的大兒子在市中心租了個房子，2萬港幣一個月，這在香港CBD已屬低廉價位。但許家印的太太知道後，嫌太貴，斥責兒子立即退掉，轉而給兒子租了個更便宜的房子。
他打電話
響3聲還沒接就罰款2萬
在工作方面，許家印是地道的「工作狂」。他通常是凌晨三四點鐘回家睡覺，睡一會就起床去公司，由此，集團一大批高層也成了工作狂。不單單是在恆大的廣州總部，到全國任何一個分公司去看，越是公司的高層中層，加班時間越多，人人都是「拚命三郎」。
恆大現任總裁夏海鈞第一天上班，許家印對他說：夏總，晚上我們一起開個會。兩人坐在餐桌前的時候，夏海鈞看了看表，六點鐘。他心裡說，吃了飯，再研究半個小時差不多了吧。結果直到十一點半，這個「晚餐」才結束。
夏海鈞心想「那晚的十一點半，可能只是偶然一次吧。」後來他才知道自己徹底錯了———十一點多結束開會確實是偶然———因為常態下，恆大的會經常要開到次日凌晨兩三點才會結束。
當時夏海鈞的太太在加拿大，每天晚上打電話問，你在做什麼？夏海鈞回答，在開會。她不相信，都晚上十一二點了，還開什麼會？他解釋半天，太太還是不信。後來在加拿大真的待不住了，就飛到廣州看，住了幾天，才知道丈夫真的「在開會」。
在嚴格管理上，恆大各項制度可稱作嚴苛。恆大有規定：許家印的電話要是響了三聲還沒人接，直接罰款2萬元！可能你上個月薪水10萬，但由於犯了錯，這個月便被腰斬，只剩5萬元。五六十歲的副總裁當著集團幾千人痛哭流涕作檢討的事情，在其他企業怕是聞所未聞。據說有某副總裁洗澡時候，不得不讓夫人在邊上拿著電話「待命」，生怕不能及時接到許家印的電話。
他最愛的夜宵：一碗熱乾麵
2009年，恆大上市當天，許家印以422億元的身價，超過當天公佈的福布斯富豪榜的首富王傳福，首次問鼎中國內地的首富寶座。
然而這一「盛名」帶給許家印的，只有惶恐，他甚至為此取消了原定於當天舉行的新聞發佈會，不想引起更多關注。
當然，有了足球後，他想低調也難了。
徐家印最愛的夜宵是熱乾麵。他在武漢上大學時，唯一奢侈的消費，就是吃學校旁邊一毛錢一碗的熱乾麵。為了這一毛錢，他還挨過老師的批評：「你是吃助學金的人，還吃一毛錢這麼貴的東西！」
直到他成為中國最富有的人，他最喜歡的夜宵，10頓裡有5頓都是熱乾麵。
