記者 蔡穎 吳黎華 北京報導

　　中國上市公司在過去21年裡融資4.3萬億元，普通股東累計分紅僅0.54萬億元

　　編者按：在過去10年裡，中國經濟保持了10.48%的平均增速，中國上市公司業績總體亦高於其他企業，而同期，中國股市在經歷了短暫的井噴之後便持續萎靡不振，似乎成了「國民經濟晴雨表」的反向指標。是什麼造成了如此巨大的反差？

　　為了求解反差的原因，本報組織記者從「股市生態」這一視角出發，對上市公司、投資者、中介機構及業內專家進行了採訪和調研，希望在直面現階段中國股市生態危機的同時，推動市場回歸本位，真正起到優化資源配置的作用。

　　從今日起，本報將陸續刊發這組調研報導。

　　儘管與著名的上海外灘隔江相望，但再怎麼宜人的風景也難掩交易所的悲觀情緒。同樣，深南大道地王大廈斜對面的深交所，也充滿著機構的嘆息。「這段時間大盤跌得比較厲害，對自己的業績影響挺大，但該做的還得做。」一位操盤手無奈地說。

　　可是，對於備戰IPO的公司而言，低迷的市場並未打消它們上市融資的熱情。統計顯示，1990年至今，國內A股累計融資4.3萬億元。可這些上市公司給投資者的紅利回報究竟有多少呢？Wind 的數據顯示，1990年末到2010年末，A股累計完成現金分紅總額約1.8萬億元。但一位資深券商分析師估算，普通投資者在上市公司的持股比例不超過 30%，其所分享的紅利最高不過0.54萬億元。也就是說，花費4.3萬億元真金白銀參與上市公司融資活動的普通股東所獲得的分紅額不超過0.54萬億 元。這意味著，近21年來，A股市場給予普通投資者的現金分紅總額佔融資總額的比率不足13%。而如果按照現在3.5%的一年期存款利率，以複利計 算，21年下來的儲蓄回報高達105.9%。

　　接受《經濟參考報》記者採訪的專家認為，上市公司只知圈錢不知回報，已成為A股市場最為病態、也最令人痛恨的現象之一。上市公司股東回報文化的缺失，已經成為絞殺普通投資者、導致市場炒作風氣盛行並制約中國資本市場健康發展的一個主要原因。

　　一毛不拔的「鐵公雞」不在少數

　　對上市公司而言，資本市場或許是最好的「提款機」。「一方面，新股源源不斷地上市『抽血』，另一方面，上市公司再融資瘋狂『圈錢』。」獨立財經評論員曹中銘撰文稱。

　　證監會統計顯示，從1990年到2011年7月，國內A股包括首發、增發、配股在內的累計融資金額高達近4.3萬億元，其中再融資額達2萬億元左右。

　　根據Wind數據，記者初步測算，從1990年到2010年末，A股累計現金分紅(除去紅利所得稅後)約1.8萬億元。但不得不提的是，出資4.3萬億元的普通投資者在上市公司中的股權比例較小，他們從上市公司獲得的紅利也是小頭。

　　Wind的數據顯示，國內股市IPO募集的股份僅佔發行前總股本的11%。「一般而言，上市公司首發和再融資(包括配股和增發)後的流通股加在一起佔 總股本的比重不超過30%。」一位資深券商分析師坦言。這位分析師估算，以普通投資者的持股比例30%計，在上市公司總計1.8萬億元的現金分紅中，普通 股東收到的現金分紅不超過0.54萬億元。

　　而且，對國內的普通投資者而言，他們還需背負「印花稅」、交易佣金等，這幾項交易成本甚至超過了 紅利。證監會的數據顯示，1990年至2010年，A股累計股票交易佣金總額約4000多億元，A股市場證券交易的印花稅總額約6000多億元。這意味 著，近21年來在整個A股市場，普通投資者的交易成本就有1萬億元左右。

　　雖然，由於監管部門近年來的政策約束，進行現金股利分配的公司數有所增加，但一毛不拔的「鐵公雞」式上市公司仍不在少數。復旦大學證券研究所的統計顯 示，2005年至2009年，實施現金分紅的上市公司佔所有上市公司總數的比例分別為45%、50.22%、51.85%、52.35%、48.52%。 2010年，在2175家上市公司中，虧損的公司僅為117家，但既不分紅也不送股的「鐵公雞」高達798家。另外，至2010年末，上市時間超過5年、 且5年內從未進行過分紅的個股高達414家，其中有136家為盈利公司，佔比高達32.85%。這其中包括金馬股份(6.40,-0.09,-1.39%)、海王生物(8.27,-0.08,-0.96%)和通化東寶(8.40,-0.19,-2.21%)這些熱門股。

　　更為惡劣的是，許多上市公司竟然以再融資募集的資金給投資者分紅。東北財經大學研究者劉淑蓮、胡燕鴻在《中國上市公司現金分紅實證分析》一文中指出， 上市公司分紅一般不超過賬面利潤，但相當一部分公司的每股現金分紅超過其每股股權自由現金流量，這意味著，這些分紅源於配股融資，圈來的錢又成為現金分紅 的來源。

　　唯圈錢主義的嘴臉暴露無遺

　　與低分紅現象相伴隨的另一些怪現象是：各類融資活動連綿不絕，ST類殭屍公司不斷上演不死神話，上市公司高管套現潮一波接一波。雖然，國內股市最近幾 個月持續低迷，但陝煤股份仍然在8月底順利過會。這家公司擬發行20億股，募資172.51億元。此前，中國水電亦成功過會，擬發行35億股，募資 173.618億元，如果其成功發行，或將成為今年最大的IPO項目。統計顯示，今年上半年，A股市場發行新股164家，較去年176家減少12 家；IPO實際募集資金1607.75億元，較去年同期的2132.28億元下降24.60%。但從8月份的新股發行看，累計發行23只新股。9月5日至 9日，又有包括巴安水務(29.680,-0.21,-0.70%)、通光線纜(16.660,-1.62,-8.86%)等在內的8只新股啟動發行程序。而且，許多權重超級大盤股，更是無節制地反覆融資再融資。9月9日，招商銀行(11.49,-0.17,-1.46%)通過了「A+H」配股方案，本次配股融資規模最高不超過350億元人民幣。有分析師表示，幾家重要銀行近五年內會有4000億至5000億元資本金缺口，銀行股再融資已經成了必然趨勢。

　　除了永無止境的圈錢之外，一些ST類殭屍股票在A股市場上屢屢上演的「不死神話」，也把市場唯圈錢主義的嘴臉暴露得一清二楚。統計數據顯示，截至 2011年6月30日，每股淨資產(扣除少數股東權益)在-1元以下的上市公司有19家。這些長期嚴重資不抵債的「殼公司」早已練就了一身超人的「生存本 領」。以*ST中華(5.17,-0.08,-1.52%)A 為例，自上市以來，它有9年虧損、2年微利的記錄：1997年、1998年虧損；1999年盈利；2000年、2001年虧損；2002年微利；2003 年、2004年虧損；2005年微利；2006年虧損；2007年微利，2008年、2009年虧損；2010年盈利。就這樣，這只股票始終未觸及「連續 三年虧損」的退市紅線。

　　部分上市公司高管則不擇手段地從資本市場撈錢。Wind統計數據顯示，2011年來，A股所有上市公司共計發生了2117宗高管減持，減持總股數達到了7.9億股，涉及市值約126億元。

　　在A股市場，股東回報文化的缺失已經成為這個市場最為讓人痛恨並飽受詬病的現象。「股權文化的核心內容是股東主權理念。」曾參加《公司法》、《證券 法》等商事經濟法律研究、起草和修改工作的中國人民大學商法研究所所長劉俊海表示，所謂股東主權就是徹底確認股東在公司治理中的主人翁地位，全面尊重股東 依據法律和章程所享有的各項權利和利益，尤其是知情權、決策參與權、分紅權、監督權與轉股權等。「這意味著，股市就不再僅僅是上市公司和發行人的圈錢工 具，而是投資者取得投資回報、分享中國資本市場和國民經濟健康發展的成果的聚寶盆。」劉俊海認為，A股「重融資、輕投資，重圈錢、輕回報」的遊戲規則必須 轉變，而「重投資、重保護、重回報」的股東主權旗幟，應當取而代之並高高飄揚。

　　重融資輕回報扭曲股市制度

　　一個健康的資本市場，應該是兼具融資與投資功能，其中任何一項功能的「出位」，必將影響到市場本身的發展。

　　「上市公司現金分紅水平整體過低，國內市場的股利支付率的比例僅為20%至30%，而海外成熟市場的股利支付率的比例一般都在40%至50%。」英大證券研究所所長李大霄認為。

　　在西方成熟市場，上市公司均有著透明的股利政策和長期的分紅措施。通用汽車、可口可樂、美國鋁業等股票數十年來保持一定數額的派現，其股票被兼顧固定 收益和成長價值的投資者長期持有。在「金磚國家」中的巴西，該國公司法要求股份公司必須在其公司章程中規定每年拿出一定比例的盈餘進行現金分紅，且比例不 得低於盈餘的25%。

　　事實上，A股市場高成長的企業不多，同時，成長型企業上市之後的表現也遠不盡如人意。國 務院發展研究中心企業研究所所長趙昌文認為，「這是中國資本市場之殤」。究其原因，一方面，我國目前發審制度在一定程度上有著「逆向選擇」的風險，典型的 體現是，以百度、騰訊為代表的一大批高成長、好質地企業無法進入A股市場。另一方面，企業上市後，由於中國資本市場的不完善，未能給企業良性成長提供相應 的治理機制，管理層或控股股東可能存在「道德風險」。同時，行業發展冷暖不均也導致分紅顯現出差距。

　　「要徹底改變這種現象，分紅機制是一個重要方面，同時還需要資本市場其他方面的完善，比如投資者結構的優化。」趙昌文認為，「目前A股市場的投資者結 構有兩個明顯特徵：短期投資者比重相對較大以及機構投資者比重相對較低。短期投資者較少將分紅納入其投資決策，這導致其對上市公司的分紅決策不敏感，因此 短期投資者比重較高意味著『用腳投票』機制一定程度上的失靈。而機構投資者比重較小，使股東積極主義難以在宏觀上對上市公司治理髮揮作用。」

　　「各種ST股在市場上作威作福，必將慫恿股市瘋狂投機，毫無投資價值的垃圾股成為賭徒手中的籌碼，它將嚴重扭曲整個A股估值體系，進而使整個股市完全喪失資源配置功能和經濟晴雨表功能。」武漢科技大學金融證券研究所所長董登新說。

　　「在某種意義上是監管政策出了問題。」中國政法大學資本研究中心主任劉紀鵬則對《經濟參考報》記者表示，就創業板來看，258家創業板上市公司三高超 募極為嚴重，但直到今天，儘管市場已經作出了不認同的反應，但258家創業板上市公司的平均發行市盈率依然高達66倍，平均發行價格高達33元/股。「這 些高管全都成了紅了眼的暴發戶，創業板對中國資本市場產生了制度性的傷害，對中國創業者的誤導，把他們從很好的、樸實的創業者變成了走上歧途的不義之 人。」他說。

In an adaptation from his upcoming shareholder letter, the Oracle of Omaha explains why equities almost always beat the alternatives over time.

By

FORTUNE -- Investing is often described as the process of laying out money now in the expectation of receiving more money in the future. At Berkshire Hathaway (BRKA) we take a more demanding approach, defining investing as the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power -- after taxes have been paid on nominal gains -- in the future. More succinctly, investing is forgoing consumption now in order to have the ability to consume more at a later date.

From our definition there flows an important corollary: The riskiness of an investment is not measured by beta (a Wall Street term encompassing volatility and often used in measuring risk) but rather by the probability -- the reasoned probability -- of that investment causing its owner a loss of purchasing power over his contemplated holding period. Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a nonfluctuating asset can be laden with risk.

Investment possibilities are both many and varied. There are three major categories, however, and it's important to understand the characteristics of each. So let's survey the field.

Investments that are denominated in a given currency include money-market funds, bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and other instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as "safe." In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta may be zero, but their risk is huge.

Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing power of investors in many countries, even as these holders continued to receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly result, moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin out of control.

Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as "income."

For taxpaying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-year period, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7% return would have yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor's visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. It's noteworthy that the implicit inflation "tax" was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. "In God We Trust" may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our government's printing press has been all too human.

High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments -- and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.

Under today's conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.

Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchase currency-related securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain -- either because a particular credit is mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we've exploited both opportunities in the past -- and may do so again -- we are now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: "Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free risk."

The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer's hope that someone else -- who also knows that the assets will be forever unproductive -- will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.

This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce -- it will remain lifeless forever -- but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.

The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.

What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As "bandwagon" investors join any party, they create their own truth -- for a while.

Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the "proof " delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers -- for a time -- expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: "What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end."

Today the world's gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $1,750 per ounce -- gold's price as I write this -- its value would be about $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.

Let's now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world's most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?

Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices make today's annual production of gold command about $160 billion. Buyers -- whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened individuals, or speculators -- must continually absorb this additional supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.

A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops -- and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil (XOM) will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.

Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it's likely many will still rush to gold. I'm confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.

Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard "cash is king" in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard "cash is trash" in the early 1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.

My own preference -- and you knew this was coming -- is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola (KO), IBM (IBM), and our own See's Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies -- think of our regulated utilities, for example -- fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.

Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See's peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.

Our country's businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial "cows" will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of "milk" to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as well).

Berkshire's goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own them in their entirety -- but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway winner among the three we've examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.