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一个实业家的诞生——读巴菲特的信（10） Barrons

 对于通胀，企业家的感触很深。通胀不仅提高成本，还吞噬企业赖以发展的资本，最终减少企业给拥有者的回报。    Like virginity, a stable price level seems capable of maintenance, but not of restoration.    稳定的价格水平如童贞，看来是能保持，却不能修复。    （1981年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    But before we drown in a sea of self-congratulation, a further - and crucial - observation must be made.  A few years ago, a business whose per-share net worth compounded at 20% annually would have guaranteed its owners a highly successful real investment return.  Now such an outcome seems less certain.  For the inflation rate, coupled with individual tax rates, will be the ultimate determinant as to whether our internal operating performance produces successful investment results - i.e., a reasonable gain in purchasing power from funds committed - for you as shareholders.    在我们陷入自我夸奖之前，必须作进一步，而且是关键的一个观察。几年前，一个每股净资产以每年20%的复利增长的企业肯定能给拥有者带来高度成功的真实投资回报。目前，这种结果显得不那么确定。因为通胀和个人税率结合在一起，将最终决定内部运营业绩能否产生成功的投资结果，也就是说对你们股东来说，投入的资金有合理的购买力增加。    Just as the original 3% savings bond, a 5% passbook savings account or an 8% U.S. Treasury Note have, in turn, been transformed by inflation into financial instruments that chew up, rather than enhance, purchasing power over their investment lives, a business earning 20% on capital can produce a negative real return for its owners under inflationary conditions not much more severe than presently prevail.    正如原来的3%的储蓄债券，5%的存折帐户，或者8%的美国国债已经被通胀变为了在投资的生命周期内，吞噬，而不是提高购买力的金融工具。一个赢得20%资本回报率的企业，在比目前稍微严重的通胀条件下能给拥有者带来负的回报。    If we should continue to achieve a 20% compounded gain - not an easy or certain result by any means - and this gain is translated into a corresponding increase in the market value of Berkshire Hathaway stock as it has been over the last fifteen years, your after-tax purchasing power gain is likely to be very close to zero at a 14% inflation rate.  Most of the remaining six percentage points will go for income tax any time you wish to convert your twenty percentage points of nominal annual gain into cash.    如果我们继续取得20%的复利增长，无论如何这不容易也不确定。这种复利增长在过去15年转化成了相应的伯克希尔股票市场价值的增长。但是在14%的通胀条件下，你的税后购买力增长很有可能是零。任何时候你希望把20个百分点的名义年收入变为现金，剩下的六个百分点大部分将流向收入税。    That combination - the inflation rate plus the percentage of capital that must be paid by the owner to transfer into his own pocket the annual earnings achieved by the business (i.e., ordinary income tax on dividends and capital gains tax on retained earnings) - can be thought of as an “investor’s misery index”.  When this index exceeds the rate of return earned on equity by the business, the investor’s purchasing power (real capital) shrinks even though he consumes nothing at all.  We have no corporate solution to this problem; high inflation rates will not help us earn higher rates of return on equity.    通 胀，以及拥有者把自己企业的年度盈利转到自己口袋里时必须支付一定百分比的资本（比如正常分红的收入税和存留收益的资本利得税），这两者相加可以看成是 “投资者的痛苦指数”。当这个指数超过企业的资本回报率，投资者的购买力（真实资本）缩小为零，即使他没有消费任何东西。我们没有针对这个问题的企业对策；高通胀不会帮助我们获得更高的资本回报率。    One friendly but sharp-eyed commentator on Berkshire has pointed out that our book value at the end of 1964 would have bought about one-half ounce of gold and, fifteen years later, after we have plowed back all earnings along with much blood, sweat and tears, the book value produced will buy about the same half ounce.  A similar comparison could be drawn with Middle Eastern oil.  The rub has been that government has been exceptionally able in printing money and creating promises, but is unable to print gold or create oil.    一个友好但眼光敏锐的伯克希尔评论者指出，我们在1964年底的净资产大概能买半盎司的黄金。但15年后，当我们投入所有的盈利，外加血汗和泪水，所产生的净资产也只能买同样的半盎司黄金。同样的比较也可以用在中东石油上。一直让人恼火的是，政府向来尤其能印钱，创造承诺，却无法印金子或创造石油。    We intend to continue to do as well as we can in managing the internal affairs of the business.  But you should understand that external conditions affecting the stability of currency may very well be the most important factor in determining whether there are any real rewards from your investment in Berkshire Hathaway.    我们致力于继续管理好内部业务。但你应理解的是，影响货币稳定的外部环境有可能是决定你对伯克希尔·哈撒韦的投资是否有任何真实回报的最关键因素。    （1979年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    High rates of inflation create a tax on capital that makes much corporate investment unwise - at least if measured by the criterion of a positive real investment return to owners.  This “hurdle rate” the return on equity that must be achieved by a corporation in order to produce any real return for its individual owners - has increased dramatically in recent years.  The average tax-paying investor is now running up a down escalator whose pace has accelerated to the point where his upward progress is nil.    高 通胀创造了一个资本税，这个税让大多数企业投资变得不明智，至少如果用对拥有者正的真实投资回报的标准来衡量是如此。这个资本回报率的最低门槛，即企业给 个人拥有者产生任何真实回报所必须取得的最低资本回报率，在最近几年显著上升。一般纳税水平的投资者现在是在一个下行的自动扶梯往上跑。自动扶梯的节奏已 经加快到了一定程度，让投资者向上的进展为零。    （1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）

顺风行业易，扭亏为盈难    巴菲特意识到，处在一个顺风发展的行业非常重要，所谓的“扭亏为盈”极少成功，除非企业本身的优异本质仍然没有改变，否则就是巧妇难为无米之炊。    The textile industry illustrates in textbook style how producers of relatively undifferentiated goods in capital intensive businesses must earn inadequate returns except under conditions of tight supply or real shortage. As long as excess productive capacity exists, prices tend to reflect direct operating costs rather than capital employed.  Such a supply-excess condition appears likely to prevail most of the time in the textile industry, and our expectations are for profits of relatively modest amounts in relation to capital.    纺 织行业用教科书式的方式说明了，在一个产品无法差异化，资本投入巨大的行业中的企业，除非供应紧缺，否则其必然无法获得足够的回报。只要产能过剩存在，价 格就会反映直接运营成本，而不是所使用的资本。这种过度供应的情况在纺织行业长期广泛存在。而我们对纺织业的预期是与投入的资本相比获得一定的盈利。    

Both our operating and investment experience cause us to conclude that “turnarounds” seldom turn, and that the same energies and talent are much better employed in a good business purchased at a fair price than in a poor business purchased at a bargain price.    我们的运营和投资经验都让我们明确意识到“扭亏为盈”极少成功。把同样的精力和才干，投入到一个用合理价格购买的好的业务中，会有好得多的结果，远超过投入一个差的业务的效果，即使差的业务的购买价格非常便宜。    （1979年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    We have written in past reports about the disappointments that usually result from purchase and operation of “turnaround” businesses.  Literally hundreds of turnaround possibilities in dozens of industries have been described to us over the years and, either as participants or as observers, we have tracked performance against expectations.  Our conclusion is that, with few exceptions, when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.    我 们在过去的报告中写到了通常情况下购买及运营“扭亏为盈”业务的失望结果。在过去一些年，在很多行业的几百个扭亏为盈的机会曾经呈现给我们，或者邀我们参 与，或者让我们入股作为旁观者。我们追踪了这些扭亏为盈机会的表现，并与之前的预期相比较。我们的结论是，除了少数例外情况，当具有卓越名声的管理层去着 手解决一个有着糟糕经济基本面名声的业务时，业务的糟糕名声原样不动（而管理层则名声扫地）。    GEICO may appear to be an exception, having been turned around from the very edge of bankruptcy in 1976.  It certainly is true that managerial brilliance was needed for its resuscitation, and that Jack Byrne, upon arrival in that year, supplied that ingredient in abundance.    GEICO似乎是个例外，已经被从1976年的破产边缘拯救回来。当然，它的复兴需要卓越的管理。当Jack Byrne从到达的那年起，就贡献了大量的卓越管理。    But it also is true that the fundamental business advantage that GEICO had enjoyed - an advantage that previously had produced staggering success - was still intact within the company, although submerged in a sea of financial and operating troubles.    同样重要的是，GEICO曾经享有的业务基本面优势，一个曾经创造了令人难以置信的成功的优势，历经大量的财务和运营问题，仍然存留于公司内部，毫发无损。    GEICO was designed to be the low-cost operation in an enormous marketplace (auto insurance) populated largely by companies whose marketing structures restricted adaptation.  Run as designed, it could offer unusual value to its customers while earning unusual returns for itself.  For decades it had been run in just this manner.  Its troubles in the mid-70s were not produced by any diminution or disappearance of this essential economic advantage.    GEICO当初的设计就是在一个大市场（汽车保险）中低成本运营。这个市场充斥了各种公司，这些公司的市场营销结构限制其模仿GEICO的运营方式。如果按照设计运营，GEICO能给客户提供异乎寻常的价值，同时自己获得异乎寻常的盈利回报。在几十年的时间里，它就是这么运营的。它在70年代中期的问题并不是由于这种基本的经济优势的弱化或消失。    GEICO’s problems at that time put it in a position analogous to that of American Express in 1964 following the salad oil scandal.  Both were one-of-a-kind companies, temporarily reeling from the effects of a fiscal blow that did not destroy their exceptional underlying economics.  The GEICO and American Express situations, extraordinary business franchises with a localized excisable cancer (needing, to be sure, a skilled surgeon), should be distinguished from the true “turnaround” situation in which the managers expect - and need - to pull off a corporate Pygmalion.    GEICO当时的问题与美国运通在1964年色拉油丑闻之后的情形类似。都是独一无二的公司，暂时被财务冲击所席卷，但财务冲击并没有毁掉其优异的内在经济特性。GEICO和美国运通的情况是优异的特许经营权业务，但有局部可切除的癌变（当然，需要一个医术精湛的外科医生）。它们的情况要与真正的“扭亏为盈”情况相区分。在后一种情况中，经理人期望，而且需要做出无米之炊。    （1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）      真实的盈利    盈利的价值不一定会体现在按会计准则报告的数字中，而是体现在对拥有者的价值。盈利虽可贵，自由价更高，只有自由现金流才是对拥有者真正有价值的。    Our own analysis of earnings reality differs somewhat from generally accepted accounting principles, particularly when those principles must be applied in a world of high and uncertain rates of inflation. (But it’s much easier to criticize than to improve such accounting rules.  The inherent problems are monumental.) We have owned 100% of businesses whose reported earnings were not worth close to 100 cents on the dollar to us even though, in an accounting sense, we totally controlled their disposition. (The “control” was theoretical.  Unless we reinvested all earnings, massive deterioration in the value of assets already in place would occur.  But those reinvested earnings had no prospect of earning anything close to a market return on capital.) We have also owned small fractions of businesses with extraordinary reinvestment possibilities whose retained earnings had an economic value to us far in excess of 100 cents on the dollar.    我们自己的真实盈利分析与通用会计准则有所不同，尤其是当那些会计准则必须应用于一个高涨且不确定的通胀世界。（但是批评会计规定比改进会计规定容易多了。固有的问题堆积如山。）有些我们100%拥 有的企业，虽然依据会计准则我们完全控制了他们盈利的处置，但他们报告的每一美元盈利对我们来说并不意味着近似一美元。（这“控制”只是理论上的。除非我 们把全部盈利重新投入，否则现存资产将大规模减值。而且那些重新投入的盈利无望获得任何接近市场资本回报率的回报。）我们同样拥有一些企业的小部分，这些 企业有着优异的投资可能性，其每一美元存留收益对我们的经济价值远超过一美元。    The value to Berkshire Hathaway of retained earnings is not determined by whether we own 100%, 50%, 20% or 1% of the businesses in which they reside.  Rather, the value of those retained earnings is determined by the use to which they are put and the subsequent level of earnings produced by that usage.    存留收益对伯克希尔·哈撒韦的价值不取决于我们是拥有100%，50%，20%，或者1%我们所投资的公司。那些存留收益的价值取决于其具体使用及使用后所产生的盈利水平。    （1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    Our view, we warn you, is non-conventional.  But we would rather have earnings for which we did not get accounting credit put to good use in a 10%-owned company by a management we did not  personally hire, than have earnings for which we did get credit put into projects of more dubious potential by another management - even if we are that management.    我提醒你，我们对盈利的观点是非传统的。但是我们宁愿要在会计上不属于我们，但却能得到良好运用的盈利，即使我们只拥有10%的公司，管理层不是我们亲自雇佣的。我们不愿要在会计上属于我们，但却被另一个管理层投入有疑问项目的盈利，即使我们就是那个管理层。    （1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    We are not at all unhappy when our wholly-owned businesses retain all of their earnings if they can utilize internally those funds at attractive rates.  Why should we feel differently about retention of earnings by companies in which we hold small equity interests, but where the record indicates even better prospects for profitable employment of capital? (This proposition cuts the other way, of course, in industries with low capital requirements, or if management has a record of plowing capital into projects of low profitability; then earnings should be paid out or used to repurchase shares - often by far the most attractive option for capital utilization.)    我 们完全拥有的企业如果能以诱人的回报率内部使用盈利，我们一点儿也不会感到不高兴。如果我们拥有小部分股份的公司，其记录显示他们能以更高的回报使用资 本，我们为什么会感到有所不同呢？（当然，这个主张将在如下情况发生改变：在低资本投入需求的行业，或者如果管理层有把资本投向低盈利性项目的记录。那 么，盈利应该被用来回购股份，这常常是到目前为止资本使用最诱人的选择。）    （1978年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    If you have owned .01 of 1% of Berkshire during the past decade, you have benefited economically in full measure from your share of our retained earnings, no matter what your accounting system.  Proportionately, you have done just as well as if you had owned the magic 20%.  But if you have owned 100% of a great many capital-intensive businesses during the decade, retained earnings that were credited fully and with painstaking precision to you under standard accounting methods have resulted in minor or zero economic value.  This is not a criticism of accounting procedures.  We would not like to have the job of designing a better system.  It’s simply to say that managers and investors alike must understand that accounting numbers are the beginning, not the end, of business valuation.   如果你在过去10年拥有伯克希尔百分之一股份的0.01，无论你的会计系统是什么，你都已经从我们的存留收益中获得了全部的经济收益。按比例，如果你拥有会计规定的神奇的20%的伯克希尔股份，你也能获得同样的收益。但是，如果在过去10年里，你100%拥有很多资本密集型的企业，那么按照标准会计方法详细精确计算的存留收益将全部归你，但却只能产生极少或者零经济价值。这并不是批评会计程序。我们不想承担设计一个更好的系统的任务。这只是说经理人和投资者们必须理解，会计数字只是商业估值的开始，而不是结束。    （1982年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）

Our acquisition preferences run toward businesses that generate cash, not those that consume it.  As inflation intensifies, more and more companies find that they must spend all funds they generate internally just to maintain their existing physical volume of business.  There is a certain mirage-like quality to such operations.  However attractive the earnings numbers, we remain leery of businesses that never seem able to convert such pretty numbers into no-strings-attached cash.    我 们的并购偏好于产生现金的企业，而不是消耗现金的企业。当通胀加剧时，越来越多的企业发现他们必须花掉内部产生的所有资金，才能仅仅维持目前的业务量。这 些运营有点儿像海市蜃楼。无论盈利的数字如何诱人，我们对那些永远也不能把美好的数字变成没有任何附带条件的现金的企业抱有疑虑。    （1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）

巴菲特接班人　也愛親筆寫信給股東

與葛洛斯、巴菲特齊名的美國低調債券天王 丹佛斯：精算細節，才能比人早一步

巴菲特经典演说 laoba1梁军儒

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4c5a73c90100n2ms.html

格雷厄姆与多德追求“价值远超过价格的安全保障”，这种证券分析方法是否已经过时?

目前许多撰写教科书的教授认为如此。他们认为，股票市场是有效率的市场；换言之，股票价格已经充分反应了公司一切己知的事实以及整体经济情况：这些理 论家认为，市场上没有价格偏低的股票，因为聪明的证券分析师将运用全部的既有资讯，以确保适当的价格。投资者能经年累月地击败市场，纯粹是运气使然。“如 果价格完全反应既有的资讯，则这类的投资技巧将不存在。”一位现今教科书的作者如此与写道。
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或许如此！但是，我要提供一组投资者的绩效供各位参考，他们长期的表现总是超越史坦普500种股价指数。他们的绩效即使纯属巧合，这项假说至少也值得 我们加以审查。审查的关键事实是，我早就熟识这些赢家，而且长年以来便视他们为超级投资者，最近的认知也有十五年之久。缺少这项条件——换言之，如果我最 近才从成千上万的记录中挑选几个名字，并且在今天早上提供给各位——我建议各位立即停止阅读本文。我必须说明，所有的这些记录都经过稽核。我必须再说明， 我认识许多上述经理人的客户，他们长年以来所收取的支票确实符合既有的记录。
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在进行审查之前，我要各位设想—场全国性的掷铜板大赛。让我们假定，全美国2．25亿的人口在明天早晨起床时都掷出一枚一美元的铜板。早晨太阳升起 时，他们都走到门外掷铜板，并猜铜板出现的正面或反面。如果猜对了，他们将从猜错者的手中赢得一美元。每次都有输家遭到淘汰，奖金则不断地累积。经过十个 早晨的十次投掷之后，全美国约有2．2万人连续十次猜对掷铜板的结果。每人所赢得的资金约超过1000美元。
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现在，这群人可能会开始炫耀自己的战绩，此乃人的天性使然。他们可能保持谦虚的态度，但在鸡尾酒宴会中，他们偶尔会以此技巧吸引异性的注意，并炫耀其投掷铜板的奇异洞察力。
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假定赢家都可以从输家手中得到适当的奖金，再经过十天，约有215个人连续二十次猜对掷铜板的结果，每个人并赢得大约100万美元的奖金。输家总共付出2．25亿美元，赢家则得到2．25亿美元。
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这时候，这群人可能完全沉迷在自己的成就中：他们可能开始著书立说：“我如何每天早晨工作30秒，而在二十天之内将—美元变成100万美元。”更糟的 是，他们会在全国各地参加讲习会，宣扬如何有效地投掷铜板，并且反驳持怀疑态度的教授说，“如果这是不可能的事，为什么会有我们这215个人呢?”
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但是，某商学院的教授可能会粗鲁地提出—项事实，如果2．25亿只猩猩参加这场大赛，结果大致上也是如此——有215只自大的猩猩将连续赢得20次的投掷。
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然而，我必须说明，前述事例和我即将提出的案例，两者之间存在着若干重大差异。

首先，如果(a)：你所选择的2．25亿只猩猩的分布状况大致上和美国的人口分布相同；如果(b)：经过20天的竞赛，只剩下215只赢家；如果 (c)：你发现其中有40只猩猩来自于奥玛哈的某个动物园，则其中必有蹊跷。于是，你会询问猩猩管理员各种问题，它们吃什么饲料、是否做特殊的运动、阅读 什么书籍……换言之，如果你发现成功案例有非比寻常的集中现象，则你希望判定此异常的特色是否是成功的原因。
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科学的调查也遵循此一形态。如果你试图分析某种罕见的癌症原因——例如，美国每年只有1500个病例——而你发现蒙大拿州的某个矿区小镇便产生400 个病例，则你必然对当地的饮水、病患的职业或其他种种变数产生兴趣。你知道，在—个小镇中发生400个病例，绝不是随机因素所造成。虽然你未必了解病因， 但你知道从哪里着手调查。
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除了地理国家，还有其他方式可以界定起源。除了地理的起源，还有我所谓“智力的起源”。我认为各位将在投资领域发现，不成比例的铜板投掷赢家来自于一 个极小的智力村庄----它可以称为“格雷厄姆一多德都市”。这个特殊“智力村”存在着许多赢家．这种集中现象绝非巧合所能够解释。
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在某些情况下，即使非比寻常的集中现象也可能不重要。或许有100个只是模仿某一位极具说服力的领导者，而依其主张来猜测铜板的投掷结果。当他猜正 面，100个追随者也会自动地做相同的猜测。如果这一位领导者是属于最后215位赢家之一，则这100也便属于同一个智力起源，这项事实便不具有任何意 义，因为100个案例实际上只代表一个案例。同理，假定你生活在一个父权结构极为严密的社会，而美国每一个家庭都恰好以父亲马首是瞻。20天之后，你将发 现215位赢家是来自于21．5个家庭。若干天真的分析师可能因此而认为，成功地猜测铜板投掷的结果，其中具有高度的遗传因素。当然，这实际上不具有任何 意义，因为你所拥有的不是215位个别赢家，而只是21．5个随机分布的家庭。
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我所要考虑的这一群成功投资者，共有一位共同的智力族长——本杰明·格雷厄姆。但是，这些离开此智力家族的孩童，都是依据非常不同的方法猜测他们自己 的“铜板”。他们各自前往不同的地方，买卖不同的股票和企业，但他们的综合绩效绝对无法用随机因素加以解释。他们做相同的猜测，并不是因为领导者下达某一 项指令，因此也无法用这种方式解释他们的表现。族长只提供了猜测铜板的智力理论，每位学生都必须自行决定如何运用这项理论。
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来自“格雷厄姆一多德都市”的投资者所具备的共同智力结构是：他们探索企业的价值与该企业市场价格之间的差异。事实上，他们利用其间的差异，却不在意 效率市场理论家所关心的问题：股票究竟在星期一或星期—：买进，或是在一月份或七月份买进…。当企业家买进某家公司时——这正是格雷厄姆一多德都市的投资 者透过上市股票所从事的行为——我怀疑有多少人会在意交易必须发生于某个月份或某个星期的第一天。如果企业的买进交易发生在星期一或星期五没有任何差别， 则我无法了解学术界人士为何要花费大量的时间和精力，探讨代表该企业部分股权的交易发生时的差异。毋庸多说，格雷厄姆一多德都市的投资者并不探讨 bate、资本资产定价模型、证券投资报酬率的变异数。这些都不是他们所关心的议题。事实上，他们大多数难以界定上述学术名词。他们只在乎两项实数：价格 与价值。
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面对图形分析师所研究的价量行为，我始终感觉惊讶。你是否会仅仅因为某家公司的市场价格在本周或前一周剧扬，便决定购买该企业呢?

在目前电脑化的时代，人们之所以会大量研究价格与成交量的行为，理由是这两项变数拥有了无数的资料。研究未必是因为其具任何功用；而只是因为资料既然 存在，学术界人士便必须努力学习操作这些资料所需要的数学技巧。—旦拥有这些技巧，不去运用它们便会带来罪恶感，即使这些技巧的运用没有任何功用，或只会 带来负面功用．也在所不惜。如同一位朋友所说的，对一位持铁锤的人来说，每—样东西看起来都像是钉子。
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我认为，这一群具有共同智力起源的投资者非常值得我们研究。虽然学术界不断地对价格、成交量、季节性、资本规模以及其他变数，研究它们对股票绩效的影响，但这群以价值为导向赢家的方法却毫不受人关心。
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关于这一项绩效的研究，我首先要追溯到从1954年到1956年间，工作于Greham—Newman公司的四位伙伴。我们总共四个人——我并不是从 数以千计的对象中挑选这四个人。在我选修本杰明·格雷厄姆的课程之后，我要求进人Graham—Newman公司担任无给职的工作，但格雷厄姆却以价值高 估而拒绝了我的要求。他对价值看得非常严重！经我不断地恳求，他最后答应雇我。当时公司有三位合伙股东，以及我们四位“学徒”。公司结束经营之后，我们四 个人陆续在1955年到1957年间离开公司，目前只能够追踪其中三个人的投资记录。
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第一个案例是华特·史洛斯。华特从来没有念过大学，但他在纽约金融协会参加了本杰明·葛雷厄姆的夜间课程。华特在1955年离开Greham—Newman公司。
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以下是“亚当·史密斯”——在我和他谈论有关华特的事迹之后——在《超级金钱》(Supermoney，1972年) 一书中对他所做的描述：
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他从来不运用或接触有用的资讯。在华尔街几乎没有人认识他，所以没有人提供他有关投资的观念。他只参考手册上的数字，并要求企业寄年报给他，情况便是如此。
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当华特介绍我们认识时，他曾经描述“他从来没有忘记自己是在管理别人的资金，这进一步强化了他对于风险的厌恶。”他有高尚的品格．并以务实的态度自持。对他来说．金钱是真实的，股票也真实的——并从此而接受了“安全边际”的原则。
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华特的投资组合极为分散，目前拥有的股票远越过100支。他了解如何选股，将价格远低于其价值者出售给私人投资者。这便是他所做的一切。他不担心目前是不是一月份，不在乎今天是不是星期一，也不关心今年是不是大选年。
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他的想法非常单纯，如果某家公司值一美元，若我能够以40美分买进，我迟早会获利。他便是如此不断地行动：他所持有的股票种类远比我的多——而且比我更不关心企业的本质；我对华特似乎没有太大的影响力。这是他的长处之—，没有人能够对他产生足够的影响力。
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第二个案例是汤姆·科纳普，他曾经和我一起在Greham—Newman公司工作。汤姆于大战之前曾在普林斯顿大学主修化学，大战结束之后，他经常在 海滩游荡。某一天，他得知大卫·多德将在哥伦比亚大学开夜间投资课程。汤姆以旁听方式选修该课程，之后他对投资学科产生了浓厚的兴趣，于是正式注册进入哥 伦比亚大学商学院，并且获得了MBA学位。35年之后，我拨电话给汤姆，确定某些有关此一主题的事，我发现他仍然在海滩游荡。惟—的差别是．他目前拥有一 片海滩！
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在1968年，汤姆与艾德·安德生——也是葛拉汉的信徒——以及其他一、两位有共同信念的人，组成了帝地布朗合伙公司。帝地布朗合伙公司的投资高度分散。他们偶尔会从事控制股权的投资，但其被动式的投资绩效约略等于控股权式投资的表现。
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我在1957年成立巴菲特合伙公司。我认为我做的最明智的决定之一是在1969年结束营业。从此之后，伯克夏公司在某种程度上仍然从事相关的投资业 务。我无法给各位单一的指数，用以合理地测试伯克夏公司的投资管理。但是，我认为各位不论如何考验它，它的表现一直都令人满意。
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红杉基金经理人比尔·卢昂，我在1951年格雷厄姆的讲座中认识他。哈佛商学院毕业之后，他进入华尔街。稍后，他发觉需要接受真正的商业教育，于是参 加了格雷厄姆在哥伦比亚大学开办的讲座，我们便相逢于1951年初。从1951年到1970年间。比尔所管理的资金规模相当小，绩效却远比大盘来得好。当 我结束巴菲特合伙公司的业务时，我要求比尔成立—个基金公司，来管理我们合伙股东的资金，他于是成立了红杉基金。他成立基金的时机非常不利。他面临两个层 次的市场，以及以价值为导向的投资者相当难以运作的情况。我十分乐于提及一点．我的合伙股东不仅继续委托他管理，还投入更多的资金，而且对他的表现十分赞 赏。
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其中并不涉及后见之明。比尔是我推荐给合伙股东的惟一人选，我当时就表示，如果他的绩效能够高出史坦普指数四个百分点，这便是非常稳固的表现。比尔的 绩效远甚于此，而且所管理的资金规模不断地扩大。这使得管理愈来愈困难。资金规模是绩效的拖累，这是毫无疑问的。这并不意味当资金规模扩大，你的表现便无 法超越平均水准，只是超越的幅度会缩些如果你所管理的资金是2兆美元，则你的表现必然无法超越平均水准，因为你的资金规模便是整个股票市场的总市值。
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我必须指出，截至目前我们所观察的记录，投资组合在整段期间都几乎没有重叠。他们都是根据价格与价值间的差异来选股，选择的标的也截然不同。华特的最重要持股都是扎实的企业，如Hudson Pulp&Paper、Jeddo HighHand Coal、 New York Trap Rock Company，即使是偶尔阅读金融版新闻的人，对这些企业的名称也耳熟能详。帝地布朗公司所选择的标的则更是名不见经传的企业。另一方面，比尔的选择标的则是大型企业。这些投资组合极少出现重叠现象。他们的记录并非由某人主导的猜测铜板，其他人则只听命附和。
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我的另—位朋友，他毕业于哈佛法学院，并且成立了一家主要的法律事务所。我大约在1960年认识他，并且建议说，法律作为嗜好是件好事，但是他应该做 得更好。于是，他成立了一家合伙公司，他的操作方式和华特迥异，他的投资组合集中在极少数的证券，因此绩效的变动比较激烈，但他仍然依据相同的价值折价法 从事投资。他愿意接受绩效的上下震荡，而他恰好是一位精神极度集中的人。他的名字是查理·蒙格，他是我在柏克夏公司从事操作的长期合伙股东。当他自己经营 合伙事业时，他的投资组合和我或任何先前所提到的人完全都不同。
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查理的一位好朋友——另一位非商学系出身的人——他毕业于南加州大学的数学系。毕业之后，他进入IBM，曾经担任推销员的工作。在我网罗查理之后，查 理又网罗他。他的名字是瑞克·吉林。从1965年到]983年，史坦普指数的复利成长率为316％，而瑞克的绩效为22200％，这或许是因为他缺乏商学 教育背景，他可以视为具有统计上的显著性。
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在此撇开主题：以40美分的价格买进一美元的纸钞，人若不能够立即接受这项概念，就永远不会接受它。它就像注射药剂。如果它无法立即抓住这个人，则我 认为即使你长期地说服他，并且展示各种记录，你也无法让他接受。这是很单纯的概念，但他们就是无法领悟。类似瑞克这样的人，他完全没有正式商学教育的背 景，却可以立即领会价值投资法，并且在五分钟之后便加以利用。我从来不曾见过任何人，会在10年之后才逐渐地皈依这种方法。它似乎和智商或学术训练无关。 它是顿悟！否则就是拒绝。
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史坦毕业于密西根大学艺术系，是Bozell＆Jacobs广告公司的合伙股东之—。我们的办公室恰好于奥玛哈市的同一幢大楼。1965年，他认为我所经营的事业比他的行业要好，于是他离开广告业。再—次地，史坦于五分钟之内就接受了价值投资法！
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史坦所持有的股票与华特的不同。他所持有的股票也和比尔不同。他们都是独立的记录。但是，史坦买进每—支股票时，都是因为他所获得的价值高于他所支付 的价格。这是他惟一的考虑。他既不参考每一季的盈余预估值，也不参考明年的盈余项估值，他不在乎当时是星期几，也不关心任何的投资研究报告，他无视价格动 能、成交量与其他类似的变数。他只提出一个问题：该企业值多少钱?
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这些“格雷厄姆一多德都市”的“铜板投掷者”，是我根据他们的投资决策架构，在多年前便选定了他们。我了解他们所接受过的训练，而且知道他们的智慧、 个性和脾气。我们务必了解，这群人只承担了一般水准以下的风险；留意他们在股市疲弱期间的记录。他们的投资风格虽然大不相同，但心态上始终恪守：买进的标 的是企业，而非企业的股票。他们当中有些人偶尔会买下整个企业，但是他们经常只是购买企业的—小部分。不论买进整体或一部分的企业，他们所秉持的态度完全 相同。在投资组合，有些人持有几十种的股票；有些人则集中少数几支股票。但是，每个人都受惠于企业市场价格与其内含价值之间的差值。
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我相信市场上存在着许多没有效率的现象。这些来自于“格雷厄姆一多德都市”的投资人成功地掌握了价格与价值之间的缺口。华尔街的“群众”可以影响股票 价格，当最情绪化的人、最贪婪的或最沮丧的人肆意驱动股价时，我们很难辩称市场价格是理性的产物。事实上，市场经常是不合理的。
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我想提出有关报酬与风险之间的重要关系。在某些情况下，报酬与风险之间存在着正向关系。如果有人告诉我“我有一支六发子弹装的左轮枪，并且填装一发子 弹。你可以任意地拨动转轮，然后朝自己扣一次扳机。如果你能够逃过一劫，我就赏你100万美元。”我将会拒绝这项提议——或许我的理由是100万美元太少 了。然后，他可能建议将奖金提高为500万美元，但必须扣两次扳机——这便是报酬与风险之间的正向关系!
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在价值投资法当中，情况恰巧相反。如果你以60美分买进一美元的纸钞，其风险大于以40美分买进一美元的纸钞，但后者报酬的期望值却比较高。以价值为导向的投资组合，其报酬的潜力愈高，风险愈低。
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我可以举一个简单的例子：在1973年，华盛顿邮报公司的总市值为8千万美元。在这一天，你可以将其资产卖给十位买家之一，而且价格不低于4亿美元， 甚至还能更高。该公司拥有华盛顿邮报、商业周刊以及数家重要的电视台。这些资产目前的价值为4亿美元，因此愿意支付4亿美元的买家并非疯子。
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现在，如果股价继续下跌，该企业的市值从8千万美元跌到4千万美元，其bate值也上升。对于用bate值衡量风险的人来说，更低的价格使它觉得更有 风险。这真是仙境中的爱丽丝！----我永远无法了解，用4千万美元，而非8千万美元购买价值4亿美元的资产，其风险竟然更高。事实上，如果你买进一堆这 样的证券，而且稍微了解所谓的企业评价，则用8千万美元的价格买进4亿美元的资产，这笔交易基本上没有风险，尤其是分别以800万美元的价格买进10种价 值4000万美元的资产，其风险更低。因为你不拥有4亿美元，所以你希望能够确实找到诚实而有能力的人，这并不困难。
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另外，你必须有知识，而且能够粗略地估计企业的价值。但是，你不需要精密的评价知识。这便是本杰明·葛拉厄姆所谓的安全边际。你不必试图以8000万 美元的价格购买价值8300万美元的企业。你必须让自己保有相当的缓冲。架设桥梁时，你坚持载重量为3万磅，但你只准许1万磅的卡车穿梭其间。相同的原则 也适用于投资领域。
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有些具备商业头脑的人可能会怀疑我撰写本文的动机：更多人皈依价值投资法，将会缩小价值与价格之间的差距。我只能够如此告诉各位，自从本杰明·格雷厄 姆与大卫·多德出版《证券分析》，这个秘密已经流传了50年，在我奉行这项投资理论的35年中，我不曾目睹价值投资法蔚然成风。人的天性中似乎存在着偏执 的特色，喜欢把简单的事情弄得更复杂。最近30年来，学术界如果有任何作为的话，乃完全背离了价值投资的教训。它很可能继续如此。船只将环绕地球而行。但 地平之说仍会畅行无阻。在市场上，价格与价值之间还会存在着宽广的差值，而奉行格雷厄姆与多德理论的人也会繁荣不绝。

一个实业家的诞生——读巴菲特的信（11） Barrons

http://blog.caing.com/article/12284/

企业并购    企 业并购为什么很难成功？首先，很多企业并购的动机就不纯，多是管理层为了自己的私利，权力欲，好大喜功，因为盘子越大，高管报酬越高。其次，真正好的并购 目标并不多，好公司少，能够被并购的好公司就更少。最后，很多管理层根本不具备高超的运营管理能力，无法把被并购公司化腐朽为神奇，没有金刚钻却偏要揽瓷 器活。    If our success were to depend upon insights we developed through plant inspections, Berkshire would be in big trouble.  Rather, in considering an acquisition, we attempt to evaluate the economic characteristics of the business - its competitive strengths and weaknesses - and the quality of the people we will be joining.    如果我们的成功依赖于我们在工厂巡视时得到的深入见解，伯克希尔将有大麻烦。与之相反，在考虑并购的时候，我们评估业务的经济特征，即它的竞争优势和弱点，以及将与我们一起工作的人的素质。    （1986年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    Our acquisition decisions will be aimed at maximizing real economic benefits, not at maximizing either managerial domain or reported numbers for accounting purposes. (In the long run, managements stressing accounting appearance over economic substance usually achieve little of either.)    我们的并购决策将以最大化真实经济效益为目标，而不是最大的管理领域，或者最大的汇报会计数字。（在长期，强调表面的会计数字胜过经济实质的管理层通常两者都得不到。）    Regardless of the impact upon immediately reportable earnings, we would rather buy 10% of Wonderful Business T at X per share than 100% of T at 2X per share.  Most corporate managers prefer just the reverse, and have no shortage of stated rationales for their behavior.    不论对马上要汇报的盈利影响如何，我们宁愿以每股X的价格买10%的出色公司T，也不愿以每股2X的价格买下100%的T公司股份。大多数企业的经理人的喜好与我们正好相反，而且他们从来不缺乏解释其行为的理由。    However, we suspect three motivations - usually unspoken - to be, singly or in combination,  the important ones in most high-premium takeovers:    但是我们怀疑有三个通常不便明说的动机，单独或结合在一起，才是大多数高溢价收购的重要原因。    (1)Leaders, business or otherwise, seldom are deficient in animal spirits and often relish increased activity and challenge.  At Berkshire, the corporate pulse never beats faster than when an acquisition is in prospect.    领导者，无论是在商业还是其他领域，从来不缺乏动物精神。他们常从增加的活动和更多的挑战中获得乐趣。在伯克希尔，当有并购可能时，企业的脉搏从来不会因兴奋更快跳动。    (2)Most organizations, business or otherwise, measure themselves, are measured by others, and compensate their managers far more by the yardstick of size than by any other yardstick. (Ask a Fortune 500 manager where his corporation stands on that famous list and, invariably, the number responded will be from the list ranked by size of sales; he may well not even know where his          corporation places on the list Fortune just as faithfully compiles ranking the same 500 corporations by profitability.)    大多数组织，公司和其他机构，更多的用规模大小而不是任何其他尺度来衡量自己，或被别人衡量，而且根据规模大小来给经理人报酬。（问一个财富500强企业的经理，他的公司在榜上的位置，回答的数字总是来自于销售额大小的排名。他可能都不知道他的公司在同样一个财富500强排名的利润榜的地位。）    (3)Many managements apparently were over exposed in impressionable childhood years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad’s body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for the profitability of Company T(arget).    很多管理层明显受到了童年时期童话故事的过度影响。在那些故事里，美丽公主之吻解救了被囚于癞蛤蟆之身的英俊王子。结果是，他们确信他们的管理之吻将对并购目标公司T的盈利状况产生神奇的效果。    Such optimism is essential.  Absent that rosy view, why else should the shareholders of Company A(cquisitor) want to own an interest in T at the 2X takeover cost rather than at the X market price they would pay if they made direct purchases on their own?    这种乐观是必不可少的。如果没有那样美好乐观的看法，为什么并购者A公司的股东想要以2X的价格收购T公司的一部分，与此同时，T公司的市场价格是X，他们为什么不自己直接购买。    In other words, investors can always buy toads at the going price for toads.  If investors instead bankroll princesses who wish to pay double for the right to kiss the toad, those kisses had better pack some real dynamite.  We’ve observed many kisses but very few miracles.  Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses - even after their corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads.    换 句话说，投资者总能以目前的癞蛤蟆市场价来买癞蛤蟆。如果投资者资助那些愿意付双倍价格去吻癞蛤蟆的公主，这些吻得有真正的作用才行。我们观察到很多吻， 但很少有奇迹发生。即便如此，很多管理层的公主仍然沉着地保持自信，自认为其吻具有未来的威力，即使企业的后院已经堆满了没膝深毫无反应的癞蛤蟆。    In fairness, we should acknowledge that some acquisition records have been dazzling.  Two major categories stand out.    公平的说，我们应当认识到有些并购记录是光彩夺目的。主要有两大类。    The first involves companies that, through design or accident, have purchased only businesses that are particularly well adapted to an inflationary environment.  Such favored business must have two characteristics: (1) an ability to increase prices rather easily(even when product demand is flat and capacity is not fully utilized) without fear of significant loss of either market share or unit volume, and (2) an ability to accommodate large dollar volume increases in business (often produced more by inflation than by real growth) with only minor additional investment of capital.  Managers of ordinary ability, focusing solely on acquisition possibilities meeting these tests, have achieved excellent results in recent decades.  However, very few enterprises possess both characteristics, and competition to buy those that do has now become fierce to the point of being self-defeating.    第一类是有些公司，无论是通过有意设计还是碰巧，只并购了些非常适应通胀环境的公司。这些受青睐的公司必须具有两个特性：（1）相当容易的涨价的能力（即使当产品需求持平，产能没有完全利用时），而不必担心市场份额或销量的大幅下跌。（2） 有能力适应业务金额的大量增长（通常是由于通胀而不是真实增长所引起）而只需很少的额外资本投入。在最近几十年，一些能力平平的经理人，由于只关注符合这 些条件的并购可能，已经获得了优异的成果。但是，只有很少的企业同时拥有这两种特性，并购这些企业的竞争现在已经变得过于白热化，以至于不值得买了。    The second category involves the managerial superstars - men who can recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise.  We salute such managers as Ben Heineman at Northwest Industries, Henry Singleton at Teledyne, Erwin Zaban at National Service Industries, and especially Tom Murphy at Capital Cities Communications (a real managerial “twofer”, whose acquisition efforts have been properly focused in Category 1 and whose operating talents also make him a leader of Category 2).  From both direct and vicarious experience, we recognize the difficulty and rarity of these executives’ achievements. (So do they; these champs have made very few deals in recent years, and often have found repurchase of their own shares to be the most sensible employment of corporate capital.)    第二类涉及一些管理超级明星，那些人能识别装扮成癞蛤蟆的稀有王子，而且有管理能力让王子脱下伪装。我们对这样的经理人表示致敬，如Northwest Industries的Ben Heineman，Teledyne的Henry Singleton，National Service Industries的Erwin Zaban，尤其是Capital Cities Communications的Tom Murphy（一 个真正的双料管理人才，他的并购努力一直恰当的关注于第一类公司，而他的运营才能同时让他成为第二类的领袖。）通过直接和间接的经验，我们意识到这些经理 人所取得的成就的困难性和珍贵程度。（他们也意识到了。这些冠军们在最近一些年只做了很少的并购。他们通常发现回购自己的股票是使用企业资本的最合理方 式。）    Your Chairman, unfortunately, does not qualify for Category 2.  And,despite a reasonably good understanding of the economic factors compelling concentration in Category 1, our actual acquisition activity in that category has been sporadic and inadequate.  Our preaching was better than our performance. (We neglected the Noah principle: predicting rain doesn’t count, building arks does.)    你们的董事长，不幸的是，够不上第二类。除了对第一类中非常引人注目的经济因素的理解，我们在第一类的实际并购活动一直是零星而且不足。我们的布道好过我们的业绩。（我们忽视了诺亚的原则：预测下雨不算什么，建造方舟才重要。）    We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports.  Clearly our kisses fell flat.  We have done well with a couple of princes - but they were princes when purchased.  At least our kisses didn’t turn them into toads.  And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.    我 们曾经偶尔尝试用便宜的价格买癞蛤蟆，这在过去的年报中有记录。很明显，我们的吻不管用。我们在几个王子身上取得了成功，但当我们并购时，他们就已经是王 子了。还好，至少我们的吻没把他们变成癞蛤蟆。最后，我们有时能非常成功的以购买癞蛤蟆的价格购买一部分很容易识别的王子的权益。    （1981年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    We will continue to seek the acquisition of businesses in their entirety at prices that will make sense, even should the future of the acquired enterprise develop much along the lines of its past.  We may very well pay a fairly fancy price for a Category 1 business if we are reasonably confident of what we are getting.  But we will not normally pay a lot in any purchase for what we are supposed to bring to the party - for we find that we ordinarily don’t bring a lot.    我们将继续寻找用合理价格购买整个公司的机会，即使被并购的公司未来沿着过去的轨迹发展。如果我们相当确信我们所购买的业务，我们愿意付出相当高的价格购买第一类企业。但是我们一般不会对那些我们必须提供很多东西的并购支付大价钱，因为我们通常无法提供很多东西。    （1981年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    Currently, we find values most easily obtained through the open-market purchase of fractional positions in companies with excellent business franchises and competent, honest managements. We never expect to run these companies, but we do expect to profit from them.    目前，我们发现最容易获得价值的是，在公开市场购买具有商业特许经营而且有着诚实称职的管理层的优秀公司的一部分。我们从来不期望运营这些公司，但我们确实期望从中获利。    We expect that undistributed earnings from such companies will produce full value (subject to tax when realized) for Berkshire and its shareholders.  If they don’t, we have made mistakes as to either:(1) the management we have elected to join; (2) the future economics of the business; or (3) the price we have paid.    我们预期这些公司的未分配利润将给伯克希尔及其股东产生全部价值（受到实现时税务的影响）。如果他们不能产生全部价值，那么我们可能在以下领域犯了错：（1）我们决定合作的管理层。（2）业务的未来经济前景。或者（3）我们付出的价格。    We have made plenty of such mistakes - both in the purchase of non-controlling and controlling interests in businesses.  Category(2) miscalculations are the most common.  Of course, it is necessary to dig deep into our history to find illustrations of such mistakes -sometimes as deep as two or three months back.  For example, last year your Chairman volunteered his expert opinion on the rosy futureof the aluminum business.  Several minor adjustments to that opinion– now aggregating approximately 180 degrees - have since been required.    我们犯过很多这样的错，不论是购买非控股还是控股公司。第（2）类的误判最普遍。当然，必须深入挖掘我们的历史才能找到这些错误的例子，有时候是两三个月前的历史。比如，去年，你们的董事长自告奋勇提出了他对铝业美好未来的意见。对那个意见经过几个小的调整之后，现在必须做180度的改变。    For personal as well as more objective reasons, however, we generally have been able to correct such mistakes far more quickly in the case of non-controlled businesses (marketable securities) than in the case of controlled subsidiaries.  Lack of control, in effect, often has turned out to be an economic plus.    由于个人及客观原因，我们通常能对这种错误进行调整，对非控股公司（可出售证券）的调整远远快于控股子公司。缺乏控制，实际上常常反而变成了经济上的好处。    （1981年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）     十年以后再看并购    对于并购，巴菲特自己的感触很深，因为他也曾亲吻过癞蛤蟆，无功而返。十年以后的信中，再次提及并购，巴菲特说出了著名的“用合理的价格购买好的公司，而不是用好的价格购买一般的公司。”的论断。    Of all our activities at Berkshire, the most exhilarating for Charlie and me is the acquisition of a business with excellent economic characteristics and a management that we like, trust and admire. Such acquisitions are not easy to make but we look for them constantly.  In the search, we adopt the same attitude one might find appropriate in looking for a spouse:  It pays to be active, interested and open-minded, but it does not pay to be in a hurry.    在伯克希尔的所有活动中，查理和我感到最兴奋的是并购具有优秀经济特征以及有着我们喜欢，信任和钦佩的管理层的公司。这些并购并不容易做，但我们一直在寻找。在寻找过程中，我们采用了适合寻找配偶的态度：积极主动，兴趣十足，以及思想开放是值得的，但是仓促行事则不可取。    In the past, I've observed that many acquisition-hungry managers were apparently mesmerized by their childhood reading of the story about the frog-kissing princess.  Remembering her success, they pay dearly for the right to kiss corporate toads, expecting wondrous transfigurations.  Initially, disappointing results only deepen their desire to round up new toads.  ("Fanaticism," said Santyana, "consists of redoubling your effort when you've forgotten your aim.")  Ultimately, even the most optimistic manager must face reality.  Standing knee-deep in unresponsive toads, he then announces an enormous "restructuring" charge.  In this corporate equivalent of a Head Start program, the CEO receives the education but the stockholders pay the tuition.    过 去，我曾注意到很多急于并购的经理人显然是还沉迷于他们童年读的有关亲吻青蛙的公主的故事中。记住了她的成功，这些经理人花大价钱购买亲吻企业界的癞蛤蟆 的权利，期望神奇的转变。刚开始，失望的结果只不过进一步加深了他们的渴望，去获得更多的癞蛤蟆。（桑塔亚那说“狂热”，“包含了当你忘记了你的目标时却 把你的努力加倍”）最终，即使是最乐观的经理人也必须面对现实。站在没膝深毫无反应的癞蛤蟆中，他于是宣布大量的“重组”费用。这相当于企业的幼儿启蒙计 划，CEO受到了教育，股东支付了学费。    In my early days as a manager I, too, dated a few toads.  They were cheap dates - I've never been much of a sport - but my results matched those of acquirers who courted higher-priced toads.  I kissed and they croaked.    在我早年，作为一个经理，我也曾与几个癞蛤蟆约会。他们是便宜的约会对象。我从来都在体育竞赛上不行，但我在约会癞蛤蟆的竞赛中可以与那些购买了高价癞蛤蟆的并购者比肩。我吻了，他们仍呱呱叫。    After several failures of this type, I finally remembered some useful advice I once got from a golf pro (who, like all pros who have had anything to do with my game, wishes to remain anonymous).  Said the pro:  "Practice doesn't make perfect; practice makes permanent." And thereafter I revised my strategy and tried to buy good businesses at fair prices rather than fair businesses at good prices.    几 个这样的失败之后，我终于回忆起曾经从一个职业高尔夫球手那里得到的一些有用的忠告（他与其他与我们有联系的职业人士一样，希望保持匿名）。他说到：“练 习并不能产生完美；练习只造成固定不变。”所以，在那之后，我改变了自己的策略，试着用合理的价格购买好的公司，而不是用好的价格购买一般的公司。    （1992年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）

一个实业家的诞生——读巴菲特的信（11）

http://blog.caing.com/article/12284/

企业并购    企 业并购为什么很难成功？首先，很多企业并购的动机就不纯，多是管理层为了自己的私利，权力欲，好大喜功，因为盘子越大，高管报酬越高。其次，真正好的并购 目标并不多，好公司少，能够被并购的好公司就更少。最后，很多管理层根本不具备高超的运营管理能力，无法把被并购公司化腐朽为神奇，没有金刚钻却偏要揽瓷 器活。    If our success were to depend upon insights we developed through plant inspections, Berkshire would be in big trouble.  Rather, in considering an acquisition, we attempt to evaluate the economic characteristics of the business - its competitive strengths and weaknesses - and the quality of the people we will be joining.    如果我们的成功依赖于我们在工厂巡视时得到的深入见解，伯克希尔将有大麻烦。与之相反，在考虑并购的时候，我们评估业务的经济特征，即它的竞争优势和弱点，以及将与我们一起工作的人的素质。    （1986年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    Our acquisition decisions will be aimed at maximizing real economic benefits, not at maximizing either managerial domain or reported numbers for accounting purposes. (In the long run, managements stressing accounting appearance over economic substance usually achieve little of either.)    我们的并购决策将以最大化真实经济效益为目标，而不是最大的管理领域，或者最大的汇报会计数字。（在长期，强调表面的会计数字胜过经济实质的管理层通常两者都得不到。）    Regardless of the impact upon immediately reportable earnings, we would rather buy 10% of Wonderful Business T at X per share than 100% of T at 2X per share.  Most corporate managers prefer just the reverse, and have no shortage of stated rationales for their behavior.    不论对马上要汇报的盈利影响如何，我们宁愿以每股X的价格买10%的出色公司T，也不愿以每股2X的价格买下100%的T公司股份。大多数企业的经理人的喜好与我们正好相反，而且他们从来不缺乏解释其行为的理由。    However, we suspect three motivations - usually unspoken - to be, singly or in combination,  the important ones in most high-premium takeovers:    但是我们怀疑有三个通常不便明说的动机，单独或结合在一起，才是大多数高溢价收购的重要原因。    (1)Leaders, business or otherwise, seldom are deficient in animal spirits and often relish increased activity and challenge.  At Berkshire, the corporate pulse never beats faster than when an acquisition is in prospect.    领导者，无论是在商业还是其他领域，从来不缺乏动物精神。他们常从增加的活动和更多的挑战中获得乐趣。在伯克希尔，当有并购可能时，企业的脉搏跳动得最快。    (2)Most organizations, business or otherwise, measure themselves, are measured by others, and compensate their managers far more by the yardstick of size than by any other yardstick. (Ask a Fortune 500 manager where his corporation stands on that famous list and, invariably, the number responded will be from the list ranked by size of sales; he may well not even know where his          corporation places on the list Fortune just as faithfully compiles ranking the same 500 corporations by profitability.)    大多数组织，公司和其他机构，更多的用规模大小而不是任何其他尺度来衡量自己，或被别人衡量，而且根据规模大小来给经理人报酬。（问一个财富500强企业的经理，他的公司在榜上的位置，回答的数字总是来自于销售额大小的排名。他可能都不知道他的公司在同样一个财富500强排名的利润榜的地位。）    (3)Many managements apparently were over exposed in impressionable childhood years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad’s body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for the profitability of Company T(arget).    很多管理层明显受到了童年时期童话故事的过度影响。在那些故事里，美丽公主之吻解救了被囚于癞蛤蟆之身的英俊王子。结果是，他们确信他们的管理之吻将对并购目标公司T的盈利状况产生神奇的效果。    Such optimism is essential.  Absent that rosy view, why else should the shareholders of Company A(cquisitor) want to own an interest in T at the 2X takeover cost rather than at the X market price they would pay if they made direct purchases on their own?    这种乐观是必不可少的。如果没有那样美好乐观的看法，为什么并购者A公司的股东想要以2X的价格收购T公司的一部分，与此同时，T公司的市场价格是X，他们为什么不自己直接购买。    In other words, investors can always buy toads at the going price for toads.  If investors instead bankroll princesses who wish to pay double for the right to kiss the toad, those kisses had better pack some real dynamite.  We’ve observed many kisses but very few miracles.  Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses - even after their corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads.    换 句话说，投资者总能以目前的癞蛤蟆市场价来买癞蛤蟆。如果投资者资助那些愿意付双倍价格去吻癞蛤蟆的公主，这些吻得有真正的作用才行。我们观察到很多吻， 但很少有奇迹发生。即便如此，很多管理层的公主仍然沉着地保持自信，自认为其吻具有未来的威力，即使企业的后院已经堆满了没膝深毫无反应的癞蛤蟆。    In fairness, we should acknowledge that some acquisition records have been dazzling.  Two major categories stand out.    公平的说，我们应当认识到有些并购记录是光彩夺目的。主要有两大类。    The first involves companies that, through design or accident, have purchased only businesses that are particularly well adapted to an inflationary environment.  Such favored business must have two characteristics: (1) an ability to increase prices rather easily(even when product demand is flat and capacity is not fully utilized) without fear of significant loss of either market share or unit volume, and (2) an ability to accommodate large dollar volume increases in business (often produced more by inflation than by real growth) with only minor additional investment of capital.  Managers of ordinary ability, focusing solely on acquisition possibilities meeting these tests, have achieved excellent results in recent decades.  However, very few enterprises possess both characteristics, and competition to buy those that do has now become fierce to the point of being self-defeating.    第一类是有些公司，无论是通过有意设计还是碰巧，只并购了些非常适应通胀环境的公司。这些受青睐的公司必须具有两个特性：（1）相当容易的涨价的能力（即使当产品需求持平，产能没有完全利用时），而不必担心市场份额或销量的大幅下跌。（2） 有能力适应业务金额的大量增长（通常是由于通胀而不是真实增长所引起）而只需很少的额外资本投入。在最近几十年，一些能力平平的经理人，由于只关注符合这 些条件的并购可能，已经获得了优异的成果。但是，只有很少的企业同时拥有这两种特性，并购这些企业的竞争现在已经变得过于白热化，以至于不值得买了。    The second category involves the managerial superstars - men who can recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise.  We salute such managers as Ben Heineman at Northwest Industries, Henry Singleton at Teledyne, Erwin Zaban at National Service Industries, and especially Tom Murphy at Capital Cities Communications (a real managerial “twofer”, whose acquisition efforts have been properly focused in Category 1 and whose operating talents also make him a leader of Category 2).  From both direct and vicarious experience, we recognize the difficulty and rarity of these executives’ achievements. (So do they; these champs have made very few deals in recent years, and often have found repurchase of their own shares to be the most sensible employment of corporate capital.)    第二类涉及一些管理超级明星，那些人能识别装扮成癞蛤蟆的稀有王子，而且有管理能力让王子脱下伪装。我们对这样的经理人表示致敬，如Northwest Industries的Ben Heineman，Teledyne的Henry Singleton，National Service Industries的Erwin Zaban，尤其是Capital Cities Communications的Tom Murphy（一 个真正的双料管理人才，他的并购努力一直恰当的关注于第一类公司，而他的运营才能同时让他成为第二类的领袖。）通过直接和间接的经验，我们意识到这些经理 人所取得的成就的困难性和珍贵程度。（他们也意识到了。这些冠军们在最近一些年只做了很少的并购。他们通常发现回购自己的股票是使用企业资本的最合理方 式。）    Your Chairman, unfortunately, does not qualify for Category 2.  And,despite a reasonably good understanding of the economic factors compelling concentration in Category 1, our actual acquisition activity in that category has been sporadic and inadequate.  Our preaching was better than our performance. (We neglected the Noah principle: predicting rain doesn’t count, building arks does.)    你们的董事长，不幸的是，够不上第二类。除了对第一类中非常引人注目的经济因素的理解，我们在第一类的实际并购活动一直是零星而且不足。我们的布道好过我们的业绩。（我们忽视了诺亚的原则：预测下雨不算什么，建造方舟才重要。）    We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports.  Clearly our kisses fell flat.  We have done well with a couple of princes - but they were princes when purchased.  At least our kisses didn’t turn them into toads.  And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.    我 们曾经偶尔尝试用便宜的价格买癞蛤蟆，这在过去的年报中有记录。很明显，我们的吻不管用。我们在几个王子身上取得了成功，但当我们并购时，他们就已经是王 子了。还好，至少我们的吻没把他们变成癞蛤蟆。最后，我们有时能非常成功的以购买癞蛤蟆的价格购买一部分很容易识别的王子的权益。    （1981年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    We will continue to seek the acquisition of businesses in their entirety at prices that will make sense, even should the future of the acquired enterprise develop much along the lines of its past.  We may very well pay a fairly fancy price for a Category 1 business if we are reasonably confident of what we are getting.  But we will not normally pay a lot in any purchase for what we are supposed to bring to the party - for we find that we ordinarily don’t bring a lot.    我们将继续寻找用合理价格购买整个公司的机会，即使被并购的公司未来沿着过去的轨迹发展。如果我们相当确信我们所购买的业务，我们愿意付出相当高的价格购买第一类企业。但是我们一般不会对那些我们必须提供很多东西的并购支付大价钱，因为我们通常无法提供很多东西。    （1981年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    Currently, we find values most easily obtained through the open-market purchase of fractional positions in companies with excellent business franchises and competent, honest managements. We never expect to run these companies, but we do expect to profit from them.    目前，我们发现最容易获得价值的是，在公开市场购买具有商业特许经营而且有着诚实称职的管理层的优秀公司的一部分。我们从来不期望运营这些公司，但我们确实期望从中获利。    We expect that undistributed earnings from such companies will produce full value (subject to tax when realized) for Berkshire and its shareholders.  If they don’t, we have made mistakes as to either:(1) the management we have elected to join; (2) the future economics of the business; or (3) the price we have paid.    我们预期这些公司的未分配利润将给伯克希尔及其股东产生全部价值（受到实现时税务的影响）。如果他们不能产生全部价值，那么我们可能在以下领域犯了错：（1）我们决定合作的管理层。（2）业务的未来经济前景。或者（3）我们付出的价格。    We have made plenty of such mistakes - both in the purchase of non-controlling and controlling interests in businesses.  Category(2) miscalculations are the most common.  Of course, it is necessary to dig deep into our history to find illustrations of such mistakes -sometimes as deep as two or three months back.  For example, last year your Chairman volunteered his expert opinion on the rosy futureof the aluminum business.  Several minor adjustments to that opinion– now aggregating approximately 180 degrees - have since been required.    我们犯过很多这样的错，不论是购买非控股还是控股公司。第（2）类的误判最普遍。当然，必须深入挖掘我们的历史才能找到这些错误的例子，有时候是两三个月前的历史。比如，去年，你们的董事长自告奋勇提出了他对铝业美好未来的意见。对那个意见经过几个小的调整之后，现在必须做180度的改变。    For personal as well as more objective reasons, however, we generally have been able to correct such mistakes far more quickly in the case of non-controlled businesses (marketable securities) than in the case of controlled subsidiaries.  Lack of control, in effect, often has turned out to be an economic plus.    由于个人及客观原因，我们通常能对这种错误进行调整，对非控股公司（可出售证券）的调整远远快于控股子公司。缺乏控制，实际上常常反而变成了经济上的好处。    （1981年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）     十年以后再看并购    对于并购，巴菲特自己的感触很深，因为他也曾亲吻过癞蛤蟆，无功而返。十年以后的信中，再次提及并购，巴菲特说出了著名的“用合理的价格购买好的公司，而不是用好的价格购买一般的公司。”的论断。    Of all our activities at Berkshire, the most exhilarating for Charlie and me is the acquisition of a business with excellent economic characteristics and a management that we like, trust and admire. Such acquisitions are not easy to make but we look for them constantly.  In the search, we adopt the same attitude one might find appropriate in looking for a spouse:  It pays to be active, interested and open-minded, but it does not pay to be in a hurry.    在伯克希尔的所有活动中，查理和我感到最兴奋的是并购具有优秀经济特征以及有着我们喜欢，信任和钦佩的管理层的公司。这些并购并不容易做，但我们一直在寻找。在寻找过程中，我们采用了适合寻找配偶的态度：积极主动，兴趣十足，以及思想开放是值得的，但是仓促行事则不可取。    In the past, I've observed that many acquisition-hungry managers were apparently mesmerized by their childhood reading of the story about the frog-kissing princess.  Remembering her success, they pay dearly for the right to kiss corporate toads, expecting wondrous transfigurations.  Initially, disappointing results only deepen their desire to round up new toads.  ("Fanaticism," said Santyana, "consists of redoubling your effort when you've forgotten your aim.")  Ultimately, even the most optimistic manager must face reality.  Standing knee-deep in unresponsive toads, he then announces an enormous "restructuring" charge.  In this corporate equivalent of a Head Start program, the CEO receives the education but the stockholders pay the tuition.    过 去，我曾注意到很多急于并购的经理人显然是还沉迷于他们童年读的有关亲吻青蛙的公主的故事中。记住了她的成功，这些经理人花大价钱购买亲吻企业界的癞蛤蟆 的权利，期望神奇的转变。刚开始，失望的结果只不过进一步加深了他们的渴望，去获得更多的癞蛤蟆。（桑塔亚那说“狂热”，“包含了当你忘记了你的目标时却 把你的努力加倍”）最终，即使是最乐观的经理人也必须面对现实。站在没膝深毫无反应的癞蛤蟆中，他于是宣布大量的“重组”费用。这相当于企业的幼儿启蒙计 划，CEO受到了教育，股东支付了学费。    In my early days as a manager I, too, dated a few toads.  They were cheap dates - I've never been much of a sport - but my results matched those of acquirers who courted higher-priced toads.  I kissed and they croaked.    在我早年，作为一个经理，我也曾与几个癞蛤蟆约会。他们是便宜的约会对象。我从来都在体育竞赛上不行，但我在约会癞蛤蟆的竞赛中可以与那些购买了高价癞蛤蟆的并购者比肩。我吻了，他们仍呱呱叫。    After several failures of this type, I finally remembered some useful advice I once got from a golf pro (who, like all pros who have had anything to do with my game, wishes to remain anonymous).  Said the pro:  "Practice doesn't make perfect; practice makes permanent." And thereafter I revised my strategy and tried to buy good businesses at fair prices rather than fair businesses at good prices.    几 个这样的失败之后，我终于回忆起曾经从一个职业高尔夫球手那里得到的一些有用的忠告（他与其他与我们有联系的职业人士一样，希望保持匿名）。他说到：“练 习并不能产生完美；练习只造成固定不变。”所以，在那之后，我改变了自己的策略，试着用合理的价格购买好的公司，而不是用好的价格购买一般的公司。    （1992年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）

巴菲特挑选接班人的启示 孙旭东

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_59d5d75d0100mp5g.html

一个实业家的诞生——读巴菲特的信（12） Barrons

http://blog.caing.com/article/12493/

企业目标    到了伯克希尔·哈 撒韦时代，巴菲特的目标已经与合伙基金时期有了很大改变。他的目标已经不是简单的超越指数，而是在长期大幅超过美国大型企业的平均回报。指数在长期反映的 是美国大型企业的平均业绩。如果长期大幅超越大型企业的平均回报，自然就会领先于指数。这体现了一个单纯的股票投资者与实业家的不同。在思考问题，评估企 业，投资决策时，巴菲特也已经与以前有了很大不同。他在评估一个企业时，会思考如果自己有足够的资金和人力，将如何与这个企业竞争。对好的企业（如GEICO）即使股价增长超过内在价值，巴菲特也会长期持有。但是，作为一个彻底的价值投资者，巴菲特绝对不会以远超内在价值的价格购买股票。   Berkshire’s economic goal remains to produce a long-term rate of return well above the return achieved by the average large American corporation. Our willingness to purchase either partial or total ownership positions in favorably-situated businesses, coupled with reasonable discipline about the prices we are willing to pay, should give us a good chance of achieving our goal.    伯克希尔的经济目标仍然是产生远高于美国大型企业平均水平的长期回报。我们愿意购买全部或部分处于有利地位的公司的所有权，加上我们有愿意支付的价格的合理准则，应该让我们很有可能取得我们的目标。    （1982年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize the average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis.  We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress.  We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future - a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that.  But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.    我 们的长期经济目标（受后面所提的一些情况影响）是最大化每股内在商业价值的年度平均增长率。我们不用规模大小来衡量伯克希尔的经济重要性或者业绩。我们衡 量每股的增长。我们确信每股增长率将在未来降低，一个增大很多的资本基数必然会是这样。但是，如果我们的增长率没有超过美国大型企业的平均增长，那么我们 会感到失望。    Our preference would be to reach this goal by directly owning adiversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital.  Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries.  The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.    我 们偏向于通过直接拥有一个多元化的业务集团而达到这一目标。这一集团产生现金并稳定的取得高于平均水平的资本回报率。我们的第二选择是拥有类似的业务的一 部分，主要通过我们的保险公司购买市场普通股来实现。购买价格及可选的业务，以及对保险资本的需求决定了当年的资本配置。    （1983年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    One question I always ask myself in appraising a business is how I would like, assuming I had ample capital and skilled personnel, to compete with it.  I’d rather wrestle grizzlies than compete with Mrs. B and her progeny.  They buy brilliantly, they operate at expense ratios competitors don’t even dream about, and they then pass on to their customers much of the savings.  It’s the ideal business - one built upon exceptional value to the customer that in turn translates into exceptional economics for its owners.    当我评估一个公司时，我总是问自己一个问题：假如我有足够的资本和熟练技巧的人员，我将如何与之竞争。我宁愿与灰熊摔跤，也不愿与B夫人及其子孙竞争。他们采购的出色，他们运营的成本率竞争对手连想都不敢想，而且他们把省下来的大部分回馈给了客户。这是理想的生意，基于给客户的优异的价值，这种价值进而转化为对拥有者优异的经济回报。    （1983年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    However, GEICO’s increase in market value during the past two years has been considerably greater than the gain in its intrinsic business value, impressive as the latter has been.  We expected such a favorable variation at some point, as the perception of investors converged with business reality.  And we look forward to substantial future gains in underlying business value accompanied by irregular, but eventually full, market recognition of such gains.    虽然GEICO在过去两年的内在价值增长令人印象深刻，但其市场价值的增长却已经大幅度超越了内在价值的增长。当投资者的认识与商业现实趋同，我们预计有时会有这种有利的偏差。我们预计未来内在商业价值会有重大增长，伴随着不规律，但最终是对此种增长的全面市场认同。    Year-to-year variances, however, cannot consistently be in our favor.  Even if our partially-owned businesses continue to perform well in an economic sense, there will be years when they perform poorly in the market. At such times our net worth could shrink significantly.  We will not be distressed by such a shrinkage; if the businesses continue to look attractive and we have cash available, we simply will add to our holdings at even more favorable prices.    年度的变化不可能一直对我们有利。即使我们部分拥有的公司继续在经济上表现良好，有些年他们也会在市场上表现糟糕。在这种时候，我们的净资产有可能严重缩水。我们不会被这种缩水困扰。如果业务持续有吸引力，而且我们有可用的现金，我们会以更优惠的价格增加我们持有的股份。    （1982年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    The market, like the Lord, helps those who help themselves.  But, unlike the Lord, the market does not forgive those who know not what they do.  For the investor, a too-high purchase price for the stock of an excellent company can undo the effects of a subsequent decade of favorable business developments.    市场，如上帝，帮助那些自助者。但是，与上帝不同，市场不原谅那些不知自己在干什么的人。对投资者来说，以一个过高的价格购买优秀公司的股票，这能抵消未来10年的有利的商业发展。    （1982年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）     衡量业绩    由于伯克希尔的控股结构，会计盈利无法真实反映其盈利。因此，巴菲特放弃了ROE作为衡量业绩的指标，转而采用“经济盈利”的概念，不论控股结构，包括了所有未分配利润。在巴菲特看来，一个公司的存留收益对拥有者的价值取决于这些收益的有效使用，而不是拥有的百分比大小。   Operating earnings of $31.5 million in 1982 amounted to only 9.8% of beginning equity capital (valuing securities at cost), down from 15.2% in 1981 and far below our recent high of 19.4% in 1978. This decline largely resulted from:    1982年的3千1百5十万美元运营利润只相当于年初权益资本（以成本计）的9.8%，从1981年的15.2%有下降，而且远低于最近1978年的19.4%的峰值。这一下降主要是由于：    (1)a significant deterioration in insurance underwriting results;    （1）保险承销结果严重恶化。    (2)a considerable expansion of equity capital without a corresponding growth in the businesses we operate directly; and    （2）权益资本大幅度增加，但是直接运营的业务没有相应的增长。    (3)a continually-enlarging commitment of our resources to investment in partially-owned, nonoperated businesses; accounting rules dictate that a major part of our pro-rata share of earnings from such businesses must be excluded from Berkshire’s reported earnings.    （3）持续增加的资源投入到部分拥有而不直接运营的公司。会计准则要求我们必须把这些部分拥有的公司中我们按股权比例计算的盈利从伯克希尔的汇报盈利中剔出。    It was only a few years ago that we told you that the operating earnings/equity capital percentage, with proper allowance for a few other variables, was the most important yardstick of single-year managerial performance.  While we still believe this to be the case with the vast majority of companies, we believe its utility in our own case has greatly diminished.  You should be suspicious of such anassertion.  Yardsticks seldom are discarded while yielding favorable readings.  But when results deteriorate, most managers favor disposition of the yardstick rather than disposition of the manager.    仅仅在几年前，我告诉你们运营利润/权 益资本的百分比，辅以适当的一些项目拨备，是衡量单一的一年管理层业绩的最重要尺度。虽然我们仍然相信这对大多数公司是适用的，但我们认为这已经越来越不 适应我们自己的情况。你应该对这样一个论断表示怀疑。在产生良好的读数时，衡量尺度极少被弃用。但当结果恶化时，大多数管理者青睐替换衡量尺度，而不是替 换管理者。    To managers faced with such deterioration, a more flexible measurement system often suggests itself: just shoot the arrow of business performance into a blank canvas and then carefully draw the bullseye around the implanted arrow.  We generally believe in pre-set, long-lived and small bullseyes.  However, because of the importance of item (3) above, further explained in the following section, we believe our abandonment of the operating earnings/equity capital bullseye to be warranted.    对面临业绩恶化的管理者来说，一个更灵活的测量系统常常是不言自明：把业绩的箭射向空白的画布，然后仔细的在其周围画上标志着靶心的牛眼。我们通常相信预先设好的，长期和小的牛眼靶心。但是，由于上面第（3）项的原因（我们在后面有更多的解释），我们相信我们弃用运营利润/权益资本这一牛眼靶心是有正当理由的。    （1982年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    We prefer a concept of “economic” earnings that includes all undistributed earnings, regardless of ownership percentage.  In our view, the value to all owners of the retained earnings of a business enterprise is determined by the effectiveness with which those earnings are used - and not by the size of one’s ownership percentage.    我们更喜欢“经济”盈利的概念，包括了所有的未分配利润，而不论我们拥有的百分比是多少。在我们看来，一个公司的存留收益对拥有者的价值取决于这些收益的有效使用，而不是拥有的百分比大小。    （1982年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    We never take the one-year figure very seriously.  After all, why should the time required for a planet to circle the sun synchronize precisely with the time required for business actions to pay off? Instead, we recommend not less than a five-year test as a rough yardstick of economic performance.  Red lights should start flashing if the five-year average annual gain falls much below the return on equity earned over the period by American industry in aggregate. (Watch out for our explanation if that occurs as Goethe observed, “When ideas fail, words come in very handy.”)    我 们从来不看重一年的数字。到头来，为什么商业行动产生效果所需的时间必须正好是一个行星环绕太阳一周的时间？与之相反，我们建议在衡量经济业绩时，以不少 于五年的测试作为粗略的尺度。当五年平均年度收益大大低于同期美国行业的总体股权回报率时，红灯就应该闪烁报警。（如果这发生了，当心我们的解释。Goethe曾经说到“当想法失败，说辞召之即来。”）    （1983年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    We report our progress in terms of book value because in our case(though not, by any means, in all cases) it is a conservative but reasonably adequate proxy for growth in intrinsic business value -the measurement that really counts.  Book value’s virtue as a score-keeping measure is that it is easy to calculate and doesn’t involve the subjective (but important)judgments employed in calculation of intrinsic business value.  It is important to understand, however, that the two terms - book value and intrinsic business value - have very different meanings.    我 们报告帐面价值的进展，因为在我们的情况下（虽然肯定不是适合所有情况），帐面价值增长是一个保守但相对足够的内在商业价值增长的近似，这才是真正重要的 衡量标准。帐面价值作为计分尺度的好处在于其易于计算，而且不涉及在计算内在商业价值中的主观（但是重要的）判断。但是，重要的是理解这两个术语：帐面价 值和内在商业价值的不同含义。    Book value is an accounting concept, recording the accumulated financial input from both contributed capital and retained earnings.  Intrinsic business value is an economic concept, estimating future cash output discounted to present value.  Book value tells you what has been put in; intrinsic business value estimates what can be taken out.    帐面价值是一个会计概念，记录了所积累的财务投入，包括投入的资本和存留的收益。内在商业价值是一个经济概念，估计未来的现金流输出并折现。帐面价值告诉你已经投入了什么，内在商业价值估计能拿出多少。    Ananalogy will suggest the difference.  Assume you spend identical amounts putting each of two children through college.  The book value(measured by financial input) of each child’s education would be the same.  But the present value of the future payoff (the intrinsic business value) might vary enormously - from zero to many times the cost of the education.  So, also, do businesses having equal financial input end up with wide variations in value.    一 个类比将揭示这两者的区别。假定你在两个孩子身上花费了一样多的钱供他们大学毕业。那么每个孩子教育的帐面价值（用投入的资金衡量）都是一样的。但是，未 来回报的折现值（内在商业价值）可能差异极大，从零到教育成本的很多倍。同理，从事商业，投入同等的资金，最终的价值有可能差异极大。    At Berkshire, at the beginning of fiscal 1965 when the present management took over, the $19.46 per share book value considerably overstated intrinsic business value.  All of that book value consisted of textile assets that could not earn, on average, anything close to an appropriate rate of return.  In the terms of our analogy, the investment in textile assets resembled investment in a largely-wasted education.    在伯克希尔，在1965财年初，当目前的管理层接手时，那时19.46美元一股的帐面价值过分夸大了内在商业价值。那时的帐面价值由纺织资产构成。那些资产平均而言无法获得接近合理的回报率。用我们的类比来说，在纺织资产的投资就像投资于很大程度上被浪费了的教育中。    Now, however, our intrinsic business value considerably exceeds book value.  There are two major reasons:    目前，我们的内在价值远超过帐面价值。这有两个主要原因：    (1)Standard accounting principles require that common stocks held by our insurance subsidiaries be stated on our books at market value, but that other stocks we own be carried at the lower of aggregate cost or market. At the end of 1983, the market value of this latter group exceeded carrying value by $70 million pre-tax, or about $50 million after tax.  This excess belongs in our intrinsic business value, but is not included in the calculation of book value;    （1）标准的会计准则要求我们的保险子公司把持有的普通股按市场价反映在帐面上。但是，我们拥有的其他股票却只能按综合成本和市场价值两者中更低的一个计算。在1983年底，第二类股票的市场价值在税前超过了帐面价值7千万美元，或者税后的5千万美元。这多出来的部分属于我们的内在商业价值，但是却没有在计算帐面价值时包括进去。    (2)More important, we own several businesses that possess economic Goodwill (which is properly includable in intrinsic business value) far larger than the accounting Goodwill that is carried on our balance sheet and reflected in book value.    （2）更重要的是我们拥有几个具有大量经济商誉（这被适当的归进内在商业价值）的公司。这些商誉远远大于在我们资产负债表上及体现在账面价值的会计商誉。    （1983年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）     商誉的思考    对无形资产和商誉的重新思考，重视具有轻资产但良好持久商誉的公司，这标志着巴菲特从100%格雷厄姆式投资的转型。多年以后，巴菲特终于走出了老师的光环，有了自己独到的投资理念与体系。    Goodwill, both economic and accounting, is an arcane subject and requires more explanation than is appropriate here.  The appendix that follows this letter - “Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities” - explains why economic and accounting Goodwill can, and usually do, differ enormously.    商誉，无论是经济上的还是会计上的，都是一个晦涩难懂的话题，需要更多篇幅的解释，超过了这封信所适合覆盖的内容。这封信后面的附件“商誉及其摊销：规定与现实”解释了为什么经济和会计商誉通常相差甚远。    You can live a full and rewarding life without ever thinking about Goodwill and its amortization.  But students of investment and management should understand the nuances of the subject.  My own thinking has changed drastically from 35 years ago when I was taught to favor tangible assets and to shun businesses whose value depended largely upon economic Goodwill.  This bias caused me to make many important business mistakes of omission, although relatively few of commission.    你根本不用想商誉和其摊销，也能生活得很充实有益。但是投资和管理的学生们应当理解这个话题的微妙之处。我自己的思考与35年前有了巨大的改变，当时我被教育要重视有形资产，避开主要依赖于经济商誉的公司。这一偏见让我犯了很多严重的商业错误，主要是忽视，虽然也有相对很少的过失。    Keynes identified my problem: “The difficulty lies not in the new ideas but in escaping from the old ones.” My escape was long delayed, in part because most of what I had been taught by the same teacher had been (and continues to be) so extraordinarily valuable.  Ultimately, business experience, direct and vicarious, produced my present strong preference for businesses that possess large amounts of enduring Goodwill and that utilize a minimum of tangible assets.    凯 恩斯指出了我的问题：“困难不在于新的想法，而在于从老的想法中解脱出来。”我的解脱耽搁了很久。部分原因就在于，这同一个老师教给我的大部分东西曾经是 极为宝贵的（而且未来仍将是极为宝贵的）。最终，商业经验，无论是直接的还是间接的，让我目前强烈偏好拥有大量持久商誉，却利用最少的有形资产的公司。    （1983年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）     产能过剩行业     在产能过剩的行业，盈利只是昙花一现，除非供应长期紧缺，或者产能需要很长时间建设。    To understand the change, we need to look at some major factors that affect levels of corporate profitability generally.  Businesses in industries with both substantial over-capacity and a “commodity” product (undifferentiated in any customer-important way by factors such as performance, appearance, service support, etc.) are prime candidates for profit troubles.    为了理解这一改变，我们需要研究总体上影响企业盈利水平的主要因素。如果一个公司处在同时拥有大量产能过剩和“大宗商品”特性的产品（无法在客户重视的因素上，如性能，外观，服务支持等，进行差异化）的行业，那么这个公司很有可能会有盈利问题。    （1982年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    In many industries, differentiation simply can’t be made meaningful. A few producers in such industries may consistently do well if they have a cost advantage that is both wide and sustainable.  By definition such exceptions are few, and, in many industries, are non-existent.  For the great majority of companies selling “commodity” products, a depressing equation of business economics prevails: persistent over-capacity without administered prices (or costs) equals poor profitability.    在 很多行业，根本就无法做到有意义的差异化。在这样的行业，少数生产者如果有广泛而可持续的成本优势，他们有可能持续稳定的取得好的业绩。从定义上讲，这些 特例非常少，而且在很多行业根本不存在。对大部分销售“大宗商品”类产品的公司，一个令人沮丧的商业经济公式是普遍存在的：持续不断的产能过剩而无价格 （或成本）管理，这就等于糟糕的盈利状况。    （1982年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    What finally determines levels of long-term profitability in such industries is the ratio of supply-tight to supply-ample years. Frequently that ratio is dismal. (It seems as if the most recent supply-tight period in our textile business - it occurred some years back - lasted the better part of a morning.)    最终决定这些行业长期盈利状况的是供应紧缺与供应充足年份的比例。通常这一比率是惨淡的。（似乎在我们的纺织生意，最近一次供应紧缺的时候，是多年前了，持续了将近一个早晨。）    In some industries, however, capacity-tight conditions can last a long time.  Sometimes actual growth in demand will outrun forecasted growth for an extended period.  In other cases, adding capacity requires very long lead times because complicated manufacturing facilities must be planned and built.    但是，在一些行业，产能紧张的情况能持续很长时间。有时候，在一个很长的时期，实际的需求增长会超过预测增长。在其他情况下，增加产能需要极长的时间，因为必须计划和建造复杂的生产设施。    （1982年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）

如果巴菲特参加了比亚迪的股东大会 孙旭东

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_59d5d75d0100mywl.html

在超市里看到 12月20日出版的《中国企业家》杂志上封面文章是《王传福，比亚迪过坎》，买了回来读，对下面这两段话颇有感触：

有经销商透露，比亚迪近年来不敢开销售大会，怕他们彼此串联起来和厂家做对。某次在青岛开小会，座位安排也是两个区域经理夹一个经销商。还有经销商直接给夏治冰（比亚迪负责汽车营销的副总裁）和王传福写信，但如同泥牛入海。

事实上，夏治冰收到过抱怨区域经理的邮件，他选择了不回应。“我不能向下越权，否则刚建立起来的团队会全部废掉。”

回复生意伙伴的邮件难道不是人之常情么？更何况，比亚迪的区域经理们远谈不上成熟，为什么不能多听听经销商的意见呢？

“怎么跟经销商打交道，怎么做网络而已规划，渠道管理管控，员工培养培训，都是一片空白。”夏治冰坦承。

既然招不到有经验的区域经理，最便捷的方式就是通过校园招聘，甚至与整个班级签订协议。

《商界》上的文章有更雷人的描述：

王传福在一次股东大会上说：“我们要实现销量目标，就必须增加销售网络，只有增加网络才能提升销量。比如，在深圳A1网有5个店，你要把它扩成10个店，现有经销商肯定不干，肯定跟你急。我们的做法就是把F3这个车改一下，看得见的地方都不一样，看不见的地方都一样，变成G3或L3了，在A2或A3网销售，这样我们就可以很轻易地扩大网络……这样，我们的店数就很轻松地从200家扩充到1000家。我们通过增加车型数量扩充网络，通过扩充网络实现我们‘两个第一’的目标。”

显然，比亚迪扩张的指导思想，就是不断建店，让经销商拼命卖车。

由此来看，夏治冰和王传福对经销商抱怨区域经理的邮件不予回复，有可能是因为问题产生的根源就在于王传福本人。如果没有王传福在股东大会上的这些话，回复邮件与否还只是个管理中的授权方面的问题，而如果王传福在股东大会上的话是真，则问题演变到哪种性质的问题就难说了。

以我肤浅的认识，比亚迪3季度净利润下滑99%，根源在那次股东大会时就产生了。不知道王传福是否跟巴菲特说过类似的话，如果巴菲特参加了那次股东大会，他会有什么样的感想？

巴菲特为何大幅调整股票组合？

http://www.yicai.com/news/2011/02/684401.html