Now, just for fun, let's push our scenario one notch further and give your trustee-manager a ten-year fixed-price option on part of your 「business」 (i.e., your savings account) based on its fair value in the first year. With such an option, your manager would reap a substantial profit at your expense - just from having held on to most of your earnings. If he were both Machiavellian and a bit of a mathematician, your manager might also have cut the pay-out ratio once he was firmly entrenched.
現在僅為了玩笑，讓我們對第一種景象的缺陷再做進一步的分析，將給託管經理一個十年期固定價格的股票期權按照最初的公允價值視為你的一項業務（也就是你的存款賬戶）。如果沒有這一期權的話，你的經理將會以你的損失為代價獲得巨額利益，僅需通過保留大部分你的收益。如果他同時是陰謀論者又有一些數學家的特質，你的經理人可能會降低支付比率只要他一旦掌握實權。
This scenario is not as far fetched as you might think. Many stock options in the corporate world have worked in exactly that fashion: they have gained in value simply because management retained earnings, not because it did well with the capital in its hands.
這種情況不是你所想的離你很遙遠。很多公司的股票期權都正是這樣運作：僅僅通過留存收益的方式獲取利益，而非因為很好的運用手頭的資本。
Managers actually apply a double standard to options. Leaving aside warrants (which deliver the issuing corporation immediate and substantial compensation), I believe it is fair to say that nowhere in the business world are ten-year fixed-price options on all or a portion of a business granted to outsiders. Ten months, in fact, would be regarded as extreme. It would be particularly unthinkable for managers to grant a long-term option on a business that was regularly adding to its capital. Any outsider wanting to secure such an option would be required to pay fully for capital added during the option period.
經理人對不期權事實上實施雙重標準。假設是對外發行這樣的認股權（這給使得發行公司立即取得大額補貼），我認為這個世界上沒有任何公司可以將10年期固定價格的期權在全部或者部分授予外部投資者。實施上10個月就已經是極限了。而對經理人來說授予一個長期期權是尤其不可思議的，因為其每年都會增加其資本。任何想要獲取期權的外部投資者將會被要求在持有期權期間對增加則本付出全額的對價。
The unwillingness of managers to do-unto-outsiders, however, is not matched by an unwillingness to do-unto-themselves. (Negotiating with one's self seldom produces a barroom brawl.) Managers regularly engineer ten-year, fixed-price options for themselves and associates that, first, totally ignore the fact that retained earnings automatically build value and, second, ignore the carrying cost of capital. As a result, these managers end up profiting much as they would have had they had an option on that savings account that was automatically building up in value.
經理人這種不願意做外部投資者的想法，卻與不願意做他們本身的想法是不匹配的。（僅與自身交流很少會產生爭吵）經理人通常自己運行股票期權而首先完全忽視留存收益自動產生價值的事實，其次忽略持有資本的成本。結果，這些經理人收益頗豐，因為他們可以有一個存款賬戶的期權，自動產生價值。（這一段沒看懂！）
Of course, stock options often go to talented, value-adding managers and sometimes deliver them rewards that are perfectly appropriate. (Indeed, managers who are really exceptional almost always get far less than they should.) But when the result is equitable, it is accidental. Once granted, the option is blind to individual performance. Because it is irrevocable and unconditional (so long as a manager stays in the company), the sluggard receives rewards from his options precisely as does the star. A managerial Rip Van Winkle, ready to doze for ten years, could not wish for a better 「incentive」 system.
當然股票期權總是賦予那些有才能、能夠增加價值的經理人的，有時候會給他們帶來完全應該的獎勵。（事實上，尤其傑出的經理人常常感到其獲得的比起應得的要少。）但是若結果公平則是碰巧。股票期權一旦賦予，就不受個人的表現的影響。因為它是不可收回且無條件的（只要經理人在公司任職），這些懶漢從他們的股票期權收到回報正如那些真正有能力者一樣。對於那些準備將來無所作為的人來說，再也找不到比這更好的激勵系統了。
(I can't resist commenting on one long-term option given an 「outsider」: that granted the U.S. Government on Chrysler shares as partial consideration for the government's guarantee of some lifesaving loans. When these options worked out well for the government, Chrysler sought to modify the payoff, arguing that the rewards to the government were both far greater than intended and outsize in relation to its contribution to Chrysler's recovery. The company's anguish over what it saw as an imbalance between payoff and performance made national news. That anguish may well be unique: to my knowledge, no managers - anywhere - have been similarly offended by unwarranted payoffs arising from options granted to themselves or their colleagues.)
我忍不住再提一下一個賦予外部投資者的股票期權：是處於對政府一些救濟款擔保的特殊考慮而賦予美國政府的Chrysler股票期權。但當這些期權對政府有利時，Chrysler尋求如何修正這種支出，爭論到這種賦予政府的獎勵即遠超出打算又遠多於其對Chrysler的恢復所做的貢獻。該公司有關付出與回報不相稱的抱怨成為了全國頭條。這種抱怨可能是獨一無二的：在我看來，沒有任何國家的經理人會因為賦予自身的不斷增加的期權支出而抱怨不斷。
Ironically, the rhetoric about options frequently describes them as desirable because they put managers and owners in the same financial boat. In reality, the boats are far different. No owner has ever escaped the burden of capital costs, whereas a holder of a fixed-price option bears no capital costs at all. An owner must weigh upside potential against downside risk; an option holder has no downside. In fact, the business project in which you would wish to have an option frequently is a project in which you would reject ownership. (I'll be happy to accept a lottery ticket as a gift - but I'll never buy one.)
諷刺的是，關於期權應該被賦予的花言巧語不斷出現，認為期權將管理人和所有者置於同一條船上。事實上，他們根本在完全不同的船上。沒有所有者可以逃脫資本成本的巨負，而持有一個固定價格的股票期權卻絲毫不承擔任何資本成本。所有人必須衡量潛在收益與可能的風險；而期權持有人沒有風險一說。事實上，一個你想要獲得期權的公司項目其實是以個將會損害所有者權益的項目。（我很高興收到一張綵排作為禮物但是我永遠都不會去購買它。）
In dividend policy also, the option holders' interests are best served by a policy that may ill serve the owner. Think back to the savings account example. The trustee, holding his option, would benefit from a no-dividend policy. Conversely, the owner of the account should lean to a total payout so that he can prevent the option-holding manager from sharing in the account's retained earnings.
在鼓勵政策方面亦然，對期權持有人有利的政策對所有者不利。想想之前存款賬戶的例子。託管人持有期權，將從零股利政策中獲益。相反的，存款所有者將會傾向於一個完全的支付以使他可以防止持有期權的經理通過留存收益分享其好處。
Despite their shortcomings, options can be appropriate under some circumstances. My criticism relates to their indiscriminate use and, in that connection, I would like to emphasize three points:
儘管有這次缺陷，期權在一些條件下還是合適的。我的批評針對對其不合適的運用，這裡我要強調三點：
First, stock options are inevitably tied to the overall performance of a corporation. Logically, therefore, they should be awarded only to those managers with overall responsibility. Managers with limited areas of responsibility should have incentives that pay off in relation to results under their control. The .350 hitter expects, and also deserves, a big payoff for his performance - even if he plays for a cellar-dwelling team. And the .150 hitter should get no reward - even if he plays for a pennant winner. Only those with overall responsibility for the team should have their rewards tied to its results.
首先，股票期權不可避免地與公司的整體表現相聯繫。因此邏輯上它們只應運用在負責公司全局的經理人身上。負責局部的管理者只應獲得與可控制結果相關的激勵。對於命中率極高的球員來說，其表現值得回報，即使他服務於一個很爛的隊。而一個低命中率的球員不應得到獎勵，同樣的即便他效忠於一個常勝隊。只有那些對全隊負責的人應該將其獎勵與成績掛鉤。
Second, options should be structured carefully. Absent special factors, they should have built into them a retained-earnings or carrying-cost factor. Equally important, they should be priced realistically. When managers are faced with offers for their companies, they unfailingly point out how unrealistic market prices can be as an index of real value. But why, then, should these same depressed prices be the valuations at which managers sell portions of their businesses to themselves? (They may go further: officers and directors sometimes consult the Tax Code to determine the lowest prices at which they can, in effect, sell part of the business to insiders. While they're at it, they often elect plans that produce the worst tax result for the company.) Except in highly unusual cases, owners are not well served by the sale of part of their business at a bargain price - whether the sale is to outsiders or to insiders. The obvious conclusion: options should be priced at true business value.
其次，期權應該被仔細規劃。除卻特殊原因，他們應該建立在留存收益與資金成本因素之上。同樣重要的是，他們的定價應該切合實際。當經理人面對著對其公司的併購時，他們肯定會指出市場價值作為真實價值的一項衡量指標是多麼的不切實際。但是為什麼同樣被低估的價格在其將公司部分權益出售給自己的時候就可以被接受？（他們可能會進一步解釋：辦公人員或董事們有時會查詢稅法來決定他們可以以多低的價格將公司的一部分出售給內部人士。當他們這樣做的時候，通常會選擇那種可能造成公司最重稅負的計劃。）除了這種非常不尋常的案例，所有者的權益因為低價出售公司而受到損害，不管是對外部還是內部人士。最清楚不過的結論就是：期權應該以內含價值定價。
Third, I want to emphasize that some managers whom I admire enormously - and whose operating records are far better than mine - disagree with me regarding fixed-price options. They have built corporate cultures that work, and fixed-price options have been a tool that helped them. By their leadership and example, and by the use of options as incentives, these managers have taught their colleagues to think like owners. Such a Culture is rare and when it exists should perhaps be left intact - despite inefficiencies and inequities that may infest the option program. 「If it ain't broke, don't fix it」 is preferable to 「purity at any price」.
最後我想要強調的一點是一些我非常欽佩的經理人，而其經營業績也遠好於我，他們不同意我關於固定價格期權的看法。他們建立了企業文化，而固定價格期權就是其中一種有用工具。在他們的領導與示範之下，同時通過期權的激勵，這些經理人使其員工學會像股東一樣思考。這樣一種文化是稀有的，若存在應努力維護，不管低效或者不公可能會侵害期權項目本身。「東西如果沒有壞，就不需要修理」好於「不計任何代價追求純粹」
At Berkshire, however, we use an incentive & compensation system that rewards key managers for meeting targets in their own bailiwicks. If See's does well, that does not produce incentive compensation at the News - nor vice versa. Neither do we look at the price of Berkshire stock when we write bonus checks. We believe good unit performance should be rewarded whether Berkshire stock rises, falls, or stays even. Similarly, we think average performance should earn no special rewards even if our stock should soar. 「Performance」, furthermore, is defined in different ways depending upon the underlying economics of the business: in some our managers enjoy tailwinds not of their own making, in others they fight unavoidable headwinds.
而在Berkshire，我們使用獎勵在管轄範圍之內實現目標的關鍵經理人的激勵與補助體系。如果See』s糖果表現優秀，則不會對News產生激勵，相反亦是如此。而當我們發放補貼的時候我們也不參考Berkshire的股票的市場價格。我們認為優異的單位表現應該被給與獎勵而不管Berkshire的股價上漲、下跌又或是保持穩定。同樣的，我們認為平均的表現不應被賦予額外的獎勵即便是我們的股價飆升。「業績」進一步說，在不同的經濟環境之下有著不同的定義：我們的一些經理人享受著不是由其自身創造的好運，而另一些卻不可避免地逆風而行。
The rewards that go with this system can be large. At our various business units, top managers sometimes receive incentive bonuses of five times their base salary, or more, and it would appear possible that one manager's bonus could top $2 million in 1986. (I hope so.) We do not put a cap on bonuses, and the potential for rewards is not hierarchical. The manager of a relatively small unit can earn far more than the manager of a larger unit if results indicate he should. We believe, further, that such factors as seniority and age should not affect incentive compensation (though they sometimes influence basic compensation). A 20-year-old who can hit .300 is as valuable to us as a 40-year-old performing as well.
在這樣的制度下有時獎勵也會非常可觀，在我們不同的業務單元，高級經理有時能夠得到五倍於其基本公司的激勵獎金，或者更多，而在1986年一個經理的獎金能夠高達2百萬美元似乎是可能的。（我希望如此。）我們沒有對獎金設置上限，所以可能的獎金是不同等級的。一個相對較小公司的經理有時候甚至可以比一個較大公司的經理賺的更多如果結果表明他值得的話。我們認為，輩分與年齡這些因素不應該對激勵機製造成影響（儘管它們有時確實影響一些基本補貼）。一個20歲的表現優異的小夥子同40歲的老將對我們來說都一樣有價值。
Obviously, all Berkshire managers can use their bonus money (or other funds, including borrowed money) to buy our stock in the market. Many have done just that - and some now have large holdings. By accepting both the risks and the carrying costs that go with outright purchases, these managers truly walk in the shoes of owners.
顯然，所有Berkshire的經理人們都可以運用其獎金（或者其他資金，包括借入資金）來購買我們在市場上流通的股票。他們當中的許多都這樣做了現在持有大量股份。通過接受直接購買而帶來的潛在風險與資金成本，這些經理人真正做到了與那些用腳投票的股東們進行對話。
Now let's get back - at long last - to our three businesses:
最後讓我們回顧一下我們的三項業務：
At Nebraska Furniture Mart our basic strength is an exceptionally low-cost operation that allows the business to regularly offer customers the best values available in home furnishings. NFM is the largest store of its kind in the country. Although the already-depressed farm economy worsened considerably in 1985, the store easily set a new sales record. I also am happy to report that NFM's Chairman, Rose Blumkin (the legendary 「Mrs. B」), continues at age 92 to set a pace at the store that none of us can keep up with. She's there wheeling and dealing seven days a week, and I hope that any of you who visit Omaha will go out to the Mart and see her in action. It will inspire you, as it does me.
Nebraska家具店的基本優勢是異常低的運營成本，這允許公司能夠持續提供給顧客優質的家具。NFM是其在國內同類型家具店中最大的一家。儘管在1985年經濟明顯地衰退，但是這家店很輕易地創造了新的銷售記錄。我是如此的高興向各位報告NFM的主席，Rose Blumkin（傳奇的B夫人），將以92歲高齡繼續忙碌，這是我們各位望塵莫及的。她開車上班一週七天處理業務，我希望我們當中的任何一員在走訪Omaha的時候可以去家具店看看，看看她是怎麼工作的。那將對你有所激勵，就像對我一般。
At See's we continue to get store volumes that are far beyond those achieved by any competitor we know of. Despite the unmatched consumer acceptance we enjoy, industry trends are not good, and we continue to experience slippage in poundage sales on a same-store basis. This puts pressure on per-pound costs. We now are willing to increase prices only modestly and, unless we can stabilize per-shop poundage, profit margins will narrow.
我們的See』s糖果店的銷量遠高於我們所知道的競爭者。儘管我們對無可匹敵的顧客認可度感到欣慰，但是趨勢並不是很好，我們將繼續體驗同一家店每磅銷售額的下滑。在對每磅的成本造成一定壓力。我們現在想要稍微提價，而如果我們不能穩定每家店舖的費用，我們的利潤就會被壓縮。
At the News volume gains are also difficult to achieve. Though linage increased during 1985, the gain was more than accounted for by preprints. ROP linage (advertising printed on our own pages) declined. Preprints are far less profitable than ROP ads, and also more vulnerable to competition. In 1985, the News again controlled costs well and our household penetration continues to be exceptional.
News銷量的增加同樣很難實現。儘管1985年行數增加了，但是收益卻主要來自預印部分。ROP行數（刊登在報紙上的廣告）減少。預印部分遠比ROP廣告獲利少，而且對競爭更加有害。在1985年，News再次很好的控制住了成本而且我們的家庭訂戶數繼續表現良好
One problem these three operations do not have is management. At See's we have Chuck Huggins, the man we put in charge the day we bought the business. Selecting him remains one of our best business decisions. At the News we have Stan Lipsey, a manager of equal caliber. Stan has been with us 17 years, and his unusual business talents have become more evident with every additional level of responsibility he has tackled. And, at the Mart, we have the amazing Blumkins - Mrs. B, Louie, Ron, Irv, and Steve - a three-generation miracle of management.
這三家公司都不存在管理的問題。See』s糖果有Chuck Huggins，在我們併入這家公司的時候就被任命接手管理。選擇他是我們一個最棒的決定。News有Stan Lipsey，一個同樣出色的管理人。Stan和我們認識已經17年了，而他非比尋常的商業才能隨著他處理問題難度的加大而愈發明顯。最後再Mart，我們有傳奇性的Blumkins，B夫人、Louie、Ron、Irv和Steven，一個由三代人組成的傳奇管理層。
I consider myself extraordinarily lucky to be able to work with managers such as these. I like them personally as much as I admire them professionally.
我覺得我及其幸運能夠和這樣一些經理人公事。我對他們個人的喜歡絕不亞於我對他們工作表現的欽佩。