值得再三反覆細讀(一) 一隻牛的投資日記
http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/04/blog-post_24.html再讀2011年巴郡致股東信, 個人認為以下這篇值得再三反覆細讀,
××××××××××××××××××××××
The Basic Choices for Investors and the One We Strongly Prefer
Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they
are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their
holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden
with risk.
(1)
Investments that are denominated in a given currency include
money-market funds, bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and other
instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as
「safe.」 In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta
may be zero, but their risk is huge.
Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing
power of investors in many countries, even as the holders continued to
receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly result,
moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value
of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to
policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin
out of control.
Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the
dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over
management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1
did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed
4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply
maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding
themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as 「income.」
For tax-paying investors like you and me, the picture has been far
worse. During the same 47-yearperiod, continuous rolling of U.S.
Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if
an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging
25%, this 5.7%(一隻牛的計算:5.7%x75%=4.275% ,after tax)return would have
yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor's visible
income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield,
and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3
points. It's noteworthy that the implicit inflation 「tax」 was more than
triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as
his main burden. 「In God We Trust」 may be imprinted on our currency, but
the hand that activates our government's printing press has been all
too human.
High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the
inflation risk they face with currency-based investments – and indeed,
rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do
not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors
assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.
Under today's conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based
investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them,
primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample
liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however
inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S.
Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for
liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working
level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.
Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we
will purchase currency-related securities only if they offer the
possibility of unusual gain – either because a particular credit is
mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates
rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial
capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we've
exploited both opportunities in the past – and may do so again – we are
now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that
Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: 「Bonds
promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver
return-free risk.」
(2)
The second major category of investments involves assets that will never
produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer's hope that
someone else – who also knows that the assets will be forever
unproductive – will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all
things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.
This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in
turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still
further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce –
it will remain lifeless forever – but rather by the belief that others
will desire it even more avidly in the future.
The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of
investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of
whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has
two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor
procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but
the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking
up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an
eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.
What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of
the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved
correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated
additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as
validating an investment thesis. As 「bandwagon」 investors join any
party, they create their own truth – for a while.
Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have
demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining
an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In
these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to
the 「proof」 delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers – for a time
– expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles
blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed
once again: 「What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in
the end.」
Today the world's gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of
this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet
per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At
$1,750 per ounce – gold's price as I write this – its value would be
$9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.
Let's now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could
buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200
billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world's most profitable
company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these
purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around
money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you
imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile
B?($9.6 trillion美金,可以買多少家新鴻基?,長江?,九龍倉?,總而言之,所有的龍頭藍籌企業?)
Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold,
current prices make today's annual production of gold command about $160
billion. Buyers – whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened
individuals, or speculators – must continually absorb this additional
supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.
A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced
staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops – and will
continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be.
Exxon Mobil will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in
dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more
trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold
will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You
can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.(以上所買入的龍頭藍籌企業,可以派發多少的股息?)
Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it's likely many will still rush to gold. I'm
confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A
will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved
by pile B.
(3)
Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear:
Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based
assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency
collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard 「cash
is king」 in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather
than held. Similarly, we heard 「cash is trash」 in the early 1980s just
when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in
memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd
paid dearly for that comfort.
My own preference – and you knew this was coming – is our third
category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or
real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in
inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its
purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital
investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola,
IBM and our own See's Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain
other companies – think of our regulated utilities, for example – fail
it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn
more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will
remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.
Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells,
shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to
exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or
some See's peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move
more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it
does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others
produce.
Our country's businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and
services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial 「cows」
will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of 「milk」 to
boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but
rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the
milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during
the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid
loads of dividends as well). Berkshire's goal will be to increase its
ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own
them in their entirety – but we will also be owners by way of holding
sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended
period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway
winner among the three we've examined. More important, it will be by far
the safest.
值得再三反覆細讀(二) 一隻牛的投資日記
http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/04/blog-post_6061.html1)
Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably
certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period.
And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.
- 股價會波動,這是正常的。
- 經歷無數次景氣循環,雖然盈利在不景氣時少許倒退,但是以10年或更久的經營歷史數據排列,盈利仍然能夠不斷增加,這樣的企業可以被稱為【對的企業】
- 找到【對的企業】,也要能夠瞭解它的業務,知道如何經營(例如performance keypoint),才能買入,
- 找到【對的企業】, 也要配合便宜/合理價,才能買入,
- 如果【對的企業】,繼續以對的方式經營,才可以繼續持有
例子:渣打(2888)
|
股票數目 |
股價的波動 |
每股盈利 |
景氣循環 |
價值 |
|
(百萬) |
(每股港元) |
(每股港元) |
|
PE=10 |
2003 |
1,207 |
82-126 |
6.33 |
SARS |
63 |
2004 |
1,210 |
116-149 |
9.78 |
|
98 |
2005 |
1,309 |
99-175 |
11.15 |
|
111 |
2006 |
1,349 |
182-231 |
12.66 |
|
127 |
2007 |
1,615 |
211-304 |
13.19 |
|
132 |
2008 |
1,638 |
88-287 |
14.54 |
金融風暴 |
145 |
2009 |
1,984 |
75-217 |
12.78 |
|
128 |
2010 |
2,192 |
176-244 |
14.82 |
|
148 |
2011 |
2,395 |
141-216 |
15.18 |
歐債風暴 |
152 |
以上,可以發覺:
- 如果已經找到【對的企業】,如果不充分瞭解它的業務,就算是買入,恐怕很快的就會被股價波動震走。
- 雖然股價會波動,但是價值是走在上升的軌道。市值+股息的增幅,如果無法超過通膨,也不能被稱為【對的企業】。所以,買入價非常重要。
- 每一天的市價,不代表是便宜/合理價,尤其是【對的企業】,都是溢價出售。
- 天上掉黃金,可遇不可求,一定要用大卡車來裝
(這是為了表達我的看法而舉的例子,可能某個事故,這家企業可以變樣)
(而且,PE=10,只是我的估計,不代表是對,也不代表所有企業都適合)
2)
Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably
certain
to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as
we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.
~a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from
bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing
power.
巴老是說他的通膨數據是4.3%,如果【市值+股息】的增幅,無法超過通膨,應該是危險的投資。但是,以極便宜的價格買入,造成股息回報超過10%,就可以扭轉乾坤,化危為安。
3)
Under today's conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based
investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them,
primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample
liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however
inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S.
Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for
liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working
level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.
- 這小段,說明了流動性的重要。好的企業,有哪一個不是流動性穩定?出問題的企業,那一個不是因為流動性乾枯?
- 反省自己,要成為成功的股票投資人,就必須學會理財,時時保持著充裕的生活費用,就算是超級金融風暴再來,也可以繼續持有投資部位,不必賣股買米,甚至股息再投資超值得的企業。
- 保持著充裕的生活費用,才不會過度在意股價的波動,才能專注於企業的價值增長。
4)
High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the
inflation risk they face with currency-based investments – and indeed,
rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do
not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors
assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.
- 太美妙了,如果能擁有超越10%利息收入的【AAA級債券,匯豐的定期存款】。如果遇上,記得用大卡車去裝。
- 【AAA級債券,匯豐的定期存款】只是代名詞,表示超級穩定和不違約。只要用心,市場內多得是。
5)
- investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the
ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its
purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital
investment.
- people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for【】
- Berkshire's goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses.
- I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to
be the runaway winner among the three we've examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.
Steve Jobs 再三請假安排欠妥 前車未鑑
1 :
GS(14)@2011-01-19 22:26:31http://www.hket.com/eti/article/ ... 2-577755?category=m
蘋果(Apple)掌舵人喬布斯(Steve Jobs)突然再宣布無限期休假,令公司發展前景蒙上陰影,有指他放假與體重持續下降有關,亦可能是舊病復發。今次蘋果的聲明沒有說明喬布斯歸期,有分析指是該公司未有汲取喬布斯前兩次放病假的教訓。
受喬布斯請假消息拖累,蘋果早段一度挫6.4%,低見326美元,追回日前場外跌幅,但其後獲買盤支持回升,截至昨晚11時,報334.9美元。
告假原因欠具體 股價曾挫6%
今次休假是喬布斯在10年來,第三次暫時放下蘋果職務,前兩次是04年和09上半年。他因罹患胰腺癌在09年接受肝臟移植手術,但今次並未說明他告假具體原因。
華盛頓大學聖路易斯分校器官移植科主管醫生William Chapman認為,喬布斯的病情可能有兩種情況。其一是器官移植方面可能出了問題,但移植1年半後出現問題的情況是很罕見的。更大的可能性是神經內分泌腫瘤又再擴散。因通過肝臟移植治癒此病的難度極大,復發某程度上是常見的事。
對於今次未有公布歸期的做法,有分析師不表認同。Fort Pitt基金分析師Kim Caughy指,董事會沒汲取08年就繼任計劃被挑戰的教訓。不過另有說法指,蘋果正是從2009年的事件中汲取教訓,為喬布斯的健康問題設定一個具體時間表,是冒險之舉,若再歸咎於營養不良等難以令人信服的原因,或適得其反。
Pier Jaffray分析師Gene Munster則指歸期不是最重要,喬布斯仍留任行政總裁,象徵今次病假長度應較上次更短,嚴重程度亦更低。
撰文:陳智深
2 :
ksw(1423)@2011-01-19 22:45:44我仲唸住等iphone 5...
3 :
GS(14)@2011-01-19 22:46:42我想買部pad多
4 :
GS(14)@2011-01-22 00:53:28http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/te ... 307&art_id=14888220
蘋果上季盈利新高
賺 468億增 78% iPhone及 iPad熱賣
2011年01月20日
【本報綜合報道】受惠於 iPhone、 iPad等人氣產品銷情大捷,蘋果公司上季業績再度令人眼前一亮,季度盈利及營業額雙雙刷新紀錄,而今季業績預測亦勝預期,令市場暫時放下對行政總裁喬布斯再度因病休假的憂慮,刺激股價昨早段反彈 2.3%。分析指出,蘋果上季所有業務全面報捷,令市場對現有管理層信心大增,相信在喬布斯暫時休假期間仍能主持大局。
截至去年 12月 25日的一季,該集團純利按年勁升 78%,至 60億美元(約 468億港元),每股盈利 6.43美元,期內營業額亦按年增長 71%,至 267.4億美元,兩者均勝預期。受惠於生產成本下降,上季毛利率升至 38.5%,較前一季的 36.9%略為改善。
喬布斯在業績報告中表示,上季假日銷情非常強勁, Mac機、 iPhone、 iPad銷售額均創新高,展望今年,集團將全速驅進,推出更多新產品。
喬布斯病假憂慮稍紓
iPhone和 iPad上季分別貢獻整體營業額的 39%和 17%。展望今季,蘋果料每股盈利達 4.9美元,營業額則達 220億美元,兩者均勝預期。
蘋果上季所有業務表現均超乎預期,令分析員對喬布斯身邊的管理層信心增強,在業績發佈後長達 1小時的電話會議中,沒有分析員就喬布斯休假一事提問。 Kaufman Bros分析員 Shaw Wu表示,投資界對喬布斯暫時退下火線的憂慮已過,雖然他的角色非常重要,但經過不斷實踐,喬布斯的想法、處事方式和風格等已深植在公司文化中。
大中華生意勁升三倍
事實上,暫代喬布斯職務的營運總監庫克,確實繼承老闆的一貫作風,在回應分析員有關市場競爭的問題時,大肆批評對手的產品,指微軟視窗系統的平板電腦既笨重又昂貴,而 Android平板電腦則太小,只是一部加大碼的智能手機,非常古怪。
庫克表示,集團正在全球拓展客源,包括較少使用蘋果產品的商業客戶。
他又指出,上季大中華區營業額高達 26億美元,按年激增 3倍,而蘋果在中國的分店人流及銷售額亦較其他地區強勁。
受行政總裁喬布斯再放病假消息打擊,蘋果公司前晚股價急瀉,由德銀發行、在港買賣的唯一蘋果認購證 10033前日亦急挫 27.57%,上市數日即遇滑鐵盧;不過,由於蘋果上季業績遠勝市場預期,該輪昨日已經回穩,顯著反彈 24.37%,收 2.45元,交投持續活躍,成交 5164萬元。
蘋果上季業績及銷售表現
─項目─
每股盈利 去年第四季: 6.43美元 09年同期: 3.67美元
營業額 去年第四季: 267.4億美元 09年同期: 156.8億美元
毛利率 去年第四季: 38.5% 09年同期: 40.9%
─產品─
iPhone 去年第四季銷量: 1624萬部 按年變幅:+86%
iPad 去年第四季銷量: 733萬部 按年變幅:─
iPod 去年第四季銷量: 1945萬部 按年變幅:+7%
Mac機 去年第四季銷量: 413萬部 按年變幅:+23%
5 :
GS(14)@2011-01-22 00:53:43外洩疑雲
喬布斯病假前夕 認沽期權成交勁
2011年01月20日
蘋果公司認沽期權上周五,即喬布斯請病假之前一個交易日,成交激增,為當日入市者翌日帶來最多速賺 8倍的機會,惹起市場關注喬布斯請假消息是否外洩,成為春江鴨圖利的工具。
英國《金融時報》報道,行使價 320美元、 1月 22日到期的蘋果認沽期權未平倉合約,在上周五增加 6091張至 40996張,是一年多前開始交易以來最大增幅。
低買高賣可賺八倍
受到喬布斯請假消息拖累,蘋果股價當日在德國場外交易應聲下挫,於周二美股復市後,最多曾瀉 6.5%至 326美元,刺激上述認沽期權一度扯上 5美元的高位,較上周五收市的 0.54美元急升逾 8倍,換言之,上周五入貨的投資者,一個交易日便可賺取多達 8倍的利潤。對於認沽期權突然成交急增,有業內人士認為是股價貼近認沽期權行使價的正常現象。然而,有部份交易員猜疑是否是人事先知道喬布斯請假的消息,遂趁消息曝光前率先掃入認沽期權賺取厚利。
芝加哥期權交易所發言人表示,旗下市場監管部門有審查市場不尋常交易,但拒絕就蘋果期權問題發表評論,美國證監會亦拒絕透露是否就今次事件展開調查。
6 :
GS(14)@2011-01-22 18:11:23http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2011-1-20/yOMDAwMDIxNzUyOQ.html
“包括中国香港和台湾在内的大中华区营收极为惊人。”苹果COO提姆•库克(Tim Cook)昨日在2011财年一季度业绩电话会议上透露,苹果大中华区该季度营收高达26亿美元,同比增长达4倍,相比之下,上财年全年的营收仅为30亿美元。
苹果昨日发布的财报显示,公司净利润为60亿美元,同比增长78%,创历史新高。当季苹果售出1624万部iPhone,733万部iPad。
苹果CFO皮特•奥本海默(Peter Oppenheimer)表示,苹果在中国的4家零售店是该公司全球客流量和营收最高的零售店。按照苹果总部的规划,由于中国市场的快速发展,苹果计划两年内将在华的Apple Store零售店增至25家,逐渐增强苹果的自身渠道力量。
即使如此,苹果在中国的营收仍有大量的潜力未被挖掘。中国市场仍然充斥着来自美国和中国香港等地的“水货”,中国电信也希望尽快引入CDMA版的iPhone 4,而3G版本的iPad也待入华。今年苹果还将发布iPad 2 和iPhone 5,一个巨大的中国市场在等待苹果发力。
但是,苹果赚得钵满盆翻,其供应商与合作伙伴却并没有同步分享苹果的高增长。招商证券研究员何金孝表示,苹果来自iPhone的利润,估计只有20%~30%属于合作伙伴或者制造商。
这不足三成的利润分配,也是多寡不均。中国台湾股市有苹果供应商板块概念,比如宸鸿是苹果iPhone及iPad触控屏幕供应商,去年10月挂牌上市,首日股价涨幅就近130%,今年将在大陆大举扩产。南玻和莱宝高科因为提供触摸屏玻璃而成为苹果间接供应商,也都受订单刺激,开始扩产,在股市中受到追捧。
但iPhone与iPad的约百家中国制造代工厂行业利润率却无法与苹果相比。比如富士康提供的iPad外壳占成本的9%,富士康组装费占iPhone成本3.5%,从财报来看,富士康的毛利率是2.8%,与苹果40%的高毛利率相去甚远。
供货产业链的低利润率迫使代工行业压缩成本,这也给苹果惹下了不少麻烦。比如在苹果2010年度供货商社会责任进展报告中,约有54%的代工厂让员工超时工作,24%则是支付薪资少于苹果规定的最低额,另外还有37%的工厂未能遵守苹果制订的反歧视规范,有三家工厂甚至有雇用未成年员工的状况。
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passport(1491)@2011-01-22 18:50:103樓提及
我想買部pad多
湯兄想買ipad2?
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GS(14)@2011-01-22 20:09:26有真的這樣想過,買部Notebook都是價錢差不多