期權(Option)的可愛在於令投資策略在單邊的升跌(Bullish or
Bearish)外，尚有無方向性的策略(Directionless)。在不同的資產中進行分散投資(Diversification)固然是人盡皆知
的投資智慧，其實投資策略亦可以應用不同的策略優化本身的投資組合回報。在2002年至2007年單邊中港牛市看升固然是必勝之道，但2008年至
2010年的熊市和隨後的大反單，以及近月的牛皮市，皆證明要每月維持有穩定回報除靠單邊賭牛市外的內含期權的混合策略是非常值得考慮的做法！
車臣(Chechnya)乃裡海(Caspian)和黑海(Black Sea)之間的高加索地區(Caucasus)其中一個俄羅斯聯邦。由於高加索地區乃羅剎人進軍土耳其和波斯必經之路，因此幾千年來皆是兵家必爭之地。近代高加索人跟羅剎人戰爭進入高峰期始於彼得大帝進軍亞洲的大博奕(The Great Game)為起點(見拙文《阿姆河斯坦恩仇錄》)。
筆者記得007系列中的《The World is Not Enough！》占士邦曾進入高加索地區調查一宗涉及英國石油大亨Sir Robert King被殺的案件。其中來自美國核彈專家邦女郎Christmas Jones曾講過美帝在高加索地區行動必須要有MI6的協助，皆因大英帝國在高加索地區乃至中亞地區情報網絡已經有幾百年歷史。Christmas Jones這番恭維事頭婆的說話原來有根有據。話說當年羅剎人東進的終極目標乃印度次大陸，因此大英帝國乃至東印度公司均派了不少密探在這地區工作，其中一名有涉足高加索地區的著名探險家便是Captain Arthur Conolly。
Captain Arthur Conolly本是東印度公司軍官，於1829年他喬裝伊斯蘭商人化名阿里汗(Khan Ali)由莫斯科出發，經過大部份高加索和中亞地區後於1831年安全抵達印度。據說Arthur Conolly作為拓荒者開啟了大英帝國在這個廣大地區的人脈網絡，其中俄羅斯更思疑大英帝國長期資助高加索人對羅剎人的戰爭。1834年在他的傳記《Journey to the North of India through Russia, Persia and Afghanistan》首次以大博奕(The Great Game)來形容英俄逐鹿中亞的國際形勢。
按道理車臣人跟羅剎人血海深仇，攻擊對象應該是俄羅斯而非米帝。據國際情報「權威」Strafor的《Why the Boston Bombers Succeeded》的分析，Dzhokhar Tsarnaev和Tamerlan Tsarnaev應該受al Qaeda宣傳影響而成為獨立行動的Inspired Operative，未必與車臣恐怖份子有關聯。不過單掌拍不響，倘若大英帝國一直以來真的默默支持高加索人對付羅剎人的獨立運動，那麼大英帝國沒落後美帝又有沒有取而代之介入這場獨立運動？假如米帝真的是現代高加索人獨立運動的幕後金主，那麼這兩名已經在美國落地生根兼學富五車的車臣靑年才子，緣何要對美國恩人痛下毒手呢？
Joe Zhang says China's massiveshadow banking sector is only a reflection of the real issue - thepersistent, unbridled growth of credit as a result of negativeinterest rates and financial repression.
InChina today, the term "shadow banking" has a negative meaning. Overthe past year, the China Banking Regulatory Commission has issuednumerous policy directives to try to contain its explosive growth.Xiao Gang , the head of the Chinese securities watchdog, calledshadow banking "a Ponzi scheme" in an opinion piece he penned lastyear while still serving as chairman of the Bank of China.
But why is shadow banking still all the rage, despite thehostile regulatory environment?
This will risk an economic recession,but it may be what is needed to avoid the next global financialcrisis
In the past two to three decades, China has implemented anextremely inflationary monetary policy. Since 1986, for example,its money supply has grown at a compound annual growth rate of 21.1per cent, and its bank loan balance by 18.2 per cent. Of course,Chinese citizens have not become richer as fast, and much of thegrowth is merely a monetary illusion.
Why did credit grow so fast for so long? Apart from a robusteconomy, the reason has been the regulated and negative realinterest rate. Due to financial repression, demand for loans hasbeen artificially boosted, as bad investments become feasible onsubsidised credit. Indeed, it has been a vicious cycle.
First, the fast growth of loans worsens inflation, which weakensthe purchasing power of money. To facilitate the same amount ofbusiness, corporate China needs more credit. And as more credit isreleased into the economy, the purchasing power of money shrinksfurther. I call this an iterative escalation of credit andinflation. There is a constant shortage of credit no matter howfast credit grows. The reason? Bank loans are impossible to refuseas they are heavily subsidised. Homebuyers and speculators knowthis all too well.
The Chinese government frequently talks about prudent monetarypolicy but does not really have the political will to tightencredit for fear of job losses and a recession. Even in April, thebroad money supply (M2) has grown at 16.1 per cent compared to thesame time last year. That is a very high rate on a high base. Chinais still inflating rapidly despite repeated declarations of creditcontrols by government officials.
The results of financial repression are visible everywhere, fromindustrial overcapacity to excess real estate construction, and theunstoppable growth of shadow banking.
Over time, the Chinese statistics (particularly on inflation)have lost credibility among citizens. Despite high inflation thatis widely believed to be somewhere between 5 and 10 per cent ayear, Chinese depositors are paid an average of 2 per centinterest. Naturally, they want better deals. While many have chosento speculate on property, others have embraced shadow banking,including microcredit and wealth management products. Afterconsistently deflating for two consecutive decades, the domesticstock market remains very expensive, with banking stocks being thepossible exception.
Negative real interest rates on bank loans constitute a subsidyfor borrowers. Unfortunately, access to finance is neither equalnor fair. State-affiliated companies and well-connectedprivate-sector borrowers take the bulk of funds for loans, leavingvery little for small businesses. The underprivileged have toresort to the curb market, involving trading outside the officialstock markets, pawnshops, microcredit firms and high-cost fundsarranged by trust companies.
In other words, China's shadow banking is a reflection of thefinancial repression. The high interest rates prevalent in shadowbanking activities are a result of the low rates in the formalbanking sector.
Financial repression has accentuated the uneven playing fieldfor the two types of borrowers. Normal bank loans carry a 6 percent annualised interest rate, while the shadow banks typicallycharge 15-30 per cent per annum.
If Beijing really wants to help small businesses, or deflate theproperty bubble, it should raise interest rates steadily. As aresult, the growth rate of money supply will decline to 7-8 percent within two to three years. Yes, this will risk an economicrecession, but a recession may be exactly what is needed to avoidthe next global financial crisis. This time, unlike in 2008, thecrisis will be made in China.
China's iterative escalation of credit and inflation has severesocial consequences, too. Ordinary savers are punished, and areleft further and further behind by the rising prices of assets suchas property. If President Xi Jinping wants Chinese people torealise their own "China dream", he must tame the credit monster.Shadow banking is only the shadow, not the monster waiting in theshadows.
Joe Zhang was chairman of Wansui Micro Credit Company inGuangzhou from 2011 to 2012, and is author of a new book, InsideChina's Shadow Banking: The Next Subprime Crisis?
This article first appeared in theSouth China Morning Post print edition on May 31, 2013 as A monsterproblem.
May 22 (Bloomberg) -- European Union finance ministers pledged to stiffen sanctions on high-deficit countries and ruled out setting up a mechanism to manage state defaults, saying no euro country will be allowed to renege on its debts.
Generally, the above news, delivered a simple message to me. G to G affairs are much easy to compromise. Further more, an old idiom;
官字，两个口
The scenario is vary from the US government provides the rescuse package, TARP, to those financial institutionals. During then, the US governement has the right to rescuse or reject any financial institutionals. It's not a NATIONAL INTEREST or to protect its' prestigous.
EU is a body, which many countries are involved. Failure of any country in the EU, swaying others is a forgone conclusion. Hence, in the "Malaysia context" of understanding how the EU countries responsding toward the Greece fiscal problem;
"You help me, I help you"
I'm turning positive, seeing the rich countries in the EU, toned decisive to halt the potential European sovereign debt crisis;
Deliberations over the revamp of Europe’s economic management came after German Chancellor Angela Merkel won parliamentary backing for Germany’s contribution of as much as 148 billion euros to the EU’s planned 440 billion-euro debt- stabilization fund, the largest single share.
“Forget the treaty, let’s focus on what we can achieve in the short term,” French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde told reporters. “We are not against change, but let’s see what is deliverable very quickly.”
After all, a US$1 trillion had been allocated in this effort. Will the EU willing to see the US$1 trillion futiled?
