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時光倒流到China Trade 蔡東豪

2011-11-17  NM

內地經濟開放後，八十年代的一段時間，香港有一種職業類別叫China Trade，跟從事會計、運輸、演戲等相同。先生做盛行？China Trade。在那年代這個詞語來得自然，感覺上甚至有點高尚。今日有人同你講佢做China Trade，你以為這個人傻咗，有什麽生意不涉及內地？

在 有China Trade這行業的年代，傳媒經常出現今日已變成老生常談的在華營商貼士，例如關係很重要，或者中國人很重視面子等，今日聽起來有點礙耳。關於內地的很多 事情已成為全球商界接受的事實，外國人對內地的認識今非昔比，今日在上海街頭蕩失路，隨時要向外國人問路。世界不同了，可是每隔一段時間（感覺上似是成日 都發生），總會見到美國政府官員或議員公開批評內地，特別是關於內地的貿易政策，矛頭通常指向人民幣匯率，指內地不公平地競爭，依賴操控匯率幫助出口，直 接損害美國企業和美國人的利益。政客為爭取選票，久不久走出來做場戲，相信大家都會理解，但這場戲一而再，再而三出現，令人生厭。美國對華政策有陣時竟然 停留在China Trade年代，戇居至令人難以相信。 中國人愛面子這一課，二三十年前在華營商入門的第一章已在教，美國人想中國人做一些事情，假如利用令中國人丟臉的方式來傳遞信息，結果是中國人偏偏不做。 二三十年來一次又一次證實這定律，相信連美國議員選區的選民也看得通，美國議員的戇居行為隨時賠上自己的形象，又爭不到選票。

一 談到內地貿易政策打茅波，美國政客立即Rambo上身，甚至用上一百年前的字眼，例如Coolie、Slave labour等。根據這些政客的邏輯，美國今日失業率高企，就是因為殘暴的內地人操控廉價勞工，出口大量廉價產品到美國，導致美國工廠倒閉，是美國失業的 罪魁禍首。我經常到美國出差，不單是指紐約和三藩市的自由派美國，還包括中西部的鄉下美國，內地的奴隸形象，連這些未必擁有護照的農夫牛仔也不相信。 就假設美國政客有超人能力迫使人民幣匯率大幅上升，到時內地出口變得昂貴，美國人不買內地貨，他們會轉買美國貨嗎？我相信不會，美國人會轉買越南貨、柬埔 寨貨、孟加拉貨，因為工廠會從內地搬去這些國家。其實這不是假設，內地工廠搬去越南等國家，特別是生產低廉產品，已在進行中。 內地工人工資過去五年平均升幅每年25%，內地政策是繼續讓工資上升，令出口變得昂貴，限制出口數量，間接以回應美國政客對內地貿易政策的不滿。美國政客 針對人民幣匯率，內地政府就是不就範，只肯微調人民幣匯率，總之你叫我做嗰樣嘢，我偏偏不做，但最後又達到你要求的目標。這不只是內地政府保面子的招數， 人民幣匯率波動牽連甚廣，超越貿易層次，內地政府不敢貿然調動，是可以理解。讓內地工人工資上升來回應美國政客對貿易政策的批評，這一招其實非常高明，內 地人民比以前富裕，消費增加，而消費型經濟正是內地政府希望朝着走過去的經濟模式。內地工人工資上升可迫使製造業轉型去高增值產品，輸家是乏力轉型的中小 企，對內地政府來說，成本可以接受。 美國解決失業問題，不是要靠跟內地貨鬥平，因為平得過內地，平唔過孟加拉。美國過去幾十年的經濟優勢，是來自不斷提升生產力、是來自創新帶來新領域；賣一 部iPhone，美國賺200美元，內地賺2美元，這正是美國致富之道。這一點太清晰，毋須由我這美國遊客指指點點。 每次見到美國政客批評內地，我身體裡的民族情緒總能保持冷靜，但腦袋的邏輯思維就無法按捺得住。我唯有相信美國政客公開批評內地貿易政策是指定廢話，無人 會聽，無人會信，包括政客自己，只代表美國政治舞台的一個必然橋段。每想起China Trade，我憶起那年代的事物，唔知點解那時候我經常在尖東流連……

蔡東豪Tony Tsoi
現任上市公司精電國際行政總裁，他曾任職投資銀行，在《信報》以筆名原復生撰寫財經專欄，對投資及求知有無限渴求，習慣早上四時起床寫作找樂趣。 ####

On China 茶怪老作

http://milkteamonster.blogspot.com/2012/02/on-china.html

基辛格的新書On China，論中國，嚴格來說是論中國與西方的外交關係。在清朝，鴉片戰爭及以後的矛盾，反映相方的誤解。西方國家希望 與中國通商，無意侵略中國，西人不明白貿易有甚麼大不了，軍事侵略才值得抵抗吧。對於中國來說，軍事侵略反而較容易接受，中國不時受外族入侵的威脅，更有 金人和滿人成功入主中原，不過最終都被中華文明所淹沒。中國幾千年歷史以來的外交，只有外國進貢卻少有平等貿易，中國為天下中心的基礎觀念一旦打破，恐怕 中華文明也受到挑戰。因此，在當時中國人看來，平等外交關係較軍事侵略更可怕。

這位前美國國務卿，用宏觀的角度觀察政局。中國人愛下圍棋，西方人下象棋，兩者反映不同的想維模式，圍棋志在圍，志在建立一種形勢在克制對手。象棋是寸土 必爭的功防戰，冒求耗盡對手一兵一卒。作者用這個分別解釋中美在五六十年代在台灣海峽上的搏奕。美軍在下象棋，旨在佈防。中國用圍棋的眼光去看，誤以為美 軍有意圍堵，所以特別反感。

接著，他用三國演義的情節講中國、蘇聯和美國的三角關係。不對，正確來說，首先提出的是毛澤東的幕僚。

也許，作者提出的觀點已不再新鮮，不過，以我對政治學的淺見，很少見有這樣顯赫的西方政治家，寫一部以中國為專題的書，而又成為暢銷書。這或者反映了西方社會對中國的求知態度，由以往的好奇，變到今天的認真。

China Angel Fund 揭祕

(1)

上星期，David Webb在Racking Mud, Part 6 入面提及過一個關於中國戶外媒體(254，前廣聯企業、華新國際、金獅遠東、金獅亞洲、信僑控股、光訊聯網、光訊控股)的一個超不值的戶外媒體交易，我們現在談談。

這交易主要是以1,241,890,000元購入GMG Media Group Limited，根據收購通函資料，這公司是連營業額和資產也沒有的。這交易的賣方是一位稱為Jiang Qi Hang的男子(按:這些人通常都有古怪先用英文名)。

據公告稱，Jiang Qi Hang「持有中山大學頒授之工商管理學士學位及新南威爾斯大學澳大利亞管理研究生院頒授之工商管理碩士學位，並於廣告及投資業擁有逾15 年經驗，其後他在1992年任職寶潔中國有限公司，負責Head & Shoulders洗髮乳之品牌管理，亦在中國傳媒及廣告業建立強大人際網絡。

在完成工商管理碩士學位後，他轉入投資業。自2000年起，法國巴黎百富勤證券有限公司出任證券銷售總監約4年，之後加入中銀國際證券有限公司出任執行董事。又過2年，他轉為私募基金投資，創辦China Angel Capital Holdings Ltd.，從事傳媒及互聯網業之策略投資。」

經瀏覽這公司的網站，可以見到他的中文名叫江啟航。對比公告及網站的資料，好像還漏了他1997年於Australian Graduate School of Management, University of New South Wales, Australia取得工商管理學碩士學位及在1997年至2000年任職里昂證券亞洲有限公司，以及2004至2005年擔任大華繼顯香港有限公司的經歷。據股權披露資料，他持有China Angel Fund 36%股權。

(2)

但這是副題。講番正題先，交易的作價是1,241,890,000元，實是以發行新股及可換股票據支付，發行價及換股價均為13仙。

GMG Media Group Limited通過對北京巨屏傳媒廣告有限公司管理協議，避開就成立外資廣告企業需成立及經營超過3年的限制，並致力於2014年初前於北京、上海、深圳及廣州與多間商場合作及安裝100 套濶屏幕顯
示器。管理層同意把股份抵押給中國戶外媒體，並簽訂股權轉讓協議，使他們在法律容許時能取得牌照。

北京巨屏傳媒廣告有限公司主要資產為對關連企業廣州市巨屏廣告傳媒有限公司的款項，廣州市巨屏廣告傳媒有限公司的款項主要從事開發及製造後投式巨屏電視，並把電視租予GMG Media Group Limited。江啟航及其聯繫人士分別持有廣州市巨屏廣告傳媒有限公司及上海巨屏文化傳播有限公司63%及38.25%股權，不過江啟航已承諾互不競爭。

根據其後的通函稱，「由於目標集團出租及租賃顯示器系統，故預期資本開支極微。實行業務模式之初步資金規定約為3,000,000人民幣。於五年期內安裝100個巨屏顯示之成本約為6,000,000 人民幣。」，使原有股東股權大幅攤薄，那這作價是否荒謬，請自己想想吧。

其後，江啟航把股權放入和中國戶外媒體的有很多關係的敦沛金融(812)旗下敦沛證券，他們的交易的朋友們，包括郭明輝、余慧妍、馬凱卓都喜歡用這一間。經過一輪轉換，這些股票經過前稱金榜的派傑、中銀國際及時富金融(510)旗下的時富證券、康宏金融(1019)旗下的康宏證券，大部分已經出售，其中有一部分是售予中國網絡的巨頭的如阿里巴巴旗下的淘寶天下傳媒有限公司、已私有化的盛大網絡全資附屬公司Shanda Capital Limited及一個由張頌義全資控制，活躍在中投三寶其中兩寶的保利協鑫(3800)，旭光(67)的投資者，以及壇金國際(621，前永興國際)的現時金礦賣家之一的曼圖宏業有限公司(Mandra Capital Limited)。但是有部分交易沒有披露，可能違反了上市規則。

綜合而言，據Webb的估計，他已經套現了18.12億，另以上星期的價格計算，他還有約3.09億的股票未售出，可見他獲利甚豐。

但是據Angel Fund網站所稱，這業務是「和公司的創始人緊密合作， 從商業模式的建立， 團隊建設， 商業談判與業務拓展等幾乎全方位的協助公司成長。 中國天使並竭力促成該公司於2009年12月被香港上市的中國戶外媒體公司全面收購。」，估計江啟航多是代持性質，只有部分獲利為其所有。

(3)

除了這件大賺的投資後，根據他們網站的資訊及港交所股權披露的資料，其實還有3項投資的:

1.  國際精密(929，前IPE集團)

據資料稱，其中一名合夥人徐志權曾為香港聯合交易所有限公司的創辦人之一及前執行董事，但是根據上市公司的招股書及Webb-site的網站資料，相信都是上市之前的事，或是有虛假的披露。

其後，他在主要股東在2009年10月出售股權時，或購入約2,000萬股，以披露資料看，作價約45仙，其後在4供1股權中，以36仙又取得5,500萬股，把股權增至7,500萬股或8.18%，但在供股後又有披露減持52,682,227股，可能是供股較預期熱烈或是在市場上出售股權，但從當日成交看，以後者居多，所以實際最後他持有22,317,773股，成本約4.074仙，其後股價一度升至1.82元，獲利甚多。

2.  中國安芯(1149，前博智國際醫藥)

筆者和鱷兄之前都有說這一家公司有問題的，亦曾撰有博客2篇。大股東或有造假帳的嫌疑，在公司宣佈獲利倒退後，有人利用警報資產借殼上市，或有關連交易問題，但最終也能通過，乘著2010年的復甦市況，股價一度升至3.2元，估計獲利甚豐，前大股東也大獲利退出。但是筆者相信這公司假帳是愈來愈大，請各位小心，有時間再跟大家細說。

在之前智富週刊(i-money)中，根據我的記憶，他曾經有做過訪問的，記者有訪問他買入這股的故事。

3. 宏創高科(8242)

這公司由僑威國際(1201)分拆，引入前永保林業(723，前安歷士、華晉國際、中國鎂業 、 晉盈控股)主要股東鄭盾尼為策略股東，董事亦多為該公司前任人士。

按股權披露顯示，China Angel Fund 以上市價80仙購入1,250萬股，共投入1,000萬元，以現價97仙計，賺約21.25%，金額約212.5萬。

總的來說，這個China Angel Fund 都是邪邪地，但是他買入的股，都有不錯的上升率，但是那些股真是好大問題，如果不及時脫手，都是竹籃打水一場空，所以筆者不會沾手他的股票。

手機旅遊軟件Touch China：盈利不僅來自下載

http://news.imeigu.com/a/1334366700264.html

商業計劃

沈卓立

2010年春天，我正在一家外企打工。彼時，我還有另一個身份兼職手機軟件開發者。我幾個月前做出的一款名為「故宮」的手機旅遊客戶端軟件，在蘋果App store的分類軟件排名中穩居第一。

故事就從此開始。有一天，蘋果公司開發者關係部突然找到我，希望我授權他們使用「故宮」應用在相應市場推廣活動裡。再後來，我就當真在當年的央視iPhone廣告宣傳片中看到了自己的軟件雖然只有5秒鐘。

這足以讓我熱血澎湃，甚至在某種程度上直接促使了我隨後的辭職創業。我現在將開發Touch China系列的手機旅遊軟件作為自己的事業，而我的創業也從起初的浪漫主義逐漸踏實落地、模式也越來越清晰。

以移動互聯網作為切入去做旅遊生意，這是我的夢想，我會一直堅持下去。

創業伊始

我非常喜歡旅遊，每到一個地方總會去當地遊覽一番。然而，在旅遊中我發現很多景點所用的語音導遊還是非常陳舊的系統。但如果不使用這些系統你很可能又會錯過很多文化和背景故事，旅遊效果大打折扣。

如果在手機上能有一個智能化的導遊軟件，有精美的地圖，有趣的語音介紹和最實用的本地信息，一定會很棒！

我之前就接觸過許多移動和客戶端領域的技術。所以，當2008年iPhone橫空出世，尤其開發者可以在開放平台上設計軟件並上傳出售時，我馬上意識到這可能是一個機會。我想要試試。

我第一個想到了故宮。我喜歡中國傳統文化、古典建築，我很願意讓別人也知道這些東西。另一方面故宮本身的地位決定了它的應用一定不會沒有市場。打定主意後，我立馬決定動手做一個介紹故宮的iPhone產品應用。

地圖是重中之重。故宮是中國古典建築的最高層次，我希望能有一個非常棒的界面表現。這個地圖要足夠直觀和細緻，讓用戶一眼就可以看出來他現在面對的建築是在地圖的什麼地方，感受到自己在故宮的哪個層次。

我在網上翻閱查找了很多地圖，但都達不到要求。直到我輾轉聯繫到雅虎移動互聯網產品的資深界面設計師James，他後來成為了我的創業夥伴。現在呈現在我們軟件中的地圖是他一點一滴設計畫出來的。

在我們地圖上，即使故宮的一個小房子都能找到。如果仔細數基座的柱子，它和實際的數量都是一樣的。我認為在移動互聯網上產品品質和用戶體驗至關重要。這些我們花了很多時間去實現。

另一個很重要的問題就是怎麼跟用戶交互。我們的故宮軟件現在可以選擇不同遊覽時長，比如2小時、4小時，軟件會根據此推薦給你不同的遊覽內容，每個單獨的遊覽點又會配以生動的語音介紹和說明。

故宮在2009年9月上線蘋果商店，當時定價2.99美金。很長一段時間它排在旅遊付費軟件第一名。論壇上很多人更是爭相求破解。

有一天，蘋果公司開發者關係部突然找到我，希望授權蘋果使用「故宮」應用在相應市場推廣活動裡。再後來，我就當真在當年的CCTV的iPhone廣告中看到了自己的軟件雖然只有5秒鐘。

這款廣告總共選了10多個應用，我們是唯一一款旅遊類的軟件。這讓我熱血澎湃，後來我和我的團隊決定出來創業這是一個很重要的鼓舞和促進因素。

故宮的框架做完以後，再去做北海、天壇、頤和園這些景點就非常容易。我們很快推出了一系列的景點旅遊軟件。

城市導覽

我最開始對於創業還是帶有很多浪漫主義和理想主義，但是隨著一步步工作的進展，我的方向逐漸清晰。

在 做了很多單個景點以後，我們開始嘗試做Touch China系列城市導覽。城市導覽最突出的特點是集成了很多景點的詳細導遊，有精美的景點地圖，也有生動的語音故事，同時還集成了遊客在旅遊過程中所需的 各種信息。我們現在上線的城市共有8~9個，北京、上海、香港、澳門、天津、蘇州等。

香港是第一個也是所有城市導覽中是最好的。從去年10月1日上線至今，現在App下載量超過30萬 。 每 天 活 躍 用 戶 接 近6000~10000人。

其中，在香港每天當地使用的用戶接近4000人。換句話說，每天有大約4000部獨立的iPhone會用我們香港城市導覽。

這個導覽集合了你在香港吃喝玩樂的應用。比如從我們城市導覽可以進入海洋公園，後者的文字介紹、開閉館時間、趣談時間等各種細節，都很無縫地集成在導覽裡邊。

針對香港購物遊客多的特點，我們還嵌入了諸如海港城這樣的購物熱點地區。我們甚至還內嵌了匯率換算這樣一個實用的模塊。

我的城市導覽還會接著做下去，我會優先選擇上線一些歷史文化名城，比如西安、成都。這些城市則會升級成省的形式，比如昆明就會嵌入到云南模塊中。組合可以很多，比如五嶽系列、古鎮系列。

在具體應用細節上我們一直非常在意。我們近期會在蘇州城市導覽中實現兩個很重要的新功能，一個是評論，一個是行程制定。

這其中行程制定非常有意思。比如做一個新計劃，只要你輸入計划去幾天，上午到還是下午到，同時旅遊偏好是什麼（親子游還是度蜜月，或者獨自去看自然風光）。我們就會實時彈出一個行程安排。比如親子游我們會推薦蘇州樂園這種地方，而經典游則是以園林為主。

對於系統推薦的行程計劃你還可以進行編輯，做各種各樣的調整。

因為我們後台集成了一系列維度的算法，比如距離的維度、關聯度的維度、時間的維度。假設你在行程制定時一天以內安排了太多內容，系統會自動檢驗並提醒你「安排太緊」。

每次無論一個景點還是一個城市導覽做完，我們的編輯都會去當地踩點，呆上一個禮拜左右，去嘗試體驗自己的產品到底好不好用。

城 市導覽這個級別做的人並不少。但Touch China是全球範圍內第一個把城市層面的信息和景區的詳細導遊無縫集成在一起的手機軟件。打個比方說，所有城市導覽都會告訴遊客去北京要去故宮、 798，但是到了故宮、798具體怎麼玩，只有Touch China可以告訴你。

商業模式

從整個旅遊產業看，機票和酒店的互聯網化做得最好，因為這兩塊產品相對比較標準化。但從整個旅遊的預算來看，在目的地的吃喝玩樂不比酒店機票花費少。

傳統互聯網沒法做這一塊。這塊到了目的地後隨機性很大的一塊消費，恰恰是移動互聯網的發力點。Touch China就是一個在當地能陪著你的東西，它將當地的一些優質的旅遊資源挖掘出來，解決目的地信息不對稱的問題。

這裡邊可以變化出來非常多的商業模式，可以是廣告，可以撮合交易，也可以從交易中做返傭。因為期間交易會非常大，可能性也很多。

這將遠遠超過單獨通過軟件收費來獲利。一個手機軟件賣到10元可能還有少部分人來買，但是賣到20元基本沒人買。這也是為什麼我們將所有應用在去年七八月份全部免費。

Touch China的盈利方式會越來越清晰。第一是旅遊產品的購買，比如景區門票、好的一日遊交通推薦，我可以通過幫助用戶來產生這個購買。

第二是在目的地的娛樂和各種消費，包括推薦吃喝玩樂信息。關於這塊我們現在都正在接洽合作。

總之，我們不會自己去做落地。我會考慮尋找有此類資源的旅遊單位和我合作做。我帶流量，他提供資源，我們彼此分成。我的角色就像淘寶一樣充當一個平台。

我認為，最有效率的方式是產業鏈上的所有單位都專注把自己擅長的領域做好，互相之間銜接好服務，聯合起來為遊客提供一條龍的服務，形成生態鏈，才能發揮出「1+1>2」的效果。

現在，確實出現了很多模仿Touch China的軟件，但我認為重要的是你的態度，你到底是從短時間賺錢來出發，還是真正從旅遊者角度出發。

我們現在有天使投資，現在我們在做A輪融資。我也陸續見過很多投資人，他們很認可我們的產品能力，也尤其欣賞我們的執行能力。

要知道，去年城市導覽還只是個故事。當時我在做故宮、做頤和園，我就告訴投資人將來要做一個城市的平台，滿足用戶吃住行遊娛購方方面面的東西，這些我們現在已經實現了。

現在又有了新的故事。我們的行程計劃會把整個旅遊的過程變得更加豐滿，會更深入地觀察客戶在旅行中的需求。我們會進一步豐滿產品線，讓用戶能更長時間地使用Touch China系列產品。

重估中國制造業: 不再是簡單的Made In China

來源: http://www.gelonghui.com/portal.php?mod=view&aid=2283

China Mobile & TenCent.....It's complicated,but

I looked at the market on Thursday, what surprised me the most was both China Mobile (941) and TenCent (700) were moved reciprocal against the market trend. Friday morning, many friends were checking around, what was going on to China Mobile?

In a glance of recent news, I had replied and stated it could be a good set of SPD result, which announced a 3 for 10 bonus issue and dividend of RMB1.50 per share, but why TenCent had been moving parallels against China Mobile two days in a row?

Checking is part of the job, verifying is part of the learning curve or experiences accumulation. Why I bother to put my trading trail/idea into writing? A lot of friends asked about it, simply because good habit is the only way to cultivate the trading discipline and the greatest asset is the discipline to stay discipline.

It’s a record for self revision and hoping to improve it from time to time. Best is someone could point out where I had gone wrong or dipped into any errors.

Every season has a reason
Kindly see the news below; In fact, it has been constantly flowing around the market if you have been the China Mobile audient.

03/02/2010 16:09
併購消息刺激騰訊股價急升６％，中移動澄清無意收購或入股

《經濟通通訊社３日專訊》中移動（００９４１）發言人向外電表示，無意全部或部分收購騰訊控股（００７００）。

有報章報道，中移動董事長王建宙表明，不能排除與騰訊之間有股本合作之可能。受併購消息刺激，騰訊今日一度高見１５１﹒６元，收報１５０﹒４元，顯著上升５﹒９９％。

上月初有內地傳媒報道，王建宙到訪騰訊位於深圳的總部，商討可能收購一事。中移動發言人則在上月初強調，去年１２月底，王建宙是在正常交流拜訪的過程中會見騰訊管理層。（ｅｈ）


04/01/2010 09:45
中移動（００９４１）澄清沒有計劃收購騰訊（００７００）

《經濟通通訊社４日專訊》有內地傳媒報道，中移動（００９４１）董事長兼首席執行官王建宙於上周四（３１日）率領中國移動代表團抵達騰訊（００７００）的深圳總部，就收購騰訊作進一步磋商。不過，中移動發言人作出澄清，指有關消息毫無根據，中移動沒有收購騰訊的意向。
據了解，王建宙曾到訪過深圳多家企業，不只有騰訊一家。

據有關報道，中移動一直有收購騰訊的想法，但因中移動體制問題及騰訊不滿收購條件而未能成事。但隨着中移動即時短訊服務「飛信」需強制對外開放，進軍互聯網亦不順利，使中移動考慮收購有皇牌ＱＱ在手的騰訊。（ｊｗ）


So, pretty obvious that the M&A angel is cooking behind the sense. Even though, China Mobile had been denied it, but the takeover news had been flowing around for the last couple of months. I think it is just same like most other countries, denying doesn’t help because insiders had been waving the price.

“Insider trading is just like having an affair, hate and criticizes others when you are not having it, addicted to it when you are having it. I’m here by not having any insider trading in Chine Mobile or TenCent, but to observe the insider trading.”

Why TenCent?
Briefly, I’m so sorry to say; my understanding toward the TenCent business model is equally like the layman. Thus, please DIY, knowing further about the TenCent business.

On the other hand, I had checked with the industry analysts, concluded the merger in between both companies business is like “如虎添翼”, direct translation is like putting a pair of wings onto a tiger. Or perfect synergy to be precise.
NOTE: Those are young analyst views.

However, saliva is flowing out non-stopping when you look into the TenCent number carefully.

The average net profit margin for its business model is approximately 38%, which attached with an average growth rate of about 58% for the last five years since listed in year 2004.

Very tame total borrowing of merely above RM470 million with backed by net cash position of RMB11.5 billion as of FY-end 2009.

Market capitalization is standing at HK$295,123,290,691.20 as of last Friday at the closing price of HK$161.40. Trading at high P/E of about 49.5x with the support of its high PEG.

Therefore, I’m interested to become TeCent shareholder if the price is reasonable.

How about any clue from China Mobile?
The most recent interview of China Mobile CEO during the recent press conference just after the SPD 20% stake acquisition. As below statement is indicating the future direction of its acquisition; 20 March 2010


“對於未來的並購，我可以明確表態，中國移動不會投資地產、能源等非電信主業的產業。我們的收購一直集中於電信業務，未來也會繼續探索並購目標，能夠通過並購充分發揮公司主業的協同效應，並提高公司EPS。對於並購，我們一直很謹慎，目前暫時還沒有新的目標。”

“If you talk to a man in a language he understands, that goes to his head. If you speak to him in his language, that goes into is heart.” – Nelson Mandela.

Pal, sorry about maintaining the original statement in Mandarin. I’m totally agreed with Nelson Mandela in the above mentioned quote. Please use Google translate, if you need to understand the original juice.

Thus, looking at both share prices performance since last Thursday till today’s before lunch; China Mobile and TenCent rested at HK$80 +$0.70 and HK$163.60 +HK$2.20 respectively. I think the insiders are accumulating.

How the takeover mechanism works?
Putting down the market capitalization as of current price;
(a) TenCent at HK$163.6 is HK$299,146,036,908.80
(b) China Mobile at HK$80.00 is HK$1,604,915,124,880.00
Comparatively, China Mobile is about 18 times bigger than TenCent in term of market capitalization.

Therefore, share issuing could be an idea mechanism to take over TenCent.

Also Very much depends on;
(a) What is the valuation post merger?
(can work out a post merger model)
(b) How much China Mobile is willing to pay?
(c) Whether the Chinese government is involved in the merger?

If the government is involved, the deal is pretty easy to go through.

My strategy is
China Mobile, buy on weakness, regardless whatsoever rumours are flowing around. The bottom line is this company has plenty of cash even post 20% stake SPD acquisition. Most importantly, China Mobile is in the acquire mode, which had been expressed by its’ CEO in many occasions.

It's just an idea from the share prices reflective, which came across my head for your perusal. Please tell me if I'm wrong.
thanks & regards

China Mobile again !!

杀死人的微笑！
The above Mandarin sentence is meaning; “killing smiles”.
This is the world for all the China Mobile’s fan/shareholder currently.

Many were trying to reach me and find out what is going on to the crazy share price, which is moving against the market trend since after 10.30am this morning.

I’m sorry to say; I don’t know much or to be precise, what is the impetus for its price acceleration. However, in a glance of what is going on surrounding China Mobile if you recalled recently;
(1) Listing on SSE.
(2) Acquisition of 20% stake in SPD Bank.

I had just gone through the newly announced SPD Bank FY result, not to elaborate further here because I’m in the rush to meet-up someone, looking for my dealing-platform in KL.

SPB had delivered a not too bad set of FY 2009 result, which attached with a bonus issue of 3 for 10 to its shareholder, and a RMB1.5 dividend.
I think this is the reason that excited the China Mobile share price.
Let’s go in details and digging into SPB later when I’m free.

RMB....China Mobile

I’m not an economist, but who love “rojak”, putting all facts and available information on the table; to find out what’s what, if I get it right, rewards are to be attached by the market and vice-versa.

Recent two years, most of the main stream media have been reporting constantly about appreciation of China’s Yuan or RMB. However, emerged various vary opinions about its VALUE. Wondering how and based on what those VALUE are rated. The world seems trying to shake the rock; billion of hot money has been flushing in China, hoping for the RMB piggy back. How about those companies with significant amount of RMB such as China Mobile?

The below news;
March 9 (Bloomberg) -- China’s yuan is facing increasing pressure to appreciate because of a widening interest-rate differential, the country’s top currency regulator said in a statement. The spread between China’s one-year deposit rate and its U.S. equivalent reached 1.43 percentage points today.

March 11 (Bloomberg) -- China’s inflation reached a 16- month high, Consumer prices rose 2.7 percent from a year earlier, the National Bureau of Statistics said in Beijing today.

Based on the news, certainly the RMB is on the appreciation journey. The world is fully aware about the contingent impacts and just like any of us, trying to seek for capital outlet to overcome the inflationary eroding.
Thus, at this moment, letting the bank to generate profit from your saving is not a savvy act.

Come back to China Mobile, according to its Interim 2009 result, reported a net cash position of about RMB246 billion.
If I’m sitting on such a cash pile, I don’t mind paying some fees to get some advices from the investment banker or fund manager; a better idea than putting my cash in the bank?
China Mobile Took the 20% stake in Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (SPD) at per share of RMB18.03 or RMB39,801,430,722.30 seems created some blast-comments. Virtually, all negative calls for China Mobile.
As a contrarian, I looked at the interim 2009 numbers again. Workout the number, after the 20% stake in SPD settled. China Mobile is still sitting on cash about RMB206 billion.
Comparatively, the SPB 20% stake is too small to shake China Mobile.
Don’t forget, the number is from Interim 2009, how about the China Mobile net profit from 30 June 2009 till now? I think the profit from these nine months “vacuum period”, would be able to add some aids to its cash position and untouched the dividend payout ratio.

The devil is in the details – Asking myself what’s the best estimation full year 2009profit forecast, I don’t know due to the low capacity of my research facility. The only equipment for me to outride others is, working hard to gain familiarity that derives a “feeling” towards the trend briefly.

Again, a glance of the Interim 2009 numbers, China Mobile had delivered a merely above RMB55 billion profit, how much going to be for the second half of the year, a period of six months when we were going through some festive seasons, tendency to consume more of the communication services.

Assuming:
(1) The net profit is to be dropped 10% to about RMB50billion.
(2) CAPEX for 3G is budgeted RMB10billion.
(3) Balance cash of RMB40billion, it is enough to “off-set” the SPB 20% stake
purchase amount included the fees involved.

Note: I don’t think the net profit is going to deteriorate, the number of subscriber had reached 527,398,000 as of 31 January 2010.
Year 2020

The year of 2020, Malaysia is dreamed to be a developed nation. Meanwhile, Shanghai is emerged to be a world financial centre. What is the valuation for a Shanghai home-grown bank when Shanghai becomes the world financial centre?
Or what is the valuation of SPB ten years later?

Lastly, as I always emphasized;

“The greatest risk in life is, not aware of what I don’t know.”

I don’t agree to those institutional on the theory of; no synergy for China Mobile to take the 20% stake in SPB.

I would rather recognize as harmless for China Mobile to have the 20% SPB.
“In the long run, investing in the bank share is better than letting the bank profit from your saving.”

Conclusion is;
the RMB VALUE is expecting to appreciate whereby the inflationary pressure is growing from strength to strength.

Investing in the China Banking business that able to generate some RMB dominated incomes should be priced at a premium multiple earnings ratio than keeping the cash, which would be eroded by inflationary in the long run.

China Mobile valuation shouldn’t be oppressed by the SPB 20% stake purchase.
Rewarding or gruelling by the market, shall see in a week. China Mobile result is expecting to be announced next week.

【軌交】萬億海外市場，怎能放棄？不僅是高鐵出口，美國地鐵也要made in China

來源: http://www.ikuyu.cn/indexinfo?type=1&id=11823&summary=

How China Small-Caps Can Come Clean

1 : GS(14)@2011-01-23 15:04:56

http://www.thestreet.com/story/10952955/1/how-china-small-caps-can-come-clean.html?cm_ven=RSSFeed

Rick Pearson is a Beijing-based private investor focusing on U.S.-listed China small-cap stocks. He is a contributing writer to TheStreet whose views on these stocks are independent of TheStreet's news coverage.

BEIJING (TheStreet) -- On Nov. 19, a certain company listed in the U.S. issued the following press release: (the "Company") today announced that it will restate its previously issued financial statements for fiscal years 2007, 2008 and 2009 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2010 (including the quarterly data for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 and its selected financial data for the relevant periods), due to errors identified in these financial statements. This decision was made by the Company's board of directors, upon the recommendation of the audit committee and in consultation with management. As a result of this decision, investors should no longer rely upon the Company's previously released financial statements for these periods and any earnings releases or other communications relating to these periods. If this were a Chinese small-cap, the consequences would be predictable: widespread allegations of fraud, the stock would plummet 30%-50% and the usual five to 10 lawsuits would roll in within one week. But it wasn't a China small-cap. It was Green Mountain Coffee(GMCR_), and instead of falling, the stock price rose 11% on the day because the restatement was somehow perceived to be not all that bad. So almost four full years of finanicals can no longer be relied upon, and it's "not all that bad!?"

2010 was a rough year for Chinese small-caps, with a number of earnings restatements, allegations of fraud and confirmed outright fraud cases. Companies who have been (rightly or wrongly) impacted include Fuqi International(FUQI_), Rino International(RINO_) Northeast Petroleum(NEP_), China Sky One Medical(CSKI_), China Biotics(CHBT_), China Marine Food Group(CMFO_), China Education Alliance(CEU_) and Orient Paper(ONP_).
I provide additional detail below, but the key conclusion is simple. Obviously, there does exist fraud in some portions of U.S.- listed China stocks. However, the real problem for the larger space as a whole is that these companies are immature in the U.S. capital markets and leave themselves very vulnerable to speculation of fraud even when none exists. As a result, valuations for the entire space have been depressed.
In my opinion, this immaturity in the capital markets can be witnessed in numerous areas including: lack of emphasis on submitting correct domestic State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) filings, use of unknown auditors, inaccurate and outdated websites, unprofessional reliance on free email services (such as Yahoo! or Gmail), as well as a lack of responsiveness to investors. None of these things are an absolute indication of fraud, but they do weaken general investor confidence and leave companies vulnerable to speculation by short-sellers. The good news is that many companies (the smart ones) are starting to realize these weaknesses and are beginning to change accordingly.
I address each of these points below.
Lack of emphasis on submitting correct domestic filings
By now, anyone who is familiar with the recent spate of short attacks is well aware that the first line of attack by shorts is to cite the fact that a company's SAIC filings do not match its SEC filings. At first, many investors fell for this ruse blindly and viewed it as concrete evidence of fraud causing massive selloffs in a number of small-cap names.

The issue is actually more complicated than that. Much has been recently written about the significance of discrepancies between SAIC and SEC filings. My experience in dealing with many China small-caps leads me to several conclusions.


1. Minor discrepancies in SAIC filings are no cause for concern due to differences in accounting treatment as well as differences in revenue and income recognition for subsidiaries and international sales.
2. Large discrepancies can be (but are not guaranteed to be) a cause for concern. I have spoken with many Chinese CFOs, and many of them have never even paid attention to their SAIC filings. The filings are a perfunctory administrative filing that is often delegated to junior non-financial staff or even outsourced to third-party filing agents. In addition, these statements are not audited by U.S. or Chinese auditors.
Therefore, in many cases they may have no relation to the legitimate profitability of the company. I do, however, view large discrepancies as a red flag and a cause for concern, partly because it reflects sloppiness on the part of management and partly because it opens up the company to short speculation or an outright short attack
3. The real filings that matter are the SAT (Tax) filings of the Chinese company. The Chinese government is focused on collecting tax revenue, and senior management does pay attention to these filings. As a result, if SAT filings do not match, it can be a cause for significant concern. Unfortunately, unlike SAIC filings, these documents are not public and in fact are almost unobtainable. It is possible to get them in some circumstances and can be a very clear indicator of the presence or absence of fraud.
4. The conclusion is a bit complicated, and many investors miss this important nuance. There are two types of corporate structure for Chinese small-caps, variable interest entities (VIEs) and foreign invested enterprises (FIEs). Getting into all of the details is beyond the scope of this particular article, but I hope to do so later. The relevant point to consider here is that for an FIE structured company, the SAIC and SAT financials are reconciled and audited in China and should definitely match. If they do not, then there exists a high probability of either SEC fraud in the U.S. or tax fraud in China. Neither of these things is good. But if the filings do all match up, then much concern can be alleviated.

The good news going forward is that companies are starting to see the havoc that SAIC filings can wreak upon their company. I am increasingly hearing that going forward, companies will make it a priority to file SAIC filings themselves with attention from senior management and that they will make sure that the filings do indeed reflect the profitability of the business which should therefore also match the SEC filings. What we will see going forward is that historical SAIC filings do not match, but 2010 and onward filings will be largely correct. Also, in my dialogue with Chinese companies, I am strongly suggesting that they make an effort to make their own SAIC and SAT filings public (disclosed on their Web sites). Whether or not this actually happens remains to be seen.

Use of unknown auditors
Many Chinese small-caps began their public existence as tiny micro-cap reverse mergers. They therefore engaged small unknown accounting firms who were cheap and willing to do the work. As the firms grow, it is obviously appropriate to switch to a top 10 auditor, or perhaps even a big four auditor. Large companies who use no-name (or even shady) auditors are a major red flag for me and there have been many times where I avoided a company that had great financials simply due to its choice of auditor.
Again, the good news for 2011 is that this is already starting to change and in this area, Chinese small-caps clearly "get it."
Based on recent discussions with China small-cap companies, I expect to see a wave of auditor upgrades during early 2011; hopefully some will be in time to process 2010 10Ks due out in March or early April. This will greatly enhance investor confidence in the space, and I believe it will help separate the good companies from the bad. Companies who are unwilling to upgrade to a reputable auditor will see their share prices suffer.
Recent examples of auditor upgrades that have recently occurred include:
It should be noted that there are more than 500 Chinese companies that trade in the U.S., and it is simply not feasible for all of them to be using big four auditors. For most of the smaller companies, I am perfectly happy with the selection of a top 10 auditor, including auditors such as BDO or Grant Thornton which have a strong and reputable China practice.

Inaccurate and outdated Web sites

It is important to remember that with many of these companies, senior management is not fluent in English and therefore does not focus on their English language website. This is often delegated to an outside firm to design on a one-time basis, and Web sites are not updated. Clearly, this is unacceptable. I have invested in companies that I felt were very solid, and in my discussions with management, I emphasized that their Web sites (which are often downright pathetic) can be a deterrent to other investors and can therefore impact the stock price.
In my experience, many Chinese companies still don't get it, and I still see many terrible Web sites even at companies that are performing very well financially. Typically, companies that use a solid IR firm will have a better-looking Web site, but that is still no guarantee that it will be updated on a regular basis. I am hopeful that this will start to change, and in some instances, I see progress, but in 2011, I still expect to see many pathetic Web sites for Chinese companies.
Also, stating the obvious, even while a great company may have a terrible Web site, a fraudulent company may have a fantastic Web site. The point is that a bad Web site is unacceptable for a company that wants to be shareholder-friendly and, despite being a triviality, it can have an impact on investor demand for the shares, thus affecting the share price.
Unprofessional reliance on free email services
When an investor tries to email the CFO of a NYSE, Nasdaq or Amex-listed company (with a market cap of perhaps several hundred million dollars) and the CFO can only be reached at wang1634@ yahoo.com, it certainly does not inspire confidence. In fact, it immediately conjures up the image of a fraudulent company operating out of someone's basement. With one company, I was so adamant about it changing to professional emails that I even bought a domain name for the company and signed it up for email. The company's excuse was that it had been using the existing Yahoo! email so long that it was reluctant to change. Ultimately, it did acquire a real domain name and now they use professional emails. It took more than a year.
Again, this is very common in China at companies big and small, public and private. It does not raise any eyebrows with investors in China at all, but for companies listed in the U.S., it is not acceptable simply due to the negative image it creates among investors. That said, even a fraudulent company (or perhaps especially a fraudulent company) can have a very professional-looking email address and not be legitimate. My point is that this is just a cosmetic issue that companies need to pay attention to.

Lack of responsiveness to investors


There is a wide gap between Chinese small-caps in terms of their responsiveness to investors. Yesterday, I sent an email to a Chinese small-cap company's internal IR person; he called me within an hour and he was very well informed. In other cases, companies are slow to respond, if they respond at all. Some of this can again be blamed on the language gap, but for larger companies, they either need to be able to respond to investors on a timely basis or cough up some money and hire an external IR firm. The ones who figure this out will trade much better than the ones who don't and as a rule I make it a point to not invest in companies who are not responsive.
The conclusion I reach from all of this is that, while there are frauds in Chinese small caps, the very widespread lack of confidence and depressed valuations for the space as a whole are a crisis of their own making. Some companies will figure this out and make the right changes and will see a benefit to their share price, others will not and will continue to languish.
My goal in 2011 will be to distinguish between the companies that can make these changes on a rapid basis and restore investor confidence. Obviously, the most important changes will be the switch to focusing on filing correct SAIC documents (and hopefully disclosing them) as well as the upgrading of auditors. I am hopeful that we will see significant progress in this area in the first quarter of 2011 and I will be sure to highlight companies that are making the right moves.
Disclosure: The author is long ONP.
The author can be reached at [url=mailto:[email protected]]comments @ pearsoninvestment.com. [/url]

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2 : GS(14)@2011-01-23 15:05:31

中国在美上市“问题”公司如何自我救赎？
imeigu.com　2010-12-23 22:46:37　来源：i美股　原文链接　作者：　共 7 条跟贴
一位专注于中国概念股研究的美国投资者Pic Pearson 近日在TheStreet撰文表示：在中国在美上市的有些小公司确实存在欺诈行为，而投资者对整个中国概念股的信心不足和估值偏低，其实是这些公司一手造成的。如果这些公司能知错就改，立即采取有效地措施，他们的股价也会随之上涨。而那些执迷不悟的公司只能被投资者遗弃。

(i美股讯）今年11月19日，一家在美国上市的公司公布了一则消息：

“根据公司审计委员会的建议以及在跟管理层商议后，公司董事会做出以下决定：本公司将重新公布2007财年，2008财年、 2009财年及2010财年前三个季度的财务报表，原因是在这些财报中发现了错误。在公布这一决定后，投资者将不要再依赖公司之前所公布的错误财报信息。”

如果这是一家市值比较小的中国公司，我们很容易预测到可能出现的结果：纷至而来的欺诈控告将会使该公司的股价大跌30%-50%，在未来一周之内，该公司将会面临5至10起诉讼。但这家公司不是中国公司，她是绿山咖啡公司（美国一家知名特种咖啡生产商）。奇怪的是，该公司的股价没跌反而一日大涨10%，因为投资者认为他们校对后的财报看起来还不错。

2010年，对在美上市的中国小公司来说是一个“多事之年”：频繁的修改财报数据和收到欺诈指控（甚至被确认为明目张胆的欺诈）。其中涉及到的公司（无论结果是好还是坏）包括福麒国际（FUQI，5.56，-1.24%），绿诺科技（RINO，2.72，-11.11%）、东北石油（NEP，5.90，-3.44%），天一药业（CSKI，6.38，-3.33%），中国生物（CHBT，15.38，+2.33%），海洋食品、中国教育集团和东方纸业（ONP，5.53，-1.95%）。

至于原因我将会在下文作详细说明，但得出的结论很简单——很明显，确实有一些在美上市的中国公司存在着欺诈行为；由于这些公司在美国资本市场上显得比较稚嫩，使得他们很容易成为人们质疑的对象（即使他们根本就没做过任何欺诈行为）。因此，投资者这种以偏概全的思维也使得在美上市的中国概念股普遍被低估。

在我看来，这些中国公司在美国资本市场上表现出的不成熟体现在以下方面：

1）不重视提交给中国工商管理总局（下文统称为“SAIC”）的文件；

2）使用不知名的财务审计机构；

3）公司网站信息不准确或者已经过时；

4）不专业地使用的电子邮件服务（如yahoo和Gmail）；

5）对投资者不负责

尽管这些都不能被绝对指控为欺诈，但他们确实消弱了投资者对公司的信心，并且使公司容易被卖空者“盯”上。

不重视提交给中国工商管理总局的文件

最近卖空者“围攻”了几家被指控存在欺诈行为的公司，任何熟悉这几起案例的人都知道，卖空者发起的第一波攻击就是举证这些公司向中国SAIC提交的文件跟美国SEC文件不匹配。起初，许多投资者盲目地相信了卖空者的这种“伎俩”，认为这就是证明这些公司实施欺诈的证据，并随后大量抛售这些公司的股票。但这一问题事实上绝非像我们所看到的那么简单，有关SAIC文件和SEC文件之间存在差异的报道很多，但根据我的经验，我做了以下结论：

1）由于中美会计计算方面的不同和子公司和国际业务在营收、利润方面会计计算方面不同所导致SAIC文件上财务信息的细微差异不应该成为我们“担心”这些公司的理由。

2）如果上述差异过大，我们的担心就是有必要的。我曾跟许多中国公司的CFO打过交道，他们表示，他们从未对SAIC文件太过在意，因为在他们看来这些文件只是一个繁衍了事的行政文件，经常会会被分配到非财务职员手中，甚至外包到第三方代理机构。除此之外，这些文件都未受美国或者中国审计机构的审查。

在我看来，如果这些文件中的财务信息偏差很大，投资者就会给予这类公司红色警告，自然他们也就会成为被“关注”的对象。部分原因是这种偏差会反映出公司管理层的草率，而另一方面这个公司将会因此成为猎头（短期投机者或者直接做空者）“攻击”的对象，

真正至关紧要的文件是这些公司提交给中国国家税务局（下文统称为“SAT”）的文件。中国政府比较关心财政税收，因此这些公司的高官也就比较重视这类文件。如果SAT文件和SEC文件不匹配，一般会引起市场的极大“关注”。不幸的是，不像SAIC文件，SAT文件不对外公布，实际上想要得到这些文件是很困难的，不过在有些情况下，还是有机会看到这些文件，这类文件将会是判断公司是否存在欺诈行为的一个明确指标。

结论有点复杂，许多投资者都忽视了这一重要的细微差别。中国这类小型公司的组织形式分为两种，即外商投资企业和可变利益实体（是指没有持投票权的股本投资者或未能向这些实体提供足够的财务资源的公司）。需要指出的是，属于外商投资企业结构的公司向SAIC和SAT所提交的财务信息是要在中国进行核对和审查的，并且彼此之间要求绝对相匹配。如果他们存在偏差，极有可能会在美国遭到欺诈指控，或者在中国遭到骗税指控。这两个结果对公司来说都不是什么好事。而如果他们相匹配，外界对这类公司的质疑可能大大减少。

另一个好消息是，现在有许多公司的管理层已经开始认真地做起他们的SAIC文件，从而确保这些文件可以真实的反映出公司的财务盈利能力，当然也必须跟 SEC文件相匹配。我在跟这些公司管理层交谈时，我也强烈建议他们作自己的SAIC和SAT公开文件（在其网站上披露）。不过这种建议到底是否可行还有待观察。

聘用不知名的审计机构

许多中国小型公司都是通过反向收购的方式在美成功上市。因此，他们会雇用一些不知名的、便宜的、规模较小并且愿意为他们工作的会计公司。随着这些公司的不断成长，他们会重新聘用知名的会计事务所，其中就包括我们通常所提及的“四大” ，而那些仍然在聘用不知名的会计事务所的公司现在已经曝露出危险的信号。

不过可喜的是， 这些公司已经清楚地认识这一问题的严重性，他们现在已经开始做出一些变化。 我希望在2011年初，我们能看到一波更换公司财务审计机构的浪潮，并希望在明年3月份或者4月初，这些公司能在2010-10Ks中公布这些信息。届时必将大大提高投资者对整个中国概念股的信心，并将“好”“坏”公司区分开来。那些不愿更换审计机构的公司到时只能坐等股价大跌了。

在最近一段时间内，有几家公司已经付之行动更换了他们财务审计机构，如西安宝润（CBEH，6.47，+0.15%）聘用毕马威会计事务所，万得汽车（WATG，7.56，-1.05%）、UT斯达康（UTSI，2.32，+0.43%）、中汽系统（CAAS，13.87，-2.12%）三家公司聘用普华永道。

需要指出的是，在美国交易的中国公司超过500家，不要指望所有公司都能聘用四大会计事务所来充当他们的审计机构。对于那些小型中国公司来说，我想“top 10”会计事务所是一个不错的选择，如德豪会计师事务所、何均富会计师事务所等，他们在中国都有着不错的口碑。

公司网站信息不准确或者已过时

我们必须牢记，许多这类公司的管理层英语都不咋地，因此他们一般不会太在意公司英文版网站。通常他们会将设计公司网站的工作外包给其他代理公司来做，而且都是一次性的工作，网站信息一般很难更新。这是让人无法接受的，事实上我也投资了这类公司。在和这些公司管理层交谈时，我也强调，他们糟糕的网站让他们错失了许多投资者，这样会对他们的股价不利。

根据我的经验，很多中国公司仍然没有认识到这一点。我也看到，一些财务数据很好的公司，他们的网站却看起来很糟糕。通常情况下，公司会聘用一个固定的公关公司来“美化”公司的网站，但由于都是一次性的工作，无法保证网站信息的更新。我希望在2011年，这种情况能有所改变。

当然，一些知名公司的网站是看起来也是很糟糕的，同样，也有一些“有问题”的公司的网站看起来却很“赏心悦目”。但有一点需要指出的，如果公司想要讨好股东，糟糕的网站是无法被接受的。糟糕的网站会影响投资者对公司股票的需求，进而影响公司的股价。

不专业的使用免费的电子邮件服务

如果投资者想要向给在纽交所、纳斯达克或者美交所上市的中国公司CFO发送电子邮件时，只能发到如[email protected]这类地址，这势必会消弱投资者对公司的信心。通常，人们提及“欺诈”首先想到的是就是公司在地下室经营的场景。我是极力主张公司向专业邮件依赖的转变，我甚至恨不得给这些公司买一个域名，通过它来向公司发送电子邮件。但这些公司给出的理由是：他们的管理层已经使用yahoo邮件很长时间了，因此他们不愿做出变化。

这种现象在中国各类大中型企业中很常见，中国的投资者对这种事也习惯了。但对于在美上市的公司，这是投资者无法接受的，因为它会损害公司在投资者的形象。我的观点是这是一个面子工程，公司应该注意一下。

中国中小企业对投资者的反应差别很大。昨天，我给一家中小企业的投资者关系负责人发了电子邮件，他在一个小时内就给我打电话，而且很多东西都讲得很清楚。但也有些公司反应就很慢。有些可能是因为语言的缘故。但是对绝大多数公司来说，他们应该对投资者询问做出快速回复，或者可以花点钱雇佣专门的公关公司来处理。

我得出的结论是，中国在美上市的有些小公司确实存在欺诈行为，而投资者对整个中国概念股的信心不足和估值偏低其实是这些公司一手造成的。如果这些公司能“知错就改”并立即采取有效措施，他们的股价也会随之上涨。而那些“执迷不悟”的公司最终只能被投资者所“遗弃”。

本文作者为Pic Pearson 是一位专注于在美上市中国公司股票研究的投资者，目前持有东方纸业的多单。

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