http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/01/blog-post.html
A+級企業的衰敗原因﹐分成5個階段﹕
巨企不一定會衰敗﹐及早了解征兆仍然有機會扭轉乾坤。
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聰明的投資人﹐更應該百分百戒備以上的征兆。猶如在任何的場所﹐永遠應該盯著逃生門。
http://feigan.blogspot.com/2011/11/2011.html
太太﹑女兒﹕
2011年結束了﹐光陰似箭啊﹗一眨眼又一年。
寸金難買寸光陰﹐所以我們應該珍惜光陰﹐努力充實學問﹐發掘能力﹐努力磨煉﹐回顧改善﹐堅定實行﹐才能不負人生。
我本身的投資經歷不長﹐從2009年才開始認真的思考對我有利的投資方法。至今﹐我認為Graham教導的證券分析﹐是我最能夠接受的投資方法﹐是所有一切的基礎。我非常幸運﹐能夠發覺自己投資信念的基石。
2011年﹐香港組合的帳面值-11%(減少)
我並非聰明人﹐況且我的知識水平也不高﹐我很感恩能得到如此的成績﹐我非常幸運。
超大﹐我認錯﹕
這是很好的價值陷阱例子﹐除了現金流﹐它的財務數字都顯示足夠的安全邊際。它生產的農產品-蔬菜﹐絕對是民生必用品。由於快速發展﹐現金淨流出﹐是可以想像的。
但是﹐它還沒有大發利市之前﹐無常已到﹐被勒令停牌。
我認為﹐如果某家企業﹐長年現金流不足﹐時常供股﹑配股﹑發各形式的債券﹐我應該避開。雖然它看來負債低﹐我也應該避開。雖然它曾經股價很高(2005-2008年)﹐我應該避開。雖然它的盈利紀錄和資產看來是good bond stock﹐我應該避開。
還有﹐在網絡世界﹐如果它的活動資訊貧乏﹐市場上非常少見到它的產品﹐我應該避開。
當然會有人在2007年因為它而發了財﹐這不代表幸運會降臨在我身上。
****
我在8-9月的時候﹐減少股票組合﹐提高定息組合。老實說這並非是有計劃的行為﹐而是被驚嚇的撤退。總而言之﹐是我的心態不堅強。我認為﹐主要的問題出在「怕」﹐
我認為策略有了弱點﹐所以恐懼叢生。
我認為﹐
唯有克服以上問題﹐投資策略才能持續實行﹐才不會朝令暮改。搖擺不定的立場﹐是沒有好下場的。
我 認為Graham's 股票+債券的方法對穩定+某個數量的股息有莫大的幫助。雖然我們的財力小﹐無法購入債券。但是﹐我認為REIT是很好的代替品。2010年﹐我擁有莫大的 幸運﹐能夠以REIT作為嘗試﹐並且得到滿意的成績。所以建立了信心﹐並且在今年增加分配比率﹐實行穩定+某個數量的股息。我太幸運了﹐能夠克服這問題。
我怕損失﹐怕退休養老用的資本毀滅﹐所以患得患失﹐沽賣止蝕。長久下去﹐恐怕虧損居多。我買入股票﹐付出的代價雖然不高﹐甚至肯定是便宜貨。很顯然的﹐在大幅度的跌市﹐我仍然生恐懼心。痛定思痛﹐我認為以便宜的價格買入股票﹐仍然不足於建立有益的信心。我認為﹐信心源自﹕
第一點說明這家企業的價值需要逐 漸增加﹐這是因為盈利逐漸增加。絕對不是盈利長遠看來會衰退﹐所以市值快速的縮小﹐造成價值暫時高於市值。我應該避免價值暫時高於市值﹐過後因為盈利長遠 衰退﹐價值和市值一起下跌的企業。反而﹐市值暫時少許高於價值的企業﹐如果經營妥當而盈利年年增加﹐價值和市值是能年年增加。
第二點說明它本來就是出色的企業﹐市場很快就知道它很值錢﹐甚至對它付出更高的價格。
不只注重quantity approach﹐也要注重quality approach﹐
excellent business and outstanding manager
投 資在擁有以上兩點特色的企業﹐自然信心滿滿﹐克服怕損失的心理。所以我專著在能力以內﹐以便宜的價格買入優秀公司的股票﹐而且是行業中10強以內的公司。 我稱它們為對的企業﹕業績持續優秀﹐市場強大﹐並且由一批能力非凡﹑能夠為股東利益著想的管理層經營的大公司。只要優秀公司的價值在不斷增長﹐就會使其股 價不斷上漲。
總結起來﹐自從今年八月開始﹐我的策略是﹕
雖然我的投資策略似乎改變巨大﹐其實不然。我仍然堅守先瞭解價值和價格的分別﹐只是更嚴格的選擇對象。後宮佳麗雖然壯觀﹐大多數是有難各自飛﹐不如賢妻可靠能依賴。
我會持續發展穩定+某個數量的股息。我把這些股息當成保險業的「float」﹐只要數目已經足夠﹐我們就能佔據不可勝的位置﹐等待敵人出現可勝的訊號。
****
滙 豐和渣打是有名的國際銀行﹐一隻牛的國家雖然貧窮﹐但是在各大城市可以看到滙豐和渣打的蹤影﹐甚至在偏遠的部落城市﹐偶而也能看到它們。要知道大多數各 國的本土銀行都是擁有政府作背景的優勢﹐而且瞭解風土人情﹐這些國際銀行要飛象過河撈過界﹐能長久立足的﹐必定具備了無法替代的優點。。雖然滙豐和渣打互 相競爭﹐不過兩者之市場略有不同﹐何況太 多大行陷入困境造成發展空間大量增加﹐摩擦難免﹐我看仍然利多於弊。我認為﹕
銀行收集了公眾人士的存款,轉借給企業家開工廠,存款人取得存款利息,是贏家;銀行賺取存款和放貸之利息差額,是二贏家;企業家取得所需的資金,開設工廠,生產產品,從中賺取利潤,是三贏家,有此「三贏」,銀行業乃能持久經營。
*****
自從2004年起,陳啟宗在2004年已經勾勒出恆隆地產在末來的策略:
恆 隆另一個引人稱道是它對存貨能善價而沽﹐例如它在香港的樓盤﹐往往在市場最旺的時候﹐以好價錢出售。恆隆堪稱是地產界的價值投資者。恆隆的主席報告在眾多 企業中﹐是最用心寫的一個﹐我認為是陳啟宗親手寫﹐不是槍手代筆。上述五點是否似曾相識?我真懷疑他是香港的巴菲特﹐專著在地產界的價值投資者高手。恆隆 所作所為﹕
10 年前﹐恆隆在上海建立了兩座佔據地利的商場﹐至今獲利豐厚﹐並且累計難得的經練。2004年開始把這樣的模式複製到其他的大城市﹐在4個城市建立5個商場 ﹐而且在行情差的時候以豆腐價格買進城市中的黃金地皮。其中兩座已經開始營業﹐未來3年﹐每一年都會有一座落成並且營業。
以普通價錢買入對的企業﹐只要盈利保證增加﹐仍然能夠得到不可勝之善。
****
領 匯的管理人替換後﹐一切都能維持﹐幸運之極。可見市場已經瞭解公屋商場 ﹐是全港獨一無二的,任何一個發展商、REIT都沒有類似的物業。在這個資產類別中,領匯是沒有對手。是一盤罕見的壟斷生意﹐壟斷香港幾百萬中下階層的日 常消費。草根階層的消費能力雖然小﹐加起來就是巨大的購買力。領匯的負債率有19%﹐監管條例規定REIT的負債率不可超過45%﹐所以領匯還有舉債的空 間﹐改善或購買產業皆可。今年領匯購買一座商場-將軍澳南豐廣場﹐租金回報為4.3%。這不是聰明的交易﹐因為租金回報與負債利息的差距不夠足大﹐令人遺 憾。
其他﹕
我很感恩﹐太太與女兒的支持和體諒﹐並且陪伴我度過每一天。你們的堅信﹐讓我擁有無比的信心。
我很感恩﹐各位blog友在這段時間給予的勸告和分享﹐豐富了我的知識﹐開闊了我的眼界。如果我有任何得罪之處﹐我道歉﹐請各位原諒。
祝﹕
身體健康
萬事如意
http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/01/vs.html
2000 Berkshire Chairman's Letter :
Our main business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand
Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
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萬法歸宗﹐以上巴老的原則﹐其實可以作為企業分析的原則﹐不局限於保險股。
(1) the amount of float that the business generates;
我們可以把它想像成企業的盈利
(2) its cost;
企業付出的成本(原料﹑員工﹑管理﹑資本等等)
(3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
以上兩個項目的未來變化(即係企業的前景)
證券分析﹐亦是如此
(1) the amount of float that the business generates;
盈利和股息 (公司表現佳﹐經營團隊杰出﹐它的股價遲早會反映其價值)
(2) its cost;
預留安全的價格空間﹐以合理價格買進好公司﹐比好價錢買進平庸公司好多了。決定要靠邏輯和理性。
(3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
把注意力放在可預期前景的公司上。長期一貫營業歷史﹑前景看好﹑基本上生產同樣產品給同樣市場的公司﹐就可以知道這些公司的未來如何。
安全空間﹑承諾﹑低價﹑良好的前景。
http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/01/framework-for-investment-success.html
不認識Seth Klarman﹖無所謂﹐只要知道他是價值法中的猛人之一就可以了﹐是絕版書“Margin of Safety”之作者﹐是Baupost Group之渣fit人。當然﹐他也是我的老師。
他認為投資勝利之道﹐在於﹕
先了解自己是股海中最卑微的參與者﹐其他人都是勤勞能幹而且是精英中的天才。要在這樣的圈子出人頭地﹐“你”的絕世武器是﹕
這個世界根本沒有十全十美的投資秘訣﹐證券的回報好像零和游戲﹐你的回報超越大市是因為你犯的錯誤比別人少。所以股市賺錢之路﹐在於做到賺多虧少,對多錯少,就可以達到累計財富的終極目標。所以要做到“有把握”﹐首先就要避免自犯錯誤。
這是能夠長期保留在股市的資金﹐是不怕被生活所逼而需要賣股。沒有參與高杠杆投機﹐就沒有被逼斬倉的可能。很多錯誤是自找的﹐並不是別人硬推給你﹐正所謂自做孽不可恕。
步行于濃密的森林中,船只航行於茫茫的大海上,飛機在黑夜中穿洲越洋,假如没有指南針或方向儀的引導,都會迷失方向,无法達到目的地。缺乏明确的投資哲理作为引導﹐在股市中搶進殺出,表面上是很努力,實際上是在兜圈子,最後是徒勞無功。這種投資方式,犯錯誤的機率很大。
廣泛的人脈關係﹐是為了方便了解各行業經營的特點和週期循環﹐再加上自修﹐才能建立重量級的知識。有深度的知識﹐才能協助我們分辨是非﹐減少犯錯誤的機率。
我相信價值投資法﹐所以我的投資策略雖然更新﹐但是仍然以價值作為根本。
先了解然後管理好自己﹐就已經站在不敗(不可勝)。
那麼接下來能做的是了解其他人﹐如果他們犯錯﹐我們是否能趁機而入。
所以決定勝負的是EQ﹐而不是IQ。
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By Seth Klarman :
Two elements are vital in designing an investment approach for long-term success. First, answer the question, ''what's your edge?" In highly competitive financial markets, with thousands of very smart, hardworking participants, what will enable you to reliably outperform the field? Your toolkit is critically important: truly long-term capital; a flexible approach that enables you to move opportunistically across a broad array of markets, securities, and asset classes; deep industry knowledge; strong sourcing relationships; and a solid grounding in value investing principles.
But because investing is, in many ways, a zero-sum activity in which your returns above the market indices are derived from the mistakes, overreactions or inattention of others as much as from your own clever insights, there is a second element in designing a sound investment approach: you must consider the competitive landscape and the behavior of other market participants. As in football, you are well-advised to take advantage of what your opponents give you: if they are defending the run, passing is probably your best option, even if you have a star running back. If scores of other investors are rigidly committed to fast-growing technology stocks, your brilliant tech analyst may not be able to help you outperform. If your competitors are not paying attention to, or indeed are dumping, Greek equities or U.S. housing debt, these asset classes may be worth your attention, regardless of the currently poor fundamentals that are driving others' decisions. Where to best apply your focus and skills depends partially on where others are applying theirs.
When observing your competitors, your focus should be on their approach and process, not their results. Short-term performance envy causes many of the shortcomings that lock most investors into a perpetual cycle of underachievement. You should watch your competitors not out of jealousy, but out of respect, and focus your efforts not on replicating others' portfolios, but on looking for opportunities where they are not.
Much of the investment business is centered around asset-gathering activities. In a field dominated by a short-term, relative performance orientation, significant underperformance is disastrous for retention of assets, while mediocre performance is not. Thus, because protracted periods of underperformance can threaten one's business, most investment firms aim for assured, trend-following mediocrity while shunning the potential achievement of strong outperformance. The only way for investors to significantly outperform is to periodically stand far apart from the crowd, something few are willing or able to do.
In addition, most traditional investors are limited by a variety of constraints: narrow skill-sets, legal restrictions contained in investment prospectuses or partnership agreements, or psychological inhibitions. High-grade bond funds can only purchase investment-grade bonds; when a bond falls below BBB, they are typically forced to sell (or think that they should), regardless of price. When a mortgage security is downgraded because it will not return par to its holders, a large swath of potential purchasers will not even consider buying it, and many must purge it. When a company omits a cash dividend, some equity funds are obliged to sell that stock. And, of course, when a stock is deleted from an index, it must immediately be dumped by many. Sometimes, a drop in a stock's price is reason enough for some holders to sell. Such behavior often creates supply-demand imbalances where bargains can be found. The dimly lit comers and crevasses existing outside of mainstream mandates may contain opportunity. Given that time is often an investor's scarcest resource, filling one’s in-box with the most compelling potential opportunities that others are forced to or choose to sell (or are constrained from buying) makes great sense.
Price is perhaps the single most important criterion in sound investment decision making. Every security or asset is a "buy" at one price, a “hold” at a higher price, and a "sell" at some still higher price. Yet most investors in all asset classes love simplicity, rosy outlooks, and the prospect of smooth sailing. They prefer what is performing well to what has recently lagged, often regardless of price. They prefer full buildings and trophy properties to fixer-uppers that need to be filled, even though empty or unloved buildings may be the far more compelling, and even safer, investments. Because investors are not usually penalized for adhering to conventional practices, doing so is the less professionally risky strategy, even though it virtually guarantees against superior performance.
Finally, most investors feel compelled to be fully invested at all times – principally because evaluation of their performance is both frequent and relative. For them, it is almost as if investing were merely a game and no client's hardearned money was at risk. To require full investment all the time is to remove an important tool from investors' toolkits: the ability to wait patiently for compelling opportunities that may arise in the future. Moreover, an investor who is too worried about missing out on the upside of a potential investment may be exposing himself to substantial downside risk precisely when valuation is extended. A thoughtful investment approach focuses at least as much on risk as on return. But in the moment-by-moment frenzy of the markets, all the pressure is on generating returns, risk be damned.
What drives long-term investment success? In the Internet era, everyone has a voluminous amount of information but not everyone knows how to use it. A well-considered investment process – thoughtful, intellectually honest, team oriented, and single-mindedly focused on making good investment decisions at every turn – can make all of the difference. Investors with short time horizons are oblivious to kernels of information that may influence investment outcomes years from now. Everyone can ask questions, but not everyone can identify the right questions to ask. Everyone searches for opportunity, but most look only where the searching is straightforward even if undeniably highly competitive.
In the markets of late 2008, everything was for sale as investors were caught in a contagion of selling due to panic, margin calls, and investor redemptions. Even while modeling very conservative scenarios, many securities could have been purchased at extremely attractive prices – if one had capital with which to buy them and the stamina to hold them in the face of falling prices. By late 2010, froth had returned to the markets, as investors with short-term relative performance orientations sought to keep up with the herd. Exuberant buying had replaced frenzied selling, as investors purchased securities offering limited returns even on far rosier economic assumptions.
Most investors take comfort from calm, steadily rising markets; roiling markets can drive investor panic. But these conventional reactions are inverted. When all feels calm and prices surge, the markets may feel safe; but, in fact, they are dangerous because few investors are focusing on risk. When one feels in the pit of one's stomach the fear that accompanies plunging market prices, risk-taking becomes considerably less risky, because risk is often priced into an asset's lower market valuation. Investment success requires standing apart from the frenzy – the short-term, relative performance game played by most investors.
Investment success also requires remembering that securities prices are not blips on a Bloomberg terminal but are fractional interests in – or claims on – companies. Business fundamentals, not price quotations, convey useful information. With so many market participants fixated on short-term investment performance, successful investing requires a focus not on how one is doing, but on corporate balance sheets and income and cash flow statements.
http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/01/blog-post_16.html
我的資金是有限的,所以,除了比較各種投資的回酬率,然后將資金投注在回酬較高及增值較快的資產,更需要加上股息再投資﹐才有機會提早財務自主。
復 利增长具有創造財富的神奇力量。不要小看數目微小的股息﹐小錢一樣是錢。从短期来说,并不会有明顯的數目,但在十年、二十年之后,總數可能增加一倍。復利 的神奇力量,是在后期才發揮出来的。我非常喜歡股息高﹑股息穩定﹑股息每年有成長的企業。我只要能把股息再投資在幾家這樣的公司﹐是可以加速財富的累計速 度。我不需要自掏錢包﹐但是未來收入反而越大。
你會購買没有租金﹑租不出去的店鋪嗎?
購買了一間店鋪,長期租不出去,反而每個月要負担分期付款。
同樣的情形,購買股票如果没有股息收入的話,將使我的收支不平衡。
試想將大筆資金投注在没有入息的資產,生活變得捉襟見肘,壓力至生病﹐即使將来能賺到大錢,也是不值得﹐畢竟健康最重要。
如果有穩定的股息收入的话,我們可以把股票視為店鋪,股息視為租金,這樣才可以長期收藏,就好像長期持有店鋪一樣。
必须重視的因素﹕
http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post.html
天堂還是地獄,只是一念之間而已。
股票是金礦還是墳墓﹐只是一念之間而已。
好習慣生好念頭﹐壞習慣生壞念頭。
多閱讀與善知識有關的書﹐就能明辨習慣的好壞。明辨習慣的好壞﹐就是瞭解自己的強弱之處﹐才不會做出以卵擊石﹑飛蛾撲火的事情。
改掉壞習慣,從養成好習慣開始。
以上是我認同的好習慣﹐可以成為在股市生存的利器。這種利器需要慢﹑定﹑觀﹑長﹐才能法力無邊。
http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post_11.html
可長期持有股票分為三大類﹐即﹕
不以股價上漲或下跌的幅度作為判斷是否應該持有或是賣出的標準﹐應該取決於經營的業績。賣出的唯一標準是獲利能力的持續﹐而不是股價上漲或下跌。
這樣的方式將會迫使投資人思考企業長期遠景而不是短期的股價表現﹐而且進行這種思考有助於改善投資組合的績效。
就長期而言﹐投資的回報取決於企業未來的獲利能力。
如果企業的獲利能力發生暫時性變化﹐但不影響它的長期獲利能力﹐是可以繼續持有它的股份。
如果發生根本性變化﹐應該豪不猶豫賣出。
以九流價錢投資這三類企業的股票﹐必然獲得豐厚的回報﹐不僅保證本金的安全﹐也有益身心的健康。
這三類企業的股票有一個共同點就是﹕
回報隨著歲月增加﹐雖然發生暫時性變化﹐可是很快的又追上來。
如果發現有這樣現像﹐意味著買對企業了。
我個人歷淺﹐認為渣打﹑領匯﹑恆隆屬於以上三類股票。
對於激成﹐我認為它在管制方面需要做出更多的改善﹐就能讓它的價值更快釋放出來。
http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post_13.html
對某個企業的股票選擇長期持股不買﹐關鍵在於
所以繼續持有的強烈信心是建立在理性的基礎。
一時的暴利並不代表長期的盈利﹐而經常的微利卻可以轉化成長期的巨大收益。
長期持有的前提是
隨時關注企業的基本面及盈利狀況﹐如果會嚴重惡化﹐就應當及時賣出手中的股票了。
長期持有並非永久持有
http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post_23.html
投資成功的關鍵在於挑選對的企業之後﹐在適當的時機﹐以便宜的價格買入後﹐只要企業還是經營妥當﹐就可以長期持有。要在股市賺錢﹐說易不易﹐說難不難。
急于讓自己手中的錢變成股票﹐再變成錢﹐其實是很難賺到錢。
對待投資應當像對待婚姻一樣慎重﹐像國與國之間的不輕易開戰﹐像愛護自己生命一樣。每個人必須自己承擔投資的風險。管理自己的組合和選擇喜歡的優秀公司都非常重要的﹔因為拿錢出來投資是為了致富﹐而不是想在股市中尋找刺激。
我在路上開車﹐明白[能]和[不能控制的風險]。不能控制的風險﹐例如公路品質﹑天氣﹑其他司機的駕駛態度﹐我是戒慎加虔誠禱告。能控制的風險﹐例如儘量在白天開車﹑恰當的速度﹑小心駕駛等等﹐我是百分百遵守和管理妥當。
投資也是一樣﹐要先要明白[能]和[不能控制的風險]。
我能做到的是﹕
至于[不能控制的風險]﹐以上我所做得已經把[不能控制的風險]降至低點﹐剩下的唯有戒慎加虔誠禱告。
分散投資風險是必要的﹐但是把它當成投資的主旨卻是不正確的。
降低風險的策略應該是小心謹慎地把資金分配在想要投資的企業上﹐要投資哪些企業以及用什麼價格買進。
以合理價買入經營卓越企業﹐能減少發生損失的機率。
絕不要隨隨便便投資﹐同時投資和持有時要慎重。
http://feigan.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post_26.html
值投資有甚麼可能會死的?價值投資根本就是平買,正價賣。數學角度來看平買,正價賣永遠都是賺錢的。問題就是在分析員的strengths and personality。Many analysts/investors don't even stick to the value discipline of buying cheap. They just buy anything with some sort of speculative potential in hopes of earning more than the fair value they have paid. In fact a lot of them don't even know the value of what they are buying into! Value investing is hard, speculation is easy(in terms of difficulty, not money making potential)...no wonder most investors fail.
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個人淺見﹐把價值投資的根本說是低買高賣﹐似乎不足夠。我認為應該擁有實業家的胸懷和眼光﹐即係要把自己當成是生意合伙人﹐對投資的生意當然要儘量去了解﹐前景和困境當然要儘量去了解﹐財務狀況當然要儘量去了解。
股價向上升﹐是很難分辨手中的股票哪一個是投資﹑哪一個是投機﹔唯有股價大跌﹐股市氣氛慘淡﹐我們心生恐懼的時候﹐這時候如果我們能夠冷靜克服心魔﹐冷靜分析手中的企業﹐你將發現真真了解的企業﹐其實是很少的。
所謂真了解﹕
如果你有勇氣進行資金分配﹐減少不了解的企業﹐增加了解企業的部位﹐你才算是擁有實業家的胸懷。
你了解的企業價值繼續成長﹐市值不斷增加﹐當世界恢復正常後﹐市值果然超越了你的成本﹐你你才算是擁有實業家的眼光。
當然﹐世界恢復正常後﹐不了解的企業的市值也有可能恢復﹐或者超越你了解的企業。你不應該感到懊惱或後悔﹐因為在最糟糕的時期﹐你已經準備要買掉全部股票﹐就是因為你保存了這種理智﹐留下了對的企業﹐甚至加重部位﹐現在你才能賺到錢。
胸懷和眼光並不是天生的﹐只要我們平時多用心學習是能夠培養的。
價值投資法是先難後易﹐其實[難]就在理智﹐如果我們能夠保持正確投資觀念﹐其實[難]只是在第一步罷了。
投機是先易後難﹐後續的操作和判斷上存有很大的失誤率。對我而言﹐我是十之八九會犯錯。
只要少錯多對﹐就有好成就。