一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（3） Barrons
http://blog.caing.com/article/9259/
复利的威力 在投资中，巴菲特逐渐体会到了复利的威力。实际上，巴菲特最终成为首富就是靠长期高速的复利增长。关于复利的威力这一点，巴菲特在32岁的时候就非常清楚。 I have it from unreliable sources that the cost of the voyage Isabella originally underwrote for Columbus was approximately $30,000. This has been considered at least a moderately successful utilization of venture capital. Without attempting to evaluate the psychic income derived from finding a new hemisphere, it must be pointed out that even had squatter's rights prevailed, the whole deal was not exactly another IBM. Figured very roughly, the $30,000 invested at 4% compounded annually would have amounted to something like $2,000,000,000,000 (that's $2 trillion for those of you who are not government statisticians) by 1962. Historical apologists for the Indians of Manhattan may find refuge in similar calculations. Such fanciful geometric progressions illustrate the value of either living a long time, or compounding your money at a decent rate. I have nothing particularly helpful to say on the former point. 我从不太可靠的消息来源得知，当年西班牙女王伊萨贝拉资助哥伦布远航的成本大约是3万美金。这被认为至少是一个相当成功的运用风险资本的例子。不考虑发 现一个新半球的精神上的收获，即使算上强占的土地的权利，这个投资也比不上IBM的例子。简单估算，3万美金投入4%复利增长，到了1962年将会是2万 亿美元。同情曼哈顿岛的印第安人的人们也会找到类似的计算。这种奇异的几何级数增长揭示了两种事物的价值：长寿或者让你的金钱以相当好的速度复利增长。我 对前一个事情没什么可讲的。 The following table indicates the compounded value of $100,000 at 5%, 10% and 15% for 10, 20 and 30 years. It is always startling to see how relatively small differences in rates add up to very significant sums over a period of years. That is why, even though we are shooting for more, we feel that a few percentage points advantage over the Dow is a very worthwhile achievement. It can mean a lot of dollars over adecade or two. 下面的表格显示的是10万美元以5%，10%和15%的速度复利增长10，20和30年。让人吃惊的是，相对较小的速度差别，经过多年的积累，逐渐变为 巨大的数字差异。这就是为什么虽然我们的目标是更高的增长，但我们感觉，对于道指的几个点的优势是非常有价值的成就。假以时日，10年或20年，这意味着 很多钱。
（1962年给合伙人的信） Since the whole subject of compounding has such a crass ring to it, I will attempt to introduce a little class into this discussion by turning to the art world. Francis I of France paid 4,000 ecus in 1540 for Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. On the off chance that a few of you have not kept track of the fluctuations of the ecu 4,000 converted out to about $20,000. 由于复利这个话题牵扯的范围很广，我就试着把这个讨论转向艺术世界，来引入一门小课程。1540年，法国的弗兰西斯一世花了4000克朗把达芬奇的蒙娜丽莎买下。你们可能没关注克朗的波动，这4000克朗相当于今天的2万美金。 If Francis had kept his feet on the ground and he (and his trustees) had been able to find a 6% after-tax investment, the estate now would be worth something over $1,000,000,000,000,000.00. That's $1 quadrillionor over 3,000 times the present national debt, all from 6%. I trust this will end all discussion in our household about any purchase of paintings qualifying as an investment. 如果弗兰西斯还活着，他（和他的受托人）当时能够找到一个税后6%的投资，这笔财产现在会价值超过1000万亿。这是目前国债的3000倍，都是从这6%而来。我相信这将结束所有家庭中关于购买画作算不算投资的讨论。 （1963年给合伙人的信） 基金无法战胜市场 巴菲特发现即使是领先的大基金也无法战胜市场指数。他认为这源于这些投资机构的机制。 The results continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment advice has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue-chip stocks. This in no sense condemns these institutions or the investment advisers and trust departments whose methods, reasoning, and results largely parallel such investment companies. These media perform a substantial service to millions of investors in achieving adequate diversification, providing convenience and peace of mind, avoiding issues of inferior quality,etc. However, their services do not include (and in the great majority of cases, are not represented to include) the compounding of money at a rate greater than that achieved by the general market. 这些结果继续显示，那些获得最高额收入和最受尊敬的投资建议也很难比得上一个无人管理的蓝筹股指数的业绩。这并不是指责这些机构或投资顾问，以及与这些 投资公司有着大体上类似的方法、推理，和结果的信托部门。这些机构给成百万的投资者起到了重要的服务作用，以获得足够的分散投资，提供便利，让人感到踏 实，避免质量低下的问题等。但是，他们的服务不包括（在大部分情况下也不声称包括）以高于市场的速度复利增长金钱。 Our partnership's fundamental reason for existence is to compound funds at a better-than-average rate with less exposure to long-term loss of capital than the above investment media. We certainly can not represent that we will achieve this goal. We can and do say that if we don't achieve this goal over any reasonable period excluding an extensive speculative boom, we will cease operation. 我们的合伙基金存在的根本原因就是要以高于平均水平的速度复利增长基金，而且与上面所说的投资公司相比，我们要有更少的长期资本损失的风险。我们当然无 法声称会达到这一目标。我们能说的而且是确实说的是，除了在长时间的投机性牛市中，如果我们在相当长的一段时期内，达不到这一目标，我们将停止运营。 （1963年上半年给合伙人的信） The repetition of these tables has caused partners to ask: "Why in the world does this happen to very intelligent managements working with (1) bright, energetic staff people, (2) virtually unlimited resources, (3) the most extensive business contacts, and (4)literally centuries of aggregate investment experience?" (The latter qualification brings to mind the fellow who applied for a job and stated he had twenty years of experience - which was corrected by the former employer to read “one year's experience -twenty times.”) 这些重复出现的表格让一些合伙人不禁问道：“这些聪明的投资经理究竟怎么了？他们有（1）聪明而精力充沛的手下（2）几乎无限的资源（3）最广泛的商业 联系（4）加在一起几个世纪的投资经验。”（这最后一点让我想起一个家伙在求职时声称有20年的经验。后来前任雇主纠正说是“1年的经验，20次”。） This question is of enormous importance, and you would expect it to be the subject of considerable study by investment managers and substantial investors. After all, each percentage point on $30 billion is $300 million per year. Curiously enough, there is practically nothing in the literature of Wall Street attacking this problem, and discussion of it is virtually absent at security analyst society meetings, conventions, seminars, etc. My opinion is that the first job of any investment management organization is to analyze its own techniques and results before pronouncing judgment on the managerial abilities and performance of the major corporate entities of the United States. 这个问题极其重要。你可能会认为投资经理和大投资者们对这个议题有着很多的研究。毕竟300亿美元的百分之一就是一年3亿美元。令人好奇的是，实际上在 华尔街没有任何文章探讨这个问题。在证券分析师会议和讲座等活动中也几乎没有讨论。我的想法是，任何一个投资管理机构的首要任务都是分析自己的技术和结 果，而不是判断整个美国的主要投资机构的管理能力和业绩。 In the great majority of cases the lack of performance exceeding or even matching an unmanaged index in no way reflects lack of either intellectual capacity or integrity. I think it is much more the product of: (1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations;(3) an institutional framework whereby average is "safe" and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational;and finally and importantly, (5) inertia. 在大多数情况下，投资机构缺乏超越无人管理的指数的业绩，甚至连与指数一致的业绩都少见。这绝不是由于缺少智慧或者诚信。我认为这主要是以下几个原因的 结果：（1）集体决策-我的可能有些偏颇的看法是：如果所有成员都真正参与决策，出色的投资管理几乎不可能从任何大小的集体中产生。（2）希望与其它备受 尊重的大型投资机构的投资政策保持一致，甚至在某种程度上与其投资组合保持一致。（3）机构的体制让平均成为“安全”。对个人的回报与激励无法补偿独立行 动所带来的全面风险。（4）拘于某些不合理的分散投资做法。最后，也是最重要的是（5）惰性。 （1964年给合伙人的信） 关于保守的问题 那些著名的大型投资公司，号称保守，以传统的方式行事。但巴菲特认为真正的保守来自于事实和逻辑，而不是投资方式。 In looking at the table of investment company performance, the question might be asked: “Yes, but aren't those companies run more conservatively than the Partnership?" If you asked that question of the investment company managements, they, in absolute honesty, would say they were more conservative. If you asked the first hundred security analysts you met, I am sure that a very large majority of them also would answer for the investment companies. I would disagree. I have over 90% of my net worth in BPL, and most of my family have percentages in that area, but of course, that only demonstrates the sincerity of my view - not the validity of it. 阅读那些投资公司的业绩表格，有人可能会问：“确实，你的业绩更好。但是那些投资公司难道不比你的合伙基金运营的更保守吗？”如果你对那些投资公司的经 理问这个问题，他们绝对会诚实的回答他们更保守。如果你问你所碰到的前100个分析师，我确信他们当中的很大一部分也都会认为那些投资公司更保守。但我不 同意。我把我自己超过90%的净值放在巴菲特合伙基金中。我大部分的家庭成员也差不多把90%的净值投入了合伙基金。当然，这只表明了我看法的真诚度，而 不是证明我的看法的正确性。 It is unquestionably true that the investment companies have their money more conventionally invested than we do. To many people conventionality is indistinguishable from conservatism. In my view, this represents erroneous thinking. Neither a conventional nor an unconventional approach, per se, is conservative. 的确，那些投资公司比我们投资的方式更加传统。对许多人来说传统与保守没有区别。但在我看来，这是错误的思维。无论是传统的还是非传统的方式，在本质上都不能说是保守的。 Truly conservative actions arise from intelligent hypotheses, correct facts and sound reasoning. These qualities may lead to conventional acts,but there have been many times when they have led to unorthodoxy. In some corner of the world they are probably still holding regular meetings of the Flat Earth Society. 真正保守的行为来自于聪明的假设，正确的事实和合理的推理。这些特点有可能导致传统的投资行为，但在很多时候也会指向非正统的方式。在世界的某个角落有些人可能仍然坚持曾经的“正统”理念，认为地球是平的，并定期开会。 We derive no comfort because important people, vocal people, or great numbers of people agree with us. Nor do we derive comfort if they don't. A public opinion poll is no substitute for thought. When we really sit back with a smile on our face is when we run into a situation we can understand, where the facts are ascertainable and clear, and the course of action obvious. In that case - whether conventional or unconventional – whether others agree or disagree - we feel - we are progressing in a conservative manner. 仅仅因为重要人物，评论家，或者非常多的人赞同我们，这并不能让我们感到安心。反之，如果他们都不同意我们的做法，也并不能让我们感到安心。民意测验无 法替代思考。只有当我们能理解我们的形势，事实清晰确定，行动方案显而易见的时候，我们才能真正放松，面带笑容。这时候，无论传统与否，无论他人同意与 否，我们都认为自己是以一种保守的方式取得进展。 （1964年给合伙人的信） 耐心与保密 投资需要耐心与保密。 (1)Our business is one requiring patience. It has little in common with a portfolio of high-flying glamour stocks and during periods of popularity for the latter, we may appear quite stodgy. It is to our advantage to have securities do nothing price wise for months, or perhaps years, while we are buying them. This points up the need to measure our results over an adequate period of time. We suggest three years as a minimum. 我们的生意必须耐心。这与满是高高在上的热门股的投资组合不同。在这些热门股票流行的时期，我们会显得非常古板枯燥。 在我们购买股票的时候，这些股票的价格几个月，甚至几年不变，这对我们来说是个优势。这清楚的表明在衡量我们结果的时候，需要足够长的时间。我们建议三年是最短的时间。 (2)We cannot talk about our current investment operations. Such an open-mouth policy could never improveour results and in some situations could seriously hurt us. For this reason, should anyone, including partners, ask us whether we are interested in any security, we must plead the “5th Amendment.” 我们不能谈论我们目前的投资运营。这种公开张扬的政策永远也无法提高我们的结果，在某些时候还可能严重损害我们自己。由于这个原因，如果任何人，包括合伙人，问我们是否对某个股票感兴趣，我们必须援引“宪法第五修正案”，保持沉默。 （1963年给合伙人的信附录）
一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（4） Barrons
http://blog.caing.com/article/9372/
投资的本质
投资的本质是什么？是与自身人性的博弈。只有时时刻刻记住投资的终极目标“最快的长期复利增长”，时时刻刻保持从零开始的态度，不断学习，不断修正自己，才有可能达到目标。 Buying activities during the first half were quite satisfactory. This is of particular satisfaction to me since I consider the buying end to be about 90% of this business. 在上半年我们的买入活动相当令人满意。这对我来说尤其感到满足，因为我认为投资这门生意大约90%在于买入。 （1964年上半年给合伙人的信） More investment sins are probably committed by otherwise quite intelligent people because of "taxconsiderations" than from any other cause. One of my friends - a noted West Coast philosopher maintains that a majority of life's errors are caused by forgetting what one is really trying to do.
更多的由于“税务考虑”，很多其实非常聪明的人犯了太多的投资罪过。我的一个朋友—一个著名的西海岸哲学家认为人一生所犯的大部分错都是由于忘记了自己真正想要做什么。
（1964年给合伙人的信）
It is obvious that the performance of a stock last year or last month is no reason, per se, to either own it or to not own it now. It is obvious that an inability to "get even" in a security that has declined is of no importance. It is obvious that the inner warm glow that results from having held a winner last year is of no importance in making a decision as to whether it belongs in an optimum portfolio this year.
显然，一个股票去年或者上个月的业绩，本质上并不是现在拥有或者不拥有这只股票的原因。同样，不能在一只已经下跌的股票上“翻本”也并不重要。当然，拥有一支去年的赢家股票会让自己的内心感到喜悦，但这在决定这只股票是否属于今年的最优组合时毫不重要。
（1964年给合伙人的信）
I don’t mention this because I am proud of such performance – on the contrary, I would prefer it if we had achieved our gain in the hypothesized manner. Rather, I mention it for two reasons: (1) you are always entitled to know when I am wrong as well as right; and,(2) it demonstrates that although we deal with probabilities and expectations, the actual results can deviate substantially from such expectations, particularly on a short-term basis.
（虽然业绩很好，但实现的方式与我们的预期不一致。）我举这个例子并不是我们对此感到自豪。正好相反，我更希望我们以事先假设的方式获得收益。我提这个是由于两个原因：（1）你有权知道我何时错了，何时对了。（2）这表明虽然我们与概率和预期打交道，但实际的结果有可能大范围的偏离这些预期，在短期内这更是如此。
（1964年上半年给合伙人的信）
After last year the question naturally arises, "What do we do for an encore?” A disadvantage of this business is that it does not possess momentum to any significant degree. If General Motors accounts for 54% of domestic new car registrations in 1965, it is a pretty safe bet that they are going to come fairly close to that figure in 1966 due to owner loyalties, dealer capabilities, productive capacity, consumer image, etc. Not so for BPL. We start from scratch each year with everything valued at market when the gun goes off. Partners in 1966, new or old, benefit to only a very limited extent from the efforts of 1964 and 1965. The success of past methods and ideas does not transfer forward to future ones.
去年的好业绩之后，一个很自然的问题就是：“我们怎么才能重复这一好的业绩？”投资这门生意的坏处就在于无法保持一定的势头。如果通用汽车在1965年占有54%的国内汽车市场，那么很有可能他们在1966年的数字也会非常接近。因为他们有消费者的忠诚，经销商的能力，生产能力，在消费者心中的形象等因素。但巴菲特合伙基金不是这样的。每年我们都是从零开始，由市场估值。在1966年的合伙人，无论新旧，都只能从我们1964年和1965年的努力中获得非常有限的好处。过去的成功方法与想法无法转移到未来。
（1965年给合伙人的信）
复利的悲哀
成也萧何，败也萧何。巴菲特享受到了复利的好处，也很快感受到了复利的悲哀。当基金越来越大，复利增长也就越来越难。到了1965年，巴菲特向新投资者关闭了合伙基金。
Nevertheless,as circumstances presently appear, I feel substantially greater size is more likely to harm future results than to help them. This might not be true for my own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your results.
但是，基于目前的情况，我认为基金越大，则越有可能伤害而不是帮助我们未来的业绩。这对我自己的收入可能不是如此（因为我的管理费和分成会随之增加），但对你的业绩确实如此。
Therefore, unless it appears that circumstances have changed (under some conditions added capital would improve results) or unless new partners can bring some asset to the Partnership other than simply capital, I intend to admit no additional partners to BPL.
所以，除非这种情况得到改变（即在某种情况下增加的资本会改善业绩），或者合伙人不仅能给合伙基金带来资金，我有意停止接收新的合伙人进入巴菲特合伙基金。
（1965年给合伙人的信）
集中投资
这是巴菲特投资理念中极其重要的一部分。与传统的“分散投资”相反，巴菲特崇尚集中投资。在35岁的时候，他就清晰的认识到，要想超越指数，就必须集中投资。这种集中投资不仅与预期的回报高低有关，更与潜在的损失相关。最新的《数学研究
》也表明，巴菲特的这种集中持股方式符合最优的长期复利增长，具有最高的几何平均增长速度。
This year in the material which went out in November, I specifically called your attention to a new Ground Rule reading, "7. We diversify substantially less than most investment operations. We might invest up to 40% of our net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could drastically change the underlying value of the investment."
今年11月发出的材料里，我特意让你注意一条新的基本原则。“7.我们比大部分投资机构都要较少的进行分散投资。如果我们的事实与逻辑推理有极高的可能性是正确的，而且投资的内在价值剧烈变化的可能性极低，我们最多可能把净值的40%投入单支股票。”
We are obviously following a policy regarding diversification which differs markedly from that of practically all public investment operations. Frankly, there is nothing I would like better than to have 50 different investment opportunities, all of which have a mathematical expectation (this term reflects the range of all possible relative performances, including negative ones, adjusted for the probability of each - no yawning, please) of achieving performance surpassing the Dow by, say, fifteen percentage points per annum. If the fifty individual expectations were not intercorrelated(what happens to one is associated with what happens to the other) I could put 2% of our capital into each one and sit back with a very high degree of certainty that our overall results would be very close to such a fifteen percentage point advantage.
很明显，我们的分散投资政策与绝大多数公众投资机构有着显著的不同。坦率的讲，我最愿意拥有50个不同的投资机会，每一个都有每年超过道指15%的数学期望。（这里的数学期望是指所有可能的相对业绩的范围，包括负值，经过概率调整后的结果。）如果这50个期望不是相互关联的（一个的结果与其它结果的联系），我能把2%的资本平均分配给每个机会，然后就能高枕无忧而且非常确信我们的整体业绩将非常接近对道指15%的优势。
It doesn't work that way.
根本不是那么回事。
We have to work extremely hard to find just a very few attractive investment situations. Such a situation by definition is one where my expectation (defined as above) of performance is at least ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. Among the few we do find, the expectations vary substantially. The question always is,“How much do I put in number one (ranked by expectation of relative performance) and how much do I put in number eight?" This depends to a great degree on the wideness of the spread between the mathematical expectation of number one versus number eight. It also depends upon the probability that number one could turn in a really poor relative performance. Two securities could have equal mathematical expectations, but one might have .05 chance of performing fifteen percentage points or more worse than the Dow, and the second might have only .01 chance of such performance. The wider range of expectation in the first case reduces the desirability of heavy concentration in it.
我们必须极其努力才能找到仅有的几个有吸引力的投资机会。这种机会是指我的预期（如上面的定义）是业绩至少每年超过道指10个 百分点。在找到的仅有的几个机会中，我们的预期非常不同。问题总是在于“我在第一个投多少（这里的第一是指按预期的相对业绩排），在第八个投多少？”这取 决于第一和第八的数学期望的差异度有多大。这也取决于第一个会取得非常差的相对业绩的概率。两只股票可能有相同的数学期望，但是一个有0.05的概率低于道指15%或更差的业绩，而第二个则只有0.01的概率会有这样差的业绩。由于第一个例子中数学期望的范围差异度很大，这就减少了重仓集中在这个股票的意愿。
The above may make the whole operation sound very precise. It isn't. Nevertheless, our business is that of ascertaining facts and then applying experience and reason to such facts to reach expectations. Imprecise and emotionally influenced as our attempts may be, that is what the business is all about. The results of many years of decision-making in securities will demonstrate how well you are doing on making such calculations – whether you consciously realize you are making the calculations or not. I believe the investor operates at a distinct advantage when he is aware of what path his thought process is following.
以上的论述让整个过程显得非常精确。其实不是的。但是，我们的投资生意就是搞清事实，然后运用经验和逻辑推理，从而得出预期。我们的努力可能不精确，并受到情感的影响，但这就是投资。多年股票投资决策的结果将证明我们在做那些计算时有多精确— 无论你是否意识到，你都在进行计算估计。我相信当投资者意识到他自己所遵从的思路时，他在投资方面就有了明确的优势。
There is one thing of which I can assure you. If good performance of the fund is even a minor objective, any portfolio encompassing one hundred stocks (whether the manager is handling one thousand dollars or one billion dollars) is not being operated logically. The addition of the one hundredth stock simply can't reduce the potential variance in portfolio performance sufficiently to compensate for the negative effect its inclusion has on the overall portfolio expectation.
我能向你保证一件事。即使基金的业绩表现是一个次要目标，一个有着100支股票的投资组合是不合理的（无论基金经理是管理1千美金或者10亿美金）。增加第100支股票根本无法把投资组合业绩的潜在波动足够降低，反而无法弥补加入这支股票对整个投资组合的预期回报所带来的负面效应。
Anyone owning such numbers of securities after presumably studying their investment merit (and I don't care how prestigious their labels) is following what I call the Noah School of Investing - two of everything. Such investors should be piloting arks. While Noah may have been acting in accord with certain time-tested biological principles, the investors have left the track regarding mathematical principles. (I only made it through plane geometry, but with one exception, I have carefully screened out the mathematicians from our Partnership.)
任何拥有这么多股票的人，估计是学了某种投资价值观（我才不管这些人有多著名），我 称之为诺亚学派的投资哲学，就是任何东西都来一对儿。这种投资者应该去开诺亚方舟。虽然诺亚每种生物都选一对儿的方式是根据了经过时间检验的某种生物规 律，但投资者这么做却是偏离了数学的基本原理。（我只学过平面几何，但是我已经仔细筛选过我们的合伙基金，把数学家排除在外了。）
Of course, the fact that someone else is behaving illogically in owning one hundred securities doesn't prove our case. While they may be wrong in overdiversifying, we have to affirmatively reason through a proper diversification policy in terms of our objectives.
当然，别人不合逻辑的拥有100支股票，这并不能证明我们是对的。他们可能过度分散是错的，而我们则必须确实推理出基于我们自己目标的合适的分散投资策略。
The optimum portfolio depends on the various expectations of choices available and the degree of variance in performance which is tolerable. The greater the number of selections, the less will be the average year-to-year variation in actual versus expected results. Also, the lower will be the expected results, assuming different choices have different expectations of performance.
最优的投资组合取决于现有的不同投资选择的数学期望，以及我们所能容忍的业绩变化的程度。选取的股票越多，平均每年的业绩与预期的结果差异越小。但是，假定不同的投资选择有不同的预期业绩，随着选取股票数量的增加，则预期的业绩也将降低。
I am willing to give up quite a bit in terms of leveling of year-to-year results (remember when I talk of “results,” I am talking of performance relative to the Dow) in order to achieve better overall long-term performance. Simply stated, this means I am willing to concentrate quite heavily in what I believe to be the best investment opportunities recognizing very well that this may cause an occasional very sour year - one somewhat more sour, probably, than if I had diversified more. While this means our results will bounce around more, I think it also means that our long-term margin of superiority should be greater.
为了取得总体更好的长期业绩，我愿意 放弃相当一部分的年度结果（记住当我说“结果”时，我指的是相对于道指的业绩）。简而言之，这意味着我愿意相当集中的重仓持有我坚信是最好的投资机会。与 此同时，我清楚的意识到，与更加分散的投资相比，我这种方式有可能造成偶尔一个业绩非常糟糕的一年。虽然这意味着我们的业绩将上下波动，但我坚信这也意味 着我们长期的优势将更大。
You have already seen some examples of this. Our margin versus the Dow has ranged from 2.4 percentage points in 1958 to 33.0 points in 1965.If you check this against the deviations of the funds listed on page three, you will find our variations have a much wider amplitude. I could have operated in such a manner as to reduce our amplitude, but I would also have reduced our overall performance somewhat although it still would have substantially exceeded that of the investment companies. Looking back, and continuing to think this problem through, I feel that if anything, I should have concentrated slightly more than I have in the past. Hence, the new Ground Rule and this long-winded explanation.
你已经看到了一些例子。我们对道指的优势从1958年的2.4个百分点到1965年的33个 百分点大范围波动。你如果把这个与第三页的投资基金与道指的差异相比，你就会发现我们业绩变化的范围更广。我本来可以按那些基金的方式运营，以减少业绩变 化的范围，但是那样会降低我们的整体业绩，虽然我们也能大范围的超过那些投资基金公司。回顾过去，我对这个问题经过持续深入思考后认为，如果要改变什么的 话，我会比过去的方式稍稍更加集中持股。所以，我就制定了这个新的基本准则，并且花了这么大的篇幅进行解释。
Again let me state that this is somewhat unconventional reasoning (this doesn't make it right or wrong - it does mean you have to do your own thinking on it), and you may well have a different opinion - if you do, the Partnership is not the place for you. We are obviously only going to go to 40% in very rare situations – this rarity, of course, is what makes it necessary that we concentrate so heavily, when we see such an opportunity. We probably have had only five or six situations in the nine-year history of the Partnership where we have exceeded 25%. Any such situations are going to have to promise very significantly superior performance relative to the Dow compared to other opportunities available at the time. They are also going to have to possess such superior qualitative and/or quantitative factors that the chance of serious permanent loss is minimal (anything can happen on a short-term quotational basis which partially explains the greater risk of widened year-to-year variation in results). In selecting the limit to which I will go in anyone investment, I attempt to reduce to a tiny figure the probability that the single investment (or group, if there is intercorrelation) can produce a result for our total portfolio that would be more than ten percentage points poorer than the Dow.
让我再次声明，这是有些反传统的推理思考（这并不决定其对错，但这意味着你必须对此做自己的的思考）。你完全可能有不同的看法。如果你有不同的看法，那么这个合伙基金不适合你。很明显，我们只会在非常罕见的情况下把净值的40%投入单支股票。当然，正是这种罕见的机会才让我们必须如此集中重仓。在合伙基金的9年历史中，我们可能只有5到6次超过25%集中持股的情形。任何这些情况，与当时其他的机会相比，都具有更大幅度超越道指的希望。不仅如此，它们还具有如此优异的定性和/或 定量因素，以至于严重的本金永久损失的机率是最小的。（在短期内，在账面价值上，任何事情都有可能发生。这也是为什么我们的风险更高，年度业绩波动扩大的 部分原因。）在选择任何单一投资的限度时，我意图把单一投资（或者一组投资，如果有内部的相关性）使我们整个投资组合的业绩低于道指10个百分点的概率减到极小。
（1965年给合伙人的信）
Interestingly enough, the literature of investment management is virtually devoid of material relative to deductive calculation of optimal diversification.
有趣的是，有关投资管理的文献几乎没有推理计算最优分散投资的材料。
All texts counsel "adequate" diversification, but the ones who quantify "adequate" virtually never explain how they arrive at their conclusion. Hence, for our summation on overdiversification, we turn to that eminent academician Billy Rose, who says, "You've got a harem of seventy girls; you don't get to know any of them very well.”
所有的教科书都建议“足够”的分散投资。但是量化“足够”的人从来没有解释他们如何得到其结论。所以，为了总结我们关于过度分散投资的论述，我引用知名学者Billy Rose的话“如果你的后宫有70个女孩，那么你对哪一个也不会有深入的了解。”
（1965年给合伙人的信）
王侯将相 宁有种乎 Barrons
http://blog.caing.com/article/9608/
在巴菲特的“The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville”一文中，提到了一个有趣的虚拟试验。2.25亿美国人，一人一块钱，玩猜硬币游戏，赢者通吃，输者出局。随着游戏的进行，每次的赌注都翻倍。当经过20轮后，将会有215个赢家连续猜对，每人拥有1百万美金。于是，就会有人出书，四处演讲，炫耀如何轻松把1美元变成百万美金。 如 果在中国进行这个试验，结果没什么不同。总会有少数人在游戏中成为赢家（当然，不排除有人在游戏中做手脚，不择手段，不惜代价，赢得游戏）。赢家中的有些 人可能会写书，声称“自己的成功可以复制”。有的人可能会写文章“按我方法行事，任何人都可以赚到一亿”。更有甚者，会总结经验，认为猜硬币成功的人，天 生具有良好的性格，而失败出局者则性格具有缺陷，性格决定了输赢，“富者愈富贫者愈贫性格使然”。最奇怪的是，一些猜硬币失败者会自己总结失败的教训，认 为成功者既然在猜硬币游戏中胜出，必然证明其有能力。无论成功者说什么，做什么，无论对错，只有同样在游戏中赢的人才有资格作评论。 一个简单的事实是，即便是几亿只大猩猩去猜硬币，也会有少数大猩猩最终成为赢家，坐拥亿万。但大猩猩不会忘乎所以，不会到处演讲出书，仍然会乐于吃自己的香蕉。 一个人成为富翁，原因有很多，性格、机遇等因素都有作用。如果用后验的方式，把致富的原因简单归于性格，甚至认为性格能创造机遇，暗示富豪的性格更优秀，贫穷者性格有缺陷，天生如此，这样的看法不仅荒谬，更可憎。 两千多年前，就有人反对所谓“天生”的优越，提出“王侯将相宁有种乎”。而且他们的反驳非常有力，不仅逻辑正确，更用行动彻底打破了“天生”的优越。而两千多年后，竟然仍然有人宣扬“宁有种”并获得追捧。 人 的性格主要来自于基因，也受到经历的影响。相同性格的人，只有少数能成功，这就是机遇的作用。其实，人获得什么样的基因，这本身就是一种运气。先天的好运 气，获得良好的基因，后天的好运气，获得良好的机遇，加之自身的努力，最终有可能造就成功。而不那么幸运的人，可能先天的运气就不佳，后天的机遇又不足， 即使自己百倍努力，历经二十年，却也只能和幸运的人喝上一杯咖啡。那些幸运的人，如果意识不到自己的幸运，对不幸的人妄加指责，这样不仅错误，更失人性。 人之所以为人，是因为有理性与情感。理性应该让人知道幸运、概率对人的巨大影响，懂得暂时的成功不过是幸运而已。情感更应该让人懂得同情与尊重。
一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（5） Barrons
http://blog.caing.com/article/9653/
市场分析与投资
巴菲特的投资原则非常清晰，对公司做分析判断，不对市场进行预测。
Ground Rule No.6 (from our November packet) says: “I am not in the business of predicting general stock market or business fluctuations.If you think I can do this, or think it is essential to an investment program, you should not be in the partnership.”
第六条基本原则（来自于11月份的材料）提到：“我不从事预测整个股票市场或者商业波动的事业。如果你认为我可以做预测，或者认为这对投资是必不可少的，那你不应该在这个合伙基金。”
Of course, this rule can be attacked as fuzzy, complex, ambiguous, vague, etc. Nevertheless, I think the point is well understood by the great majority of our partners. We don't buy and sell stocks based upon what other people think the stock market is going to do (I never have an opinion) but rather upon what we think the company is going to do. The course of the stock market will determine, to a great degree, when we will be right, but the accuracy of our analysis of the company will largely determine whether we will be right. In other words, we tend to concentrate on what should happen, not when it should happen.
当 然这条原则会被人批评是模糊、复杂、含混、不清楚。但是，我认为大多数合伙人都非常理解这一原则。我们不根据其他人所认为的股票市场将如何表现（我从来对 此没有意见）而买入和卖出。我们根据我们认为公司将如何表现而买入和卖出。股票市场的进程将很大程度上决定我们何时会正确。而我们对公司分析的精确程度将 主要决定我们是否正确。换句话说，我们倾向于集中精力分析什么能发生，而不是何时能发生。 （1966年上半年给合伙人的信） I resurrect this "market-guessing" section only because after the Dow declined from 995 at the peak in February to about 865 in May, I received a few calls from partners suggesting that they thought stocks were going a lot lower. This always raises two questions in my mind: (1) if they knew in February that the Dow was going to 865 in May, why didn't they let me in on it then; and, (2)if they didn't know what was going to happen during the ensuing three months back in February, how do they know in May? There is also a voice or two after any hundred point or so decline suggesting we sell and wait until the future is clearer. Let me again suggest two points: (1) the future has never been clear to me (give us a call when the next few months are obvious to you – or, for that matter the next few hours); and, (2) no one ever seems to call after the market has gone up one hundred points to focus my attention on how unclear everything is, even though the view back in February doesn't look so clear in retrospect. 我把“猜测市场”这部分又重新提出来是因为道指从2月份995点的高峰跌到5月的865点，之后我接到了几个合伙人的电话，认为股票还将继续下跌很多。这总会在我脑海里引发两个问题：（1）如果他们在2月份知道，道指将在5月份跌到865点，为什么当时他们不阻止我投资。而且（2）如果他们不知道2月份之后接下来的三个月将发生什么，他们怎么知道5月之后将发生什么？也有几个人在道指大跌百点后建议我们卖出，等待未来更加清晰后再行动。让我再次建议两点：（1）对我来说，未来从没有清晰过（如果未来几个月对你非常显而易见，给我们打个电话，在接下来的几个小时就打）（2）在市场上涨百点后没人给我打电话，让我注意任何事情都是不清晰的，即使回过头来看2月份的情形其实并不清晰。 （1966年上半年给合伙人的信） 十年总结 从10万到5千万，巴菲特的第一个10年是幸运的。他的投资哲学得到了实践，个人财富也大大增长，成为了一个有经验的成功投资人。但是，随着规模的扩大，投资变得越来越难，好的投资想法则越来越少。即便如此，巴菲特还是坚守自己的原则，不随波逐流。 The results of the first ten years have absolutely no chance of being duplicated or even remotely approximated during the next decade. They may well be achieved by some hungry twenty-five year old working with $105,100 initial partnership capital and operating during a ten year business and market environment which is frequently conducive to successful implementation of his investment philosophy. 第一个10年的结果，在下一个10年绝对无法复制，甚至连接近都不可能。这些结果完全有可能由一个25岁，充满渴望，却只有10万5千100美元初始资金的年轻人取得。而且还得有10年常常是有助于成功实施他的投资哲学的商业和市场环境。
They will not be achieved by a better fed thirty-six year old working with our $54,065,345 current partnership capital who presently finds perhaps one-fifth to one-tenth as many really good ideas as previously to implement his investment philosophy.
这些成绩无法由一个相对富足的36岁的人取得。他运营着5千4百万美元的合伙人资金，与以前相比，却可能只有五分之一到十分之一的好想法去实施他的投资哲学。
Buffett Associates. Ltd. (predecessor to Buffett Partnership. Ltd.) was founded on the west banks of the Missouri. May 5. 1956 by a hardy little band consisting of four family members, three close friends and $105,100. (I tried to find some brilliant flash of insight regarding our future or present conditions from my first page and a half annual letter of January, 1957 to insert as a quote here. However, someone evidently doctored my file copy so as to remove the perceptive remarks I must have made.)
巴菲特联合有限公司（巴菲特合伙有限公司的前身）于1956年5月5日，在密苏里河西岸成立，主要由四个家庭成员，三个亲密的朋友组成，外加10万5千100美元。（我曾经想从写于1957年1月的第一份年度信中，找到揭示我们目前或者未来的光辉的闪光点而引用到这。但是，显然有人对我的文件作了手脚，抽走了我当时所做的洞悉未来的评论。）
At that time, and for some years subsequently, there were substantial numbers of securities selling at well below the "value to a private owner" criterion we utilized for selection of general market investments. We also experienced a flow of “workout” opportunities where the percentages were very much to our liking. The problem was always which, not what. Accordingly, we were able to own fifteen to twenty-five issues and be enthusiastic about the probabilities inherent in all holdings.
那时，以及后面的几年里，有相当多股票的价格都远低于我们所用的“私人拥有的价值”衡量的投资标准。在“Workout”类别的投资机会中有很多的百分比都是我们喜欢的。对于我们来说，问题总是选哪一个，而不是选什么。所以，我们能够拥有15到25个投资，对所有机会的内在可能性充满热情。
In the last few years this situation has changed dramatically. We now find very few securities that are understandable to me, available in decent size, and which offer the expectation of investment performance meeting our yardstick of ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. In the last three years we have come up with only two or three new ideas a year that have had such an expectancy of superior performance. Fortunately, in some cases, we have made the most of them. However, in earlier years, a lesser effort produced literally dozens of comparable opportunities. It is difficult to be objective about the causes for such diminution of one's own productivity. Three factors that seem apparent are: (1) a somewhat changed market environment; (2) our increased size; and (3)substantially more competition.
在过去几年，这种情况发生了重大改变。我们现在发现只有很少的股票我能理解，而且规模足够大，能提供满足我们的投资业绩预期，即每年增长高于道指10个百分点。在过去3年里，我们每年只找到了2-3个符合这样出色业绩预期的新的投资想法。幸运的是，在一些情况下，我们充分利用了大部分这些机会。但是，在早些年，很少的努力就能产生几十个类似的投资机会。在探讨一个人自己的生产效率下降的原因时，很难做到客观。有三个因素可能是明显的：（1）市场环境有了相当的改变；（2）我们的规模增加了；（3）大幅度增加的竞争。
It is obvious that a business based upon only a trickle of fine ideas has poorer prospects than one based upon a steady flow of such ideas. To date the trickle has provided as much financial nourishment as the flow. This is true because there is only so much one can digest(million dollar ideas are of no great benefit to thousand dollar bankaccounts - this was impressed on me in my early days) and because a limited number of ideas causes one to utilize those available more intensively. The latter factor has definitely been operative with us in recent years. However, a trickle has considerably more chance of drying up completely than a flow.
显然，一个只是基于涓涓细流式的好想法的生意，其前景比不上有着源源不断的稳定的好 想法的生意。到今天为止，这涓涓细流提供了与滚滚洪流一样的财务营养。这只是因为一个人的消化能力有限（百万美元的想法对只有一千美元的银行账户没什么益 处—这在早期我深有体会）而且正是因为想法有限，才会尽量充分利用这些现有的想法。在最近几年，我们一直在充分利用有限的投资想法。但是，涓涓细流与滚滚 洪流相比，有更大的可能完全枯竭。
These conditions will not cause me to attempt investment decisions outside my sphere of understanding (I don't go for the "If you can'tlick 'em, join 'em” philosophy - my own leaning is toward "If you can't join ‘em, lick 'em”). We will not go into businesses where technology which is away over my head is crucial to the investment decision. I know about as much about semi-conductors or integrated circuits as I do of the mating habits of the chrzaszcz.(That's a Polish May bug, students - if you have trouble pronouncing it, rhyme it with thrzaszcz.)
这些状况并不能让我尝试在我所理解的范围之外进行投资决策。（我的哲学不是“不能战胜他们，就加入他们”。我自己倾向于“不能加入他们，就战胜他们”。）我们不会投资科技对投资决策有决定性作用的业务，科技远远超出了我的理解。我对半导体或芯片的了解与我对chrzaszcz虫子的交配习惯的了解差不多。（这是一种波兰的虫子，发音是thrzaszcz。）
Furthermore, we will not follow the frequently prevalent approach of investing insecurities where an attempt to anticipate market action overrides business valuations. Such so-called "fashion" investing has frequently produced very substantial and quick profits in recent years (and currently as I write this in January). It represents an investment technique whose soundness I can neither affirm nor deny. It does not completely satisfy my intellect (or perhaps my prejudices), and most definitely does not fit my temperament. I will not invest my own money based upon such an approach hence, I will most certainly not do so with your money.
而且，我们不会追寻盛行的投资方式，那些方式意图预测市场而不是业务估值。那些所谓的“流行”投资方式在近些年经常取得了高额而快速的利润（在我写这封信的1月就是如此）。对这种投资方式的可靠性，我无法接受也无法否认。这种方法不能完全达到我的思考的标准（或者是我的偏见），而且绝对不适合我的禀性。所以，我不会用我自己的钱去进行此种投资。我当然也不会用你的钱去进行此种投资。
Finally, we will not seek out activity in investment operations, even if offering splendid profit expectations, where major human problems appear to have a substantial chance of developing.
最后，我们不会寻求投资于有很大可能会造成严重人类问题的机会，即使这些机会能提供无与伦比的利润预期。
What I do promise you, as partners, is that I will work hard to maintain the trickle of ideas and try to get the most out of it that is possible – but if it should dry up completely, you will be informed honestly and promptly so that we may all take alternative action.
我所能向你保证的是，作为合伙人，我将努力工作，保持投资想法的涓涓细流，并从中获得尽可能多的回报。但是，如果投资想法的涓涓细流一旦枯竭，你将及时得到通知，我们都将选择各自的其他出路。
（1966年给合伙人的信）
坚持集中投资
巴菲特式的集中投资，用短期波动换取长期业绩，但绝不冒资本金重大损失的风险。这是典型的符合凯利判据的投资方式。而1966年，凯利判据也正好诞生10年。
The sort of concentration we have in this category is bound to produce wide swings in short term performance – some, most certainly, unpleasant. There have already been some of these applicable to shorter time spans than I use in reporting to partners. This is one reason I think frequent reporting to be foolish and potentially misleading in a long term oriented business such as ours.
我们所进行的集中投资必然导致短期内大范围的业绩波动，这有时候肯定是令人不愉快的。在比我向合伙人汇报的时间段更短的时期里，已经有了一些大范围波动的情况。这就是为什么我认为在我们这种注重长期的生意里，频繁的汇报是愚蠢而且有可能是误导的。
Personally, within the limits expressed in last year's letter on diversification, I am willing to trade the pains (forget about the pleasures) of substantial short term variance in exchange for maximization of long term performance. However, I am not willing to incur risk of substantial permanent capital loss in seeking to better long term performance. To be perfectly clear - under our policy of concentration of holdings, partners should be completely prepared for periods of substantial underperformance (far more likely in sharply rising markets) to offset the occasional over performance such as we have experienced in 1965 and 1966, and as a price we pay for hoped-for good long term performance.
从个人来讲，在去年的信中所说的极限之内，我愿意用短期波动带来的痛苦（忘记快乐 吧）来换取长期的业绩。但是，我不会承担资本金重大永久损失的风险来换取更高的长期业绩。必须明确指出，在我们目前的集中重仓持有的策略下，为了我们所希 望的好的长期业绩，合伙人必须完全准备好迎接业绩严重不佳（在暴涨的牛市更有可能）的时期，虽然我们偶尔也会有像1965和1966年这样的好业绩。
All this talk about the long pull has caused one partner to observe that“even five minutes is a long time if one's head is being held underwater." This is the reason, of course, that we use borrowed money very sparingly in our operation. Average bank borrowings during 1966 were well under 10% of average net worth.
所有这些关于长期的说辞引起了一位合伙人的评论“如果一个人的头被按在水下，即使五分钟也是一段很长的时期。”这就是为什么我们很少借钱投资。在1966年，我们的平均银行贷款远低于平均净值的10%。
（1966年给合伙人的信）
一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（6） Barrons
http://blog.caing.com/article/9761/
坚持原则拒绝投机
当投机盛行，而且获利颇丰的时候，对坚持价值投资原则的人是很大的考验。投机的迅速高额回报是极具诱惑的，而只有内心强大的投资者才能拒绝这种诱惑。
Last year I said:
“A few mutual funds and some private investment operations have compiled records vastly superior to the Dow and, in some cases, substantially superior to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Their investment techniques are usually very dissimilar to ours and not within my capabilities.”
去年我说过：
“有些共同基金和私人投资公司获得了大大超越道指的业绩，有些还大范围的超越了巴菲特合伙基金的业绩。他们的投资技术通常与我们的非常不同，这超越了我的能力范围。”
In 1967 this condition intensified. Many investment organizations performed substantially better than BPL, with gains ranging to over 100%. Because of these spectacular results, money, talent and energy are converging in a maximum effort for the achievement of large and quick stock market profits. It looks to me like greatly intensified speculation with concomitant risks - but many of the advocates insist otherwise.
在1967年，这种情况加剧了。很多投资机构大范围的超越了巴菲特合伙基金，有的收益超过100%。由于这些惊人的业绩，金钱、人才、精力都以最大的程度汇集到一起，来取得大量而迅速的股票市场收益。这在我看来更像是加剧的投机，同时伴随着风险。但很多这些投资方式的倡导者并不这么看。
My mentor, Ben Graham, used to say. “Speculation is neither illegal, immoral nor fattening (financially).” During the past year, it was possible to become fiscally flabby through a steady diet of speculative bonbons. We continue to eat oatmeal but if indigestion should set in generally, it is unrealistic to expect that we won’thave some discomfort.
我的导师，格雷厄姆曾经说。“投机不是非法的，不是不道德的，也不是（金钱上）增肥的。”在过去一年，通过连续吃投机的巧克力夹心可以在金钱上变胖。而我们继续吃燕麦片，但是如果大家整体都消化不良，希望我们不会感到不舒服也是不现实的。
（1967年给合伙人的信）
Essentially I am out of step with present conditions. On one point, however, I am clear. I will not abandon a previous approach whose logic I understand (although I find it difficult to apply) even though it may mean foregoing large and apparently easy, profits to embrace an approach which I don’t fully understand, have not practiced successfully and which, possibly, could lead to substantial permanent loss of capital.
我基本上是跟不上目前的形势了。但是，我非常清楚一点。即使放弃大量而明显的容易挣的利润，我也不会放弃我以前的方法，因为我理解这种方法的逻辑（虽然我发现这种方法难以应用）。我不会接受一种我不完全理解，没有成功实践的方法，因为这有可能导致资本的重大永久损失。
（1967年给合伙人的信）
定性与定量
证券分析与决策总是结合了定性与定量，定性赚大钱，定量赚稳钱，缺一不可。
The evaluation of securities and businesses for investment purposes has always involved a mixture of qualitative and quantitative factors. At the one extreme, the analyst exclusively oriented to qualitative factors would say. "Buy the right company (with the right prospects, inherent industry conditions, management, etc.) and the price will take care of itself.” On the other hand, the quantitative spokesman would say, “Buy at the right price and the company (and stock) will take care of itself.” As is so often the pleasant result in the securities world, money can be made with either approach. And, of course, any analyst combines the two to some extent – his classification in either school would depend on the relative weight he assigns to the various factors and not to his consideration of one group of factors to the exclusion of the other group. 为 了投资目的而对证券与业务进行的估值，向来混合了定性和定量的因素。在一个极端，完全偏向定性因素的分析者会说：“买好的公司（有好的前景，好的内在行业 状况，好的管理等），价格自己会上涨。”在另一个极端，定量分析一方会说：“买在合适的价位，公司（和股票）自己会努力。”在证券世界里，良好的业绩往往 证明，这两种方式都可以赚钱。当然，任何分析师在某种程度上都综合了这两种方式，他对这两种学派的划分要看他对不同因素所给予的权重，而不是只考虑一类因 素而拒绝其他一类因素。
Interestingly enough, although I consider myself to be primarily in the quantitative school (and as I write this no one has come back from recess - I may be the only one left in the class), the really sensational ideas I have had over the years have been heavily weighted toward the qualitative side where I have had a "high-probability insight". This is what causes the cash register to really sing. However, it is an infrequent occurrence, as insights usually are, and, of course, no insight is required on the quantitative side - the figures should hit you over the head with a baseball bat. So the really big money tends to be made by investors who are right on qualitative decisions but, at least in my opinion, the more sure money tends to be made on the obvious quantitative decisions.
有趣的是，虽然我自认为主要是定量这一学派的（在我写这封信的时候，大家都还没从休 假回来，我可能是这一派唯一剩下的一个人），但是在过去这么多年，那些真正绝妙的投资想法都严重倾向于定性一端，对那些想法我有着“高概率的深刻见解”。 这才是赚钱的真正原因。但是，这种机会并不常见。因为洞察、深入见解通常并不是定量分析所必须的。数字是直来直去的，就像你的头被棒球棒击中一样。所以， 至少在我看，真正的大钱是靠投资者在定性分析上决策正确而赚的，而可靠而稳定的赚钱则要靠明显而直接的定量决策。
Such statistical bargains have tended to disappear over the years. This may be due to the constant combing and recombing of investments that has occurred during the past twenty years, without an economic convulsion such as that of the ‘30s to create a negative bias toward equities and spawn hundreds of new bargain securities. It maybe due to the new growing social acceptance, and therefore usage (or maybe it's vice versa - I'll let the behaviorists figure it out) of takeover bids which have a natural tendency to focus on bargain issues. It may be due to the exploding ranks of security analysts bringing forth an intensified scrutiny of issues far beyond what existed some years ago. Whatever the cause, the result has been the virtual disappearance of the bargain issue as determined quantitatively - and thereby of our bread and butter. There still maybe a few from time to time. There will also be the occasional security where I am really competent to make an important qualitative judgment. This will offer our best chance for large profits. Such instances will. however, be rare. Much of our good performance duringthe past three years has been due to a single idea of this sort.
这些便宜的机会在过去一些年逐渐消失。这可能是由于在过去20年里，投资公司不断合并，而且又缺乏像30年 代那样的大的经济震荡来产生对股票的负面偏见，因此无法大量产生成百的便宜股票。这也可能是因为社会的容忍度逐渐增加，所以收购兼并的使用逐渐增加（也可 能是反过来，收购兼并增加而导致社会越来越容忍，让行为学者想明白吧。）这些收购兼并自然集中在便宜的投资机会上。这还可能是由于证券分析师数量的暴增， 对证券的仔细深入研究程度远超过多年前的水平。无论原因是什么，结果是通过量化分析就能判断是便宜的股票几乎消失了，而这是我们投资的基本生计。偶尔，也 会有几个便宜的机会。有时候，有的股票我确实有能力做出重要的定性判断。这将带来巨额盈利的最好机会。但是，这些情况都非常少见。我们过去三年的好业绩很 大一部分都是由于一个这种好的投资想法。
（1967年给合伙人的信）
投资与生活的平衡
投资并不是生活的全部，人需要平衡，巴菲特也不例外。放弃追求最大化，也给自己留出了空间。
Elementary self-analysis tells me that I will not be capable of less than all-out effort to achieve a publicly proclaimed goal to people who have entrusted their capital to me. All-out effort makes progressively less sense. I would like to have an economic goal which allows for considerable non-economic activity. This may mean activity outside the field of investments or it simply may mean pursuing lines within the investment field that do not promise the greatest economic reward. An example of the latter might be the continued investment in a satisfactory (but far from spectacular) controlled business where I liked the people and the nature of the business even though alternative investments offered an expectable higher rate of return. More money would be made buying businesses at attractive prices, then reselling them. However, it may be more enjoyable (particularly when the personal value of incremental capital is less) to continue to own them and hopefully improve their performance, usually in a minor way, through some decisions involving financial strategy.
基本的自我分析告诉我，我无法不全身心投入去实现一个对大家公开宣称的目标，这些人 们把资本托付了给我。但全身心投入的方式越来越不明智了。我希望设立一个容许相当多的非经济活动的经济目标。这有可能意味着投资领域以外的活动，或者只意 味着追寻不具有最大经济回报的投资。后一个的例子，比如持续投资于一个令人满意（但远不是绝妙）的控股业务。即使有其他投资机会能提供预期更高的回报率， 我也会投资于这样的生意，因为我喜欢管理者和生意本身。在好的价位买入业务，然后卖掉能挣更多的钱。但是，持续拥有生意，并通过财务决策有希望稍微改善它 们的业绩，这更有乐趣（尤其当个人不必持续投入精力时）。
Thus, I am likely to limit myself to things which are reasonably easy, safe, profitable and pleasant. This will not make our operation more conservative than in the past since I believe, undoubtedly with some bias, that we have always operated with considerable conservatism. The long-term downside risk will not be less; the upside potential will merely be less.
所以，我将会把我的工作限于比较容易、安全、盈利，而且愉快的业务。这不会让我们的运营比过去更加保守。因为我坚信（毫无疑问这有些我自己的偏见）我们一直以相当保守的方式运营。长期的下行风险不会更少，而向上的潜力将更少。
（1967年给合伙人的信）
一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（7） Barrons
http://blog.caing.com/article/10012/
灵感的枯竭
作为一个投资者，到了1968年，巴菲特的投资灵感已经枯竭。在1968年给合伙人的信中， 已经很难找到让人豁然开朗的语句。终于，面临危机的巴菲特在1969年5月决定解散合伙基金。
Everyone makes mistakes.
At the beginning of 1968, I felt prospects for BPL performance looked poorer than at any time in our history. However, due in considerable measure to one simple but sound idea whose time had come (investment ideas,like women are often more exciting than punctual), we recorded an overall gain of $40,032,691.
每个人都会犯错。 在1968年初，我感觉巴菲特合伙基金的业绩看起来比历史上任何时候都要差。但是，由于一个简单而可靠的投资想法起了显著的作用（投资想法如同女人，常令人激动，却很少准时），我们的整个盈利达到了4千万美金。 （1968年给合伙人的信） 解散合伙基金 巴菲特解散合伙基金的决定不仅是由于当时市场的状况，更是其个人诉求。在全身心投入18年后，巴菲特面临着人生与投资的双重平台期，需要对自己的人生与事业做出重大调整。
To My Partners:
致我的合伙人：
About eighteen months ago I wrote to you regarding changed environmental and personal factors causing me to modify our future performance objectives.
大约18个月前，我给你们写信，讲了由于环境改变和个人因素，致使我修改我们未来的业绩目标。
The investing environment I discussed at that time (and on which I have commented in various other letters) has generally become more negative and frustrating as time has passed. Maybe I am merely suffering from a lack of mental flexibility. (One observer commenting on security analysts over forty stated: “They know too many things that are no longer true.”)
随着时间的推移，当时我提到的投资环境（我在其他多封信中也多次提到）已经进一步恶化并令人沮丧。也许我只是受困于头脑缺乏灵活性。（有一个观察者对40岁以上的证券分析师的评论是：“他们知道过多已经不再正确的事情。”）
However, it seems to me that: (1) opportunities for investment that are open to the analyst who stresses quantitative factors have virtually disappeared, after rather steadily drying up over the past twenty years; (2) our $100 million of assets further eliminates a large portion of this seemingly barren investment world, since commitments of less than about $3 million cannot have a real impact on our overall performance, and this virtually rules out companies with less than about $100 million of common stockat market value; and (3) a swelling interest in investment performance has created an increasingly short-term oriented and (in my opinion) more speculative market.
但是，对我来说：（1）在过去20年里，侧重量化因素的分析师的投资机会逐渐枯竭，已经完全消失。（2）我们1亿美元的资产规模进一步排除了本来就贫瘠的投资世界的一大部分。因为任何少于3百万美元的投资都无法对整体业绩产生真正的影响。这实际上就排除了市值低于1亿美金的公司。（3）不断增加的对投资业绩的兴趣催生并加剧了注重短期和（在我看来）投机的市场。
The October 9th, 1967 letter stated that personal considerations were the most important factor among those causing me to modify our objectives. I expressed a desire to be relieved of the (self-imposed) necessity of focusing 100% on BPL. I have flunked this test completely during the last eighteen months. The letter said: I hope limited objectives will make for more limited effort. It hasn't worked out that way. As long as I am “on stage”, publishing a regular record and assuming responsibility for management of what amounts to virtually 100% of the net worth of many partners, I will never be able to put sustained effort into any non-BPL activity. If I am going to participate publicly, I can't help being competitive. I know I don't want to be totally occupied with out-pacing an investment rabbit all my life. The only way to slow down is to stop.
在1967年10月9日的信中，我提到，个人考虑是致使我修改我们投资目标的最重要因素。我表达了希望不再（我自己强加的）必须100%集中在巴菲特合伙基金。在过去18个月，我彻底没有通过这一测试。在信中，我曾经说我希望有限的目标将导致有限的努力。但现实并不如我想象那样。只要我在投资的“台上”，定期发布记录，承担管理几乎是很多合伙人100%净值的资金的责任，我将永远不能把精力持续的投入巴菲特合伙基金以外的活动中去。如果我参与公开活动，我无法不争强好胜。我知道我不想一生都完全沉迷于与投资的兔子赛跑。慢下来的唯一方式就是停止。
Therefore, before yearend. I intend to give all limited partners the required formal notice of my intention to retire.
所以，在年底前，我将给所有的有限合伙人发出必须的正式通知，告知我有意退休。
（1969年5月给合伙人的信）
Quite frankly, in spite of any factors set forth on the earlier pages. I would continue to operate the Partnership in 1970, or even 1971, if I had some really first class ideas. Not because I want to, but simply because I would so much rather end with a good year than a poor one. However. I just don't see anything available that gives any reasonable hope of delivering such a good year and I have no desire to grope around, hoping to "get lucky" with other people's money. I am not attuned to this market environment and I don't want to spoil a decent record by trying to play a game I don't understand just so I can go out a hero.
非常坦率的讲，除了前面说的因素，如果有真正一流的投资想法，我本来想继续运营合伙基金到1970年，甚至是1971年。并不是因为我想继续运营，而是我更想用好的一年而不是差的一年来结束。但是，我根本看不到任何能有希望产生好的一年业绩的机会，而我并不想胡乱尝试，用他人的钱去碰运气。我不适合目前的市场环境，而且我不会为了逞能而尝试做我不懂的事情，我不想破坏一个良好的记录。
（1969年5月给合伙人的信）
Some of you are going to ask, "What do you plan to do?" I don't have an answer to that question. I do know that when I am 60, I should be attempting to achieve different personal goals than those which had priority at age 20. Therefore, unless I now divorce myself from the activity that has consumed virtually all of my time and energies during the first eighteen years of my adult life, I am unlikely to develop activities that will be appropriate to new circumstances in subsequent years.
你们中的有些人将会问“你计划去做什么？”对此我没有答案。我肯定知道的是，当我60岁的时候我将尝试达到不同的人生目标，这些人生目标与我二十多岁时优先考虑的事情不同。所以，除非我现在脱离投资活动，否则我将无法发展适合以后新情况的新的活动。因为投资这项活动完全占据了我作为一个成年人的第一个18年。
（1969年5月给合伙人的信）
结束语
到1969年解散合伙基金，巴菲特已经走完了作为一个投资者的第一段历程。人生的问题，投资的停滞，让他不得不重新思考，彻底改变。
当我们再次读到巴菲特写给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信，巴菲特已经由一个简单的股票投资者蜕变为一个实业家和投资者，并逐渐脱离了导师格雷厄姆的光环，发展了自己独特的投资理念与投资体系。
一个实业家的诞生——读巴菲特的信（8） Barrons
从投资到实业的转型
从70年代中期开始，巴菲特已经不仅是单纯的股票投资，他开始更多的从企业拥有者的角度思考问题，进行决策。从某种意义上讲，巴菲特更像一个精于投资的实业家。
在早期，巴菲特更注重买入价格和足够的安全边际。而到了这个阶段，他看重的因素是企业的经济前景，管理层，以及购买价格。前面两点在巴菲特早期的投资决策中并没有得到太多的体现。但是，他的投资方式仍然没有变，仍然是对确信度非常高的企业重仓集中投资。
Our equity investments are heavily concentrated in a few companies which are selected based on favorable economic characteristics, competent and honest management, and a purchase price attractive when measured against the yardstick of value to a private owner.
我们的股票投资重仓集中在少数几个公司。我们选择这些公司是基于有利的经济特征，有能力而且诚实的管理层，以及用私人拥有价值衡量有吸引力的购买价格。
When such criteria are maintained, our intention is to hold for a long time; indeed, our largest equity investment is 467,150 shares of Washington Post “B” stock with a cost of $10.6 million, which we expect to hold permanently.
当这些条件都满足时，我们有意长期持有。实际上，我们最大的股票投资是46万7千1百5十股华盛顿邮报的“B”股，成本为1千万美元。我们打算永远持有。
With this approach, stock market fluctuations are of little importance to us — except as they may provide buying opportunities — but business performance is of major importance. On this score we have been delighted with progress made by practically all of the companies in which we now have significant investments. 采用这种方式，股票市场的波动对我们毫无意义，只不过有时能提供买入的机会，但是业务表现对我们极为重要。在这方面，我们对所有我们有重大投资的企业的进展感到高兴。 （1975年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
You will notice that our major equity holdings are relatively few. We select such investments on a long-term basis weighing the same factors as would be involved in the purchase of 100% of an operating business: (1) favorable long-term economic characteristics; (2)competent and honest management; (3) purchase price attractive when measured against the yardstick of value to a private owner; and (4)an industry with which we are familiar and whose long-term business characteristics we feel competent to judge. It is difficult to find investments meeting such a test, and that is one reason for our concentration of holdings. We simply can't find one hundred different securities that conform to our investment requirements. However, we feel quite comfortable concentrating our holdings in the much smaller number that we do identify as attractive.
你会注意到我们的主要股票投资个数较少。我们选择这些投资是基于长期的考虑，按照我们购买100%的业务的情况权衡了各种因素：（1）有利的长期经济特征。（2）有能力而且诚实的管理层。（3）用私人拥有价值衡量有吸引力的购买价格。（4）我们熟悉的行业，而且我们有能力判断其长期业务特征。但是很难找到符合条件的投资，这也是为什么我们集中持股的一个原因。我们根本无法找到100个不同的股票，而且都能满足我们的投资要求。但是，我们对集中投资在如此之少的几个股票感到非常舒服自在，因为这几个股票我们确认是有吸引力的。
（1975年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
We are not concerned with whether the market quickly revalues upward securities that we believe are selling at bargain prices. In fact, we prefer just the opposite since, in most years, we expect to have funds available to be a net buyer of securities. And consistent attractive purchasing is likely to prove to be of more eventual benefit to us than any selling opportunities provided by a short-term run up in stock prices to levels at which we are unwilling to continue buying. 我 们不担心市场能否迅速向上重估我们坚信卖便宜了的股票。实际上，我们希望的正好相反，因为在大多数年份里，我们预期将获得资金，成为股票的净买入者。持续 以诱人的价格购买，这对我们最终的益处多于任何短期股价上涨所带来的卖出机会的好处。因为如果股票上涨到一定程度，我们就不愿继续买入。 Our policy is to concentrate holdings. We try to avoid buying a little of this or that when we are only lukewarm about the business or its price. When we are convinced as to attractiveness, we believe in buying worthwhile amounts. 我们的策略是集中持股。我们避免对业务或价格只是半信半疑，却这买一点儿，那买一点儿。当我们确信一个投资是有吸引力的，我们坚信，要买就要重仓买入。
（1978年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
衡量公司业绩的标准
巴菲特在衡量公司业绩时，更多的是从一个长期拥有者的角度考虑，注重ROE，注重长期。
Most companies define “record” earnings as a new high in earnings per share. Since businesses customarily add from year to year to their equity base, we find nothing particularly noteworthy in a management performance combining, say, a 10% increase in equity capital and a 5% increase in earnings per share. After all, even a totally dormant savings account will produce steadily rising interest earnings each year because of compounding.
很多公司把“创纪录”的盈利定义为每股盈利创新高。由于企业通常年复一年的增加资本基数，我们觉得如果一个管理层的业绩包括了如10%的资本增加和5%的每股盈利增加，那么这没什么值得注意的。毕竟一个完全不动的存款帐户，由于复利的作用，每年还能产生稳定的利息收入增长。
Except for special cases (for example, companies with unusual debt-equity ratios or those with important assets carried at unrealistic balance sheet values), we believe a more appropriate measure of managerial economic performance to be return on equity capital.
除了特殊的情况（如有异常的债务/资本比例，或者有重要的资产以不现实的价值体现在资产负债表上），我们相信权益资本回报率是衡量管理层业绩表现的更合适指标。
（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
“Earnings per share” will rise constantly on a dormant savings account or on a U.S. Savings Bond bearing a fixed rate of return simply because “earnings” (the stated interest rate) are continuously plowed back and added to the capital base. Thus, even a “stopped clock” can look like a growth stock if the dividend payout ratio is low. “每股盈利”将持续稳定增长，即使是一个完全不动的存款帐户，或者固定利率的美国储蓄债券也是如此。因为“盈利”（标称利率）将持续加回到本金中。所以，如果分红率足够低，一个“不走的钟表”也能看起来像一个成长股。 The primary test of managerial economic performance is the achievement of a high earnings rate on equity capital employed (without undue leverage, accounting gimmickry, etc.) and not the achievement of consistent gains in earnings per share. In our view, many businesses would be better understood by their shareholder owners, as well as the general public, if managements and financial analysts modified the primary emphasis they place upon earnings per share, and upon yearly changes in that figure. 衡 量管理层经济业绩的最主要测试就是达到在使用的权益资本之上获得高的回报率（但没有过度的杠杆，会计花招等。），而不是获得每股盈利的持续稳定增长。在我 们看来，如果管理层和金融分析师能改变对每股盈利及每股盈利年度变化的重视，很多业务能被股东拥有者以及公众更好的理解。
（1979年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
In measuring long term economic performance - in contrast to yearly performance - we believe it is appropriate to recognize fully any realized capital gains or losses as well as extraordinary items, and also to utilize financial statements presenting equity securities at market value. Such capital gains or losses, either realized or unrealized, are fully as important to shareholders over a period of years as earnings realized in a more routine manner through operations; it is just that their impact is often extremely capricious in the short run, a characteristic that makes them inappropriate as an indicator of single year managerial performance. 在衡量长期经济表现时，与年度业绩不同，我们相信把所有实现的资本增值/损失，以及特殊项目进行确认，并且用目前的市场价值体现财务报表中股票的价值是合适的。这些资本增值/损失，无论实现的还是未实现的，与日常运营中实现的盈利一样，在多年的时间里，对股东都具有同样重要的价值。只不过在短期内，这些资本增值/损失的影响极为多变，这让它们不适合作为某一年管理层业绩的指标。
（1979年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
As we have noted, we evaluate single-year corporate performance by comparing operating earnings to shareholders’ equity with securities valued at cost. Our long-term yardstick of performance, however, includes all capital gains or losses, realized or unrealized. We continue to achieve a long-term return on equity that considerably exceeds the average of our yearly returns. The major factor causing this pleasant result is a simple one: the retained earnings of those non-controlled holdings we discussed earlier have been translated into gains in market value. 正如我们提到的，我们衡量某一年的企业业绩是用运营利润比上按成本估值的股东权益。但是我们长期的业绩衡量指标包括了所有的资本增值/损失，无论是实现的还是未实现的。我们不断取得显著超过年度平均回报的长期资本回报率。造成这个良好结果的主要的因素在于一个简单的事实：我们前面所讨论的非控股公司的存留收益已经转化为市场价值的增长。 Of course, this translation of retained earnings into market price appreciation is highly uneven (it goes in reverse some years), unpredictable as to timing, and unlikely to materialize on a precise dollar-for-dollar basis. And a silly purchase price for a block of stock in a corporation can negate the effects of a decade of earnings retention by that corporation. But when purchase prices are sensible, some long-term market recognition of the accumulation of retained earnings almost certainly will occur. Periodically you even will receive some frosting on the cake, with market appreciation far exceeding post-purchase retained earnings. 当然，这种将存留收益转化为市场价格上涨的过程是高度不平均的（有时候方向甚至是相反的），在时间上无法预测，无法精确按照一美元兑一美元来实现。而且一个荒谬的股票购买价格能抵消企业10年的存留收益的效果。但是，当购买价格合理时，对存留收益积累的一定程度的长期市场确认几乎肯定会发生。
（1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
买股票如同买整个业务
“买股票如同买整个业务”，这是巴菲特重要的投资哲学，也体现了他从一个纯粹的股票投资者向实业家，企业拥有者的转变。
Most of our large stock positions are going to be held for many years and the scorecard on our investment decisions will be provided by business results over that period, and not by prices on any given day. Just as it would be foolish to focus unduly on short-term prospects when acquiring an entire company, we think it equally unsound to become mesmerized by prospective near term earnings or recent trends in earnings when purchasing small pieces of a company;i.e., marketable common stocks.
我们将长期持有大多数的重大股票投资。因此衡量我们投资决策的记分卡将会是那段时期 的业务表现，而不是任何一天的股价。这就如同并购一整个公司时过分关注短期前景是愚蠢的。同样，我们认为在购买一个公司的一小部分时（即购买股票时），痴 迷于近期盈利前景或者最近的盈利趋势，这也是不明智的。
（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
We select our marketable equity securities in much the same way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be (1) one that we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) available at a very attractive price. We ordinarily make no attempt to buy equities for anticipated favorable stock price behavior in the short term. In fact, if their business experience continues to satisfy us, we welcome lower market prices of stocks we own as an opportunity to acquire even more of a good thing at a better price.
当选择购买股票时，我们用非常类似于评估并购整个业务的方法来进行。我们想要的业务是（1）我们能懂的。（2）有利的长期前景。（3）由诚实而且有能力的人运营。（4）可以用非常诱人的价格获得。我们一般不因为预期的短期股价的良好表现而购买股票。实际上，如果公司的业务持续让我们满意，对拥有的股票，我们欢迎更低的市场价格，我们把这看成是用更好的价格购买更多的好东西。
Our experience has been that pro-rata portions of truly outstanding businesses sometimes sell in the securities markets at very large discounts from the prices they would command in negotiated transactions involving entire companies. Consequently, bargains in business ownership, which simply are not available directly through corporate acquisition, can be obtained indirectly through stock ownership. When prices are appropriate, we are willing to take very large positions in selected companies, not with any intention of taking control and not foreseeing sell-out or merger, but with the expectation that excellent business results by corporations will translate over the long term into correspondingly excellent market value and dividend results for owners, minority as well as majority.
我们的经验表明，相对于谈判并购整个公司的交易价格，真正优秀的业务的一部分有时会 在股票市场有很大的折价。因此，在拥有实业方面，便宜货在企业并购中根本不能直接获得，但却可以通过股票所有权间接获得。当价格合适的时候，我们愿意买入 精心挑选的一些公司很多的股份。我们无意控制公司，或者寻求整体出售及合并。但是我们预期公司优异的业绩将在长期转化为给拥有者的出色的市场价值和股息， 无论拥有者是少数股东还是大股东。
（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
Whatever the appellation, we are delighted with our GEICO holding which, as noted, cost us $47 million. To buy a similar $20 million of earning power in a business with first-class economic characteristics and bright prospects would cost a minimum of $200 million (much more in some industries) if it had to be accomplished through negotiated purchase of an entire company.
无论怎么说，我们都对GEICO的持股感到满意。这耗费了我们4千7百万美元。但如果谈判并购整个公司，要买一个类似的有2千万美元盈利能力的第一流经济特征和光明前景的企业，至少要耗资2亿美金（在某些行业要多得多）。
（1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
Since See’s was purchased by Blue Chip Stamps at the beginning of 1972, pre-tax operating earnings have grown from $4.2 million to $12.6 million with little additional capital investment. See’s achieved this record while operating in an industry experiencing practically no unit growth.
喜诗巧克力公司是由Blue Chip Stamps公司在1972年初购买的。其税前运营利润从4百二十万美元增长到了1千2百6十万美元，而仅有非常少的额外资本投入。喜诗巧克力在一个正在经历着毫无数量增长的行业取得了如此的业绩。
（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
一个实业家的诞生——读巴菲特的信（9） Barrons
http://blog.caing.com/article/10365/
关于保险行业 巴菲特在1967年开始进入保险行业。他对这个行业有着深入的见解。保险业的资金也支撑了他进一步投资。保险资金的特点在于无利息，甚至是负利息。当保险亏钱时，与整体的浮存金（Float）相比，亏钱百分比很小，常常低于美国国债利息，所以还是划算。而当保险赚钱时，就相当于负利息，也就是借别人的钱，别人还倒贴给你利息。所以保险是否赚钱不是最重要的，浮存金才是关键。通过浮存金，巴菲特获得了无利息甚至负利息的杠杆，提高了投资的业绩。2009年伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东权益为1360亿美元，保险浮存金（float）为620亿美元，相当于1.46的负利率杠杆。 SAFECO probably is the best run large property and casualty insurance company in the United States. Their underwriting abilities are simply superb, their loss reserving is conservative, and their investment policies make great sense. SAFECO可能是美国运营最好的大型财产事故保险公司。他们的承保能力一流，赔款拨备保守，投资策略非常明智。 SAFECO is a much better insurance operation than our own (although we believe certain segments of ours are much better than average), is better than one we could develop and, similarly, is far better than any in which we might negotiate purchase of a controlling interest. Yet our purchase of SAFECO was made at substantially under book value. We paid less than 100 cents on the dollar for the best company in the business, when far more than 100 cents on the dollar is being paid for mediocre companies in corporate transactions. And there is no way to start a new operation - with necessarily uncertain prospects - at less than 100 cents on the dollar. SAFECO比我们的保险业务好很多（虽然我们坚信我们在某些方面远好过平均水平），好过我们自己所能发展的水平。同样，也远好过我们通过谈判购买控股权所能得到的业务。而且，我们对SAFECO的购买价格远低于帐面价格。对这个业界最好的公司，对每一美元的帐面资产我们支付了不到一美元的价格。与此同时，一些平庸的公司在企业并购中的价格远超过帐面价格。用少于帐面价格的花费，根本无法创建一个新的业务，而且新建业务还必然有不确定的前景。 Of course, with a minor interest we do not have the right to direct or even influence management policies of SAFECO. But why should we wish to do this? The record would indicate that they do a better job of managing their operations than we could do ourselves. While there may be less excitement and prestige in sitting back and letting others do the work, we think that is all one loses by accepting a passive participation in excellent management. Because, quite clearly, if one controlled a company run as well as SAFECO, the proper policy also would be to sit back and let management do its job. 当然，拥有少数股东权益，我们无权指导或者影响SAFECO的管理策略。但是，我们为什么要这样做呢？记录显示，他们自己管理的运营比让我们来管还更好。虽然撒手不管，让别人去做事不够令人激动，也缺少声望，但我们认为，这是接受被动参与优秀的管理层所能失去的唯一东西。因为，非常清楚，如果一个人完全拥有一个像SAFECO这样运营良好的公司，合适的策略也是撒手不管，让管理层自主管理。 （1978年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信） Insurance companies offer standardized policies which can be copied by anyone. Their only products are promises. It is not difficult to belicensed, and rates are an open book. There are no important advantages from trademarks, patents, location, corporate longevity, raw material sources, etc., and very little consumer differentiation to produce insulation from competition. It is commonplace, in corporate annual reports, to stress the difference that people make. Sometimes this is true and sometimes it isn’t. But there is no question that the nature of the insurance business magnifies the effect which individual managers have on company performance. We are very fortunate to have the group of managers that are associated with us.
保 险公司提供标准化保单，可以被任何人复制。他们惟一的产品就是承诺。执照不难获得，保费是公开的。保险公司在商标、专利、地点、企业的悠长历史、原材料来 源等方面没有重要的优势。他们很难把自己与竞争对手区分开来。在企业的年报中，常常强调人的作用。有时候，这是事实，有时候不是。但是，毫无疑问，保险业 的本质放大了个别经理人对于公司业绩的作用。我们很幸运，拥有一群好的经理人。
（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信） Nevertheless, we believe that insurance can be a very good business. It tends to magnify, to an unusual degree, human managerial talent - or the lack of it. We have a number of managers whose talent is both proven and growing. (And, in addition, we have a very large indirect interest in two truly outstanding management groups through our investments in SAFECO and GEICO.) Thus we expect to do well in insurance over a period of years. However, the business has the potential for really terrible results in a single specific year. If accident frequency should turn around quickly in the auto field, we, along with others, are likely to experience such a year. 但是，我们相信保险业可以是一个很好的业务。保险趋向于以非常大的比例放大管理人才（或者缺乏管理人才）的效果。我们有很多经理人，其才干不仅得到证实，而且正在不断增长。（而且我们通过投资SAFECO 和GEICO 而间接获得了两个真正优秀的管理团队的权益。）所以，我们预计未来一些年将在保险行业取得好业绩。但是，这一行业有潜在的可能性在某一年取得非常糟糕的业绩。如果汽车领域的事故频率突然升高，我们和同行业者都有可能遭遇这样糟糕的一年。 （1979年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信） 保险行业的问题 在 极高通胀背景下，保险行业受到双重挤压。一方面，保费增长跟不上赔付成本的快速增长。另一方面，投资的债券又在通胀加息后损失惨重。为了不被迫卖掉债券而 实现损失，各个保险公司宁肯赔本卖保险，也要维持保费收入增加，从而引发价格战并进入了恶性循环，加重了保险业的问题。美国保险业过去的问题，对于有可能 进入高通胀时期的中国，也有借鉴意义。
We estimate that costs involved in the insurance areas in which we operate rise at close to 1% per month. This is due to continuous monetary inflation affecting the cost of repairing humans and property, as well as“social inflation”, a broadening definition by society and juries of what is covered by insurance policies. Unless rates rise at a comparable 1% per month, underwriting profits must shrink.
我们估计我们的保险运营所涉及的成本正以每月1%的速度递增。这是由于持续的货币通胀影响了医治人和修复财产的成本，以及“社会通胀”，即社会和陪审团对什么是保险应该负责的定义越来越宽泛。除非保费能以类似每月1%的速度增加，承保盈利必然减少。
（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
The insurance industry’s underwriting picture continues to unfold about as we anticipated, with the combined ratio (see definition on page37) rising from 100.6 in 1979 to an estimated 103.5 in 1980. It is virtually certain that this trend will continue and that industry underwriting losses will mount, significantly and progressively, in 1981 and 1982. To understand why, we recommend that you read the excellent analysis of property-casualty competitive dynamics done by Barbara Stewart of Chubb Corp. in an October 1980 paper. (Chubb’s annual report consistently presents the most insightful, candid and well-written discussion of industry conditions; you should get on the company’smailing list.) Mrs. Stewart’s analysis may not be cheerful, but we think it is very likely to be accurate.
保险行业的承保情况如我们预期的一样发展。综合赔付率（译者注：综合赔付率是指：综合赔款，即理赔费用与发生的赔款总合，与相应的已赚保费的比率）从1979年的100.6%上升到1980年估计的103.5%。几乎可以确定，这个趋势将会继续，保险行业的承保损失将在1981年和1982年逐渐显著增加。想要了解为什么会这样，我建议读一读Chubb公司的Barbara Stewart写于1980年10月的文章，这是一篇对财产事故险行业竞争态势的出色分析。（Chubb的年报一直呈现了最深刻、坦率的文笔流畅的行业情况讨论。你应当加入其公司邮寄名单。）Stewart女士的分析可能不乐观，但我们认为很有可能是准确的。
And, unfortunately, a largely unreported but particularly pernicious problem may well prolong and intensify the coming industry agony. It is not only likely to keep many insurers scrambling for business when underwriting losses hit record levels - it is likely to cause them at such a time to redouble their efforts.
不幸的是，一个未被报道，但却非常有害的问题有可能持续并加剧即将到来的行业困境。这不仅有可能让很多保险公司在承保损失达到创纪录的水平时忙于应对，而且还有可能迫使他们付出加倍的努力。
This problem arises from the decline in bond prices and the insurance accounting convention that allows companies to carry bonds at amortized cost, regardless of market value. Many insurers own long-term bonds that, at amortized cost, amount to two to three times net worth. If the level is three times, of course, a one-third shrink from cost in bond prices - if it were to be recognized on the books - would wipe out net worth. And shrink they have. Some of the largest and best known property-casualty companies currently find themselves with nominal, or even negative, net worth when bond holdings are valued at market. Of course their bonds could rise in price, thereby partially, or conceivably even fully, restoring the integrity of stated net worth. Or they could fall further. (We believe that short-term forecasts of stock or bond prices are useless. The forecasts may tell you a great deal about the forecaster; they tell you nothing about the future.)
这 个问题出在下跌的债券价格和保险会计惯例允许公司不论债券的市场价值而用已摊销成本持有债券。很多保险公司拥有的长期债券按已摊销成本计算是其净资产的两 到三倍。如果是净资产的三倍，那么当债券的价值从成本价贬值三分之一后，在账面上体现出来就会把净资产全部消除。而这些债券确实已经贬值了。当持有的债券 用市场价估值时，一些最大，最有名的财产损失险公司目前发现自己仅有微不足道，甚至是负的净资产。当然，他们的债券有可能升值，部分，甚至是全部恢复规定 净资产的完整性。或者他们也有可能进一步恶化。（我们坚信对股票或者债券价格的短期预测是毫无用处的。预测可能更多的是告诉你很多关于预测者本身的情况， 而不是未来的情况。）
It might strike some as strange that an insurance company’s survival is threatened when its stock portfolio falls sufficiently in price to reduce net worth significantly, but that an even greater decline in bond prices produces no reaction at all. The industry would respond by pointing out that, no matter what the current price, the bonds will be paid in full at maturity, thereby eventually eliminating any interim price decline. It may take twenty, thirty, or even forty years, this argument says, but, as long as the bonds don’t have to be sold, in the end they’ll all be worth face value. Of course, if they are sold even if they are replaced with similar bonds offering better relative value - the loss must be booked immediately. And, just as promptly, published net worth must be adjusted downward by the amount of the loss.
对 有些人来讲，会觉得以下情况很奇怪：当保险公司的股票投资组合下跌到足够的程度，以至于严重减少净资产时，保险公司的生存就会受到威胁；但即使保险公司拥 有的债券价格下跌更多，保险公司却毫不受影响。保险业的反应可能是指出，无论目前的价格如何，债券在到期后将全额付清，所以最终将消除任何在这之间的价格 下跌。这个论点指出，债券可能持续20，30，甚至是40年，只要不必卖出，最终债券将回归面值。当然，如果债券被卖掉，即使是用有更好价值的类似债券替换，债券的损失也要立刻记入。而且，公布的净资产也将同时根据损失额相应向下调整。
Under such circumstances, a great many investment options disappear, perhaps for decades. For example, when large underwriting losses arein prospect, it may make excellent business logic for some insurersto shift from tax-exempt bonds into taxable bonds. Unwillingness to recognize major bond losses may be the sole factor that prevents such a sensible move.
在这种情况下，很多投资选择在几十年的时间里消失了。比如，当预计有大量承保损失时，非常符合商业逻辑的做法是保险公司从免税债券转向付税债券。保险公司不愿意做这样合理的转换，完全是由于不愿确认债券的重大损失。
But the full implications flowing from massive unrealized bond losses are far more serious than just the immobilization of investment intellect. For the source of funds to purchase and hold those bonds is a pool of money derived from policy holders and claimants(with changing faces) - money which, in effect, is temporarily on deposit with the insurer. As long as this pool retains its size, no bonds must be sold. If the pool of funds shrinks - which it will ifthe volume of business declines significantly- assets must be sold to pay off the liabilities. And if thoseassets consist of bonds with big unrealized losses, such losses will rapidly become realized, decimating net worth in the process.
但是大量的未确认债券损失所带来的问题远比仅仅失去投资智慧的灵活性严重。用于购买并持有那 些债券的资金来源是保险客户和保险索赔人（充满变化）的钱。这些钱实际上是暂时存在保险公司的。只要这些钱的多少保持不变，债券无需被卖出。但是如果这些 钱减少，如果业务流量急剧减少时就会如此，资产必须被卖掉以平衡负债。而且如果这些资产包含了大量未确认损失的债券，那么这些损失将迅速被确认，随之减损 净资产。
Thus,an insurance company with a bond market value shrinkage approaching stated net worth (of which there are now many) and also faced within adequate rate levels that are sure to deteriorate further has two options. One option for management is to tell the underwriters to keep pricing according to the exposure involved - “be sure to get a dollar of premium for every dollar of expense cost plus expectable loss cost”.
所 以如果一个保险公司拥有的债券的市值减少接近规定的净资产（目前有很多公司是这样的），而且面临综合赔付率水平不足且肯定会进一步恶化的情况，这个保险公 司有两个选择。一个选择是管理层指示保险承保人依据所面临的风险定价，即“对每一美元的成本和预计赔付，一定要得到一美元的保费。”
The consequences of this directive are predictable: (a) with most business both price sensitive and renewable annually, many policies presently on the books will be lost to competitors in rather short order; (b) as premium volume shrinks significantly, there will be alagged but corresponding decrease in liabilities (unearned premiums and claims payable); (c) assets (bonds) must be sold to match the decrease in liabilities; and (d) the formerly unrecognized disappearance of net worth will become partially recognized (depending upon the extent of such sales) in the insurer’s published financial statements.
这个指示的后果可以预测：（a）由于大多数的业务对价格敏感而且是年度续约，很多目前的保单将在短期内丢失到竞争对手那里去。（b）当保费的数量严重减少，那就会有滞后但相应的负债减少（预收保费和应付索赔）。（c）资产（债券）必须被卖掉以平衡减少的负债。（d）之前未确认的净资产消失将在保险公司公布的财务报表中得到部分确认（还要看这些销售债券的情形）。
Variations of this depressing sequence involve a smaller penalty to stated net worth. The reaction of some companies at (c) would be to sell either stocks that are already carried at market values or recently purchased bonds involving less severe losses. This ostrich-like behavior - selling the better assets and keeping the biggest losers -while less painful in the short term, is unlikely to be a winner inthe long term.
这一恶性循环的一个变种会让规定净资产的减少较轻。有些公司对（c）的反应是卖掉已经以市场价值计的股票，或者最近购买的债券，这些债券较少涉及严重的损失。这种鸵鸟式的行为，卖掉更好的资产却留着最大的损失，在短期内痛苦较少，但长期看不太可能成功。
The second option is much simpler: just keep writing business regardless of rate levels and whopping prospective underwriting losses, thereby maintaining the present levels of premiums, assets and liabilities -and then pray for a better day, either for underwriting or for bond prices. There is much criticism in the trade press of “cash flow”underwriting; i.e., writing business regardless of prospective underwriting losses in order to obtain funds to invest at current high interest rates. This second option might properly be termed“asset maintenance” underwriting - the acceptance of terrible business just to keep the assets you now have.
第 二个选择简单多了：只要继续卖保险，不论综合赔付率水平，也不管巨大的未来承保损失。只要保持目前的保费水平，资产和负债状态，祈祷未来会更好，无论是承 保还是债券价格。在保险行业媒体有很多关于“现金流”承保的批评。这种方式不论未来的承保损失，只为了获得资金以目前的高利率投资。这第二种选择可以称为 “资产维持”承保，接受糟糕的业务只为了维持你目前现有的资产。
Of course you know which option will be selected. And it also is clear that as long as many large insurers feel compelled to choose that second option, there will be no better day for underwriting. For if much of the industry feels it must maintain premium volume levels regardless of price adequacy, all insurers will have to come close to meeting those prices. Right behind having financial problems yourself, the next worst plight is to have a large group of competitors with financial problems that they can defer by a“sell-at-any-price” policy.
当 然你知道哪一个选择会被采用。而且，非常清楚，只要许多大型保险公司迫不得已选择这第二种方式，承保的好日子不会到来。如果行业中的大部分都认为不论价格 是否足够，必须维持保费的数量水平，那么所有保险公司都必须用接近的价格应对。在自己有财务问题之外，第二糟糕的困境就是，有着财务问题的一大群竞争对 手，能用“卖在任何价格”的方式延缓问题。
We mentioned earlier that companies that were unwilling - for any of a number of reasons, including public reaction, institutional pride, or protection of stated net worth - to sell bonds at price levels forcing recognition of major losses might find themselves frozen in investment posture for a decade or longer. But, as noted, that’s only half of the problem. Companies that have made extensive commitments to long-term bonds may have lost, for a considerable period of time, not only many of their investment options, but many of their underwriting options as well.
我前面提到，保险公司不愿以不得不确认重大损失的价格卖掉债券。他们这样做可能有很多原因，公众反应，机构的自尊，或者保护规定的净资产。他们这样做有可能导致束缚自己的投资方式长达10年，甚至更久。但是，如前面所说，这只是问题的一半。购买了大量长期债券的保险公司有可能在很长时期内已经失去了不仅是投资选择，而且是他们的承保选择。
Our own position in this respect is satisfactory. We believe our net worth, valuing bonds of all insurers at amortized cost, is the strongest relative to premium volume among all large property-casualty stockholder-owned groups. When bonds are valued at market, our relative strength becomes far more dramatic. (But lest we get too puffed up, we remind ourselves that our asset and liability maturities still are far more mismatched than we would wish and that we, too, lost important sums in bonds because your Chairman was talking when he should have been acting.)
在 这种情形下，我们自己的情况是令人满意的。用已摊销成本计价来评估债券，我们相信我们的净资产相对于保费，在所有的大型财产事故保险公司里是最强的。当用 市值评估时，我们的相对优势变得更加突出。（但别信心膨胀，我们提醒自己，我们的资产和负债仍然不匹配，离我们希望的差的很远。我们也在债券上亏了很多， 因为你们的董事会主席在需要行动的时候正在滔滔不绝的讲话。）
Our abundant capital and investment flexibility will enable us to do whatever we think makes the most sense during the prospective extended period of inadequate pricing. But troubles for the industry mean troubles for us. Our financial strength doesn’t remove us from the hostile pricing environment now enveloping the entire property-casualty insurance industry. It just gives us more staying power and more options.
我们大量的资本和投资的灵活性让我们能够在长期定价不足的条件下做出我们认为最明智的决策。但是，行业的麻烦就意味着我们的麻烦。我们的财务优势并不能让我们免于目前席卷了整个财产事故险行业的恶性价格战环境。我们的优势只给了我们更好的持续能力与更多的选择。
（1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
一个实业家的诞生——读巴菲特的信（9.1）Barrons
http://blog.caing.com/article/10474/
浮存的秘密 保 险是伯克希尔的主营业务，也是最重要的业务。保险的商业模式在于浮存和投资。浮存的成本以及投资回报率是关键。相对而言，某一年的承保损失并不重要。但 是，由于保险的复杂性，以及大量运用估计，保险业务的数字有可能变化很大，也给了不良公司巨大的空间来操纵数字。这对一般的投资者非常不利。
TheEconomics of Property/Casualty Insurance
财产意外险的经济特性
Our main business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
虽然我们有其他非常重要的业务，但我们的主要业务是保险。要了解伯克希尔，你必须知道如何评估一个保险公司。主要的决定因素是：（1）业务所产生的浮存的量；（2）浮存的成本；以及（3）最重要的因素是浮存量及其成本的长期前景。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.
首先，浮 存就是我们持有但不拥有的钱。在一个保险运营，浮存的产生是由于保费在赔付之前支付，之间的间隔有时长达许多年。在这期间，保险公司把钱投资。这一愉快的 活动有一个坏处：保险公司拿到的保费往往无法足够支付赔付和其最终必须支付的费用。这就导致保险公司的“承保损失”运营。这种损失就是浮存的成本。如果一 个保险公司的浮存成本在长期低于这个公司从别处获得资金的成本，那么这个保险业务是有价值的。但如果其浮存成本高于市场资金成本，那么这个业务是个没用的 业务。
A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. Both the income statements and balance sheets of insurers can be minefields.
一个特别 值得注意的事：由于赔付必须是估计的，保险公司在搞清其承保结果时有极大的自由度。这让投资者很难计算一个公司的真实浮存成本。估计错误可以非常大，通常 是无恶意的，但有时却不是。这些计算错误的结果直接影响盈利。一个有经验的观察者通常能察觉大规模的准备金错误。但是普通公众一般却只能接受呈现出的结 果。有时我都惊异于著名会计审计事务所无保留确认的数字。保险公司的资产负债表和利润表都有可能是雷区。
At Berkshire, we strive to be both consistent and conservative in our reserving. But we will make mistakes. And we warn you that there is nothing symmetrical about surprises in the insurance business: They almost always are unpleasant.
在伯克希尔，我们努力做到在我们的准备金上稳定而保守。但是，我们将犯错误。而且我警告你们，在保险业务，没有什么意外是对称的：那些意外总是令人不快的。 （2000年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信） MeasuringInsurance Performance 衡量保险业绩
In the previous section I mentioned "float," the funds of others that insurers, in the conduct of their business, temporarily hold. Because these funds are available to be invested, the typical property-casualty insurer can absorb losses and expenses that exceed premiums by 7% to 11% and still be able to break even on its business. Again, this calculation excludes the earnings the insurer realizes on net worth - that is, on the funds provided by shareholders.
在前面部分我提到了“浮存”，即保险公司在进行其业务时暂时保管的他人资金。因为这些资金可以被用来投资，典型的财产意外险公司能吸收超过保费7-11%的赔付和费用，而仍能达到业务的盈亏平衡。当然，这个计算没有包括保险公司在净值之上的收益，也就是用股东的钱获得的收益。
However, many exceptions to this 7% to 11% range exist. For example, insurance covering losses to crops from hail damage produces virtually no float at all. Premiums on this kind of business are paid to the insurer just prior to the time hailstorms are a threat, and if a farmer sustains a loss he will be paid almost immediately. Thus, a combined ratio of 100 for crop hail insurance produces no profit for the insurer.
但是，在这7-11%的范围之外存在很多例外情况。比如承保农作物冰雹损失的保险几乎就根本没有浮存。这种业务的保费刚好在冰雹成为威胁的季节之前支付给保险公司，而如果农民受到了损失，他将几乎立即得到偿付。所以，一个综合赔付率为100%的农作物冰雹险不给保险公司产生利润。
At the other extreme, malpractice insurance covering the potential liabilities of doctors, lawyers and accountants produces a very high amount of float compared to annual premium volume. The float materializes because claims are often brought long after the alleged wrongdoing takes place and because their payment may be still further delayed by lengthy litigation. The industry calls malpractice and certain other kinds of liability insurance "long- tail" business, in recognition of the extended period during which insurers get to hold large sums that in the end will go to claimants and their lawyers (and to the insurer's lawyers as well).
另 外一个极端，执业过失险承保了医生，律师，和会计师的潜在责任，与每年的保费量相比，产生了大量的浮存。能够实现浮存是因为索赔经常是在声称的过失发生后 很久，而且还因为赔付往往被长时间的诉讼过程所拖延。保险行业把执业过失险和其他一些责任险称为“长尾”业务，意思是保险公司得以长期拿着大量的保费，而 最终这些保费都会流向索赔人及其律师（以及保险公司的律师）。
In long-tail situations a combined ratio of 115 (or even more) can prove profitable, since earnings produced by the float will exceed the 15% by which claims and expenses overrun premiums. The catch, though, is that "long-tail" means exactly that: Liability business written in a given year and presumed at first to have produced a combined ratio of 115 may eventually smack the insurer with 200, 300 or worse when the years have rolled by and all claims have finally been settled.
在长尾情况下，一个115%（或者更高）的综合赔付率可能是盈利的，因为由浮存产生的收益将超过15%的索赔和费用出超保费部分。但一个隐含的问题是，“长尾”顾名思义：某一年承保的责任险开始假定能产生115%的综合赔付率，但是当多年过去后，所有的索赔都终于被解决，最终综合赔付率可能高达200%，300%或者更高，从而打击保险公司。
The pitfalls of this business mandate an operating principle that too often is ignored: Though certain long-tail lines may prove profitable at combined ratios of 110 or 115, insurers will invariably find it unprofitable to price using those ratios as targets. Instead, prices must provide a healthy margin of safety against the societal trends that are forever springing expensive surprises on the insurance industry. Setting a target of 100 can itself result in heavy losses; aiming for 110 - 115 is business suicide.
这种业务的陷阱让其必须有一个运营原则，而这一原则常常被忽视：虽然某些长尾业务在110-115%的综合赔付率有可能盈利，但保险公司如果用这作为目标，他们将总是发现自己无法盈利。价格必须提供健康的安全边际，以应对永远给保险行业带来昂贵惊讶的社会趋势。设定100%的综合赔付率目标将带来严重亏损；目标设定在110-115是商业上的自杀。
All of that said, what should the measure of an insurer's profitability be? Analysts and managers customarily look to the combined ratio - and it's true that this yardstick usually is a good indicator of where a company ranks in profitability. We believe a better measure, however, to be a comparison of underwriting loss to float developed.
说了那么多，什么才应该是衡量一个保险公司盈利的标准？分析师和经理人习惯上看综合赔付率。确实，这个尺度通常是公司盈利排名的好指标。但我们我们相信，一个更好的衡量标准是承保损失与浮存的比。
This loss/float ratio, like any statistic used in evaluating insurance results, is meaningless over short time periods: Quarterly underwriting figures and even annual ones are too heavily based on estimates to be much good. But when the ratio takes in a period of years, it gives a rough indication of the cost of funds generated by insurance operations. A low cost of funds signifies a good business; a high cost translates into a poor business.
这个损失/浮存比率，就像任何用来评估保险结果的统计指标一样，用在短期是毫无意义的。季度承保数字，甚至年度数字都过于严重的依赖估计，意义不大。但是长达几年的比率，就大致显示出保险运营产生的资金成本。一个低成本的资金显示出一个好的业务；一个高成本则意味着糟糕的业务。
On the next page we show the underwriting loss, if any, of our insurance group in each year since we entered the business and relate that bottom line to the average float we have held during the year. From this data we have computed a "cost of funds developed from insurance."
在下一页我们列出了自我们进入保险这一行业以来，我们保险集团每年的承保损失（如果有的话），以及与之相对应的我们在那一年所持有的平均浮存。从这组数据我们计算出了“保险提供资金的成本。” (1) (2) Yearend Yield Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds ------------ ------------ --------------- ------------- (In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2) 1967 .........profit $17.3 less than zero 5.50% 1968 .........profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90% 1969 .........profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79% 1970 .........$0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25% 1971 .........profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81% 1972 .........profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82% 1973 .........profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27% 1974 .........7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13% 1975 .........11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03% 1976 .........profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30% 1977 .........profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97% 1978 .........profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93% 1979 .........profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08% 1980 .........profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94% 1981 .........profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61% 1982 .........21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64% 1983 .........33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84% 1984 .........48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58% 1985 .........44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34% 1986 .........55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60% 1987 .........55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95% 1988 .........11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00% 1989 .........24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97% 1990 .........26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%
The float figures are derived from the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. At some insurers other items should enter into the calculation, but in our case these are unimportant and have been ignored.
浮存的数字是用赔款准备金，理赔费用准备金和预收保费准备金之和减去代理人余额，预付获得客户成本和承担的再保险的递延费用。在有些保险公司，其他项目也应该记入这个计算，但在我们的例子里这些都不重要，已经被忽略了。
During 1990 we held about $1.6 billion of float slated eventually to find its way into the hands of others. The underwriting loss we sustained during the year was $27 million and thus our insurance operation produced funds for us at a cost of about 1.6%. As the table shows, we managed in some years to underwrite at a profit and in those instances our cost of funds was less than zero. In other years, such as 1984, we paid a very high price for float. In 19 years out of the 24 we have been in insurance, though, we have developed funds at a cost below that paid by the government.
在1990年我们持有大约16亿美金的浮存，这些浮存最终将流到其他人手中。我们在这一年的承保损失是2700万美元。所以我们的保险运营所产生的资金，对于我们来说成本为1.6%。如表格所示，我们在一些年实现了承保盈利，在那种情况我们的资金成本低于零。而在另外一些年，如1984年，我们为浮存付出了极高的代价。我们在保险行业的24年中，有19年我们以低于政府支付的成本获得了资金。
There are two important qualifications to this calculation. First, the fat lady has yet to gargle, let alone sing, and we won't know our true 1967 - 1990 cost of funds until all losses from this period have been settled many decades from now. Second, the value of the float to shareholders is somewhat undercut by the fact that they must put up their own funds to support the insurance operation and are subject to double taxation on the investment income these funds earn. Direct investments would be more tax-efficient.
这个计算有两个重要的限定条件。首先，还远没到结束的时候。我们无法知道1967到1990年这段时间真实的资金成本，这要直到几十年后，所有这一时期的赔付都解决后才行。第二，浮存对于股东的价值有些降低。因为股东必须投入他们的资金来支持保险运营，而且在浮存资金所获得的投资收益上受到双重征税。直接投资在税收上更有效。
The tax penalty that indirect investments impose on shareholders is infact substantial. Though the calculation is necessarily imprecise, I would estimate that the owners of the average insurance company would find the tax penalty adds about one percentage point to their cost of float. I also think that approximates the correct figure for Berkshire.
由于间接投资而强加给股东的税务惩罚实际上很重。虽然计算不一定精确，但我估计保险公司的拥有者平均而言会发现税务惩罚加在一起大概是浮存成本的1个百分点。我认为这对伯克希尔也是个正确的估计数字。
Figuring a cost of funds for an insurance business allows anyone analyzing it to determine whether the operation has a positive or negative value for shareholders. If this cost (including the tax penalty) is higher than that applying to alternative sources of funds, the value is negative. If the cost is lower, the value is positive - and if the cost is significantly lower, the insurance business qualifies as a very valuable asset.
算出一个保险公司的资金成本能让任何人对此进行分析，以决定这个保险业务对股东的价值是正还是负。如果这个成本（包括税务惩罚）高于其他来源资金的成本，这一价值就是负的。如果这个成本更低，则价值为正。而如果这一成本显著低于其他来源的资金成本，这个保险业务够得上是一个非常有价值的资产。
So far Berkshire has fallen into the significantly-lower camp. Even more dramatic are the numbers at GEICO, in which our ownership interest is now 48% and which customarily operates at an underwriting profit. GEICO's growth has generated an ever-larger amount of funds for investment that have an effective cost of considerably less than zero. Essentially, GEICO's policyholders, in aggregate, pay the company interest on the float rather than the other way around. (But handsome is as handsome does: GEICO's unusual profitability results from its extraordinary operating efficiency and its careful classification of risks, a package that in turn allows rock-bottom prices for policyholders.)
目前为止伯克希尔的资金成本属于显著低于其他来源的一类。GEICO的数字更加突出。我们拥有GEICO48%的股份。他们通常的运营具有承保盈利。GEICO的增长产生了不断增加的大量资金用于投资，而这部分资金的实际成本远低于零。基本上，GEICO的保险客户作为一个整体向公司支付浮存的利息，而不是公司支付利息给保险客户。（但是GEICO不仅盈利，其内部运营才是根本：GEICO不同寻常的盈利能力来自于其卓越的运营效率及精心划分的风险，这一组合让给投保人的价格达到最低。）
Many well-known insurance companies, on the other hand, incur an underwriting loss/float cost that, combined with the tax penalty, produces negative results for owners. In addition, these companies, like all others in the industry, are vulnerable to catastrophe losses that could exceed their reinsurance protection and take their cost of float right off the chart. Unless these companies can materially improve their underwriting performance - and history indicates that is an almost impossible task - their shareholders will experience results similar to those borne by the owners of a bank that pays a higher rate of interest on deposits than it receives on loans.
很多知名的保险公司却不一样，其承保损失/浮 存成本与税务惩罚加在一起产生了对拥有者负的结果。另外，这些公司与行业中其他公司一样，容易受到有可能超出再保险保护的灾难性损失的打击，从而让浮存成 本大幅提高。除非这些公司能实实在在的提高承保业绩（历史表明这几乎是不可能完成的任务），他们的股东将遭受损失。这就如同一个银行股东的遭遇，这个银行 支付比贷款利息还高的存款利息。
All in all, the insurance business has treated us very well. We have expanded our float at a cost that on the average is reasonable, and we have further prospered because we have earned good returns on these low-cost funds. Our shareholders, true, have incurred extra taxes, but they have been more than compensated for this cost (so far) by the benefits produced by the float.
总而言之，保险业务对我们来说很不错。我们以平均而言合理的成本扩大了浮存。而由于我们在这些低成本资金上获得了良好的回报，我们进一步获利。我们的股东确实交了额外的税，但他们所获得的补偿，即由于浮存所获得的好处，目前为止远超过税务成本。
A particularly encouraging point about our record is that it was achieved despite some colossal mistakes made by your Chairman prior to Mike Goldberg's arrival. Insurance offers a host of opportunities for error, and when opportunity knocked, too often I answered. Many years later, the bills keep arriving for these mistakes: In the insurance business, there is no statute of limitations on stupidity.
一个尤其令人鼓舞的事情是，记录表明虽然你们的董事长在MikeGoldberg来之前犯下了巨大的错误，保险业仍然取得了如此业绩。保险有很多机会容易犯错，当这些机会出现时，我做出了应对。很多年以后，这些错误带来的帐单持续到来：在保险业务，没有对愚蠢的法律时限。
The intrinsic value of our insurance business will always be far more difficult to calculate than the value of, say, our candy or newspaper companies. By any measure, however, the business is worth far more than its carrying value. Furthermore, despite the problems this operation periodically hands us, it is the one - among all the fine businesses we own - that has the greatest potential.
我们保险业务的内在价值将一直比其他业务，如糖果和报纸公司的价值，更难计算。无论如何衡量，这一业务的价值都远超过其帐面价值。更重要是，虽然这一运营偶尔带给我们麻烦，但在我们拥有的所有优秀业务中，保险具有最大的潜力。 （1990年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
Berkshire's insurance business has changed in ways that make combined ratios, our own or the industry's, largely irrelevant to our performance. What counts with us is the "cost of funds developed from insurance," or in the vernacular, "the cost of float."
伯克希尔的保险业务已经改变，这让综合赔付率，无论是我们自己还是行业的综合赔付率，大体上与我们的业绩无关。对我们重要的是“保险产生资金的成本”，或者用白话说“浮存成本”。
Float - which we generate in exceptional amounts - is the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. And the cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss.
我们产生了大量的浮存。这是用赔款准备金，理赔费用准备金和预收保费准备金之和减去代理人余额，预付获得客户成本和承担的再保险的递延费用。而浮存成本则用我们的承保损失来衡量。
The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the business in 1967.
下面的表格显示的是自1967年我们进入这一业务以来我们的浮存成本。 (1) (2) Yearend Yield Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds ------------ ------------- --------------- ------------- (In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2) 1967 ........profit $17.3 less than zero 5.50% 1968 ........profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90% 1969 ........profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79% 1970 ........$0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25% 1971 ........profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81% 1972 ........profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82% 1973 ........profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27% 1974 ........7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13% 1975 ........11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03% 1976 ........profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30% 1977 ........profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97% 1978 ........profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93% 1979 ........profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08% 1980 ........profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94% 1981 ........profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61% 1982 ........21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64% 1983 ........33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84% 1984 ........48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58% 1985 ........44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34% 1986 ........55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60% 1987 ........55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95% 1988 ........11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00% 1989 ........24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97% 1990 ........26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24% 1991 ........119.6 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%
As you can see,our cost of funds in 1991 was well below the U. S. Government's cost on newly-issued long-term bonds. We have in fact beat the government's rate in 20 of the 25 years we have been in the insurance business, often by a wide margin. We have over that time also substantially increased the amount of funds we hold, which counts as a favorable development but only because the cost of funds has been satisfactory. Our float should continue to grow; the challenge will be to garner these funds at a reasonable cost.
正如你所看到的，我们在1991年的资金成本远低于美国政府新发行的长期债券的成本。实际上，我们在保险业务的25年里，有20年都好于政府的利率，常常是好很多。在那期间，我们还大规模的增加了我们持有的资金。这只有在资金成本一直令人满意的情况下才是对我们有利的发展。我们的浮存应该继续增长。而挑战将在于用合理的成本取得这些资金。 （1991年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
比亚迪的两难战略选择 Barrons
作为一个以发展电动汽车为目标的企业，比亚迪目标远大。但是，正是因为其远大的目标，比亚迪面临两难的战略选择。 一 个企业要成功，必须战略清晰，集中资源投入在战略重点。什么都想要，就什么都得不到。比亚迪必须作出重要的战略抉择，到底是集中精力投入传统汽车的发动机 和变速箱领域，还是重点发展电动汽车相关的关键技术。传统汽车的关键在变速箱和发动机。而电动汽车则基本不需要这两种传统的关键核心部件。为了给未来的电 动汽车积蓄力量，比亚迪成功进入了传统汽车领域。但是，传统汽车的后续发展要求有变速箱和发动机的研发实力。不然，没有后续车型的推出，只是反复对旧车型 拉皮，换汤不换药式的“升级”，迟早要遭消费者抛弃。F3的大起大落就是明证。而缺乏产品升级换代，没有后续发展潜力，只靠压榨经销商，盲目增加经销商数 量所带来的收入增长必然不可持续。 比亚迪实际上是在和技术赛跑，看电动汽车能否发展的足够快，以至于替代甚至超越传统汽车。当新技术替代了传统技术，比亚迪在传统汽车领域的致命短板就不算问题。但是，在那之前，如果还不投入在传统汽车领域，比亚迪的发展会严重受限。
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