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中國在世貿組織起訴美國對160億美元中國產品的征稅措施

據商務部消息，中國於8月23日在世貿組織起訴美國301調查項下對華160億美元輸美產品實施的征稅措施。

責編：羅懿

恆基地產(0012)在建議後2分鐘反對組織章程細則的修訂

1 : GS(14)@2011-04-25 16:14:36

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20110415/LTN20110415076_C.pdf
他們應該知道他們提議的是一個差劣的公司管治榜樣-容許書面決議案得到過半人數(代替所有)之董事或董事委員會之成員簽署同意便可獲通過。投資者應投票反對該特別的第6項提議。這與投資者於去年港交所反對的議案一樣。恆基地產2010年只舉行5次董事局會議，所以他們不見得有需要對緊急的議案以書面一致性通過。
They must know that what they are proposing is bad corporate governance - allowing decisions to be made by written majority without board meetings or discussion. Investors should vote against this special resolution, number 6. It's the same proposal which investors in HKEx voted down last year. HLD only held 5 board meetings in 2010, so they don't appear to have difficulty passing urgent matters by unanimous written resolution.

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2 : leoyk1014(859)@2011-05-06 22:59:33

greatsoup sir: 其實(他們)是否想小股東行使紅利認股權政(879) 比錢供股？

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3 : leoyk1014(859)@2011-05-06 22:59:33

greatsoup sir: 其實(他們)是否想小股東行使紅利認股權政(879) 比錢供股？

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4 : GS(14)@2011-05-07 10:19:41

2樓提及

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greatsoup sir: 其實(他們)是否想小股東行使紅利認股權政(879) 比錢供股？

當然想

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反對規劃鄉郊地　新界原居民揚言： 「組織槍炮　同佢哋死過」

1 : GS(14)@2011-09-27 21:39:48

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/te ... 104&art_id=15650369

全港有 77幅鄰近郊野公園但不受《郊野公園條例》規管、被形容為發展冇王管的「黑洞地帶」，佔地約 2,000多公頃，當中有 54幅未納入分區計劃大綱圖規管。鄉議局昨與約 20多名旅居英國、荷蘭及澳洲等地的新界原居民舉行閉門會議，商討對策，居荷蘭逾 40年的新界原居民曾先生批評政府強搶民產，「完全冇諮詢過，我哋返到香港先知發生緊咩事，真喺好嬲。」

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2 : 龍生(798)@2011-09-28 01:35:37

我真係想睇呀...

擔定登仔呀我

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3 : pars(2406)@2011-09-28 10:50:05

我都好想睇，睇下佢地D特權幾時比人收返。

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4 : 龍生(798)@2011-09-28 13:00:24

記得要買逼擊炮, 自走炮, 槍就唔駛講啦, 另外如果無坦克好難配合,步兵打地戰的

仲要有空軍作掩護 , 先可以守護到新界農地的

加油呀!! 我支持你地架

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5 : calvinx(8907)@2011-09-28 13:21:02

陰謀論我會覺得政府係特登挑起公憤, 當有一日, 等到無特權果500萬人齊齊出聲反對既話, 就可以一句話大部份既民意係讚成點樣點樣, 收返佢的特權.

不過咁重成世界既? 新界傳統到時去左邊, 阿爺果時幫手打日本仔的戰績又吾講, 明明之前乜朝代封地比佢地架嗎. 咁重有皇法?

所以我都好讚成佢打多的交架, 爭取佢地應該有既權利, 我好支持佢地架, 千奇吾好怕事退下來. 抗戰到底呀, 沒有付出, 那有收獲, 吾係點可以著數到千秋萬載. :)

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6 : dennis001(8614)@2011-09-28 14:19:27

xx派幾架坦克輾完就知味道

唔洗用豬黎試ge

用原居民就得啦

xx坦克,的確威,的確好洗

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7 : GS(14)@2011-09-28 21:02:20

加油，武鬥就一舉搞掂晒佢地啦

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8 : 亞力士(1473)@2011-09-28 23:23:07

居荷蘭逾 40年的新界原居民曾先生批評政府強搶民產<---- 都估到佢做邊行

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9 : dennis001(8614)@2011-09-28 23:31:20

8樓提及

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居荷蘭逾 40年的新界原居民曾先生批評政府強搶民產<---- 都估到佢做邊行

佢做開調理農務?

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10 : 龍生(798)@2011-09-28 23:58:47

住荷蘭, 應該都係毒品多

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11 : terryyim(13133)@2011-09-29 00:09:58

10樓提及

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住荷蘭, 應該都係毒品多

唔好咁講，話唔定人地只係種鬱金香霸地

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12 : dennis001(8614)@2011-09-29 08:47:39

11樓提及

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10樓提及

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住荷蘭, 應該都係毒品多

唔好咁講，話唔定人地只係種鬱金香霸地

荷蘭除左農務,藥物

養雞都好出名架啊

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13 : GS(14)@2011-09-29 10:50:13

你講邊D?

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14 : dennis001(8614)@2011-09-29 12:20:18

13樓提及

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你講邊D?

你話呢

不過荷蘭有安樂死

頂唔順政府可以幫襯下荷蘭醫生,醫下心病

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黑客組織指造假 華寶瀉8％

1 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:47:43

http://www.mpfinance.com/htm/Finance/20120425/News/ec_ech1.htm



華寶於年報中曾刊登其德國研發中心的照片（圖左），但匿名分析指，這與他們實地探訪所拍下的照片（圖右）有異，年報中的研發中心面積大一點，且隱藏了實際地址。

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2 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:52:58

指控：部分客戶否認華寶為供應商

至於Anonymous Analytics的報告，王基信指公司現階層不作回應，「公司基金股東以long fund(長線投資者)為主，上周亦有基金增持，今日電話與部分基金股東溝通，他們對公司仍有信心，反應很令人鼓舞。」

華寶於2006年借殼上市，並由主席朱林瑤注入香精公司Chemactive。匿名分析的報告指出，Chemactive在被注入前毛利率僅48%，注入後僅半年，華寶毛利率便急升至65.4%，最近一期財政報告更達70%。然而，根據他們所得資料，華寶旗下23家子公司的毛利率僅在40%至50%之間。同時，華寶的研發開支是行業中最少的，報告質疑如何能維持高毛利。
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20060608042_C.pdf
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20060629078_C.pdf

除毛利率外，報告亦質疑華寶虛構收入。華寶在2008年聲稱國內10大煙草品牌都是其顧客，但匿名分析聯絡這些品牌的負責人時，部分否認華寶是其供應商。

報告最後指摘朱林瑤以高價注入資產，並以高派息吸引投資者入股，自己則不停減持公司股份，持股量由5年前的97.6%減至37.7%，累計套現94億元，被冠以「套現女王」稱號。

基金經理：前Banker執董都未跳船

雖然匿名分析再度發功，但有基金經理對此不以為然。「報告指華寶換走核數師德勤，但無提及換入來的係另一間四大羅兵咸永道。」至於質疑華寶毛利率高於同業，但報告列出的同行公司主業是食物及飲品的香精業務，毛利一向遠低於香煙香精，對比起逾八成收入來自香煙香精的華寶，毛利率自然較低。
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20060329082_C.pdf

不過該基金經理亦稱，報告提及華寶客戶的部分確實值得留意。「華寶執行董事熊卿之前在德銀工作，當年於德銀替華寶搞借殼後獲邀入公司，前banker都未跳船，應該係一個信號。」

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20080211090_C.pdf
熊卿先生，現年31歲，二零零七年五月加入本集團任總裁助理。熊先生曾在多家國際投資銀行任職多年，於中國大陸之企業以及國際資本市場方面擁有豐富經驗。熊先生畢業於清華大學經濟管理學院國際會計專業，獲經濟學學士學位。
http://webb-site.com/dbpub/positions.asp?p=43240&hide=N
明報記者 廖毅然

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3 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:53:53

http://tobaccodocuments.org/rjr/ ... atted&start_page=11

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4 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:56:58

The proximate cause seems to have been the acquisition of Chemactive. Prior to this acquisition, Huabao was more or less a shell company with de minimis operations reporting annual losses. On the other hand, Chemactive was a highly profitable company enjoying margins of 48% based on the pre-acquisition financial statements.
But still, 48% is a long way from 70+%. So what happened between the acquisition and the following year when management released their annual results showing margins had skyrocketed? We aren’t actually sure. You see, management only dedicated a few lines in their entire 2006 Annual Report to explaining the jump in gross margins:
“As the raw material structure of many of the continuous developing products were being optimized as well as the capacity of relevant production accessories increased, the gross margin rose from 47.3% of last year to 69.5%, which further improved the operating results.”16

From our reading of this explanation, management did two things to significantly improve margins:
1) ‘optimized’ the raw material structure; and
2) Increased ‘relevant production accessories.’
If you’re confused, you’re not alone. We don’t understand this vague explanation either. Moreover, we do not believe that management was able to re-engineer Chemactive within a year to become some sort of super-profitable money machine.
First, this transformation didn’t even take a year. As presented in the interim 2006 report, gross margins had already improved to 65.4% within 6 months of the Chemactive acquisition. Just so our readers don’t think they’re missing something:
 March 31, 2006 (Chemactive prior to acquisition): Gross Margins – 48.0%
 September 30, 2006 (Huabao interim report post-acquisition): Gross Margins – 65.4%
 March 31, 2007 (Huabao annual report post-acquisition): Gross Margins – 69.5%
Second, what type of re-engineering/cost cutting/synergies could management possibly have pulled out of their hat? Prior to acquiring Chemactive, Huabao was just a shell. It’s not like there was a second material operating business that was merged with Chemactive to cut costs or increase efficiencies. In fact, the same person who had run Chemactive prior to the acquisition was still running Chemactive after the acquisition – Huabao’s Chairwoman, Ms. Chu.
Given management’s dubious explanation, we turned to the most obvious source of confirmation – documents Huabao filed with the SAIC. 17 It took nearly three months, but we didn’t just get documents related to the Chemactive acquisition, we got documents related to the entire Company – nearly all of its principal operating subsidiaries representing 99.5% of Huabao’s production capacity. In total, we are in possession of SAIC documents for 23 different Huabao subsidiaries.
Based on our analysis of these documents, it appears that the overwhelming majority of Huabao’s subsidiaries report gross margins around 40-50%, in line with industry standards but a far cry from the 74% reported by the Company in 2010. It should be noted that since these results are not consolidated, it becomes difficult to calculate an exact gross margin figure. But in either case, 40%+ and 70%+ are a world apart.
To get more clarity on industry margins, we contacted several private F&F companies located in China. In our discussions with them, no representative was able to understand how gross profit margins of 70%+ could be achieved in this industry. Moreover, one representative mentioned that his company supplies tobacco flavors and fragrances for several foreign brands and that the gross profit margin of their business is ‘quite low.’ When pushed further, he relented that it *may* be possible for the gross profit margin of some new products to reach up to 70 or 80%, but was unlikely for older products. Looking back at Exhibit 4, a simple analysis of China Flavors and Fragrances’ gross margins confirms this statement. This point was also reaffirmed by a contact at a different F&F company, who went on to state that potentially better margins on new products is why all of the companies in the industry continue to develop new products through R&D.

And so it seems that R&D is vital to the industry’s profitability and staying power. However, as Exhibit 5 shows, for Huabao this issue raises more questions than it answers – simple questions such as:
How is Huabao able to maintain its leadership position and gross margins by spending less on R&D than most of its peers?
This chart is baffling when one reads through Huabao’s annual reports and sees the following gem:
“The R&D capability of a flavours and fragrances company reflects its overall strength. After continuous investment, the Group has set up a leading R&D team which is top-notch in China and up to international standards. The State-recognized technology centre, the overseas R&D centre in Germany and the professional R&D departments in Yunnan, Guangdong and Fujian together formed a vertically integrated platform for R&D in areas ranging from fundamental research to application. The R&D strategy of the Group is market-driven so as to closely follow the latest global industry trends and to accelerate the mastering of technologies in key raw materials. With such strengths, the Group is able to develop products and technologies that meet market demands, deliver comprehensive technical services to customers and remain dedicated to maximizing value for clients, while the Group’s overall competitiveness is greatly elevated.”18
Based on these type of statements, Huabao seems quite dedicated to cutting-edge, international caliber R&D. So much so that to aid its efforts in internationalizing its R&D capabilities, in 2006, Huabao set up an R&D center in Holzminden, Germany, a town famous for its F&F industry and the proud headquarters of Symrise, an industry powerhouse.

German research facility stands out as an important jewel in Huabao’s R&D initiative, because:
 It’s located in a logistically out-of-the-way place for a company that does all its business in China.
 “Internationalized R&D” seems to be a key strategy for the Company.
 Management considers it a “world-class R&D center.”
 Huabao’s Chief Technical Officer for Tobacco Flavors, Mr. Alan Davies, is posted at the Holzminden facility.
Given the apparent importance of this facility, we decided to give it a closer look to get a better feel for Huabao’s R&D work.
At the prompting of our contacts, our sources at Anonymous Germany agreed to take a road trip to Holzminden and put the R&D center under surveillance for three days.
Minimal Activity
Our contacts told us that during their investigation several points struck them as notable, especially in contrast with activity at the Symrise facility, which they also visited:
 Most of the lights in the complex were off.
 There was minimal noticeable staff activity.
 There was no security protecting the research facility.
 When neighbours were questioned, they either did not know what business was being carried out at the facility or assumed the facility belonged to Symrise.
It should be noted that the R&D center is not actually located in Holzminden, but in a very small village called Neuhaus, which is a twenty minute drive out of town. We were told there was no public transportation to speak of and it was during the winter season, making it difficult to ride a bicycle. This is relevant because over the three days, our contacts did not see more than six vehicles in the parking lot of the research center.

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5 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:57:17

Concluding on R&D Expenses
So, here we have a company with questionably low R&D spending that reports absurdly high margins, which industry sources say should not be possible. How do we bridge this divide?
We have come across various explanations. However, the best ones can be summarized as follows:
Huabao has established relationships with several prominent SOE tobacco manufacturers. Cigarette smokers are sensitive to their preference of cigarette brands and manufacturers are hesitant to change ingredients/suppliers in their blend. Accordingly, there is no need for major R&D as once Huabao is contracted to supply flavoring to a brand, that relationship will continue until the tobacco brand is terminated. Consumer preference for their favorite brand creates a natural moat for Huabao, ensuring lofty margins and low R&D expenditure.
This is actually a very logical, very good explanation.
The idea behind this explanation is that in a mature industry, there really is no need for R&D. The Company already has its flavours, it already has its connections, and it already has its committed cigarette brands. All the work is done.
And this makes sense. Except when it doesn’t.
The problem with this explanation is that the math cuts both ways. It may be possible for low R&D expenses to co-exist with high profit margins in a mature industry, but then we should be seeing correspondingly low revenue growth. Growth implies new markets, new opportunities, and therefore new R&D initiatives. If a company is not incurring substantial R&D costs because it benefits from being the leading player in a mature industry, we should not then be also witnessing high revenue growth that appears to be far surpassing the growth of its customer base.
Despite this, Huabao has also inexplicably experienced the fastest sales growth in the industry, as we discuss next.

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6 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:58:57

The Cannibalization Problem
Huabao supplies flavouring to approximately 50% of the top ten cigarette brands. In terms of consolidation, this is a positive factor for the Company. As the top brands consolidate smaller players, by proxy Huabao increases its market share and grows accordingly.
However, Huabao also supplies approximately 50% of the overall market, which implies that on average it also supplies 50% of brands and suppliers that are being or have been phased out. And as surely as Huabao gains from its biggest customers consolidating the industry, it also loses equally as its smaller clients are squeezed out. The result is a near zero-sum game.
Given these factors, we question Huabao’s growth story as a result of ‘industry consolidation’. In sections 3 and 4, we follow up this macro analysis by providing a granular look at Huabao’s revenue streams and client relationships.

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7 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:59:38

For example, we contacted Heinz’s corporate office in the US and were placed in contact with the Procurement Department. We provided the department Huabao’s name, along with the names of all its food and flavor subsidiaries. The department ran the names through their system and confirmed that they have no relationship with any of the names we had given them. We were informed that it may be possible that their Chinese factory sources directly from Huabao, in which case the Corporate office wouldn’t be aware. They therefore provided us with the contact information of the person in charge of procurement at the Chinese factory.
We contacted the individual who confirmed that they were in the best position to provide information regarding Heinz’s suppliers. When asked about Huabao, the individual wasn’t convinced Huabao could be classified as a “supplier” to Heinz because, to quote:
“We didn’t purchase much *from Huabao+… we didn’t really use them, previously we only purchased from them once. It was very little.”

Admittedly, the presented client list is dated. What about current clients? While Huabao stopped providing a client list, Shanghai H&K Flavor, one of Huabao’s food and flavoring subsidiaries does have a website where it lists products that it evidently provides flavouring for.
On its website (http://www.hbkq.com.cn/en/) under the tab ‘Market > Product Information’, there is a list of various products from flavoured yogourt to flavoured peanuts. This list was updated as recently as October 20, 2011, so we can assume it’s relevant.
From this list, we picked two products at random and contacted their manufacturers to confirm a client/supplier relationship with Huabao or its subsidiary.
The first product we picked was Harris Teeter Simply Clear Water, as shown in Exhibit 12.
We contacted Harris Teeter, a grocery store chain based in the US. Harris Teeter put us in contact with Cott Beverages, the company that manufactures and bottles the Simply Clear product. When asked about Huabao, Cott simply confirmed that they are not using any Chinese based company to supply flavouring ingredients for this product.

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8 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:59:50

We contacted HyVee who put us in touch with the account manager and the third party broker responsible for this product. Both individuals confirmed that no Chinese company is sourced for flavouring in the production of the milk.
Confused, we asked our contacts if they knew any reason why their products were displayed on Huabao’s website. Their simple response: “No.”

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9 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:00:29

http://whlg.cei.gov.cn/doc/hyc9c01/2012030518751.pdf
中国烟草行业分析报告
（2011 年4 季度）
2011 年，烟草行业卷烟产销量平稳增长，卷烟结构持续优化，行业效益稳步
提升，卷烟市场价格稳定。“532”、“461”品牌发展目标引领效应突出，持续推动
重点品牌快速发展，行业品牌价值和竞争力进一步提升，行业经济运行态势持续
向好发展，经济运行质量明显好于往年。4 季度，烟草行业生产卷烟5154.79 亿支，
同比下降0.84 个百分点，与上季度相比，减少1294.38 亿支。但从2011 年整体分
析，卷烟产量微增，累计生产卷烟24474 亿支，同比增长3.04%，低于上年同期
0.68 个百分点。1～12 月份，烟草行业累计完成卷烟销量24431.7 亿支，同比增长
3.34%。

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10 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:01:25

Part 1: The Chemactive Injection 5.1
As we mentioned at the beginning of our report, Huabao did not go public through a traditional IPO. It went public through a backdoor listing via a shell company. In an IPO setting, you hire investment bankers and outside consultants with their own reputations on the line to vet through your business operations, look through your financial statements, and then sell your shares to the public. And while this outside scrutiny in no way guarantees that your business is legitimate, it doesn’t hurt.
In a backdoor listing, you can be as shady as you want. No one is really there to question your business or inspect it. In fact, most people will just assume you’re doing something sketchy. Backdoor listings have that certain je ne sais quoi grease-ball quality to them.
After Huabao took over Leaptek, management effectively had a shell company available. They then bought the Chemactive assets from the Chairwoman and injected it into the shell, essentially taking Chemactive public. This is when we believe management first began to misstate their financials.
As we mentioned on page 14, Chemactive’s reported gross margins rose drastically immediately after the injection. Based on the evidence previously presented, we believe management simply fabricated their numbers. But of course, if you begin to lie about your gross margins, it’s going to affect reported net income as well.
Exhibit 17 shows the difference in 2010 net income between Huabao’s public filings and its SAIC documents. The net income of the SAIC documents are based on the sum of Huabao’s disclosed principal operating subsidiaries representing 99.5% of its production capacity, plus several ancillary subsidiaries that have some form of business operations. There appears to be a 36% difference in earnings between these two sources.
Exhibit 17 (HK$ millions) Difference
Public Filings
1,632
SAIC Documents
~1,200
36%
Reported R&D Expense
122
R&D Expense net of taxes
105
SAIC Documents less R&D
~1,095
49%
Source: Company financials and SAIC documents
It should also be noted that in calculating the SAIC net income, we did not included any cost centers, such as R&D facilities. However, Huabao claims to have spent HK$122 million on R&D in 2010. If we subtract this expense on an after tax basis from the SAIC net income, then we get an even larger discrepancy.
So, what reason did management have to inflate the financial figures?

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11 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:01:43

Part 2: The Chairwoman’s Share Sell Down 5.2
Better financial figures bring a higher share price. And that’s exactly what the Chairwoman wanted when she began dumping her shares. In order to understand the Huabao story, it’s important to understand that Huabao and its Chairwoman are inextricably linked. It helps to think of the Chairwoman as Huabao’s off-balance sheet entity. So yes, it’s true that Huabao as a company has never raised any money. But through the years, the Chairwoman has raised HK$9.4 billion (US$1.2 billion) on the back of inflated share prices.
Exhibit 18 Date (HK$ millions)
3-Aug-2006
1,500
17-Jan-2007
1,300
7-Apr-2009
1,200
8-Oct-2009
1,200
12-Apr-2010
2,000
28-Jan-2011
2,200
To Date:
9,400
In most instances of fraud, management will usually issue shares/debt through the company and abscond with the proceeds. However, this creates certain problems. For instance, when the auditors do their annual cash verification, management will need to explain what happened to the money. To cover the theft, management has to create lies such as claiming the money was spent on expanding/improving the business. This lie leads to other lies, such as inflated asset balances. Unfortunately, these inflated assets stay on the balance sheet where they can eventually be uncovered. Then there’s the issue of trust. If management repeatedly raises money to ‘expand’ business, people are going to start asking questions. The market will begin to suspect foul play. The whole process can become very messy.
We believe Chairman Chu avoided these complications. Instead of raising money through the Company, she simply inflated the value of Huabao, and then sold her personal shares into the market, generating a small fortune in the process.
The Queen of Cashout
Well, ‘small fortune’ may be a bit of an understatement. Last year Ms. Chu was ranked the 8th richest woman in China at the age of 41 on Hurun’s list of Self-Made Women Billionaires.
But that’s not the only list that Ms. Chu made. Hurun also released a ‘Cashout List’ which lists billionaires who have been cashing out of their own companies.26 According to the list, Ms. Chu was the second biggest inside-seller in China, cashing out US$549 million in the last year alone. This sum was so large that she has been dubbed ‘Queen of Cashout’ by The Shanghai Daily.
Disregarding everything in this report, at the most basic level shareholders should ask themselves: Why am I an investor in this company when the Chairwoman can’t sell her shares fast enough?

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12 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:01:54

Part 3: Other Related Party Acquisitions 5.3
Of course, overstating a company’s earning power has its own issues. For instance, auditors expect to see a commensurate cash balance as proof of income. Sales receipts and expense receipts can easily be forged or faked. However, bank cash balances are slightly more difficult to fake – slightly.
We know that Ms. Chu disposed of a large portion of her shares two days after the Chemactive acquisition, and once more before fiscal year end. Together, these two share sales gave her proceeds of approximately HK$2.5 billion.
With this amount, it would have been easy enough to pad Huabao’s bank accounts, which at the end of Fiscal 2007 (one year after the Chemactive acquisition) were reported to be approximately HK$ 900 million and still have enough money left over to grease the palms of third parties and their proxies working behind the curtain – and as a result of our investigation we certainly have reason to believe there are a multitude of outside players who are involved in this game Huabao is playing.
Of course, one does not perpetuate a scheme to simply leave money in the bank for the auditors. Moreover, as each year goes by and fake earnings continue to accumulate, it becomes more difficult to maintain sufficient cash in the bank. Ms. Chu could have sold down her holdings at a faster rate to continue to pad Huabao’s bank account, but then that would likely attract scrutiny. So what to do?
The answer was to transfer these ‘earnings’ out of Huabao. Enter Win New Group and Wealthy King Investments.
Recall from the beginning of this report that these two companies were injected into Huabao through Chairwoman Chu as related party transactions. More dubiously, the Chairwoman acquired these assets from third parties and resold them to Huabao within months. Not only that, but the price paid for these acquisitions were absurdly high, as shown in Exhibit 19.
Exhibit 19 Net Income Acquisition Price P/E Ratio
Win New Group
31
652
21.0
Wealthy King Investments
70
870
12.4
Average P/E
101
1522
15.1
Xiamen Amber
5.7
62
10.9
Maoming Kebi
20
117
5.9
Qingdao Qingda
2.5
12
4.8
Yunnan Huaxiangyuan
0.4
4.3
12.2
Average P/E
29
195
6.8
Source: Company disclosures
This Exhibit contrasts the valuation of the transactions between Huabao and the Chairwoman, and the transactions between Huabao and third parties. What is evident here is that the transactions involving the Chairwoman were valued at more than twice the transactions involving third parties.

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13 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:02:08

So, was the Chairwoman just greedy and looking to make money by flipping these businesses to Huabao? Yes and No.
We believe that these subsequent acquisitions were carried out at inflated valuations for the purpose of removing fake earnings from Huabao’s balance sheet. That way, management had an excuse when the auditors found Huabao’s bank accounts empty. Put another way, these transactions were used to clean up the theft that had already occurred.
And this is exactly why the Chairwoman took the awkward step of buying these assets from third parties only to resell them to Huabao.
We do not believe Huabao paid the reported price to acquire Win New Group and Wealthy King Investments from the Chairwoman. The reported acquisition price consisted of imaginary money/earnings that needed to be removed from Huabao’s balance sheet. It would have been impossible to do this through an arm’s length transaction, since a third party would be publically questioned regarding the value of the transactions. However, since the Chairwoman acquired the assets quietly from a third party, she was free to resell them to Huabao at any price with impunity.
Take the acquisition of Win New Group as an example. When Win New Group was acquired by Huabao from the Chairwoman, it had three operating subsidiaries as listed below:
Exhibit 20
Win New Group 2007
(In millions of RMB) Subsidiaries Revenue % of Total Net Profit % of Total
Shanghai Zhezhan
35.8
18%
26.2
80%
Huasheng Qinghua
30.8
15%
-0.1
0%
Zhaoqing Fragrances
134.1
67%
6.7
20%
Total
200.7
100%
32.8
100%
Huabao acquired Win New Group for HK$650 million, or 21 times earnings. It’s vital to note that this acquisition included 100% of Shanghai Zhezhan and Huasheng Qinghua, but only 72.1% of Zhaoqing Fragrances. A third party owned the other 27.9% of Zhaoqing Fragrances. This is important, because according to filings, Huabao would later acquire this outstanding portion of Zhaoqing Fragrances for only HK$21 million. This transaction from an independent third party implied a valuation of only 10.6 times earnings, for the same business Huabao bought at twice that valuation from Ms. Chu. It’s interesting how Huabao only pays reasonable prices for acquisitions that are not through the Chairwoman.
Over the years, Huabao has continued to grow and overstate its earnings. The share price has continued to grow as well, giving the Chairwoman more opportunities to sell down her stake. However, this growth has come with a price: Huabao is so large now that it has become difficult to conduct additional related party transactions of significant size to be meaningful in removing earnings from its balance sheet. Moreover, as Huabao’s reported cash balance grew, calls from investors and analysts to declare dividends intensified.

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14 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:02:31

Part 4: Dividend Payouts 5.4
Here we return to the stated amount of HK$2.4 billion – the cumulative amount Huabao has paid out in dividends all these years, the amount that regardless of how shady management has been in the past, should remove any doubts about Huabao’s brilliant and legitimate business.
But there’s a problem with this number: it’s a red herring.
Over the relevant period, the Chairwoman has had anywhere between 66% to 38% ownership in Huabao. Due to this interest, a significant amount of the dividends that have been ‘paid out’ have never actually been ‘paid out’ – they have just circled back to the Chairwoman. In fact, as Exhibit 21 shows, only half of the HK$2.4 billion has actually made it to public shareholders.
Exhibit 21
(In HK$ ‘000) 2007H1 2007H2 2008H1 2008H2 2009H1 2009H2 2010H1 2010H2 2011H1 2011H2 2012H1 Total
Dividends per share
1.80
3.80
2.30
6.00
5.00
8.80
8.80
12.28
7.20
7.98
12.98
Declared dividends
54,773
116,382
70,451
184,147
154,100
271,463
274,970
384,219
226,789
251,374
409,467
2,398,135
Chairwoman's stake
65.78%
65.35%
62.96%
62.80%
62.64%
51.28%
50.87%
44.10%
37.71%
38.43%
38.40%
Dividends paid out
18,743
40,326
26,095
68,503
57,572
132,257
135,087
214,767
141,267
154,776
252,232
1,241,625
To put this all into perspective:
Over the last six years, the Chairwoman has raised HK$9.4 billion from the public. Over that same time period, Huabao has paid HK$1.2 billion back to the public in the form of dividends. That’s 13% of what was raised – over six years.
Based on our time weighed calculation, the Chairwoman could have put the money she raised in a bank account earning 5.00% interest and still made those payments to public shareholders. And despite official statistics, anyone who actually lives in China will know that 5.00% doesn’t even cover the cost of inflation.
With some perspective, suddenly Huabao’s dividend story doesn’t seem so compelling anymore.

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15 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:02:52

http://www.mpfinance.com/htm/Finance/20120425/News/ec_ech3.htm
問題在於，海外研究機構並非香港持牌人士，本地證監會是否只能袖手旁觀、任造市之風氾濫？證監會發言人昨日回覆本報查詢時表示，不對個別事件發表評論。然而，海外研究機構唱淡民企的一系列事件，早在去年7月已經引起監管方注意，證監會曾擬定3招，專門應對以造空為生的海外對畄基金，其中包括：要求與傳言相關的民企第一時間作出解釋、由證監會出手調查沽空交易、由交易所及港府對外澄清本港上市監管水平高於海外借殼上市等。有法律界人士曾指出，即使並非本港持牌金融機構，涉嫌誹謗的造市行為仍可能受到追究。

證監關注沽空率高股份 是否潛在違規

證監會亦表示，已加強對沽空活動的檢查，每天針對沽空比率最高的股份，關注是否存在潛在違規行為。另一方面，市場對類似披露開始習慣之後，「渾水效應」已不及初時迅猛。有觀點認為，雖然有關監管應該對造市行為起到遏制作用，普通投資者也須要提高分辨力，不應聽信一面之詞、一遇到不利消息便急於沽售或沽空。

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16 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:24:25

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/te ... 307&art_id=16278898
本報致電華寶投資者關係經理王基信，面對記者反覆提問，他只堅持回答：「我哋朝早 9點收到呢份報告，公司內部處理緊，全日喺度開緊會，所以呢一刻無任何嘢可以 comment（評論）。」
雖然匿名報告早上已「出街」，但華寶昨日沒有停牌，在下午報告廣為流轉後，跌勢越來越急，全日瀉 8.08%至 3.98元，創三個月來新低，單日蒸發 11億元。華寶昨晚刊發通告，指不明股價下跌及成交增加的原因，公司現正編製業績，強調現時生產經營一切正常。
華寶近兩周股價無端急挫，引來市場揣測。華寶前日早上 9時即舉行電話會議，執董熊卿強調不知股價積弱原因，又聲稱核數師已開始工作，可如期在 6月底前公佈全年業績。
有基金經理坦言，華寶「開幾多電話會議都無用」，「份報告今次講咗成個 picture，都幾有說服力，我驚股價有排跌。」

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17 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:24:42

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/te ... 307&art_id=16278899
狙擊華寶國際（ 336）的「匿名分析」（ Anonymous Analytics），其手法與去年多次出手的渾水研究近似，匿名於去年 9月首次「發炮」，質疑超大現代（ 682）誤導投資者而一戰成名。而遭匿名質疑加上主席涉及市場失當行為的雙重夾擊，超大於去年 9月起一直停牌至今。

團隊陣營有來頭

根據匿名的網頁介紹，其團隊包括分析員、鑑證會計師（ Forensic Accountant）、統計師、律師及電腦專家，故其調查比起投資銀行的研究報告並不遜色，例如有關超大的調查報告，所涉及內容超過 10年，更附以詳盡解說。
有消息指匿名分析是互聯網黑客組織「匿名者」新成立部門，英國《金融時報》曾訪問過他們，他們表示，是被「佔據華爾街」（ Occupy Wall Street）示威行動啟發，希望透過影響股價而引起市場注意。

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18 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 23:27:34

http://www.mpfinance.com/htm/Finance/20120426/News/ec_ecj1.htm
匿名分析周二發表報告稱，從事香精香料生產及銷售的華寶國際涉嫌誇大收入及毛利率。華寶當日股價瀉8%，至昨早終宣布停牌。摩根大通隨即發表報告，認為匿名分析的報告確有值得關注之處，例如提及一些客戶否認與華寶有合作，以及盈利數字與國家工商總局有差異。華寶的股價可能會受報告影響出現一個月的持續下跌，但該行仍維持對華寶「跑贏大市」的評級。華寶投資者關係經理王基信昨日則表示，公司正準備回應報告，同時亦希望未來在數據披露上做得更好。他又強調，一直與股東進行溝通，部分對公司持正面、樂觀的態度。

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19 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 23:28:24

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... N201204261422_C.pdf
本公司正就近日市場流傳一些對本公司不正確及誤導的指控作出澄清工作，其中
包括於今天本公司已派專員至中華人民共和國國家工商行政管理總局（「工商局」）
下屬各地工商行政管理局調出本集團國內之若干附屬公司二零一零年度（即截至
二零一零年十二月三十一日止十二個月）的已經備案之財務資料，以作為公司日
後刊登澄清公告的其中一項佐證。
根據中華人民共和國法律、行政、法規及部門規章，所有在中國經營的企業法人
每年需向當地工商行政管理局報送上一年度（一月一日至十二月三十一日）的年檢
材料，其中包括按中國會計準則編制及審計的財務報表，而該等財務報表的貨幣
單位為人民幣。由於本公司及其附屬公司（「本集團」）的綜合財務報表是按本公
司的財政年度而編制，即由每年四月一日開始至下一年度三月三十一日止十二個
月，故與附屬公司的內地之經審計財務報表存在時間性的差異，加上本集團的綜
合財務報表之貨幣乃以港幣為單位，而兩者適用之會計準則亦不同。
此外，本公司與本公司之核數師羅兵咸永道會計師事務所亦正在進行本公司及其
附屬公司截至二零一二年三月三十一日止年度之末期業績審計工作，本公司擬按
香港聯合交易所有限公司證券上市規則於二零一二年六月三十日或之前公告業績。
最後，本公司就前述不正確及誤導之澄清工作有序開展，一旦有進一步進展將會
另行公告。

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大亞灣核安全會「只係公關組織」

1 : GS(14)@2012-06-10 10:32:52

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20120610/16413127

不甘淪為唱好核電「花瓶」的溫石麟，辭任大亞灣核安全諮詢委員會委員。何柏佳攝
溫石麟透露，有大亞灣核電廠的工程師私下向他透露，二號反應堆幾年前開始試用中國製造的燃料棒，作軍事用途研究，「用中國製造嘅燃料棒做啲 plutonium（鈽）同福島三號反應堆情況一樣，但佢冇公佈，鈽可以用嚟做核子彈、軍事用途。」他質疑核電廠隱瞞潛在危機，「喺偏遠地方做軍事研究同香港冇關係，但喺商營核反應堆，特別喺咁接近香港嘅情況下，我哋有權知道。」
中電發言人否認事件，指大亞灣核電廠只引進含有濃縮鈾的燃料組件作發電之用，並沒有引進裝入鈽的燃料組件作發電之用，進行核裂變的元素為鈾235。反駁溫石麟言論並非事實。
大亞灣核電站核安全諮詢委員會副主席李焯芬指，委員會只是諮詢組織，每個國家有既定法定組織監察核電業務，大亞灣核電廠是由國家核安全局負責，並非由諮詢委員會監督。他又稱，從未聽聞大亞灣有反應堆試用中國製造的燃料棒，「完全唔知呢件事情，唔知佢從邊度搵到咁嘅資料。」

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2 : GS(14)@2012-06-10 10:33:42

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20120610/16413128
溫石麟表示，福島事件發生至今已經15個月，委員會只推卸責任指國務院尚未完成及通過核安全檢查報告，「一次正式會議都冇，冇任何檢討，更加冇任何公佈，好似採取乜措施，對香港人、對內地居民都係不負責任。」他又稱，委員會多次向外宣稱核電廠安全，「大亞灣核安全問題係最貼身嘅問題，但何鍾泰、李焯芬講嘅嘢全部一面倒，指大亞灣唔同福島設計、絕對安全、海嘯唔怕，冇地震等，刻意淡化事件令市民放心。」
不過，大亞灣核電站核安全諮詢委員會副主席李焯芬反駁，指福島事件屬嚴重災難，中國已啟動核安全檢查，需待國務院正式通過核安全檢查報告才召開相關會議，「過去幾個月大家喺到等國家嘅報告出咗先，再作調整。」

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3 : GS(14)@2012-06-10 10:33:59

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20120610/16413129
已辭職的前委員溫石麟透露，委員會一年最多開會1至2次，開會次數極少，委員溝通不多，即使發生核事故，也多數要透過媒體或其他途徑才知悉，「最近好咗，喺網上發佈，但都係流於表面。」
核安全諮詢委員會成員全是由內地主導的大亞灣核電運營管理公司委任，港府無權過問。雖然正副主席是來自本港的何鍾泰及李焯芬，其他委員也包括本港學者及環保專家，但委員會只向管理公司負責，無需向港府交代。
近年大亞灣屢被揭發核事故，但委員會一味為核安全護航，文過飾非。主席何鍾泰多次以涉及的事故輕微為由，聲稱無需向公眾交代。副主席李焯芬也指若事無大小都向公眾滙報，市民未必有興趣想知，更揚言「大亞灣用波音747客機撞落去都唔爛」云云。

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警員方組織退出薪調機制 學者恐制度崩潰葉劉﹕輸打贏要

1 : GS(14)@2013-06-08 15:24:33

http://www.mpfinance.com/htm/finance/20130608/news/ec_gha1.htm




公務員事務局呼籲員方按既有渠道，表達對薪酬趨勢調查的意見。警方表示，管理層深切明白和體會人員對薪酬調整方案的意見，會繼續支持和協助職方利用既有途徑和方法與當局溝通，以取得公平和合理的薪酬調整結果。警隊管理層會繼續向當局反映警評會職方的意見。

政府「薪酬趨勢調查委員會」日前公布公務員今年的薪酬調整，低、中層人員加幅為3.92%、高層人員為2.55%，之後須再交行會最後決定。不少公務員工會對加幅不滿，加幅亦與代表警察員方組織的警評會所提出的6.7%有甚大差距，但公務員事務局長鄧國威周三表明，無論「在1997年前或1997年後……基本上以淨指標為主要考慮點」。

警評會轄下其中三個組織，包括警務督察協會、外籍督察協會及警察員佐級協會對此極為不滿，昨日宣布退出薪酬趨勢調查委員會。警務督察協會主席曾昭科表示，政府過往透過市場作薪酬調查，無公開問及公司背景，質疑調查結果不可靠，如去年有40多間公司只回覆「單一加薪指標」，今次情亦然。

員方組織批機制有「先天缺陷」

警察員方組織指局方現制度未充足考慮將士氣、通脹等其他六大因素，形容機制有「先天缺陷」，堅決不會返回機制，要求警隊成立獨立組織處理加薪問題。

警隊現有逾2.8萬名紀律部隊職系人員，外界憂會引發連鎖效應。入境事務主任協會主席倪錫水表示，協會暫時未決定是否退出薪酬趨勢調查委員會內的紀評會，但自己將不再出任代表參與。高級公務員協會發表公開信，批評鄧國威早前指高級公務員「承受能力高」的言論，是扭曲現行機制。

馬嶽﹕連鎖效應將損政府威信

中大政治與行政學系副教授馬嶽相信，警隊組織是以本身影響力作談判籌碼，若確實脫離有關委員會，將對政府造成甚大影響，並引發連鎖效應，等同令制度崩潰，嚴重打擊政府威信。

行政會議召集人林煥光表示，過去20年曾因調查結果出現負數，才有數次不跟隨趨勢調查以調整薪酬的情，將減薪改為凍薪；目前中、低級人員加幅已比同期通脹高，強調機制行之有效，不希望團體因一次半次不滿退出。他明白公務員也有政治困難，但不應透過調整薪酬解決。

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5萬元入場峰會 借李嘉誠過橋 內地組織「擬邀」18高官名人 半數未獲邀拒到

1 : GS(14)@2014-03-17 22:56:31

http://www.mpfinance.com/htm/finance/20140317/news/ec_gca1h.htm




【明報專訊】內地組織「中國經濟貿易促進會」(下稱促進會)年初向商界人士發信，邀請參加5月在香港洲際酒店舉辦的「全球華人企業領袖(香港)峰會」，每人收近4萬元人民幣(約5萬港元)，信件列出18名「擬邀請嘉賓」，包括特首梁振英、前特首董建華，還有長和系主席李嘉誠，又安排考察長實集團。但9名嘉賓回覆本報稱無收過邀請，酒店回覆未接獲場地預訂；長實回覆對事件一無所知，會調查。

促進會否認手法誇大，起初解釋是嘉賓未收到邀請信，其後又指根本未邀請，近日則決定取消峰會(見表)。





會方否認誇大 稱峰會取消

商人陳先生(化名)去年12月到北京公幹，獲促進會邀請入會，他形容過程像層壓推銷，「他們叫我去酒店傾，在酒店房我被困逾一小時，起初叫我入會，5萬至20萬元等，會畀你一個title(名銜)，我堅持不肯，最後他們才讓步叫我去翌日的一場經濟會議」。

他憶述，促進會的人遊說他該會議有成思危(前全國人大副委員長)及其他重要嘉賓出席，會後又可與嘉賓一起食飯，「他(成思危)也算是權威人士，我也想聽他演講，就付了2萬元(人民幣)」。誰知最終這些主要嘉賓一個也沒有來，令他大感憤怒，現場約有二三百人參加會議。後來促進會來信邀請他參加5月在港舉行的峰會，陳質疑這峰會的結局會一樣，因此聯絡本報。

梁振英董建華成思危列名單

據陳先生提供的邀請信，題為「關於舉辦全球企業領袖(香港)峰會的特邀通知」，峰會訂於今年5月6至8日在香港洲際酒店舉行，及提到「屆時邀請國家領導人、香港特別行政區政府官員、華僑領袖、香港學者、全球華人企業領袖等代表出席」，並邀請收信人「作為優秀華人企業家代表出席……屆時會頒發世界傑出華商行業領軍人物榮譽證書！」

邀請信附上的擬定日程，列出18名「擬邀請嘉賓」，8人為中港現任或前任官員，如梁振英、董建華、前港澳辦副主任華建、成思危、前人大常委會副委員長許嘉璐、前全國政協副主席厲無畏等；5人為商界，包括李嘉誠、力寶集團主席李文正、台灣遠東集團董事長徐旭東； 3人為學者，如中文大學杜巨瀾教授等；其餘2人是促進會高層。峰會主持人為鳳凰衛視主持人吳小莉。

洲際酒店：未接預訂

日程編排了上述部分嘉賓在不同時段演講，如長實高層領導講「長江實業的經營之道」，李文正講「力寶集團的追夢之路」，又會考察「首富李嘉誠先生創辦的香港長江實業集團，學習先進的治企經驗」，收費每人39,800元人民幣(約5萬港元)。

本報在2月中至3月初，除了兩名「擬邀請嘉賓」是促進會成員外，向其他16人發信或電郵查詢，結果9人回覆本報，全部表示無收過邀請(見圖)；吳小莉亦向本報稱無收過邀請擔任峰會主持，亦不清楚活動內容。香港洲際酒店發言人稱，上述時間沒有促進會預訂活動場地。

稱考察長實 長實不知情

長實發言人回覆稱，對「促進會」、「全球華人企業領袖峰會」、「全球華人企業家論壇」以至宣傳資料上與長實集團有關的參觀考察活動，均一無所知。集團僅從本報查詢知悉有關機構及活動，如能提供資料，會就事件調查。

本報以某企業秘書身份致電促進會聯絡人杜勇查詢，他說「習(近平)主席上台後，查得特別嚴，有些領導來港的簽證做不到，所以(香港峰會)取消了，8月改在上海」。本報記者再以記者身份向促進會秘書長姜黎明查詢，姜透露暫時約有50個機構報名參加5月的峰會，「不存在欺騙成分，每次活動延期我們都有通知參加者」。他又稱該會去年在港的活動因人數不足而取消，已退款給10多個機構。

國資委曾斥冒名宣傳

其實，2011年促進會宣傳在北京舉辦「第五屆全球華人企業家與政府官員高層論暨優秀企業家頒獎典禮」，稱「擬邀請國資委領導出席開幕式」。但全名為國務院國有資產監督管理委員會的國資委，發聲明批評活動是冒名宣傳，指斥促進會「提供虛假信息，騙取公眾信任，會保留追究權利」。

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2 : GS(14)@2014-03-17 22:56:43

http://www.mpfinance.com/htm/finance/20140317/news/ec_gca2.htm
出席陣容屢縮水 會方：給獎他們沒來領
  2014年3月17日

【明報專訊】中國經濟貿易促進會多名高層都是內地前高官。記者分析過去該會舉辦的多次論壇及峰會，手法多是向政商界人士發信，列明10多名「擬邀請嘉賓」，包括前國家領導人、知名企業領袖，甚至諾貝爾得獎者，但最終陣容「大縮水」，只有三數嘉賓撐場。

港分會註冊地址空置多時

根據促進會網頁，該會名譽理事長是中紀委前委員、司法部前副部長岳宣義，會長是國內貿易部前副部長何濟海。促進會轄下成立了多個分會，包括香港分會，會長是宋玲鋆，她是新界總商會副主席，公司註冊處資料顯示，她在2011年底申報的地址為中環長江中心一單位，記者日前拍門不果，管理員稱該單位已空置很久。

促進會舉辦多個「峰會」、「論壇」等活動，包括2013年6月在深圳舉行首屆「時代領袖論壇」，頒發「時代領袖獎」，向外宣傳「時代領袖」有10人，「擬邀請嘉賓」長實主席李嘉誠、中國太空人楊利偉、諾貝爾文學獎得主莫言等並無出席。促進會聯絡人杜勇說﹕「不是誇大，是我們給他們獎，他們沒來領，就是這樣子。」長實發言人表示對此一無所知。

美聯集團前副主席黃錦康2011年底出席促進會的「第五屆全球華人企業家論壇」，獲頒「亞太地區最受尊敬企業家大獎」。他指在北京釣魚台國賓館及一間知名酒店出席頒獎禮，很有氣派，「厲無畏(時任全國政協副主席)後面有成班軍人陪伴」。至於集團要付多少錢，他說不瞭解。

劉夢熊：印章有星似政府部門

全國政協前委員劉夢熊表示，內地有所謂「會議經濟」，「我收好多呢類邀請，多數在人民大會堂、京西賓館搞，退休高官做佈景板，引鰟鱓博上位，又未有名堂鮋企業家，花錢換個什麼全國十大企業家返鈬」。他指這些機構特別設計印章，「紅色圓形印，旁邊寫上中國乜乜會，中間有粒紅色星星，令人以為佢好似政府部門」。他說這類機構很多時亦用「擬邀請嘉賓」作宣傳，製造效果，但事實上大部分不會來，只會有「一兩個膽」，「好似第幾多屆全國政協副主席咁，老人家不甘寂寞，可以發揮餘熱，賺纒出場費」。

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3 : GS(14)@2014-03-17 22:56:53

http://www.mpfinance.com/htm/finance/20140317/news/ec_gca3.htm
20萬可當副會長 稱可陪領導合照出訪
  2014年3月17日

【明報專訊】中國經濟貿易促進會的網頁，列出近100名常務副會長及副會長，幾乎全是內地大小企業的高層。其實副會長名銜「有價」，本報取得的信件披露，一個5年任期的常務副會長，需付50萬元人民幣換取，副會長需20萬元人民幣。單以網頁列出常務副會長24名、副會長69名，促進會每5年的收入可達2580萬元人民幣。

以資產納稅額計資格

促進會在今年初發出的邀請信中表示，要增補10名常務副會長及20名副會長，前者的資格是企業近3年累計納稅達2億元以上，後者的資格是企業總資產及年營業額均達3億元以上。

兩類副會長均享有多項權益，包括在企業產品發佈等活動時，促進會「可協助邀請國家領導人」參加；任期內「可免費安排隨國家領導人出訪一次(團費自理)」，又可「安排國家領導、專家學者到副會長單位實地考察、調研」，「建立與國家相關部委局領導等高層資源的聯絡、溝通」。兩類副會長可在促進會年會上，「與出席活動的國家領導、專家學者單獨合影」、「陪同國家領導前排就座觀看大型文藝演出」等。

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拉登親信新組織威脅大

1 : GS(14)@2014-09-22 22:19:11



西方多國近日雖粉碎多個懷疑IS聖戰分子恐襲陰謀，美國官員始終認為IS主力集中在擴大其在伊敍的地盤，多於策劃恐襲西方，直接恐襲威脅，反不及敍利亞另一新興激進組織「呼羅珊」（Khorasan）。「呼羅珊」是去年才冒起的新組織，現時外界所知甚少，官員指是阿蓋德敍利亞分支「勝利陣線」的分支，由中東、南亞和北非阿蓋德分子組成，特別有興趣設計利用隱藏炸彈施襲或炸民航機的恐襲陰謀。「呼羅珊」領袖法德利（Muhsin al-Fadhli）是阿蓋德已故領袖拉登的親信，是極少數事前知道911襲擊計劃的人，911後與一小群阿蓋德分子逃到伊朗，涉協助2002年也門炸法國油輪案，美國國務院前年懸賞700萬美元（5,460萬港元）捉拿他，指他是阿蓋德駐伊朗領袖，跟祖國科威特的金主合作，為敍利亞親阿蓋德叛軍籌款。美國《紐約時報》



【動LIVE】萬人罷課　蘋果全程直播:和平佔中: http://occupycentral.appledaily.com
YouTube: http://bit.ly/occupycentral




來源: http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/international/art/20140922/18874357

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華府疑資助反內坦亞胡組織

1 : GS(14)@2015-03-20 01:38:20





眾所周知，內坦亞胡與美國總統奧巴馬關係欠佳，美國一個獲華府巨額資助的非牟利組織，就被揭發支援以色列一個反內坦亞胡機構，共和黨要求華府解釋及就有否違法展開調查。



共和黨促調查是否違法

OneVoice Movement（圖）前年獲國務院資助三十五萬美元（二百七十三萬港元），當中三分之二撥歸以色列分支，其餘就發給巴勒斯坦分支，以推動以巴和談，然而自以巴和談去年四月觸礁後，組織仍一直獲資助至同年八月中。年初，共和黨兩名國會議員去信國務卿克里，指OneVoice Movement支援以色列反內坦亞胡的狂熱機構V15，質疑違反免稅條款，更懷疑奧巴馬有意阻撓內坦亞胡連任。事件曝光後，有資助人暗中遞交文件，要求容許OneVoice Movement參與政治活動。OneVoice Movement否認支援V15是要煽動反內坦亞胡運動。美國霍士新聞





來源: http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/international/art/20150319/19081754

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移植兒時冷凍卵巢組織比利時不育婦誕B

1 : GS(14)@2015-06-11 09:06:02

■一名剛果出生的化療女病人，在比利時醫院協助下植回多年前切除的卵巢組織成孕，創全球先河。



癌症患者接受化療或電療，生育能力可能受損，無法繁衍後代。比利時一名女子童年接受化療前，冷凍保存了卵巢組織，成年後將卵巢組織植回體內，重拾生育能力，並且在切除卵巢14年後，於去年11月順利誕下健康寶寶，是首次有人植回未完全發育的卵巢組織後順利懷孕並分娩，成為全球首例。


負責這個個案的醫生，在最新一期《人類生育》（Human Reproduction）期刊發表報告。個案主角現年27歲，在非洲剛果共和國出生，5歲時確診患了鐮狀細胞病（sickle-cell disease）。




患上遺傳性血液病

患有這種遺傳性血液病的人，紅血球會產生異常的血紅蛋白，在血液失氧後會變為不溶性，很快從血液循環中被除去，導致貧血。患者會有周期性疼痛，平均壽命亦會縮減至40歲左右。女子11歲時舉家移居比利時，醫生發現她已急性貧血，需要盡快移植骨髓。為免身體出現排斥，骨髓移植病人要接受化療或電療，但這同時會損害她的卵巢。為了讓女子有機會生兒育女，醫生切除她右邊卵巢，冷凍保存部份組織。當時女子13歲，未有初經。約10年後，女子希望懷孕，醫生替她將部份卵巢組織解凍並植回體內。但由於她左邊卵巢已萎縮並且失去功能，只能夠移植4片。另外11片被植於皮膚下和子宮一帶，以刺激她的荷爾蒙生產，令卵泡生長，產生月經。女子在手術後5個月開始定期來經，顯示她卵巢可以孕育小生命。誰知她的男友原來不育，兩人試圖進行人工受孕但失敗。到去年初，女子跟新伴侶成功造人，自然懷孕，胎兒發育良好，在去年11月順利出生，是重3.1公斤的男嬰。女子終於圓了媽媽夢。



成為全球首宗例子


為女子做手術的布魯塞爾伊拉斯謨醫院（Erasmus Hospital）德梅斯泰爾醫生（Isabelle Demeestere）指出：「本個案是這個領域的重大突破。這意味將來兒童病人最有機會受益。」過去亦有成年女性在化療、電療前保存健康的卵巢組織，並且在治療後藉此誕下嬰兒；但使用切除自青春期前的卵巢組織，本個案卻是全球首例。專家指，在青春期前切下卵巢組織，以後是否可以製造出成熟卵子，此前一直沒有定論。同樣值得注意的是，以往同類手術中，卵巢組織移植後一兩年就會喪失功能，但本個案中的女子去年初成功懷孕時，距離做移植卵巢組織手術已超過兩年。醫生指她的卵巢在產後維持正常功能，「沒有理由顯示她不能再生育」。法新社/美聯社/英國《每日電訊報》





來源: http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/international/art/20150611/19180137

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