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黑客組織指造假 華寶瀉8％

1 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:47:43

http://www.mpfinance.com/htm/Finance/20120425/News/ec_ech1.htm



華寶於年報中曾刊登其德國研發中心的照片（圖左），但匿名分析指，這與他們實地探訪所拍下的照片（圖右）有異，年報中的研發中心面積大一點，且隱藏了實際地址。

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2 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:52:58

指控：部分客戶否認華寶為供應商

至於Anonymous Analytics的報告，王基信指公司現階層不作回應，「公司基金股東以long fund(長線投資者)為主，上周亦有基金增持，今日電話與部分基金股東溝通，他們對公司仍有信心，反應很令人鼓舞。」

華寶於2006年借殼上市，並由主席朱林瑤注入香精公司Chemactive。匿名分析的報告指出，Chemactive在被注入前毛利率僅48%，注入後僅半年，華寶毛利率便急升至65.4%，最近一期財政報告更達70%。然而，根據他們所得資料，華寶旗下23家子公司的毛利率僅在40%至50%之間。同時，華寶的研發開支是行業中最少的，報告質疑如何能維持高毛利。
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20060608042_C.pdf
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20060629078_C.pdf

除毛利率外，報告亦質疑華寶虛構收入。華寶在2008年聲稱國內10大煙草品牌都是其顧客，但匿名分析聯絡這些品牌的負責人時，部分否認華寶是其供應商。

報告最後指摘朱林瑤以高價注入資產，並以高派息吸引投資者入股，自己則不停減持公司股份，持股量由5年前的97.6%減至37.7%，累計套現94億元，被冠以「套現女王」稱號。

基金經理：前Banker執董都未跳船

雖然匿名分析再度發功，但有基金經理對此不以為然。「報告指華寶換走核數師德勤，但無提及換入來的係另一間四大羅兵咸永道。」至於質疑華寶毛利率高於同業，但報告列出的同行公司主業是食物及飲品的香精業務，毛利一向遠低於香煙香精，對比起逾八成收入來自香煙香精的華寶，毛利率自然較低。
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20060329082_C.pdf

不過該基金經理亦稱，報告提及華寶客戶的部分確實值得留意。「華寶執行董事熊卿之前在德銀工作，當年於德銀替華寶搞借殼後獲邀入公司，前banker都未跳船，應該係一個信號。」

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20080211090_C.pdf
熊卿先生，現年31歲，二零零七年五月加入本集團任總裁助理。熊先生曾在多家國際投資銀行任職多年，於中國大陸之企業以及國際資本市場方面擁有豐富經驗。熊先生畢業於清華大學經濟管理學院國際會計專業，獲經濟學學士學位。
http://webb-site.com/dbpub/positions.asp?p=43240&hide=N
明報記者 廖毅然

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3 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:53:53

http://tobaccodocuments.org/rjr/ ... atted&start_page=11

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4 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:56:58

The proximate cause seems to have been the acquisition of Chemactive. Prior to this acquisition, Huabao was more or less a shell company with de minimis operations reporting annual losses. On the other hand, Chemactive was a highly profitable company enjoying margins of 48% based on the pre-acquisition financial statements.
But still, 48% is a long way from 70+%. So what happened between the acquisition and the following year when management released their annual results showing margins had skyrocketed? We aren’t actually sure. You see, management only dedicated a few lines in their entire 2006 Annual Report to explaining the jump in gross margins:
“As the raw material structure of many of the continuous developing products were being optimized as well as the capacity of relevant production accessories increased, the gross margin rose from 47.3% of last year to 69.5%, which further improved the operating results.”16

From our reading of this explanation, management did two things to significantly improve margins:
1) ‘optimized’ the raw material structure; and
2) Increased ‘relevant production accessories.’
If you’re confused, you’re not alone. We don’t understand this vague explanation either. Moreover, we do not believe that management was able to re-engineer Chemactive within a year to become some sort of super-profitable money machine.
First, this transformation didn’t even take a year. As presented in the interim 2006 report, gross margins had already improved to 65.4% within 6 months of the Chemactive acquisition. Just so our readers don’t think they’re missing something:
 March 31, 2006 (Chemactive prior to acquisition): Gross Margins – 48.0%
 September 30, 2006 (Huabao interim report post-acquisition): Gross Margins – 65.4%
 March 31, 2007 (Huabao annual report post-acquisition): Gross Margins – 69.5%
Second, what type of re-engineering/cost cutting/synergies could management possibly have pulled out of their hat? Prior to acquiring Chemactive, Huabao was just a shell. It’s not like there was a second material operating business that was merged with Chemactive to cut costs or increase efficiencies. In fact, the same person who had run Chemactive prior to the acquisition was still running Chemactive after the acquisition – Huabao’s Chairwoman, Ms. Chu.
Given management’s dubious explanation, we turned to the most obvious source of confirmation – documents Huabao filed with the SAIC. 17 It took nearly three months, but we didn’t just get documents related to the Chemactive acquisition, we got documents related to the entire Company – nearly all of its principal operating subsidiaries representing 99.5% of Huabao’s production capacity. In total, we are in possession of SAIC documents for 23 different Huabao subsidiaries.
Based on our analysis of these documents, it appears that the overwhelming majority of Huabao’s subsidiaries report gross margins around 40-50%, in line with industry standards but a far cry from the 74% reported by the Company in 2010. It should be noted that since these results are not consolidated, it becomes difficult to calculate an exact gross margin figure. But in either case, 40%+ and 70%+ are a world apart.
To get more clarity on industry margins, we contacted several private F&F companies located in China. In our discussions with them, no representative was able to understand how gross profit margins of 70%+ could be achieved in this industry. Moreover, one representative mentioned that his company supplies tobacco flavors and fragrances for several foreign brands and that the gross profit margin of their business is ‘quite low.’ When pushed further, he relented that it *may* be possible for the gross profit margin of some new products to reach up to 70 or 80%, but was unlikely for older products. Looking back at Exhibit 4, a simple analysis of China Flavors and Fragrances’ gross margins confirms this statement. This point was also reaffirmed by a contact at a different F&F company, who went on to state that potentially better margins on new products is why all of the companies in the industry continue to develop new products through R&D.

And so it seems that R&D is vital to the industry’s profitability and staying power. However, as Exhibit 5 shows, for Huabao this issue raises more questions than it answers – simple questions such as:
How is Huabao able to maintain its leadership position and gross margins by spending less on R&D than most of its peers?
This chart is baffling when one reads through Huabao’s annual reports and sees the following gem:
“The R&D capability of a flavours and fragrances company reflects its overall strength. After continuous investment, the Group has set up a leading R&D team which is top-notch in China and up to international standards. The State-recognized technology centre, the overseas R&D centre in Germany and the professional R&D departments in Yunnan, Guangdong and Fujian together formed a vertically integrated platform for R&D in areas ranging from fundamental research to application. The R&D strategy of the Group is market-driven so as to closely follow the latest global industry trends and to accelerate the mastering of technologies in key raw materials. With such strengths, the Group is able to develop products and technologies that meet market demands, deliver comprehensive technical services to customers and remain dedicated to maximizing value for clients, while the Group’s overall competitiveness is greatly elevated.”18
Based on these type of statements, Huabao seems quite dedicated to cutting-edge, international caliber R&D. So much so that to aid its efforts in internationalizing its R&D capabilities, in 2006, Huabao set up an R&D center in Holzminden, Germany, a town famous for its F&F industry and the proud headquarters of Symrise, an industry powerhouse.

German research facility stands out as an important jewel in Huabao’s R&D initiative, because:
 It’s located in a logistically out-of-the-way place for a company that does all its business in China.
 “Internationalized R&D” seems to be a key strategy for the Company.
 Management considers it a “world-class R&D center.”
 Huabao’s Chief Technical Officer for Tobacco Flavors, Mr. Alan Davies, is posted at the Holzminden facility.
Given the apparent importance of this facility, we decided to give it a closer look to get a better feel for Huabao’s R&D work.
At the prompting of our contacts, our sources at Anonymous Germany agreed to take a road trip to Holzminden and put the R&D center under surveillance for three days.
Minimal Activity
Our contacts told us that during their investigation several points struck them as notable, especially in contrast with activity at the Symrise facility, which they also visited:
 Most of the lights in the complex were off.
 There was minimal noticeable staff activity.
 There was no security protecting the research facility.
 When neighbours were questioned, they either did not know what business was being carried out at the facility or assumed the facility belonged to Symrise.
It should be noted that the R&D center is not actually located in Holzminden, but in a very small village called Neuhaus, which is a twenty minute drive out of town. We were told there was no public transportation to speak of and it was during the winter season, making it difficult to ride a bicycle. This is relevant because over the three days, our contacts did not see more than six vehicles in the parking lot of the research center.

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5 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:57:17

Concluding on R&D Expenses
So, here we have a company with questionably low R&D spending that reports absurdly high margins, which industry sources say should not be possible. How do we bridge this divide?
We have come across various explanations. However, the best ones can be summarized as follows:
Huabao has established relationships with several prominent SOE tobacco manufacturers. Cigarette smokers are sensitive to their preference of cigarette brands and manufacturers are hesitant to change ingredients/suppliers in their blend. Accordingly, there is no need for major R&D as once Huabao is contracted to supply flavoring to a brand, that relationship will continue until the tobacco brand is terminated. Consumer preference for their favorite brand creates a natural moat for Huabao, ensuring lofty margins and low R&D expenditure.
This is actually a very logical, very good explanation.
The idea behind this explanation is that in a mature industry, there really is no need for R&D. The Company already has its flavours, it already has its connections, and it already has its committed cigarette brands. All the work is done.
And this makes sense. Except when it doesn’t.
The problem with this explanation is that the math cuts both ways. It may be possible for low R&D expenses to co-exist with high profit margins in a mature industry, but then we should be seeing correspondingly low revenue growth. Growth implies new markets, new opportunities, and therefore new R&D initiatives. If a company is not incurring substantial R&D costs because it benefits from being the leading player in a mature industry, we should not then be also witnessing high revenue growth that appears to be far surpassing the growth of its customer base.
Despite this, Huabao has also inexplicably experienced the fastest sales growth in the industry, as we discuss next.

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6 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:58:57

The Cannibalization Problem
Huabao supplies flavouring to approximately 50% of the top ten cigarette brands. In terms of consolidation, this is a positive factor for the Company. As the top brands consolidate smaller players, by proxy Huabao increases its market share and grows accordingly.
However, Huabao also supplies approximately 50% of the overall market, which implies that on average it also supplies 50% of brands and suppliers that are being or have been phased out. And as surely as Huabao gains from its biggest customers consolidating the industry, it also loses equally as its smaller clients are squeezed out. The result is a near zero-sum game.
Given these factors, we question Huabao’s growth story as a result of ‘industry consolidation’. In sections 3 and 4, we follow up this macro analysis by providing a granular look at Huabao’s revenue streams and client relationships.

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7 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:59:38

For example, we contacted Heinz’s corporate office in the US and were placed in contact with the Procurement Department. We provided the department Huabao’s name, along with the names of all its food and flavor subsidiaries. The department ran the names through their system and confirmed that they have no relationship with any of the names we had given them. We were informed that it may be possible that their Chinese factory sources directly from Huabao, in which case the Corporate office wouldn’t be aware. They therefore provided us with the contact information of the person in charge of procurement at the Chinese factory.
We contacted the individual who confirmed that they were in the best position to provide information regarding Heinz’s suppliers. When asked about Huabao, the individual wasn’t convinced Huabao could be classified as a “supplier” to Heinz because, to quote:
“We didn’t purchase much *from Huabao+… we didn’t really use them, previously we only purchased from them once. It was very little.”

Admittedly, the presented client list is dated. What about current clients? While Huabao stopped providing a client list, Shanghai H&K Flavor, one of Huabao’s food and flavoring subsidiaries does have a website where it lists products that it evidently provides flavouring for.
On its website (http://www.hbkq.com.cn/en/) under the tab ‘Market > Product Information’, there is a list of various products from flavoured yogourt to flavoured peanuts. This list was updated as recently as October 20, 2011, so we can assume it’s relevant.
From this list, we picked two products at random and contacted their manufacturers to confirm a client/supplier relationship with Huabao or its subsidiary.
The first product we picked was Harris Teeter Simply Clear Water, as shown in Exhibit 12.
We contacted Harris Teeter, a grocery store chain based in the US. Harris Teeter put us in contact with Cott Beverages, the company that manufactures and bottles the Simply Clear product. When asked about Huabao, Cott simply confirmed that they are not using any Chinese based company to supply flavouring ingredients for this product.

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8 : GS(14)@2012-04-25 23:59:50

We contacted HyVee who put us in touch with the account manager and the third party broker responsible for this product. Both individuals confirmed that no Chinese company is sourced for flavouring in the production of the milk.
Confused, we asked our contacts if they knew any reason why their products were displayed on Huabao’s website. Their simple response: “No.”

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9 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:00:29

http://whlg.cei.gov.cn/doc/hyc9c01/2012030518751.pdf
中国烟草行业分析报告
（2011 年4 季度）
2011 年，烟草行业卷烟产销量平稳增长，卷烟结构持续优化，行业效益稳步
提升，卷烟市场价格稳定。“532”、“461”品牌发展目标引领效应突出，持续推动
重点品牌快速发展，行业品牌价值和竞争力进一步提升，行业经济运行态势持续
向好发展，经济运行质量明显好于往年。4 季度，烟草行业生产卷烟5154.79 亿支，
同比下降0.84 个百分点，与上季度相比，减少1294.38 亿支。但从2011 年整体分
析，卷烟产量微增，累计生产卷烟24474 亿支，同比增长3.04%，低于上年同期
0.68 个百分点。1～12 月份，烟草行业累计完成卷烟销量24431.7 亿支，同比增长
3.34%。

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10 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:01:25

Part 1: The Chemactive Injection 5.1
As we mentioned at the beginning of our report, Huabao did not go public through a traditional IPO. It went public through a backdoor listing via a shell company. In an IPO setting, you hire investment bankers and outside consultants with their own reputations on the line to vet through your business operations, look through your financial statements, and then sell your shares to the public. And while this outside scrutiny in no way guarantees that your business is legitimate, it doesn’t hurt.
In a backdoor listing, you can be as shady as you want. No one is really there to question your business or inspect it. In fact, most people will just assume you’re doing something sketchy. Backdoor listings have that certain je ne sais quoi grease-ball quality to them.
After Huabao took over Leaptek, management effectively had a shell company available. They then bought the Chemactive assets from the Chairwoman and injected it into the shell, essentially taking Chemactive public. This is when we believe management first began to misstate their financials.
As we mentioned on page 14, Chemactive’s reported gross margins rose drastically immediately after the injection. Based on the evidence previously presented, we believe management simply fabricated their numbers. But of course, if you begin to lie about your gross margins, it’s going to affect reported net income as well.
Exhibit 17 shows the difference in 2010 net income between Huabao’s public filings and its SAIC documents. The net income of the SAIC documents are based on the sum of Huabao’s disclosed principal operating subsidiaries representing 99.5% of its production capacity, plus several ancillary subsidiaries that have some form of business operations. There appears to be a 36% difference in earnings between these two sources.
Exhibit 17 (HK$ millions) Difference
Public Filings
1,632
SAIC Documents
~1,200
36%
Reported R&D Expense
122
R&D Expense net of taxes
105
SAIC Documents less R&D
~1,095
49%
Source: Company financials and SAIC documents
It should also be noted that in calculating the SAIC net income, we did not included any cost centers, such as R&D facilities. However, Huabao claims to have spent HK$122 million on R&D in 2010. If we subtract this expense on an after tax basis from the SAIC net income, then we get an even larger discrepancy.
So, what reason did management have to inflate the financial figures?

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11 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:01:43

Part 2: The Chairwoman’s Share Sell Down 5.2
Better financial figures bring a higher share price. And that’s exactly what the Chairwoman wanted when she began dumping her shares. In order to understand the Huabao story, it’s important to understand that Huabao and its Chairwoman are inextricably linked. It helps to think of the Chairwoman as Huabao’s off-balance sheet entity. So yes, it’s true that Huabao as a company has never raised any money. But through the years, the Chairwoman has raised HK$9.4 billion (US$1.2 billion) on the back of inflated share prices.
Exhibit 18 Date (HK$ millions)
3-Aug-2006
1,500
17-Jan-2007
1,300
7-Apr-2009
1,200
8-Oct-2009
1,200
12-Apr-2010
2,000
28-Jan-2011
2,200
To Date:
9,400
In most instances of fraud, management will usually issue shares/debt through the company and abscond with the proceeds. However, this creates certain problems. For instance, when the auditors do their annual cash verification, management will need to explain what happened to the money. To cover the theft, management has to create lies such as claiming the money was spent on expanding/improving the business. This lie leads to other lies, such as inflated asset balances. Unfortunately, these inflated assets stay on the balance sheet where they can eventually be uncovered. Then there’s the issue of trust. If management repeatedly raises money to ‘expand’ business, people are going to start asking questions. The market will begin to suspect foul play. The whole process can become very messy.
We believe Chairman Chu avoided these complications. Instead of raising money through the Company, she simply inflated the value of Huabao, and then sold her personal shares into the market, generating a small fortune in the process.
The Queen of Cashout
Well, ‘small fortune’ may be a bit of an understatement. Last year Ms. Chu was ranked the 8th richest woman in China at the age of 41 on Hurun’s list of Self-Made Women Billionaires.
But that’s not the only list that Ms. Chu made. Hurun also released a ‘Cashout List’ which lists billionaires who have been cashing out of their own companies.26 According to the list, Ms. Chu was the second biggest inside-seller in China, cashing out US$549 million in the last year alone. This sum was so large that she has been dubbed ‘Queen of Cashout’ by The Shanghai Daily.
Disregarding everything in this report, at the most basic level shareholders should ask themselves: Why am I an investor in this company when the Chairwoman can’t sell her shares fast enough?

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12 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:01:54

Part 3: Other Related Party Acquisitions 5.3
Of course, overstating a company’s earning power has its own issues. For instance, auditors expect to see a commensurate cash balance as proof of income. Sales receipts and expense receipts can easily be forged or faked. However, bank cash balances are slightly more difficult to fake – slightly.
We know that Ms. Chu disposed of a large portion of her shares two days after the Chemactive acquisition, and once more before fiscal year end. Together, these two share sales gave her proceeds of approximately HK$2.5 billion.
With this amount, it would have been easy enough to pad Huabao’s bank accounts, which at the end of Fiscal 2007 (one year after the Chemactive acquisition) were reported to be approximately HK$ 900 million and still have enough money left over to grease the palms of third parties and their proxies working behind the curtain – and as a result of our investigation we certainly have reason to believe there are a multitude of outside players who are involved in this game Huabao is playing.
Of course, one does not perpetuate a scheme to simply leave money in the bank for the auditors. Moreover, as each year goes by and fake earnings continue to accumulate, it becomes more difficult to maintain sufficient cash in the bank. Ms. Chu could have sold down her holdings at a faster rate to continue to pad Huabao’s bank account, but then that would likely attract scrutiny. So what to do?
The answer was to transfer these ‘earnings’ out of Huabao. Enter Win New Group and Wealthy King Investments.
Recall from the beginning of this report that these two companies were injected into Huabao through Chairwoman Chu as related party transactions. More dubiously, the Chairwoman acquired these assets from third parties and resold them to Huabao within months. Not only that, but the price paid for these acquisitions were absurdly high, as shown in Exhibit 19.
Exhibit 19 Net Income Acquisition Price P/E Ratio
Win New Group
31
652
21.0
Wealthy King Investments
70
870
12.4
Average P/E
101
1522
15.1
Xiamen Amber
5.7
62
10.9
Maoming Kebi
20
117
5.9
Qingdao Qingda
2.5
12
4.8
Yunnan Huaxiangyuan
0.4
4.3
12.2
Average P/E
29
195
6.8
Source: Company disclosures
This Exhibit contrasts the valuation of the transactions between Huabao and the Chairwoman, and the transactions between Huabao and third parties. What is evident here is that the transactions involving the Chairwoman were valued at more than twice the transactions involving third parties.

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13 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:02:08

So, was the Chairwoman just greedy and looking to make money by flipping these businesses to Huabao? Yes and No.
We believe that these subsequent acquisitions were carried out at inflated valuations for the purpose of removing fake earnings from Huabao’s balance sheet. That way, management had an excuse when the auditors found Huabao’s bank accounts empty. Put another way, these transactions were used to clean up the theft that had already occurred.
And this is exactly why the Chairwoman took the awkward step of buying these assets from third parties only to resell them to Huabao.
We do not believe Huabao paid the reported price to acquire Win New Group and Wealthy King Investments from the Chairwoman. The reported acquisition price consisted of imaginary money/earnings that needed to be removed from Huabao’s balance sheet. It would have been impossible to do this through an arm’s length transaction, since a third party would be publically questioned regarding the value of the transactions. However, since the Chairwoman acquired the assets quietly from a third party, she was free to resell them to Huabao at any price with impunity.
Take the acquisition of Win New Group as an example. When Win New Group was acquired by Huabao from the Chairwoman, it had three operating subsidiaries as listed below:
Exhibit 20
Win New Group 2007
(In millions of RMB) Subsidiaries Revenue % of Total Net Profit % of Total
Shanghai Zhezhan
35.8
18%
26.2
80%
Huasheng Qinghua
30.8
15%
-0.1
0%
Zhaoqing Fragrances
134.1
67%
6.7
20%
Total
200.7
100%
32.8
100%
Huabao acquired Win New Group for HK$650 million, or 21 times earnings. It’s vital to note that this acquisition included 100% of Shanghai Zhezhan and Huasheng Qinghua, but only 72.1% of Zhaoqing Fragrances. A third party owned the other 27.9% of Zhaoqing Fragrances. This is important, because according to filings, Huabao would later acquire this outstanding portion of Zhaoqing Fragrances for only HK$21 million. This transaction from an independent third party implied a valuation of only 10.6 times earnings, for the same business Huabao bought at twice that valuation from Ms. Chu. It’s interesting how Huabao only pays reasonable prices for acquisitions that are not through the Chairwoman.
Over the years, Huabao has continued to grow and overstate its earnings. The share price has continued to grow as well, giving the Chairwoman more opportunities to sell down her stake. However, this growth has come with a price: Huabao is so large now that it has become difficult to conduct additional related party transactions of significant size to be meaningful in removing earnings from its balance sheet. Moreover, as Huabao’s reported cash balance grew, calls from investors and analysts to declare dividends intensified.

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14 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:02:31

Part 4: Dividend Payouts 5.4
Here we return to the stated amount of HK$2.4 billion – the cumulative amount Huabao has paid out in dividends all these years, the amount that regardless of how shady management has been in the past, should remove any doubts about Huabao’s brilliant and legitimate business.
But there’s a problem with this number: it’s a red herring.
Over the relevant period, the Chairwoman has had anywhere between 66% to 38% ownership in Huabao. Due to this interest, a significant amount of the dividends that have been ‘paid out’ have never actually been ‘paid out’ – they have just circled back to the Chairwoman. In fact, as Exhibit 21 shows, only half of the HK$2.4 billion has actually made it to public shareholders.
Exhibit 21
(In HK$ ‘000) 2007H1 2007H2 2008H1 2008H2 2009H1 2009H2 2010H1 2010H2 2011H1 2011H2 2012H1 Total
Dividends per share
1.80
3.80
2.30
6.00
5.00
8.80
8.80
12.28
7.20
7.98
12.98
Declared dividends
54,773
116,382
70,451
184,147
154,100
271,463
274,970
384,219
226,789
251,374
409,467
2,398,135
Chairwoman's stake
65.78%
65.35%
62.96%
62.80%
62.64%
51.28%
50.87%
44.10%
37.71%
38.43%
38.40%
Dividends paid out
18,743
40,326
26,095
68,503
57,572
132,257
135,087
214,767
141,267
154,776
252,232
1,241,625
To put this all into perspective:
Over the last six years, the Chairwoman has raised HK$9.4 billion from the public. Over that same time period, Huabao has paid HK$1.2 billion back to the public in the form of dividends. That’s 13% of what was raised – over six years.
Based on our time weighed calculation, the Chairwoman could have put the money she raised in a bank account earning 5.00% interest and still made those payments to public shareholders. And despite official statistics, anyone who actually lives in China will know that 5.00% doesn’t even cover the cost of inflation.
With some perspective, suddenly Huabao’s dividend story doesn’t seem so compelling anymore.

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15 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:02:52

http://www.mpfinance.com/htm/Finance/20120425/News/ec_ech3.htm
問題在於，海外研究機構並非香港持牌人士，本地證監會是否只能袖手旁觀、任造市之風氾濫？證監會發言人昨日回覆本報查詢時表示，不對個別事件發表評論。然而，海外研究機構唱淡民企的一系列事件，早在去年7月已經引起監管方注意，證監會曾擬定3招，專門應對以造空為生的海外對畄基金，其中包括：要求與傳言相關的民企第一時間作出解釋、由證監會出手調查沽空交易、由交易所及港府對外澄清本港上市監管水平高於海外借殼上市等。有法律界人士曾指出，即使並非本港持牌金融機構，涉嫌誹謗的造市行為仍可能受到追究。

證監關注沽空率高股份 是否潛在違規

證監會亦表示，已加強對沽空活動的檢查，每天針對沽空比率最高的股份，關注是否存在潛在違規行為。另一方面，市場對類似披露開始習慣之後，「渾水效應」已不及初時迅猛。有觀點認為，雖然有關監管應該對造市行為起到遏制作用，普通投資者也須要提高分辨力，不應聽信一面之詞、一遇到不利消息便急於沽售或沽空。

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16 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:24:25

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/te ... 307&art_id=16278898
本報致電華寶投資者關係經理王基信，面對記者反覆提問，他只堅持回答：「我哋朝早 9點收到呢份報告，公司內部處理緊，全日喺度開緊會，所以呢一刻無任何嘢可以 comment（評論）。」
雖然匿名報告早上已「出街」，但華寶昨日沒有停牌，在下午報告廣為流轉後，跌勢越來越急，全日瀉 8.08%至 3.98元，創三個月來新低，單日蒸發 11億元。華寶昨晚刊發通告，指不明股價下跌及成交增加的原因，公司現正編製業績，強調現時生產經營一切正常。
華寶近兩周股價無端急挫，引來市場揣測。華寶前日早上 9時即舉行電話會議，執董熊卿強調不知股價積弱原因，又聲稱核數師已開始工作，可如期在 6月底前公佈全年業績。
有基金經理坦言，華寶「開幾多電話會議都無用」，「份報告今次講咗成個 picture，都幾有說服力，我驚股價有排跌。」

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17 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 00:24:42

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/te ... 307&art_id=16278899
狙擊華寶國際（ 336）的「匿名分析」（ Anonymous Analytics），其手法與去年多次出手的渾水研究近似，匿名於去年 9月首次「發炮」，質疑超大現代（ 682）誤導投資者而一戰成名。而遭匿名質疑加上主席涉及市場失當行為的雙重夾擊，超大於去年 9月起一直停牌至今。

團隊陣營有來頭

根據匿名的網頁介紹，其團隊包括分析員、鑑證會計師（ Forensic Accountant）、統計師、律師及電腦專家，故其調查比起投資銀行的研究報告並不遜色，例如有關超大的調查報告，所涉及內容超過 10年，更附以詳盡解說。
有消息指匿名分析是互聯網黑客組織「匿名者」新成立部門，英國《金融時報》曾訪問過他們，他們表示，是被「佔據華爾街」（ Occupy Wall Street）示威行動啟發，希望透過影響股價而引起市場注意。

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18 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 23:27:34

http://www.mpfinance.com/htm/Finance/20120426/News/ec_ecj1.htm
匿名分析周二發表報告稱，從事香精香料生產及銷售的華寶國際涉嫌誇大收入及毛利率。華寶當日股價瀉8%，至昨早終宣布停牌。摩根大通隨即發表報告，認為匿名分析的報告確有值得關注之處，例如提及一些客戶否認與華寶有合作，以及盈利數字與國家工商總局有差異。華寶的股價可能會受報告影響出現一個月的持續下跌，但該行仍維持對華寶「跑贏大市」的評級。華寶投資者關係經理王基信昨日則表示，公司正準備回應報告，同時亦希望未來在數據披露上做得更好。他又強調，一直與股東進行溝通，部分對公司持正面、樂觀的態度。

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19 : GS(14)@2012-04-26 23:28:24

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... N201204261422_C.pdf
本公司正就近日市場流傳一些對本公司不正確及誤導的指控作出澄清工作，其中
包括於今天本公司已派專員至中華人民共和國國家工商行政管理總局（「工商局」）
下屬各地工商行政管理局調出本集團國內之若干附屬公司二零一零年度（即截至
二零一零年十二月三十一日止十二個月）的已經備案之財務資料，以作為公司日
後刊登澄清公告的其中一項佐證。
根據中華人民共和國法律、行政、法規及部門規章，所有在中國經營的企業法人
每年需向當地工商行政管理局報送上一年度（一月一日至十二月三十一日）的年檢
材料，其中包括按中國會計準則編制及審計的財務報表，而該等財務報表的貨幣
單位為人民幣。由於本公司及其附屬公司（「本集團」）的綜合財務報表是按本公
司的財政年度而編制，即由每年四月一日開始至下一年度三月三十一日止十二個
月，故與附屬公司的內地之經審計財務報表存在時間性的差異，加上本集團的綜
合財務報表之貨幣乃以港幣為單位，而兩者適用之會計準則亦不同。
此外，本公司與本公司之核數師羅兵咸永道會計師事務所亦正在進行本公司及其
附屬公司截至二零一二年三月三十一日止年度之末期業績審計工作，本公司擬按
香港聯合交易所有限公司證券上市規則於二零一二年六月三十日或之前公告業績。
最後，本公司就前述不正確及誤導之澄清工作有序開展，一旦有進一步進展將會
另行公告。

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