2011年 Charlie and I
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2011ltr.pdfIn my early days I, too, rejoiced when the market rose. Then I read Chapter Eight of Ben
Graham’s The Intelligent Investor, the chapter dealing with how investors should view fluctuations in stock prices. Immediately the scales fell from my eyes, and low prices became my friend. Picking up that book was one of the luckiest moments in my life.
一只牛：
我是窮牛，當我已經全部買入，市場大升，我會很開心，然後我希望天價賣出。
人生不如意十之八九，哪有可能行運一條龍？尤其是一隻牛。
【The Intelligent Investor】--Investor and Market Fluactuation，並不難懂，平價是好朋友，波動是好朋友，人人都懂。為何大跌市，好股大平賣，卻不敢買入？這是不是似懂非懂？為何股價波動了幾個%，就急着止賺/止蝕，我們是不是似懂非懂？我要多謝Graham，我才能接觸善知識。
In the end, the success of our IBM investment will be determined primarily by its future earnings. But an important secondary factor will be how many shares the company purchases with the substantial sums it is likely to devote to this activity. And if repurchases ever reduce the IBM shares outstanding to 63.9 million, I will abandon my famed frugality and give Berkshire employees a paid holiday.
一只牛：
企業的價值是建立在
我發現，未來盈利：
聰明的管理股東權益：
- excellent management
- 誠實（小股東能分享）
InsuranceIn most years, including 2011, the industry’s premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some extraordinary insurance operations. Let me tell you about the major units.
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must
(1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses;
(2) conservatively evaluate the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does;
(3) set a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and
(4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that their competitors are eagerly writing.
一只牛：
如果保險公司是由傻仔打理，後果不堪想像。
就算是國內最大的保險商，由傻仔打理，後果也是不堪想像。
各行各業，哪有競爭不激烈的？
有哪一個上班族沒有壓力？
如果公司是傻仔打理，唯有自求多福。
Regulated, Capital-Intensive BusinessesA key characteristic of both companies is the huge investment they have in very long-lived, regulated assets,
Both businesses have earning power that even under terrible business conditions amply
covers their interest requirements.
BNSF’s interest coverage was 9.5x.
At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two key factors ensure its ability to service debt under all
circumstances: The stability of earnings that is inherent in our exclusively offering an essential service and a diversity of earnings streams, which shield it from the actions of any single regulatory body.
Measured by ton-miles, rail moves 42% of America’s inter-city freight, and BNSF moves more than any other railroad – about 37% of the industry total. A little math will tell you that about 15% of all inter-city ton-miles of freight in the U.S. is transported by BNSF. It is no exaggeration to characterize railroads as the circulatory system of our economy. Your railroad is the largest artery.
Massive investments of the sort that BNSF is making would be foolish if it could not earn appropriate returns on the incremental sums it commits.
MidAmerican, 89.8% owned by Berkshire, supplies 2.5 million customers in the U.S. with electricity, operating as the largest supplier in Iowa, Utah and Wyoming and as an important provider in six other states as well. Our pipelines transport 8% of the country’s natural gas. Obviously, many millions of Americans depend on us every day. They haven’t been disappointed.
一只牛：
投資公用企業，就要預算它的龐大資本支出，隨時要有出差錯的準備。
所以利息保障比率，我們要懂得計。你看，BNSF’s interest coverage was 9.5x.
投資公用企業，就要選最厲害的，最厲害的才能形成壟斷局勢，才能成為強大。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing OperationsA few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business being purchased or the future economics of the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes my eyesight has been poor.
Overall, the intrinsic value of the businesses in this Berkshire sector significantly exceeds their book value. For many of the smaller companies, however, this is not true. I have made more than my share of mistakes buying small companies. Charlie long ago told me, “If something’s not worth doing at all, it’s not worth doing well,” and I should have listened harder. In any event, our large purchases have generally worked well – extraordinarily well in a few cases – and overall this sector is a winner for us.
一只牛：
原來，巴菲特也是時常犯錯，但是他的犯錯成本非常細小，做對的回報卻很大。
我個人認為，十強之內的企業，找到對的公司的機會很高（它們就是因為做對了，才能在十強之內）。