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22 Dec 10 - 中國民航信息 (0696) 送紅股 藍兵手記

http://airmanblue.blogspot.com/2010/12/22-sep-10-0696.html

豪送紅股將成絕響？ 探險家

來源: http://hkcitizensmedia.com/2016/05/03/%E8%B1%AA%E9%80%81%E7%B4%85%E8%82%A1%E5%B0%87%E6%88%90%E7%B5%95%E9%9F%BF%EF%BC%9F/

早前聯交所就上市公司賣殼行動加緊收管，現金公司條例成為聯交所的尚方寶劍。雖然這增加了賣殼時的難度，如公司必須有足夠業務營運，現金比例不過50%等，但這並不能有效地打壓賣殼活動，也未能直接解決上市公司啤殻的行為。而最近聯交所也就另一項財技 — 送紅股進行規管。筆者認為聯交所的確可以阻止上市公司大規模送紅股，但對於阻止市場秩序混亂，筆者則覺得成效不大，同樣是治標不治本。

送紅股這個財技對於細股投資者來說相信不會陌生，但其實送紅股不一定只限於細股，大股甚至是藍籌股也會，經典代表當然有香港中華煤氣(0003)每年派息時也會10送1紅股，而幾年前中國建材(03323)也曾1送1紅股。今次聯交所的通告則指出就一般情況而言，上市公司發行紅股的目的是為了增加股份流動性，惟大規模(200%或以上)的紅股發行，有可能令市場秩序混亂，故建議上市公司採取股份拆細，以達致同樣效果。另外，指引信亦提到，上市公司在發行紅股時，應盡可能縮短除權日及配發日的時間；及根據《上市規則》13.64條，若股價低於0.1元，聯交所有權要求公司更改交易方法或將其證券合併。

或許大家會問，送紅股為甚麼會令市場秩序混亂呢? 送紅股的最大特色，就是在除淨日與派送日之間流通市值會大幅降低。因為新印的紅股尚未派發，流通的已發行股本並沒有增加，但由於股價因除淨而大幅降低，因此整體市值便會降低。如果是1送1，除淨時市值會縮少50%，若然是大比例1送9，市值更會縮少90%。市值變細了，變相炒作的成本也細了，炒作的誘因更大，這也解釋了為何很多送紅股的股票會在除淨日中被炒起。這正正是聯交所不喜歡的地方。

的確，今次的指引將令豪送紅股成為絕響，但市場秩序混亂卻不會因此完全終止。剛才說過混亂是源於除淨，要知道除送紅股外，供股和公開發售同樣會有除淨。背後人士只需將1送1紅股改為1供1，同樣可以達致除淨時市值縮少50%的效果，唯一不同之處只是要背後人士拿錢出來供股，但供股價只要有大折讓，問題其實不大。要市值縮水90%，1供9便成。更甚的是，供股時會有供股權買賣，因為有槓桿成份，更容易造成市場秩序混亂，這是違背了聯交所原意。

水清無魚，探險家相信聯交所並不想完全阻止細股炒作，聯交所只是想壓制一下炒風，但若論今次送紅股的作用，這與監管賣殼活動一樣，卻是有點治標不治本的感覺。

更多文章詳見於：

「股市探險家」專頁：https://www.facebook.com/stockadventurer/

(以上純屬個人意見，並不構成任何投資建議或勸誘。)

Webb: 絕對無謂的拆股及送紅股

1 : GS(14)@2010-12-28 14:46:14

http://webb-site.com/articles/bonusplit.asp

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2 : GS(14)@2010-12-30 22:46:09

Webb轟亂送紅股擾股民
信利志高送紅股 即告炒高
  2010年12月29日




【明報專訊】上市公司屢送紅股「以回饋股東支持」，獨立股評人David Webb昨日撰文指出，送紅股或拆細股份，為小股東徒添麻煩兼無助刺激交投，實際上十分「無謂」，而近日多隻送紅股股份中，更以信利國際(0732)做法特別混亂。事實上，以送紅股為例，由股份除權至紅股上板期間，由於貨源較少，極易被人為地炒上，昨日除權買賣的志高(0449)股價，便曾彈升近四成。

David Webb昨日於網上發表題為「Truly pointless bonuses and splits」(意即「絕對無謂的紅股及拆細」，同時，信利英文名稱亦為「Truly 」)的文章，批評一些上市公司派送紅股或將股份拆細，部分更會同時進行，做法無助增加股東利益之餘，更增加小股東增加交易成本。

發紅股增成本 製造碎股

文章指出，送紅股不會增加公司實際資產，但發行紅股卻產生不少成本，包括發出公告、列印文件、召開股東會等。同時，紅股往往帶來碎股問題，持股量低的散戶很多時未能湊足一手，在沽售碎股時被迫以低於市價出售等。

David Webb又稱，在股份除權日，股東的部分實際權益因紅股未到手而不能沽售，而經調整後的股價，亦難與過去數據比較，凡此種種均對小股東不利。文章特別點名批評信利早前的送紅股及拆股計劃，做法無意義及十分混亂，建議管理層若想降低入場費，以刺激股份交投量，只需將每手股數由2000股降至400股，亦能達到相同效果。信利本月初宣布，擬按每10 股送1紅股，同時將股份1拆5，每手買賣單位則維持2000股。

乾貨期 令股價易被炒上

此外，近日多隻宣布送紅股的股份，在除權日往往被炒高，證券界指出，送紅股對基本因素無任何影響，但介乎除權日至紅股正式上板，便出現了一段「乾貨期」，可令股價更易被炒上。

以昨日除權的志高為例，該公司擬1送9紅股，即本月28日前每持有志高1股的股東，昨日起帳面上擁有10股志高股份，但在紅股正式到手前，僅得1股可沽出， 在供求失衡之下，莊家便可利用這一段時間把股價炒上。而志高昨日亦「表現對辦」，股價最多茘升38%，收市仍升19.6%。

(明報記者毛婷婷報道)

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3 : GS(14)@2010-12-30 22:46:18

Smartbox﹕送紅股怪現象 股東會未開已除權
  2010年12月29日

【明報專訊】不少二、三線公司每隔一段時間便會建議將股份拆細、發紅股或供股等，一連串數字往往令人眼花繚亂。此外，送紅股或供股須經過股東會批准，但很多公司卻將除權日定於股東會舉行之前，亦令投資者承受更多不確定風險。業界人士指出，發紅股及供股均要召開股東大會並獲股東投票批准，方可進行。然而，擺在眼前的怪現象是，不少上市公司如信利國際(0732)及志高(0449)，紅股除權日均在股東特別大會之前，若最終議案被否決，買賣雙方均失預算。

資料顯示，09年共有605宗除權個案，當中3宗被股東大會否決，而港交所(0388)早前已就應否規定股份，須待有關權益獲得股東批准後，方可進行除權買賣，徵詢市場人士的意見。

此外，發紅股及供股，在除權日及股價正式上板日往往相差數個星期，而股份拆細則是即日生效，相比之下，送紅股及供股所產生的「真空期」，令投資者面對更多不確定因素。

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4 : idsdown(1658)@2011-01-22 17:07:27

送紅股, 咁咪多D流通量
多D錢入來, 多D人炒, 咁至易容搵食ga ma

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5 : GS(14)@2011-01-22 17:10:03

咁但是對股東權益有損失，有甚麼作用?

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6 : idsdown(1658)@2011-01-22 17:19:23

呢個係立埸的問題, 邊個提出送紅股, 目的係乜?
小股東點解要接受, 有冇諗清楚當中會否有古惑.

無意幚老千亦痛恨老千, 但更重要的是小股東要懂得去辨識老千.

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7 : GS(14)@2011-01-22 17:21:04

6樓提及

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呢個係立埸的問題, 邊個提出送紅股, 目的係乜?
小股東點解要接受, 有冇諗清楚當中會否有古惑.

無意幚老千亦痛恨老千, 但更重要的是小股東要懂得去辨識老千.

都是炒高股價，方便套現...

但是別人知多少甚麼是老千? 唉。

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8 : idsdown(1658)@2011-01-22 17:30:49

7樓提及

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6樓提及

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呢個係立埸的問題, 邊個提出送紅股, 目的係乜?
小股東點解要接受, 有冇諗清楚當中會否有古惑.

無意幚老千亦痛恨老千, 但更重要的是小股東要懂得去辨識老千.

都是炒高股價，方便套現...

但是別人知多少甚麼是老千? 唉。

唔洗灰心喎, 呢個網站之所以出現都係因為佢地, 仲有香港正苦

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9 : GS(14)@2011-01-22 17:31:22

我要搞好呢個站

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10 : a10808434(6441)@2011-01-26 19:10:53

9樓提及

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我要搞好呢個站

加油呀!!
剛剛加入此網站, 發現有好多股票知識可以學
令我這些初學者更容易理解股票交易背後o即用意

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11 : GS(14)@2011-01-26 21:16:51

學得多，得個多字

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送紅股維持公眾持股量 高仁

1 : GS(14)@2012-07-03 21:41:48

....
雖然高仁在財金圈打滾十多年，但一直堅持要與時並進，皆因上市公司處理交易手法愈來愈新穎。近期的例子是， 盈大地（432）及中國星（326）於回購股份後，同樣利用派發紅股及紅利可換股債券的「奇招」，回復公眾持股量的最低規定。
一般而言，上市公司大股東持股量超過75%，其他股東的總持股量又不足25%，便不符合公眾持股量的最低規定；慣常的做法是，大股東透過配售代理減持部分股份，由獨立第三者接手，以增加公眾持股量至25%或以上，但配售價可能較市價呈現折讓。
盈大溢價35%回購然而，盈大地產及中國星卻懂得運用奇招，以派發紅股予其他股東及紅利可換股債券予大股東的方式，回復公眾持股量的規定。
這種做法比較罕見及新穎，以「發生時間」的先後次序來看，其「發明者」估計是盈大地產居多。
3 月初，盈大地產向股東提出一項高溢價股份回購要約，建議以每股回購價1.85 元（較停牌前收市價1.37 元，溢價約35%），回購約9.26 億股「街貨」，涉及資金約17.13億元。
財技解決股東恩怨
根據協議，盈大地產大股東電訊盈科（008）承諾不會就其持有14.81 億股（約61.53%股權）接納要約； 持有5.63 億股（ 約23.39%股權）的美國對沖基金Elliott Capital，承諾在回購要約期間，只會出售不超過約1.2億股。
雖然電盈及Elliott Capital 都不會在盈大地產的EGM（ExtraordinaryGenera l Meeting，股東特別大會）上投票，但因為回購要約沒有設定最低接納股份數目，所以只要其他股東通過回購決議案，Elliott Capital亦可以出售其持有全部股權。
事實上，Elliott Capital悉售所持盈大地產股權，是解決四年以來的恩怨情仇。
送股增公眾持股比重
2008 年，盈大地產獲電盈提出私有化，每股作價2.85 元， ElliottCapital 充當「攔路虎」，積極掃貨至持有16%，試圖逼使電盈調高收購價但不遂，最終令到私有化計劃胎死腹中。其後，Elliott Capital反覆增持盈大地產，至23.39%水平，惟盈大地產股價一直未見起色。心有不甘的Elliott Capital，於是致函盈大地產，批評其管理差，導致每股資產淨值（NAV）出現重大折讓，要求釋放公司價值。
最終，盈大地產與Elliott Capital達成協議，以每股1.85 元回購所有街貨，不但令Elliott Capital 可以套現10.4 億元離場，而且小股東亦有變現投資的機會，做到皆大歡喜的效果。
回購要約截止後，盈大地產接獲約8.27 股股份有效接納，佔股本約34.26%；當註銷所有回購股份後，電盈持股量達到93.59%，公眾持股量只有6.41%，要實施回復公眾持股量的措施。
盈大地產隨即施展奇招，宣布1 送4 紅股，以及股份5 合1。這當然不是一般的派送紅股行動，集團只會向小股東按1比4 的基準派發紅股，大股東電盈則會收取總值5.93 億元的紅利可換股票據（CB）；完成派送後，公眾持股量由6.41%，大幅回升至25.49% ， 符合最低規定的25%。
持紅利CB隨時增持
雖然盈大地產發行的紅利
CB 並沒有投票權，惟大股東電盈依然不會太蝕底，因為該紅利CB 沒有到期日，即是可以在任何時候兌換股份，要增持或減持「話咁易」。此外，電盈亦可以享有與派送紅股的大致相同經濟利益，例如收取股息、分派資產及資本化發行等等。
盈大地產建議在1 送4 紅股之際，同時進行股份合併，其背後目的相信是抵銷派送紅股對股價調整造成的影響，以及減少股價的波動。
中國星回購溢價更高可能是得到盈大地產的啟發，中國星6 月初亦宣布進行股份回購，建議以每股0.35 元（較停牌前收市價0.196 元，溢價78.57%），回購最多9.83 億股股份，相當於擴大後股本45.55%。
由於大股東向華強及陳明英的持股量估計將由45.74%，增加至76.5%，中國星提出1 送4 紅股方式，以回復公眾持股量至25%，當然，股東亦可選擇收取紅利CB代替紅股。

總而言之，財金圈嶄新招式無奇不有，各位「巴打」，務要格外留神！
本欄逢周二刊出
歡迎交流上市公司的財技個案及招數，請電郵至[email protected]。
高仁

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2 : GS(14)@2012-07-03 21:44:37

432

http://sdinotice.hkex.com.hk/di/ ... 2&src=MAIN&lang=ZH&

私有化
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20080214184_C.pdf

最後失敗
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20080417540_C.pdf

回購派紅股
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... N201203021097_C.pdf
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20120405021_C.pdf
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20120621479_C.pdf

326
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20120605005_C.pdf

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3 : GS(14)@2012-07-03 21:46:06

其實他可能唔知8008先是始祖

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20100909018_C.pdf
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20100928060_C.pdf
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20101125018_C.pdf

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4 : 健次郎(29109)@2012-07-03 21:55:58

呢招都幾高,連"獨立第三者"果筆都慳返.

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5 : GS(14)@2012-07-03 21:56:55

4樓提及

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呢招都幾高,連"獨立第三者"果筆都慳返.

老細又可變相可以公正地持多些股票

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6 : GS(14)@2013-06-11 23:36:12

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20130328486_C.pdf
3688 都咁做

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7 : GS(14)@2013-06-11 23:36:29

http://webb-site.com/articles/freefloat.asp
Webb哥都講
Investors in SCMP Group Ltd (SCMP, 0583), publisher of the South China Morning Post, must be growing weary of the repeated long-term suspension by the Stock Exchange of dealings in their shares, after another 3 months in the deep freeze. This is through no fault of their own, or even of the company, because this is entirely a matter of the Listing Rules and the ownership structure. They are not the only ones to be impacted by Listing Rule 8.08. In this article we will explain by the rule requiring a 25% public float should be scrapped, because it has no real purpose, and because the only way to enforce it is to victimize minority shareholders by suspending their shares from trading.
Background

On 13-Dec-2007, the Kuok family's Kerry Media Ltd (Kerry) bought 3.20% of SCMP at $2.39 in an off-market transaction, raising its stake (including its associates) to 44.85%. That was more than the 2% per year "creeper" allowance (for creeps) under the Takeover Code, so it resulted in a mandatory general offer at the highest price paid within the previous 6 months, which was $2.75. The offer closed on 25-Feb-2008 with acceptances and purchases during the offer period raising the stake to 74.93%. This was despite the advice from Platinum Securities Co Ltd in the response document, advising independent shareholders not to accept the offer.

As of 21-Mar-2007, Silchester Partners Ltd (Silchester, UK), an asset manager and long-term substantial shareholder, held 14.00%. They did not accept the offer, and as they are over 10%, under the Listing Rules they do not count towards the public float requirement of 25%. As a result, on 27-Feb-2008, the Stock Exchange suspended the shares on the grounds that the remaining public float was below 25%, freezing the minority shareholders. On 6-Mar-2008 SCMP announced that Silchester held 14.06%, leaving a public float of 11.01%.
Parking

A whole year went by, then on 27-Feb-2009, Kerry agreed with 3 investment banks, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Deutsche Bank and Bank of East Asia (BEA, 0023), to "sell" 225m shares (14.4%, one-third to each bank) at $1.70 (38% discount to market), and the banks had the right to sell them back to Kerry on the 4th anniversary at a price which would give the banks a return of 1.1% p.a., which we will call a "parking fee". Kerry also had the right to require the banks to exercise the put options at any time, so in effect Kerry held a call option at the same price.

The combination of a long put and short call is virtually the same as a forward sale, because it is in the interests of one side or the other to exercise their option, assuming they have a common view on the value of the shares. To make things air-tight, Kerry deposited the proceeds of the "sale" with the same 3 banks, as collateral for its future payment under the put options. Any dividends reduced the exercise price of the option, allowing Kerry to withdraw the same amount from the collateral (less the accrued parking fee). In theory, the banks could have sold the shares in the market at above the put price (if such a price was available), but then if Kerry called the shares back by requiring the banks to exercise the put option, the banks would have to repurchase the shares in the market, so that was never likely to happen.

In short, this was an arrangement to park shares with banks for 4 years, in order to technically satisfy Listing Rules on the public float without actually reducing Kerry's economic interest or increasing the number of shares in circulation in the market. It worked. With the blessing of the Stock Exchange to this highly contrived arrangement, trading resumed in the afternoon of 2-Mar-2009, with a purported public float of 25.12%, including the 14.4% held by the banks.

Apart from the parking fee and expenses, Kerry also paid the banks an undisclosed advisory fee. It is worth mentioning at this point that David Li Kwok Po, the Chairman and CEO of BEA, has been an INED of SCMP since its IPO in 1990. Kuok Khoon Ean, then Chairman of SCMP and son of Kerry's founder Robert Kuok Hock Nien, has been an INED of BEA since 10-Jan-2008, and fellow Malaysian tycoon Khoo Kay Peng has been an NED of SCMP since 25-Jun-1994 and of BEA since 15-Oct-2001.

Roll the clock forward 4 years, and on 7-Feb-2013, Kerry triggered the options, reducing the official public float back to 10.59%, so SCMP warned investors that upon completion on 26-Feb-2013, the stock would again be suspended. And so it was. Investors have now spent more than 3 months without access to their capital.
Bonus shares

There is another way to avoid the free float rule. Create a new class of non-voting securities which have all the same economic attributes as the shares (as to dividends, capital on liquidation, and so on) but are not listed or transferable, and then declare a bonus issue in which shareholders can elect to receive either ordinary shares or the new unlisted securities. The majority shareholder then accepts the unlisted securities, reducing his percentage of the ordinary shares and thereby restoring the free float without making any change to the economic value of the free float or to his economic interest in the company.

An early example of this was Sunevision Holdings Ltd (Sunevision, 8008). On 9-Sep-2010, it announced a 1:1 bonus issue, with the option of receiving unlisted, irredeemable non-transferable convertible notes instead. Sunevision was 84.64% owned by Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd (SHKP, 0016) and they needed to increase the float by 30-Jun-2011 when the Listing Rules were changed to require a 25% float. By electing to receive the notes, SHKP's shareholding was cut to 73.37%, while its economic interest remained at 84.64%.

A more recent example is Top Spring International Holdings Ltd (Top Spring, 3688). On 28-Jan-2013, it announced that its public float had dropped below 25% and was then 20.64%. On 27-Mar-2013 it announced a 2:5 bonus issue of shares with an alternative of unlisted perpetual subordinated convertible securities. This would raise the public float to 25.14%, assuming nobody but the chairman elected to receive the convertibles. His voting interest would drop, but his economic interest would remain the same.

Again, these arrangements satisfy the Listing Rules but make no difference to the economic value (or market capitalisation) of the publicly held, tradable shares. In that respect, the costs incurred in terms of legal fees, printing and advisory fees are a waste of shareholders' money purely to satisfy a Listing Rule.
The float rule lacks a proper purpose

What is the purpose of the public float rule? If it is to provide some minimum value of tradable shares, then it fails, because there are plenty of companies whose entire market value is less than the public float of SCMP and yet they are not suspended, and because it is easily circumvented with a bonus share scheme which does nothing to increase the market value of the public shares.

There is full disclosure of insider shareholdings, so investors are aware (if they choose to be) what the public float of any company is. Furthermore, if a major shareholder in a listed company keeps buying the shares, by reducing the float he is making it easier to block an eventual privatisation and delisting, because it only takes 10% of the minority shares to veto such a deal. So without a free float rule, major shareholders would be unlikely to push it that far.

As the SCMP case demonstrates, the float rule is in practice unenforceable, because the Listing Rules and the Listing Agreement are a contract binding companies, not shareholders. Companies cannot force their shareholders to sell, or to buy in privatisation offers. Even the bonus share manoeuvre described above requires shareholder approval, which may not be forthcoming. SCMP has recently said that Kerry will not support such a move. Perhaps it suits them to freeze Silchester and all the other minority shareholders, by refusing to support an artificial bonus share scheme which would restore the public float. It might make it easier to squeeze them out with another low privatisation offer.

If this is a question of voting rights, then from a minority shareholder perspective, it makes little difference to the balance of power whether the major shareholder owns 70% or 90%. With 75% you can pass a special resolution to change the articles of association even if all the other shareholders vote against it. Turnouts in shareholder meetings are never 100%, so in practice you can absolutely control a company with 70%, and of course you can absolutely elect or remove any director with a 50% majority of the votes cast in general meetings.

The public float rule places minority shareholders in all companies at constant risk of having their shareholdings frozen by the Stock Exchange despite the fact that neither they, nor the company, have done anything wrong, but purely because of the actions of other shareholders. That risk is obviously higher in situations with two substantial shareholders where, for their own economic reasons, neither of them wishes to sell.
Scrap the rule

The public float rule should be scrapped. Let the market trade. The market has full information on what the substantial shareholdings over 5% are (to the nearest whole percent) as required by law. Investors can make their own choice over whether they want to own shares in a small percentage float, whether it is a large company or a small one. Investors should not have to pay, via their companies, to execute convoluted bonus share schemes just to comply with the Listing Rules, and should not be at risk of having their money frozen in suspended shares purely because of the actions of other shareholders. This rule is not serving investor interests.

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8 : greatsoup38(830)@2013-06-12 15:40:12

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/financeestate/art/20130612/18294411


【本報訊】獨立股評人David Webb建議，廢除上市公司必須要有25%公眾持股量的規限，因為這只會迫使小股東無緣無故承受上市公司停牌之苦，成為這上市條例的犧牲者。
David Webb援引南華早報（583）為例，早於2008年2月南華早報大股東持股量增至74.93%。
南早大股東曾破解招數

不過，餘下的25.07%權益中，有一名基金股東Silchester持有南華早報14%權益，超過了10%，因而不符合公眾股東資格要求，結果只有11.01%的小股東符合公眾股東資格，南華早報違反了上市規則；結果在大股東和公司均沒有犯錯的情況下，公司要被迫停牌。
David Webb又指出，市場已有不少迴避方法，令到這條規則形同虛設。
早於2009年2月南華早報大股東便使出破解招數，向三名投資銀行「出售」合共2.25億股或14.4%南華早報的股份，於四年後大股東可以行使認購權購回相關股份，但就每年向這三間投行繳付「泊位費」1.1%；若計及這三間投行股份，公眾持股量輕易回升至25%。當四年過去，大股東回購這筆股份後，南華早報又再次面對公眾持股量不足的情況，令集團再度陷入停牌困局，已達3個月。

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送紅股無實際得益 高仁

1 : GS(14)@2013-05-11 14:39:59

2013-05-07 HJ
...

上市公司愈來愈流行派送紅股，表面上理由層出不窮，小股東以為好「着數」，實際上是謬誤處處，又沒有任何實際得益。

送紅股無實際得益

派送紅股【小檔案】又被稱為「生股仔」，上市公司會按照股東持股比例發行股份，小股東獲得公司贈送額外的「獎品」（股份），使到其持有股份數目上升，所以會以為好「着數」。

然而，派送紅股會導致發行股份數目增加，每股盈利及每股淨值則會被攤薄，而股數增加正好彌補了每股盈利及每股淨值的損失，小股東並沒有任何實際得益。

事實上，派送紅股只是等同於股份拆細，同樣是增加發行股份的數目。譬如說，10 送1紅股相當於股份1 拆1.1，而10 送3 紅股相等於股份1拆1.3。

上市公司派送紅股的理由層出不窮，最常見有提高股份於市場上的流通量、參與公司的業務增長、回饋股東的支持、擴大公司股東基礎、擴大公司資本基礎等等，部分是言之有理，部分卻是謬誤處處【表】。

中石化（386）首次派送紅股就「出事」。董事會以為，發行紅股可擴大公司資本基礎、提高股份流通量，並且回饋股東的支持。

但「高仁指點」話你知，理論上，派送紅股並不可以擴大資本，而且股東沒有任何實際得益，根本談不上回饋股東。

國企送股要徵股息稅

內地又會徵收股息稅（內地稱為紅利稅）【小檔案】，H 股股東需要繳付10%股息稅，換言之，是「九折收息」，有時候可能甚至更低。除了現金股息會被扣稅之外，股東獲派送的紅股也要按股票面值（par value）折算成現金繳交股息稅，小股東隨時會被徵收高昂股息稅率。

以中石化既派「獎金」又派「獎品」為例， 「獎金」是末期息每股0.2 元（人民幣．下同），「獎品」則是10送3紅股。

集團10送3紅股，其中1股紅股是利用資本公積金轉增股本毋須繳稅，但其餘2 股紅股需要按股票面值1 元計稅，10 送2 即是派送了0.2 元股息，按10% 計算稅款為0.02元。

派發末期股息0.2 元，每股要徵收0.02 元代扣代繳股息，加上紅股股息稅0.02 元，小股東合共要繳交0.04 元稅項，實際稅率為20%（0.04/0.2＝20%），而非原先的10%。

經過「高仁指點」的「教路」，小股東就可以判別發行紅股理據的真偽，即使獲贈紅股沒有帶來任何實際得益，也可以避免招致其他無謂損失。

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