ASN Group Limited (也斯電視) 專區
1 :
GS(14)@2016-09-02 05:09:35招股書
http://www.hkexnews.hk/APP/GEM/2 ... ls-2016083001_c.htm
2 :
greatsoup38(830)@2017-03-12 23:42:28https://webb-site.com/articles/sbie2.asp
SBI, E2 and Xinhua Finance
18 May 2010
We're going to tell you how a mini-investment bank was assembled and injected into not one but two listed companies at great expense, then gradually sold off, and how at least some of the SFC-regulated firms came under the ownership of someone who now faces criminal charges in the USA in relation to newsletter stock promotion schemes for companies which include the first Chinese company to list in Japan.
The company names in this article are going to be a bit confusing, partly because of the myriad of similarly-named companies, and partly because of repeated changes of company name and ownership over the last decade, so we will try to use names and definitions which are relevant to the story. You can find current names in our database by clicking on the names we use.
So pour yourself a big mug of coffee, and let us begin.
E2-Capital
On 26-Feb-2000, E2-Capital (Holdings) Ltd (E2, 0378, then Goodwill Investment (Holdings) Ltd, now CIAM Group Ltd) agreed to buy e2-Capital Ltd (E2-Capital, HK) from e2-Capital Inc (ECI, BVI) for HK$348m in shares, representing 25.1% of the enlarged company. Both ECI and E2-Capital had been incorporated in Sep-1999, just 5 months earlier, and E2-Capital became an SFC-registered investment adviser and securities dealer just 15 days before the deal. E2-Capital had net assets of just $3.748m at 31-Dec-1999. The co-founders of E2-Capital, Wong Sin Just (Mr Wong) and Jenny Tam Yuk Ching, were described as the "controlling shareholders" of ECI. The breathtaking price on this start-up was based on an even higher valuation of HK$490m as at 26-Feb-2000 by Andrew W Slevin on behalf of Knight Frank Petty Ltd (then Chesterton Petty Ltd). Here's the circular.
Dato' Dr. Wong
We pause to note that Mr Wong rather enjoys titles. Mr Wong was awarded a Datukship by the Sultan of Pahang state, Malaysia in 2004, and in June 2008 he was awarded an honorary doctorate from "York University, Alabama, United States", whereupon he started titling himself "Dato' Dr." That doctorate is mentioned in the 2008 and 2009 annual report of China Zenith Chemical Group Ltd (0362), where Mr Wong is an INED. Just one thing you need to know though - York University, Alabama (not to be confused with the legitimate one in Canada) is an unaccredited entity which has hooked up with the United World Chinese Association and awards the degrees along with the "World Outstanding Chinese Award", which was bestowed upon Mr Wong in 2008. There are literally dozens of HK company chairmen or directors who have "received" this award, along with honorary doctorates from several different "universities" over the years, some of which actually had accreditation, but none you would have heard of. The internet domain of "yorkuniversity.us" is registered to "Akiva Fradkin" of "York University" at "257 Saint Anthony Street, Mobile, Alabama" which is a lawyer's office. A quick search locates Akiva Fradkin, Ph.D, founder of the Phd Institute.
Anyway, we'll save the "World Outstanding Cheesiness" dissection for another article. That will be fun.
Winbox
At the same time as buying E2-Capital, E2 granted a 1-year option to Goodwill International (Holdings) Ltd, then the controlling shareholder of E2, to buy up to its 88% stake in Boxmore Ltd (BVI) for $88m in cash (or pro rata). Boxmore owned only Winbox (BVI) Ltd, the consumer goods packaging business. Yue Xiu Enterprise (Holdings) Ltd owned the other 12%. On 23-May-2001, this option was exercised to the extent of 50%, leaving E2 with 38%. Winbox was relisted in 2006 as Winbox International (Holdings) Ltd (0474), and E2 distributed its stake to its shareholders.
Goodwill Financial Services becomes SEC
Before E2 bought E2-Capital, E2 already owned 40% of then-named Goodwill Financial Services (Holdings) Ltd (SEC, Cayman), a joint venture with Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd (30%) and then-named Jardine Fleming Holdings Ltd (30%). Simultaneously with the acquisition of E2-Capital, E2 bought the remaining 60% of SEC for $57m, half in cash, half in shares. SEC owned:
a stockbroker, now SBI e2-Capital Financial Services Ltd (SECFS);
another stock broker and margin lender, now SBI e2-Capital Securities Ltd (SECS);
a futures broker, now SBI E2-Capital Commodities Ltd (SECC); and
a corporate finance adviser, now SBI E2-Capital (HK) Ltd (SECHK).
After E2 completed the acquisition of E2-Capital, on 20-Apr-2000, Mr Wong joined the board as CEO and later co-Chairman, alongside Mr Fung Ka Pun (Mr Fung), the previous controlling shareholder. All the other directors resigned and were replaced with Mr Wong's new team, with Ms Tam as his alternate director. SEC was renamed e2-Capital Securities (Holdings) Ltd and later SBI E2-Capital Ltd.
Incidentally, in one of those all-too-common cross-directorships, Mr Wong is an INED of CSI Properties Ltd since 23-Apr-2001, where Mico Chung Cho Yee (Mr Chung) has been Chairman since 29-Jun-2005. Meanwhile, Mr Chung was an INED of E2 from 9-Mar-2001 to 31-May-2008, resigning the same day as Mr Wong stepped down as Chairman there.
Creation of 1st Singapore arm
On 1-Apr-2000, Westcomb Capital Pte Ltd (Westcomb Capital, then e2-Capital Pte Ltd) was incorporated in Singapore with S$2 of capital. On 20-Apr-2000, E2 injected S$2.5m for 560 shares, while Westcomb Profits Ltd (WP) and Mr Cheong Mun Hong (Mr Cheong) acquired or subscribed 67 and 7 shares for S$1 each. Both WP and Mr Cheong were management shareholders. So at this point, Westcomb Capital was 88.33% owned by E2. On 13-Oct-2000, there was a dilution of E2's stake by way of a non-proportionate bonus issue of shares by Westcomb Capital. As a result, Westcomb Capital was 56% owned by E2, 40% by WP and 4% by Mr Cheong.
Sale of 51% of SEC to SIIS
On 31-Jan-2001, Softbank Investment International (Strategic) Ltd (SIIS, 0648, now China Renji Medical Group Ltd) agreed to buy 51% of SEC from E2 for HK$318.5m, of which $130m was in cash and the rest in shares. SEC was then renamed SBI E2-Capital Ltd. The remaining 49% was retained by E2. As part of the deal, E2 transferred its 56% stake in Westcomb Capital to SEC. The deal completed on 2-Apr-2001. Here's the SIIS circular, and here's the E2 circular. E2 booked a profit of $243.7m on the sale. 51% of the net assets of SEC at 31-Dec-2000 were $72.1m. On 3-Apr-2001, the day after completion, Mr Wong was appointed CEO of SIIS.
You might be surprised to learn that this deal did not include E2-Capital, which E2 had paid so much for. E2-Capital was renamed OpenIBN (HK) Ltd, then OpenOffering Capital Ltd, and finally NAPA Global Ltd. It gave up all its SFC licenses on 4-May-2004, and by the end of the year, it was developing "digital consumer and electronics products".
Westcomb expands
On 16-Nov-2001, Westcomb Capital was injected by its shareholders into a new holding company, SBI E2-Capital Holdings Pte Ltd, which was later renamed Westcomb Financial Group Ltd (Westcomb). There was no change in shareholdings at this point.
On 11-Sep-2002, Westcomb and SEC agreed to establish SBI E2-Capital Securities Pte Ltd (Westcomb Securities) for securities brokerage and trading, with a S$5m capital injection. As a result Westcomb Securities was 51% owned by Westcomb and 49% owned by SEC. At the same time, Westcomb Securities agreed to buy 10% of SECFS for S$0.5m. All this was supposed to have completed by 31-Oct-2002 or such later date as the parties may agree. That date came and went, and it wasn't until 16-May-2003 that SIIS announced that completion of the subscription had been delayed (by a supplemental agreement on 30-Oct-2002) and eventually occurred on 9-Apr-2003, and that the purchase of the stake in SECFS was terminated on 12-May-2003. As stated in the announcement, the Stock Exchange of HK considered that this late disclosure may be a breach of the Listing Agreement, but did not take any public action.
On 23-Dec-2002, SEC's 56% stake in Westcomb was distributed to its shareholders, 27.44% to E2 and 28.56% to SIIS.
On 3-Mar-2003, WP and Mr Fung agreed to buy 7% and 3% of Westcomb respectively from SIIS for a total of S$2m (HK$8.96m), reducing its stake to 18.56% "as a reflection of their confidence in the Singapore operations". Mr Wong also bought 3% of Westcomb from Mr Cheong. Curiously, the announcement says that Westcomb Securities was incorporated on 22-Jan-2003, whereas the earlier announcement and circular regarding the establishment of Westcomb Securities say it was already incorporated by 11-Sep-2002, when it entered into the subscription agreement with Westcomb and SEC. We now suspect that statement was false. Since the company did not exist until 22-Jan-2003, how could it have signed the subscription agreement on 11-Sep-2002 or the supplemental agreement on 31-Oct-2002?
Sale of 2% of SEC
On 22-Oct-2003, SIIS agreed to sell 2% of SEC to E2 for HK$1.405m. However, on 26-Nov-2003, that deal was terminated, for the somewhat flimsy reason that E2 would find complying with the Listing Rules on the acquisition "burdensome". You would think, having a 49% stake in a corporate finance business, that they would have understood the Listing Rule requirements before agreeing to the deal in the first place, especially since the two listed companies had the same co-Chairman, Mr Wong, an experienced investment banker who also owned 26.04% of E2. Instead of selling to E2, on the day of the termination, SIIS agreed to sell the same 2% to Mr Wong, for the same price. The disposal was completed on 17-Dec-2003, booking a loss of $438k.
The reason given by SIIS for selling 2% was "to focus its business" on the management of venture capital and private equity and reduce its exposure to "the financial services business". This holds little water, given that they were only reducing their exposure by 4%, and given that asset management is a financial service.
As a result, SEC was owned 49% by SIIS, 49% by E2 and 2% by Mr Wong. Rather conveniently, SEC was no longer a subsidiary of either company, so transactions by SEC were not subject to the Listing Rules.
SEC separates from Westcomb
On 21-Jan-2004, Westcomb was listed on SGX-ST. The prospectus states that Westcomb Securities was incorporated on 22-Jan-2003 (see above).
In Aug-2004, Westcomb agreed to acquire the remaining 49% of Westcomb Securities from SEC for S$4.9m. This was completed on 4-Nov-2004, as mentioned in Westcomb's 2004 annual report. Also in Aug-2004, E2 sold half its holding in Westcomb, retaining 10.92%.
E2 and SEC then set about re-entering the Singapore market. In Sep-2004, SBI E2-Capital Asia Holdings Pte Ltd (SECAH) was incorporated in Singapore. The next month, a 100% subsidiary, SBI E2-Capital Asia Securities Pte Ltd (SECASS) was incorporated. In a circular dated 24-Jun-2005, E2 explained that it would subscribe S$2m for 40% of SECAH, while SEC would subscribe S$3m for 60% of SECAH. On 16-Aug-2005, SECASS was granted a license to deal in securities and provide corporate finance advice, and on 18-Aug-2005 it was admitted as a clearing member of SGX.
Employee shares in HK/China business of SEC
Note 14 of the SIIS 2003 annual report discloses that during the year, SEC incorporated SBI E2-Capital China Group Limited (SECCG, BVI) which in turn owned a company later renamed SBI E2-Capital Asia Securities Ltd (SECAS, HK), which in turn owned (at least) SECS, SECC, SECFS, SECHK and SBI E2-Capital Research Ltd, comprising the HK/China business of SEC. Then an equity compensation scheme was adopted whereby a 30% interest in SECAS (via SECCG) was set aside for eligible employees, vesting in tranches.
The vehicle established to hold the 30% stake was SBI E2-Capital China Employees Ltd (SECE, BVI), which was first mentioned in an announcement on 21-Oct-2004 and was 16.7% owned by Mr Wong and the rest owned by other employees of the group.
Later, in 2005 or 2006, the interest of E2 and SIIS in SECHK (one of the subsidiaries of SEC and SECAS) was further reduced. The SIIS 2006 interim report discloses that Mr Wong owned 50% of a company called Goodwill SBI Limited, which in turn owned 5.1m shares (51%) of SECHK, leaving SIIS with a 24.01% indirect interest (being 49% of 49%).
On 15-Jan-2007, SEC gave 2.24%, 0.53% and 0.13% of SBI E2-Capital Asia Securities Group Ltd (SECASG) to Mr Wong, Mr Ong Tiang Lock and Mr Billy Cheung Chung Wai as bonuses, reducing its stake to 97.1%.
Sale of HK/China arm of SEC to Mr Singhal
On 13-Jun-2007, SIIS announced that on 12-Jun-2007, an unnamed jointly-controlled entity (which was SECASG) had sold 100% of SECAS for HK$76.76m to an unnamed independent third party. The interim report for the half-year to 30-Jun-2007 disclosed that the transaction completed on 12-Sep-2007.
The E2 2007 interim report names the buyer of SECAS as Clear Smart Enterprises Ltd (CSE, BVI), without saying who owned that. We can tell you that on 13-Sep-07, the day after completion, CSE was owned by Shelly Sean Singhal (Mr Singhal). We know this because he disclosed an interest in another listed company via CSE that day. CSE also owned SBI E2-Capital Management Ltd (SECM, BVI), while SECAS owned the similarly-named SBI E2-Capital Asset Management Ltd (SECAM, HK). At least until 26-Sep-2008, Mr Singhal was still the owner of CSE, as his latest filing shows.
Mr Singhal was an SFC-licensed Responsible Officer of SECAM from 17-Oct-2007 to 4-Jun-2008. He was also a licensed Representative of SECC from 24-Aug-2005 to 4-Jun-2008, when he became a Representative of SECS until 15-Apr-2009. All of these were subsidiaries of SECAS.
Note 46(vii) of the E2 2007 annual accounts shows that SEC pledged a bank deposit of HK$78m to secure banking facilities granted to an unnamed "independent third party". That's a large guarantee for a business of SEC's size, and it is remarkably close to the amount received for the sale of SECAS, so we remark on it - could Mr Singhal or CSE have been the borrower of the bank facility? Mr Wong and Mr Lawrence Yu Kam Kee (Lawrence Yu) lent HK$5m and $10.8m respectively to SEC "to finance" the guarantees provided by SEC in respect of those facilities - although it is unclear what "to finance" means. Lawrence Yu was the previous controlling shareholder of SIIS.
Sale of Singapore arm of SEC
On 4-Feb-2008, E2 and SECASG (97.1% owned by SEC) agreed to sell SECAH, the Singapore business, to Glory High Holdings Ltd (Glory High, BVI) for a total of HK$105m, approximately its net asset value. The transaction was completed on 31-Mar-2008. Glory High was 50% owned by Goodwill International (Holdings) Ltd (Goodwill, HK) and 50% owned by ECI, of which Mr Wong was the sole director, and which (by now) was owned by his family trust. Goodwill is a private company which in 2006 had over 20 shareholders, the largest of which was Mr Fung. He currently owns about 25.44% of it.
Sale of SEC
Now, having sold the Singapore arm and HK/China arm, that just leaves SEC itself. Very quietly, without announcement by either of the two listed companies, it was sold, at very different prices:
As first disclosed in note 47(b) of the SIIS 2007 annual report, on 16-Jan-2008, it agreed to sell its 49% stake in SEC to CSE for HK$81m, satisfied by a 2-year promissory note bearing 1.5% p.a. interest, and the deal was completed on 9-Apr-2008. For accounting purposes, SIIS assumed an effective interest rate of 6.18%, thereby valuing the promissory note at $73.97m.
According to note 2(i)(b) of the E2 2008 interim report, on 21-Feb-2008, E2 agreed to sell its 49% stake in SEC for HK$17.604m. The buyer was not named. The transaction was completed on 8-Apr-2008. The sale was made during the "offer period" of an offer for E2 under the Takeovers Code, but it was not mentioned in the offer document as a material contract and only appeared later, in the interim report.
You might pause to wonder why E2 was paid just $17.604m when SIIS was paid a price more than 4 times higher, each for a 49% stake in SEC, only a month apart. For 2008, as detailed in note 37 of its annual report, SIIS booked a "loss on disposal" of $12.911m, while E2, as detailed in note 11 of its annual report, booked a "loss on disposal of discontinued operations" in the brokerage services and investment banking segments of $10.677m and $0.980m respectively, including its sale of 40% of SECAH as well as 49% of SEC.
On 21-Apr-2010, SIIS (now renamed) announced that the sale of its 49% stake in SEC had taken place on 16-Jan-2008 and that CSE had defaulted on the repayment of the IOU due on 8-Apr-2010, 2 years after completion of the sale. Following this, in the annual accounts for 2009, it made a provision for full impairment of the outstanding amount of HK$81.449m, including accrued interest.
It appears that Mr Wong also sold his 2% stake, because at least as early as 19-Aug-2008, SEC was 100% owned by CSE, as shown in this disclosure of interest in another company.
On 13-May-2010, SIIS announced that the board had removed Lucian Yu Chung Hang (Lucian Yu) as executive director and CEO with immediate effect, by unanimous resolution of all the other directors. Lucian Yu, son of Lawrence Yu, joined the company in Jan-2005 and joined the board as ED on 1-Jan-2006, becoming CEO on 18-Apr-2007. The announcement stated:
"The Company has considered that [Lucian Yu] has failed to exercise his fiduciary duties as a director of the Company and has committed material faults in representing the Company in the disposal of [SEC] to [CSE] and the subsequent follow-up actions, which have resulted in the Company having suffered a substantial loss..."
As far as we know, Lucian Yu has not yet made any published response to these allegations. Of course, he wasn't the only director at the time of the disposal of SEC, but he was the last survivor.
Shelly Singhal
Now, here's what we know about Shelly Singhal, who is or was (based on disclosures) the purported owner of CSE, which bought SECAS on 12-Jun-2007, probably bought SEC in Jan/Feb 2008 (completed on 8-Apr-2008) and has now apparently defaulted on the promissory notes.
According to the E2 2001 annual report, E2 also owned SBI E2-Capital (USA) Limited (SECUSA), a financial services operation based in Newport Beach, California, which in Dec-2001 "formed a strategic alliance with Nasdaq-listed vFinance, Inc., a rapidly growing and fully licensed dealer broker". Records show that the Executive Vice President of SECUSA was Shelly Singhal.
Mr Singhal resigned as a director of Xinhua Finance Limited (Xinhua Finance, TSE:9399) and its subsidiary Xinhua Finance Media Ltd (now Xinhua Sports & Entertainment Ltd, NASDAQ:XSEL) on 19-May-2007, a month before CSE bought SECAS saying:
"Unfortunately, recent allegations against me in the press concerning my activities prior to joining Xinhua Finance have created a situation where my continued involvement with Xinhua Finance has become a distraction to management..."
That was 4 days after he was moved out of his positions as CFO of XSEL and its parent, which followed criticism of the recently-listed XSEL for non-disclosure of his somewhat interesting past in the US financial arena. He owned a brokerage called Bedrock Securities, which had been subject to a NASD cease-and-desist order which was withdrawn on 14-Dec-2006.
According to a conference bio, as of 28-Apr-2008, Mr Singhal was CEO and CIO of "Crestwood Pacific Group (Crestpac), an investment firm founded in 2001 (as SBI Group)". Apart from another delegate called Nicholas Sandler at the same conference, we cant find any other trace of Crestpac or Crestwood Pacific Group. That was just after CSE appears to have bought SEC.
Mr Singhal and his firm, SBI USA LLC, triumphed in court on 10-Apr-2008 when a civil case against them was dismissed, and he put out a vindication press release.
But wait, there's more. On 27-Apr-2010, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia, USA returned a 3-count indictment against Mr Singhal, charging him with engaging in a conspiracy and scheme to defraud the investing public through the use of stock manipulation schemes, including a scheme referred to as "scalping", charging that he and others obtained at least US$10m in proceeds through the scheme to defraud by selling shares of the three companies that they controlled into the demand they had artificially created though newsletters.
To date, three other individuals are involved:
Robert Steven Brown, a New York attorney, who on 3-Nov-2009 pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice concerning, among other things, his business dealings with Mr Singhal. He has not yet been sentenced, but has agreed to forfeit US$275k.
Jukka Tolonen, a stock promoter from Texas, who agreed to forfeit US$500k in connection with his involvement in the fraudulent promotional campaign related to one of the companies involved in the alleged fraud, and agreed to cooperate in two separate, on-going investigations.
Melissa A Mahler, a New York attorney, who on 8-Jan-2010 pleaded guilty to making a false statement. She has not yet been sentenced, but has agreed to forfeit US$63,750. As part of a separate transaction, she admitted that in or around 2004, the CEO of a Newport Beach, California investment banking firm informed her of an opportunity to acquire warrants for the purchase of shares of a Chinese company. The CEO explained that the warrants were extremely valuable because the Chinese company was planning an IPO and would be the first China related company to be listed in Japan. The CEO also stated, however, that neither his name or his firm's name could be associated with the purchase of the warrants. So at his direction, Mr Brown formed an Limited Liability Company to own the warrants, and Mahler used a friend who was a prison guard (nice touch, that) as the nominee. The LLC obtained the right to purchase the shares for US$5m. Mahler was paid $100k. Brown admitted that those shares ultimately generated more than US$20m, which was distributed primarily to three insiders at the Chinese company, including the CEO of the investment banking firm.
We assume the CEO of the Newport Beach investment banking firm is Mr Singhal of SBI USA LLC. Now, what about that Chinese company which was "first to be listed in Japan"? That must be none other than Xinhua Finance, which began trading on Tokyo's Mothers market on 28-Oct-2004, when they said "we are proud to be the first China IPO in Japan...". Obviously, in the above allegations, Mr Singhal is one of the three insiders. He was a director of Xinhua Finance. We don't yet know who the other two are.
The charges against Mr Singhal carry a penalty of up to 20 years in jail. He is innocent unless and until proven guilty.
So what does this mean?
From 12-Sep-2007 at least until 26-Sep-2008, if not later, Mr Singhal was named in filings as the owner of CSE, which owned SECAS, and hence he was the controller of several SFC-licensed entities. It is unclear whether or when he, CSE or SECAS sold any of the subsidiaries, and if so, to whom. The brokerages and advisory firm are still up and running, as their web site shows, but they don't say who owns the firm.
Given the criminal charges in the USA against Mr Singhal, including the allegation that a nominee was used to disguise ownership of shares, it is a fair question whether in fact he was the true purchaser of SECAS and SEC (via CSE), or whether he was just a nominee for someone else, and if so, then who else knew about it.
Whoever owned CSE, it seems at least possible that they never put up a penny for SECAS, because of the possibility that CSE or its owner was the "independent third party" which received a $78m loan from SEC in the same year, which would be enough to pay SEC $76.76m for SECAS. If CSE or its owner was the borrower, then by buying SEC a few months later, they effectively cancelled out the loan, in exchange for the promissory note which has now defaulted, and possibly the cash payment of $17.6m to E2 for its 49% stake. There is a lot for the ICAC or SFC to investigate here.
We conclude with a reminder to the Government and the SFC that there is still no transparency on ownership of licensed firms in HK. The SFC should know who they are, because its approval is required for any holder of 10% or more of a licensed entity, but that register of interests remains a secret. It is ironic that the firms have a "know your client" obligation, but clients cannot properly "know their firm". That opacity also makes investigations like this story so much more difficult.
© Webb-site.com, 2010
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greatsoup38(830)@2017-03-12 23:43:59http://www.baike.com/wiki/%E6%96 ... 8%E4%BC%A0%E5%AA%92
新华悦动传媒企业认领
开放分类：企业公司机构经济
新华悦动传媒（“XSEL”；NASDAQ 股票编码: XSEL）是一家中国领先的体育和娱乐传媒集团。XSEL以其独特的内容和渠道，在中国准确定位，服务广大年轻的新富消费者。通过国际合作伙伴，XSEL 能够为其目标受众提供他们所渴求的精彩体育赛事和优质影视节目。最近消息称，新华悦动传媒因股价长期低于1美元，2011年3月9日正式被纳斯达克市场除名。
编辑摘要
编辑信息模块
中文名称：新华悦动传媒 英文名：Xinhua Sports & Entertainment Limited.
上市市场：纳斯达克证券交易所 上市代码：Nasdaq: XSEL
组织形式：股份制 创建时间：2005年
总部所在地：北京 产品服务：体育和娱乐传媒
员工人数：1000多名
目录
1简介
2身世之谜
3其母公司
4并购模式
5财务数据
6发展情况
7其现状
8相关新闻
简介/新华悦动传媒 编辑
新华悦动传媒
新华悦动传媒图册
纳斯达克上市公司200年3月2日宣布，从即日起更改公司名称为新华悦动传媒（英文简称为XSEL），其纳斯达克股票代码也更改为“XSEL”。
该公司于上月公布的财报中披露，由于公司的业务不断增长超出了财经媒体的功能、特别是体育和娱乐领域的业务拓展。去年12月5日，公司董事会决定进行更改公司名称为“新华悦动传媒”。在2009年1月15日的股东大会上，这一更名事宜得到批准。 据了解，为了向广告商提供面向中国年轻新富人群的有效平台，公司的传媒服务已不再局限于财经类别，而扩展到体育和娱乐领域。因此新的公司名称和标识能更准确地反映公司的使命和未来发展方向。
新华悦动传媒（“XSEL”；NASDAQ 股票编码: XSEL）是一家中国领先的体育和娱乐传媒集团。XSEL以其独特的内容和渠道，在中国准确定位，服务广大年轻的新富消费者。通过国际合作伙伴，XSEL 能够为其目标受众提供他们所渴求的精彩体育赛事和优质影视节目。
通过中国的合作伙伴，XSEL 可以借助各式各样的传播渠道，如电视、互联网、手机和其它多媒体渠道，将这些内容传送给观众。加上集团综合一体化的广告服务资源，XSEL 能为客户提供全面的解决方案，充分满足客户在传播各阶段的不同需求，成为广告商和中国年轻新富一族之间的桥梁。
XSEL 总部设在北京，拥有1000多名员工，办事处和分支机构遍及北京、上海、广州、深圳、香港等中国主要城市。XSEL 的股票在纳斯达克证券交易所上市 (Nasdaq: XSEL)。 [1]
身世之谜/新华悦动传媒 编辑
，“百万英雄杯”——2009中国悦动山地户外大奖赛是登山运动管理中心为推动全民健身运动的开展而与新华悦动传媒精心打造的一个全新的赛事，目的是让更多的群众走向户外，走向自然，参加运动。因而在项目设置上加强了参与性、娱乐性和观赏性，并相应降低了赛事的专业性和技术难度。主办方相信通过这种大众性群众体育赛事的举办，能够掀起一个群众性山地户外运动的高潮，使更多的人自觉地参与到全民健身的行列中来。
“百万英雄杯”——2009中国悦动山地户外大奖赛是登山运动管理中心为推动全民健身运动的开展而与新华悦动传媒精心打造的一个全新的赛事，目的是让更多的群众走向户外，走向自然，参加运动。因而在项目设置上加强了参与性、娱乐性和观赏性，并相应降低了赛事的专业性和技术难度。主办方相信通过这种大众性群众体育赛事的举办，能够掀起一个群众性山地户外运动的高潮，使更多的人自觉地参与到全民健身的行列中来。图册
这家13美元ipo，现在股价只剩下0.29美元面临退市的公司；这家打着“新华”旗号，曾经并购过经济观察报经营权和新传在线的公司，到底是做什么业务的？通过对其公司历史的梳理，各类财报公告的解读，以及诸多事件的分析，还是可以看出其并不神秘的公司经营方式。
（i美股）2010年2月4日，新华悦动传媒接到纳斯达克相关机构通知，称其在美国的存托股份（ADR）竞价已连续30天收盘价低于每股1美元，不符合纳斯达克上市公司继续交易规定。如果在2010年8月3日之前，股价仍持续低于1美元，那么新华悦动传媒将被摘牌。从通知发布到目前，近6个月过去，新华悦动股价并无起色，最新报价为0.32美元。照此看，其8月份退市的可能性非常大。
新华悦动传媒2007年3月10日登陆纳斯达克，当时IPO发行价为13美元，共发售2310万股美国存托凭证。从上市开始，新华悦动传媒股价便一路下跌，13美元的发行价一度跌到0.3美元。从2008年开始，新华悦动的巨量亏损开始与持续下跌的股价开始并行。最新数据显示，2009年全年净亏损3.116亿美元，亏损具体原因不详。
总体来说，新华悦动传媒是一家费解而神秘的公司，不仅业务模式与经营状况不透明，而且其公司结构和持续亏损也让人费解。但通过对其公司历史的梳理，各类财报的解读，以及诸多事件的分析，还是可以看出其并不神秘的公司经营方式。这种经营依靠拼凑资产上市，并通过并购策略达到利润的短期增长。这种简单模式的缺点也显而易见，即不可持久。[2]
其母公司/新华悦动传媒 编辑
新华悦动传媒
新华悦动传媒图册
要了解新华悦动传媒，首先要搞清其母公司新华财经有限公司。新华财经有限公司成立于1999年11日，于2004年10月在东京证券交易所创业板上市（编号：9399）。新华悦动传媒在2009年3月更名前叫做“新华财经传媒”，由此一点即可见其与母公司传承关系。
新华财经有限公司被媒体称为拿着“中国概念”穿行于国际市场的“资本玩家”，多次借助“新华社”品牌进行收购与融资。但其与新华社的“特殊合作关系”一直受到媒体质疑。要梳理清楚，必须追溯到新华财经成立之初。
有关新华财经有限公司的成立，现有官方版本是这样：一位名为布希（Fredy Bush）的女士，怀着媒体梦想从美国来到中国，于1999年创建新华财经有限公司。这位女士随后成为新华财经首席执行官，并在2004年入选《华尔街日报》全球商界女性50强。此外，更详细版本如下：
1996年1月，新华财经信息咨询有限公司（Xinhua Financial Co.）成立，为新华财经有限公司的前身公司。该公司股东为新华社下属金融信息部门“中国经济信息社”和有色金属工业总公司，双方分别持有49%和51%的股份。
新华财经信息咨询有限公司主要产品为财经信息终端机，成立后取得不错的业绩。由于与新华社独特关系，新华财经信息咨询有限公司成为外国通讯社最希望联手的对象。在中国，新华社是唯一被国务院授权管理外国通讯社在中国境内发布经济信息的机构，所有外国通讯社在中国境内发布经济信息都必须向新华社提出申请。
新华财经信息咨询公司随后在扩张业务，追求融资上市过程中，吸引到三个主要投资者：布希、丹尼斯-佩里诺、台湾投资者Billy Kung。布希等人开始与新华财经信息咨询公司协商建立新公司，并以上市为目标。
1999年11月，新华财经有限公司(Xinhua Financial Network)在香港注册成立，新华财经控股有限公司同时在开曼群岛注册成立。布希、佩里诺和Billy Kung购买新华财经有限公司的原始股，正式以投资者身份进入新华财经。随后，根据此前拟定协议，新华财经有限公司出面收购在北京的新华财经信息咨询有限公司。
收购完成后，新华社旗下的中国经济信息社作为新华财经的投资方，也成为新华财经有限公司股东，这种关系一直持续到2007年。2007年新华社发表声明，称已出售手中持有的新华财经剩余股票，双方无任何关联。随后布希致信股东称“真实情况是，我们与新华社下属的中国经济信息社于2000年签订了20年（期满后可再续10年）的独家协议，这从未改变过。”即根据此前协议，新华财经有限公司仍可以在命名其现有产品和服务时使用“新华”名称，并延续到2019年。
在新华传媒有限公司发展初期，“新华社”这块招牌起到关键作用。借用新华社旗下中国经济信息社的“独家授权协议”（中国经济信息社授权CEIS实时信息的独家布权。其玄机在于，只能从CEIS的信息库中调取文章，不可能获得新华社实时新闻。新华社未因这一授权出让任何实质资产），新华财经为其他合作者带来广阔想象空间，进行多项比较顺利的并购项目。
2000年，新华财经与与富时集团成立新华富时指数有限公司，试验性地开始新华远东中国评级服务；2002年11月，新华财经与美国最大的企业新闻通稿发布公司美通合资成立了新华美通；2002年，新华财经收购法新社旗下亚太金融新闻通讯社。截止2004年，新华财经收购公司包括：法新社旗下亚太金融通讯社、Mergent、G7集团和Stone&McCarthy Research Associates、Market News Inernational。
但需要指出，新华财经成立后的系列行动，在内容生产领域未见成效，其他合作项目也没取得显著效果。已披露数据显示，新华财经有限公司并未从中国市场找到实质业绩增长点，收入持续不振。从1999-2004年，由于国内股市和债券市场整体规模有限，新华财经着力推动的指数和评级业务也并未带来可观收入。即布希在成为首席运营官后，推出得一系列指数业务，以及多项并购行动，未取得实质业绩增长，只是拉长公司业务线。到2004年，根据国际财务报告标准 (International Financial Reporting Standards)，新华财经有限公司净亏损为140万美元。
尽管不断亏损，新华财经有限公司2004年还是成功在日上市。分析者称，新华财经之所以能上市成功，和日本股市独特监管状况直接相关。日本资本市场监管严苛，但监管主要针对于公司治理有效性，而非营利状况。新华财经在上市前，邀请新华社吴继光接替新华财经董事长一职，利用“新华社”品牌效应带来超出预期的溢价。
上市成功为新华财经带来新的开端。领导者布什开始采取新策略，对这个“大而空”的公司进行填充工作，并筹划登陆纳斯达克。具体措施是：购买中国国内经营不善媒体的广告业务代理权，靠转手出售广告权获利。在他们看来，只要购买到一家媒体的广告代理权，就会很容易让人们相信他们已经“拥有”这家媒体。彼时新华财经典型宣传是这样：
“如果你生活在中国，清晨醒来打开电视就能看到收视率最高的节目之一：《财富早7点》。乘车上班途中，可以收听到中国国际广播电台EasyFM的节目。路过报刊亭可以见到《经济观察报》、《投资有道》和《基金观察》。”
上述所有公司，其独家广告代理权都被新华财经所掌控。这种商业模式并不难理解，即购买媒体广告代理权，通过自身收购广告公司统一销售广告版面或时间获取收益。
虽然新华财经从较早时候起就对旗下媒体进行整合，并预备打包上市，但直到2005年成立新华财经传媒公司后，这个战略才开始明确。2005年新华财经传媒在开曼群岛注册成立，业务涉及电媒广告、平面广告、内容服务、综合广告和市场调查五大领域。主要收入是各种形式的广告收入。主要业务包括：通过内蒙古卫视台制作和发行电视节目；从母公司获得《财富中国周刊》电视节目；通过旗下广告公司负责《投资有道》杂志广告销售，负责《经济观察报》独家广告代理权。[2]
并购模式/新华悦动传媒 编辑
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短暂的辉煌:疯狂并购急速扩张
新华财经传媒（新华悦动传媒）一经成立，就开始了与其母公司相同的发展路线，走并购扩张之路:北京世纪光年传媒文化有限公司、收购经世集团有限公司、收购中国广告集团明声国际有限公司、收购联恒市场研究公司等先后悉数收归。
疯狂的收购给新华财经传媒（新华悦动传媒）带来了短暂的黄金时代，从2005年5月26日到2005年12月31日，新华财经传媒净收入为540万美元，2006年的净收入为5900万美元，收入大幅增长主要得益于收购。2006年的收入中,广告服务收入占到76.1%。
广告服务收入方面增长主要在这几个方面：担任北京电视台等一些电视台的部分节目广告代理商，成为上海一些大学校园广告牌代理商；设计并制作电视、印刷和广告牌广告；在内蒙古电视台做广告、节目赞助、提供内容。其主要业务涉及内蒙古卫视台制作和发行电视节目；从母公司获得《财富中国周刊》电视节目;通过旗下广告公司负责《投资有道》杂志广告销售，负责《经济观察报》独家广告代理权。
但好景不长，在经历短暂的黄金时代后,自2008年后，新华财经传媒（新华悦动传媒）逐渐陷入亏损泥潭。但在此时,其仍未放缓收购的脚步，2007年,新华财经传媒（新华悦动传媒）首期金额现金4300万美元全资收购了JCBN 集团，JCBN 集团是搜狐网房地产频道和焦点房地产网的最大广告代理商，也是保乐利加 (Pernod Ricard) 的主要市场营销服务提供者，保乐利加公司管理着芝华士 (Chivas) 和马爹利 (Martell) 两大洋酒品牌。
在此次收购之后，新华财经传媒将成为中国房地产互联网广告和进口洋酒市场领先的广告代理商，2008年经济危机，新华财经传媒（新华悦动传媒）逆势而动，与China Media Network公司达成收购协议，收购了天津时代天创传媒发展有限公司4个覆盖全国的数字付费电视频道49%的股份。但这些收购却未能挽回新华悦动传媒下滑的大踏步。
对于新华悦动传媒的模式，外界分析认为,从2008年到2010年,虽然新华悦动传媒进行一系列转型努力，但在产业模式方面,仍未脱离此前老路径，靠收购扩展庞大的产业线，涉足广播、电视、网络、广告等各方面，依靠承包独家广告代理权，并出售广告权来获取收益。
对此，有评论称新华悦动传媒是一家为了上市而拼凑资产的公司，一直没有进行有效的业务整合与利用，寻找到固定的盈利模式。利用并购手段，新华悦动传媒让自己的身躯无比庞大，却没有效的建立起与庞大身躯匹配的管理手段及经营效率，并直接造成08-09年的巨额亏损。依靠“并购式策略”推动业绩的增长，短期内是能取得疯狂增长，但长期看，只会带来不断增加的不良资产以及持续的业绩亏损。
从不断收购到出售资产，从纳斯达克上市到被退市的险境，新华悦动传媒的经历如果用人生来比喻的话，绝对是跌宕起伏，充满神奇色彩，只是这个神奇多了些悲剧色彩。[3]
财务数据/新华悦动传媒 编辑
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发展情况/新华悦动传媒 编辑
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新华悦动传媒图册
从2005年5月26日到2005年12月31日，新华财经传媒净收入为540万美元，2006年的净收入为5900万美元，收入大幅增长主要是由于收购。包括收购：北京世纪光年传媒文化有限公司、收购经世集团有限公司、收购中国广告集团明声国际有限公司、收购联恒市场研究公司等。
在2006年收入中广告服务收入占到76.1%。仔细梳理会发现，广告服务收入方面增长主要在这几个方面：担任北京电视台等一些电视台的部分节目广告代理商，成为上海一些大学校园广告牌代理商；设计并制作电视、印刷和广告牌广告；在内蒙古电视台做广告、节目赞助、提供内容。
2007年3月9日，新华悦动传媒登陆纳斯达克，开盘当天股价大跌12.69%。在上市招股书中，新华悦动传媒披露其股权比例结构为：CEO Fredy Bush拥有新华财经媒体5.8%股份，价值大约1亿美元。母公司新华财经将拥有该公司37%股份，投资公司Patriarch Partners LLC s拥有大约8%股份。新华财经传媒表示，计划用融资的5千万美元偿还母公司及新华财经网络有限公司债务，其他部分资金将用于对补充型业务进行战略性收购。
新华悦动传媒上市后，经历短暂“黄金成长时代”。2007年财报显示，新华财经传媒全年净营收为1.348亿美元，比2006年的5900万美元增长129%。2007年净利润为2800万美元，比2006年的330万美元增长738%。净利润的大幅增长，主要得益于及新收购业务的贡献及已有业务贡献。即在2006年，新华悦动采取了与此前相同的收购式增长策略。2007年收购的公司包括：北京心情互动信息技术有限公司、声色（控股）香港有限公司、权威广告有限公司、小世界影视制作有限公司、JCBN集团。
不过随后2008年—2009年，新华悦动传媒逐渐陷入亏损泥潭。2008年全年，新华财经传媒净亏损达到2.749亿美元，第4季度净亏损2.515亿美元。2009年，新华财经传媒改名“新华悦动传媒”，全年净亏损3.116亿美元，第四季度净亏2.957亿美元。伴随着亏损，新华悦动传媒放缓收购速度，与此同时，为填补亏损，不得不开始出售此前所收购的子公司。据不完全统计，从2008-2010.6，新华悦动传媒收购公司：China Media Network、China Sports Media、新传在线。出售公司包括：Convey广告公司、北京金冠新广告有限公司、北京京师景观有限公司。
收购式增长策略在08年以后的逐渐失效，让新华悦动传媒开始自身转型之路。于此同时，其母公司新华财经有限公司也开始寻求转型。
如上文所提及，新华财经开创之后主要产品是财经产品。随着时间推移，财经新闻产品面对越来越激烈的竞争，在路透社、彭博社和道琼斯等知名通讯社的夹击下，其新闻产品开始处于长期亏损状态。于是同样从2008年开始，母公司新华财经也开始出售此前并购进来的多个财经和数据研究公司，其中包括G7集团、Mergent、Kinetic。并最终在2008年年底终止了在北京、上海、香港、台北和新加坡的财经新闻服务。出售业务有很现实的考量，即业务增长缓慢，亏损严重，不得不出售资产。
对于转型方向，引用新华悦动传媒官方说法是“朝着体育、娱乐这个方向来做”。于是可以看到，新华悦动传媒在2008年签署的一系列体育赛事合约，并取得陕西卫视的独家广告代理权，在2009年收购体育媒体报道权分销商China Sports Media，同时收购新传在线。新传在线旗下拥有中国最大体育门户网站新传宽频。
但从2008年到2010年，虽然新华悦动传媒进行一系列转型努力，但在产业模式方面，仍未脱离此前老路径，靠收购扩展庞大的产业线，涉足广播、电视、网络、广告等各方面，依靠承包独家广告代理权，并出售广告权来获取收益。
这种盈利模式，从2007-2009年财报看，没有逆转亏损趋势。广告服务这一块，下降明显，并受到2008、2009官方政策的影响。在2009年第四季度亏损财报发表后，新华悦动传媒官方称“2009年全年营收同比下降18%，主要因剥离非核心业务。自去年10月颁布的对电视广告时间和范围的新规定后，对国内整个电视市场产生重大影响，也对公司第四季度广播电视业务产生影响。”这样回应无疑与上面的分析暗合。
总的来说，新华悦动传媒是一家为了上市而拼凑资产的公司，一直没有进行有效的业务整合与利用，寻找到固定的盈利模式。利用并购手段，新华悦动传媒让自己的身躯无比庞大，却没有效的建立起与庞大身躯匹配的管理手段及经营效率，并直接造成08-09年的巨额亏损。依靠“并购式策略”推动业绩的增长，短期内是能取得疯狂增长，但长期看，只会带来不断增加的不良资产以及持续的业绩亏损。
曾经让新华悦动传媒引以为傲的“并购媒体帝国”现在正带来无尽的烦恼。而始自2008年的转型之路却依然没见有所突破。确定无疑的是，只要其业务增长策略不改变，盈利模式不改变，新华悦动的前景将难逃亏损下降螺旋。 [2]
其现状/新华悦动传媒 编辑
2008年全年，新华财经传媒净亏损达到2.749亿美元，第4季度净亏损2.515亿美元。2009年，新华财经传媒改名“新华悦动传媒”，全年净亏损3.116亿美元，第3季度亏损1060万美元，第4季度净亏2.957亿美元。无论是广播业务，广告业务，出版业务等全线下滑。
2009年3月，为挽救下滑态势，新华财经传媒其业务重心将转向体育、娱乐，致力于成为一家具有竞争力的体育娱乐传媒公司，并更名为新华悦动传媒，但经营乏力，转型后的新华悦动传媒仍无大起色，无奈走上了出售旗下资产以改善运营状况之路。
2009年5月11日新华悦动传媒对外宣称有意出售其2年前购得的《经济观察报》广告经营权。带隔仅8天后，新华悦动传媒再次宣布出让消息，出售北京金冠新城广告有限公司和北京京师景观有限公司全部股份。
2010年7月，在纳斯达克的摘牌危机悬头后，为自救，新华悦传媒与美国投资基金Patriarch Partners公司达成协议，以其部分资产做为贷款抵押，向Patriarch公司支付一定数额的费用及补偿的方式，获得美国投资基金4900万美元贷款，同时，Patriarch所持股份将占新华悦动传媒总普通股的25%。
相关新闻/新华悦动传媒 编辑
新华悦动传媒被纳斯达克除名 股价大跌78.57%
新华悦动传媒因股价长期低于1美元，2011年3月9日正式被纳斯达克市场除名。
新华悦动传媒的美国存托凭证（ADS）已被转移至美国粉单市场(american pink sheet market)继续交易，股票代码由“XSELD”变为“XSELY.PK”。目前报价仅为0.15美元，较前一交易日大跌78.57%。
此前，新华悦动传媒由于股价长期在1美元以下徘徊，无法满足纳斯达克上市条件，曾多次遭到纳斯达克退市警告。公司为避免摘牌退市，曾于2011年1月24日宣布完成15合1的并股，原来1ADS=2个普通股，合股后变为1ADS=30个普通股。 [4]
4 :
greatsoup38(830)@2017-03-12 23:44:18http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2011-03/10/c_121172280.htm
据经济之声报道，中国概念股“新华悦动传媒”因股价长期低于1美元，今天（9号）正式被纳斯达克市场除名。专家表示，发达资本市场上市条件比较宽松，所以不必大惊小怪。
此前，新华悦动传媒股价长期在1美元以下徘徊，公司为避免摘牌退市，曾于2011年1月24日宣布完成15合1的并股，藉此来推高股价。但反复的挣扎并没有挽救它被纳斯达克除名的遭遇。
根据纳斯达克市场规定，上市公司的股票如果每股价格不足一美元，且这种状态持续30个交易日，纳斯达克市场将发出亏损警告；被警告的公司如果在警告发出的90天里，仍然不能采取相应的措施进行自救以改变其股价，将被宣布停止股票交易。这就是所谓的“一美元退市规则”。
每日经济新闻首席评论员叶檀认为，在发达资本市场，这样的事情大家习以为常：
叶檀：股价低于一美元，一年还是两年，它有一个期限的，股价还不能上去，它的股性就没有了，存在呢也就是成了僵尸公司了。它没有活跃的股性，这个时候它肯定要除名。这个在发达国家，在全球市场是非常正常的事情。
银河证券传媒分析师许耀文表示赞同，他认为美国股市一直以来都是秉承“宽进严出”的原则：
许耀文：你只要符合一定的条件，你业绩是亏损的你都可以上市。但是它上市以后它的要求就很高了，要达到一定的业绩水平、交易量这些，这公司一直达不到这样的业绩水平，这样的要求。
新华悦动传媒的前身是成立于1999年11月的新华财经有限公司， 2009年3月变更为现在的名称。一直关注传媒领域的许耀文分析师表示，新华悦动传媒是一家为上市而拼凑资产的公司，缺乏固定的盈利模式。从赴美上市的角度来说，上市并不等同于竞争力。（中广网北京3月9日消息 记者 黄耀伟）
5 :
greatsoup38(830)@2017-03-12 23:49:031. 搞手旗下有間電視台，但搞唔掂，執左
2. 電視台前身有做假的竫華悅動傳媒
3. 引左好多輪錢，才正式能上市
6 :
greatsoup38(830)@2017-03-12 23:55:374. 搞體育電視台，主要是非足球，來自Sport Illustrated
5. 整個亞洲的電視台有買他的電視片
6. 轉播佔收入80%，其他20%
7. 英足佔收入好少
8.定額收入佔50%
9. 各地區收益平穩
10. 內容成本佔70%，其他30%
11. 最大客佔17%，五大58%，關連人士少
12. 搞年輕台
7 :
greatsoup38(830)@2017-03-13 00:00:0013. 風險: 版權、喜好、AR、依賴時代公司、擴張、客戶、第三方供應商、人、融資、技術、手機、季節性、保險、
8 :
greatsoup38(830)@2017-03-13 02:07:3914. 轉播Sport Illiustrated 電視
15.今年推的廣告佔約20%收入
16. 好多籃球、前式足球節目咁
17. 轉播費用大部分是固定，約70%，分錢及按比例是30%
18. 重播80%，轉播及直播得20%
19. 廣告只有2個客
20. 482 的 Dish都有播
21. 大部分轉播分都在上年到期
22. 近年客戶流失多過增加
23.內容供應到2019年到期後多
24. 分包商佔銷售較多，最大供應商佔30%供應，五大佔90%
25.7 個員工
9 :
greatsoup38(830)@2017-03-13 02:09:5626. 趙之仁:1132
27. 曾至鍵: 113、1555、0987
28. 周紹榮: 923
10 :
greatsoup38(830)@2017-03-13 02:11:2929. 德勤
30. 2015年盈利降5成，至80萬、2016年轉盈100萬，輕債