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商誉及其摊销:规则与现实 Barrons

http://blog.caing.com/article/13176/

 

BERKSHIREHATHAWAY INC.

 

伯克希尔·哈撒韦有限公司

Goodwill and its  Amortization: The Rules and The Realities
商誉及其摊销:规则与现实
 

   

This appendix deals only with economic and accounting Goodwill – not the goodwill of everyday usage. For example, a business may be well liked, even loved, by most of its customers but possess no economic goodwill. (AT&T, before the breakup, was generally well thought of, but possessed not a dime of economic Goodwill.) And, regrettably, a business may be disliked by its customers but possess substantial, and growing, economic Goodwill. So, just for the moment, forget emotions and focus only on economics and accounting.
 

 

这篇附录探讨的只是经济和会计商誉,而不是日常所说的声誉。比如,一个公司可能被大多数客户喜欢,甚至热爱,但是却不具有任何经济商誉。(AT&T在分拆前总的来说声誉很好,但没有一分钱的经济商誉。)遗憾的是,一个公司可能被其客户所不喜欢,但却具有大量,而且不断增长的经济商誉。所以,就目前而言,让我们先忘掉感情,只关注于经济和会计。
 

 

When a business is purchased, accounting principles require that the purchase price first be assigned to the fair value of the identifiable assets that are acquired. Frequently the sum of the fair values put on the assets (after the deduction of liabilities) is less than the total purchase price of the business. In that case, the difference is assigned to an asset account entitled "excess of cost over equity in net assets acquired". To avoid constant repetition of this mouthful, we will substitute "Goodwill".
 

 

当一个公司被并购时,会计准则要求并购价格首先分配给所并购的可确认资产的公 允价值。资产的公允价值总和(经过扣除负债后)经常是少于公司的并购总价格。在这种情况,这两者的差异就被分配到一个资产帐户,称为“超出并购的净资产权 益的额外成本”。为了避免不断的重复这一很长的说法,我们将用“商誉”来替代之。
 

 

Accounting Goodwill arising from businesses purchased before November 1970 has a special standing. Except under rare circumstances, it can remain an asset on the balance sheet as long as the business bought is retained. That means no amortization charges to gradually extinguish that asset need be made against earnings.
 

 

在1970年11月前购买公司所产生的商誉有不同的处理。除非在极少的情况下,只要仍然持有所购买的公司,商誉就可以存在于资产负债表上。这意味着不需针对盈利核算摊销费用而逐渐削减这项资产。
 

 

The case is different, however, with purchases made from November 1970 on. When these create Goodwill, it must be amortized over not more than 40 years through charges – of equal amount in every year –to the earnings account. Since 40 years is the maximum period allowed, 40 years is what managements (including us) usually elect. This annual charge to earnings is not allowed as a tax deduction and, thus, has an effect on after-tax income that is roughly double that of most other expenses.
 

 

但是1970年以后的并购就不同了。当并购产生商誉,这些商誉必须在不超过40年的时间里进行摊销。每年以相等的摊销费用减少利润帐户。由于40年是所允许的最长时间,这也是管理层(包括我们自己)通常选用的。这项减少利润的年度费用不允许被用来抵扣税,所以具有一般费用大约两倍的税后收入影响。
 

 

That’show accounting Goodwill works. To see how it differs from economic reality, let’s look at an example close at hand. We’ll round some figures, and greatly oversimplify, to make the example easier to follow. We’ll also mention some implications for investors and managers.
 

 

这就是会计商誉的做法。为了揭示这与经济商誉实际情况的不同,让我们看一个手头的例子。我们将近似一些数字,并极大的简化,以让这个例子容易理解。我们还将提及一些对投资者和经理人的影响。
 

 

 

Blue Chip Stamps bought See’s early in 1972 for $25 million, at which time See’s had about $8 million of net tangible assets. (Throughout this discussion, accounts receivable will be classified as tangible assets, a definition proper for business analysis.) This level of tangible assets was adequate to conduct the business without use of debt, except for short periods seasonally. See’s was earning about$2 million after tax at the time, and such earnings seemed conservatively representative of future earning power in constant 1972 dollars.    

 

Blue Chip Stamps于1972年初以2500万美元购买了喜诗糖果。当时,喜诗有大约8百万的净有形资产。(在整个讨论中,应收帐款将被归于有形资产,这个定义对商业分析是适合的。)这个水平的有形资产,除了季节性的短时期,当时足够不用债务而运营业务。喜诗当时的税后盈利是2百万美元,这似乎保守的代表了以1972年美元计的未来盈利能力。    

 

Thus our first lesson: businesses logically are worth far more than net tangible assets when they can be expected to produce earnings on such assets considerably in excess of market rates of return. The capitalized value of this excess return is economic Goodwill.    

 

因此,我们学到的第一课:当净有形资产能产生远超过市场水平的回报率时,公司价值从逻辑上讲,远超过净有形资产。这一超出市场回报的价值被资本化就变成了经济商誉。    

 

In 1972 (and now) relatively few businesses could be expected to consistently earn the 25% after tax on net tangible assets that was earned by See’s – doing it, furthermore, with conservative accounting and no financial leverage. It was not the fair market value of the inventories, receivables or fixed assets that produced the premium rates of return. Rather it was a combination of intangible assets, particularly a pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based upon countless pleasant experiences they have had with both product and personnel.    

 

在1972年(和现在)相对来说只有很少的公司能像喜诗那样稳定的获得25%的 税后净有形资产回报率。而且这种回报率还是建立在保守的会计方式和没有财务杠杆的情况下。并不是公允市场价值的库存,应收款,或者固定资产,产生了这种非 凡的回报率。正好相反,是无形资产的组合,尤其是在消费者中良好的声誉产生了这一切。这种良好的声誉是建立在消费者对其产品以及公司员工无数愉快的体验之 上。    

 

Such a reputation creates a consumer franchise that allows the value of the product to the purchaser, rather than its production cost, to be the major determinant of selling price. Consumer franchises are a prime source of economic Goodwill. Other sources include governmental franchises not subject to profit regulation, such as television stations, and an enduring position as the low cost producer in anindustry.    

 

这种声誉创造出了一个消费者特许经营权。这让产品对购买者的价值,而不是产品的生产成本,成为了决定销售价格的主要决定性因素。消费者特许经营权是经济商誉的主要来源。其他的来源包括无盈利管制的政府特许经营权,如电视台和在一个行业的低成本生产者的持久地位。    

 

Let’s return to the accounting in the See’s example. Blue Chip’s purchase of See’s at $17 million over net tangible assets required that a Goodwill account of this amount be established as an asset on Blue Chip’s books and that $425,000 be charged to income annually for 40 years to amortize that asset. By 1983, after 11 years of such charges, the $17 million had been reduced to about $12.5 million. Berkshire, meanwhile, owned 60% of Blue Chip and, therefore, also 60% of See’s. This ownership meant that Berkshire’s balance sheet reflected 60% of See’s Goodwill, or about $7.5 million.    

 

让我们回到喜诗这个例子的会计处理。BlueChip对喜诗的并购超出了净有形资产1700万美元。这就要求在BlueChip的资产负债表上设立同等额度的商誉帐户,并在40年的时间里,每年把这项资产摊销42.5万美元的费用,随之减少利润。到了1983年,经过了11年这样的摊销,这1700万已经被减少到了1250万。伯克希尔,与此同时,拥有60%的BlueChip,所以也就是60%的喜诗。这一所有权意味着伯克希尔的资产负债表反映了60%的喜诗的商誉,即750万美元。    

 

In 1983 Berkshire acquired the rest of Blue Chip in a merger that required purchase accounting as contrasted to the “pooling” treatment allowed for some mergers. Under purchase accounting, the“fair value” of the shares we gave to (or “paid”) Blue Chip holders had to be spread over the net assets acquired from Blue Chip. This “fair value” was measured, as it almost always is when public companies use their shares to make acquisitions, by the market value of the shares given up.    

 

1983年伯克希尔并购了BlueChip余下的股份。这一合并要求使用并购会计处理,而不是一些合并所允许的“合并”会计处理。在并购会计处理下,我们给(或“支付”)Blue Chip的股份的“公允价值”必须在我们从BlueChip获得的净资产上分摊。这一“公允价值”的多少,当上市公司用股票进行并购时总是用所放弃的市场价值来衡量。    

 

The assets “purchased” consisted of 40% of everything owned by Blue Chip (as noted, Berkshire already owned the other 60%). What Berkshire “paid” was more than the net identifiable assets we received by $51.7 million, and was assigned to two pieces of Goodwill: $28.4 million to See’s and $23.3 million to Buffalo Evening News.    

 

“并购”的资产包括了Blue Chip所拥有的所有东西的40%(如上所示,伯克希尔一直拥有余下的60%)。当伯克希尔“支付”的超过了我们收到的5170万美元可确认净资产,这一超出的部分被分配到两部分商誉:2840万美元在喜诗,以及2330万美元在Buffalo Evening News。    

 

After the merger, therefore, Berkshire was left with a Goodwill asset for See’s that had two components: the $7.5 million remaining from the 1971 purchase, and $28.4 million newly created by the 40% “purchased” in 1983. Our amortization charge now will be about $1.0 million for the next 28 years, and $.7 million for the following 12 years, 2002 through 2013.    

 

所以在并购后,伯克希尔有了喜诗的商誉,具有两部分:从1971年并购所剩下的750万美元,以及1983年的40%“并购”所新创造的2840万美元。我们在未来28年的摊销费用将是每年1百万美元,之后的12年也就是2002到2013年是每年70万美元。    

 

In other words, different purchase dates and prices have given us vastly different asset values and amortization charges for two pieces of the same asset. (We repeat our usual disclaimer: we have no better accounting system to suggest. The problems to be dealt with are mind boggling and require arbitrary rules.)    

 

换句话说,不同的并购日期和价格,让我们对同样一个资产有了两个非常不同的价值和摊销费用。(我们重复我们的免责声明:我们没有更好的会计系统可以建议。必须被解决的大量问题令人难以想象,因此必须有硬性的规则。)    

 

But what are the economic realities? One reality is that the amortization charges that have been deducted as costs in the earnings statement each year since acquisition of See’s were not true economic costs. We know that because See’s last year earned $13 million after taxes on about $20 million of net tangible assets – a performance indicating the existence of economic Goodwill far larger than the total original cost of our accounting Goodwill. In other words, whilea ccounting Goodwill regularly decreased from the moment of purchase, economic Goodwill increased in irregular but very substantial fashion.    

 

但是,经济现实是什么?一个实际情况是,从喜诗并购后每年从利润表中作为成本扣除的摊销费用并不是真正的经济成本。我们知道喜诗去年在2000万美元的净有形资产之上,挣了1300万美元的税后利润。这一业绩表明现存的经济商誉远高于最初总的商誉会计成本。换句话说,虽然会计商誉从并购那一刻就有规律的定期减少,但经济商誉却以不规律但却非常重大的方式增加。    

 

Another reality is that annual amortization charges in the future will not correspond to economic costs. It is possible, of course, that See’s economic Goodwill will disappear. But it won’t shrink in even decrements or anything remotely resembling them. What is more likely is that the Goodwill will increase– in current, if not in constant, dollars – because of inflation.    

 

另一个现实是,未来的年度摊销费用将无法符合经济成本。当然,喜诗的经济商誉也可能消失。但商誉不会稳定的消耗,或者以类似稳定的方式消耗。最有可能的是,商誉将会增加。由于通胀的作用,商誉将会以目前的美元价值,而不是以不变美元价值计增加   

 

That probability exists because true economic Goodwill tends to rise in nominal value proportionally with inflation. To illustrate how this works, let’s contrast a See’s kind of business with a more mundane business. When we purchased See’s in 1972, it will be recalled, it was earning about $2 million on $8 million of net tangible assets. Let us assume that our hypothetical mundane business then had $2 million of earnings also, but needed $18 million in net tangible assets for normal operations. Earning only 11% on required tangible assets, that mundane business would possess little or no economic Goodwill.    

 

这一可能性的存在是因为真实的经济商誉倾向于随通胀在名义价值上成比例增加。为了说明这是如何运作的,让我们把喜诗这样的业务和一个更普通的业务做一个对比。1972年,当初我们并购喜诗时,它在8百万美元净有形资产之上的盈利是2百万美元。让我们假定我们假设的普通业务也有2百万美元的盈利,但却需要1800万美元的净有形资产来维持正常运营。在必须的有形资产之上只获得11%的回报,这个普通的业务具有很少,或者没有经济商誉。    

 

A business like that, therefore, might well have sold for the value of its net tangible assets, or for $18 million. In contrast, we paid $25 million for See’s, even though it had no more in earnings and less than half as much in “honest-to-God” assets. Could less really have been more, as our purchase price implied? The answer is “yes”– even if both businesses were expected to have flat unit volume – as long as you anticipated, as we did in 1972, a world of continuous inflation.    

 

这样一个业务,完全有可能因其净有形资产而以1800万美元卖出。与之相反,我们支付了2500万美元购买了喜诗,即使它没有更多的盈利,而且只有前面普通业务不到一半的实打实的资产。难道少既是多,就像我们的并购价格所暗示的那样?答案是“对”。即便两个业务都预期有停滞的业务量,只要你预计到了一个持续通胀的世界,正如我们在1972年预计的那样,这个答案就是“对”。    

 

To understand why, imagine the effect that a doubling of the price level would subsequently have on the two businesses. Both would need to double their nominal earnings to $4 million to keep themselves even with inflation. This would seem to be no great trick: just sell the same number of units at double earlier prices and, assuming profit margins remain unchanged, profits also must double.    

 

要理解为什么,想象物价水平翻倍之后对这两个业务的影响。这两者都需要把名义盈利翻倍到4百万美元才能赶得上通胀。这似乎不需要太多的手段:只要卖同样多的数量,把价格翻倍就行了,假设利润率不变,盈利一定翻倍。    

 

But, crucially, to bring that about, both businesses probably would have to double their nominal investment in net tangible assets, since that is the kind of economic requirement that inflation usually imposes on businesses, both good and bad. A doubling of dollar sales meansc orrespondingly more dollars must be employed immediately in receivables and inventories. Dollars employed in fixed assets will respond more slowly to inflation, but probably just as surely. And all of this inflation-required investment will produce no improvement in rate of return. The motivation for this investment is the survival of the business, not the prosperity of the owner.    

 

但是关键的是,为了达到这一点,两者恐怕都必须把正常的净有形资产投资翻倍。 因为这就是通胀常常强加于商业的经济要求,有好处也有坏处。以美元计的销售额翻倍意味着更多的钱必须马上被用在应收款和库存。固定资产所用的钱对通胀会有 较慢的反应,但肯定会有反应。而且,所有这些通胀要求的投资将无法改善回报率。这种投资的原因在于维持业务的生存,而不是拥有者利益的增长。    

 

Remember, however, that See’s had net tangible assets of only $8 million. So it would only have had to commit an additional $8 million to finance the capital needs imposed by inflation. The mundane business, meanwhile, had a burden over twice as large – a need for $18 million of additional capital.    

 

记住,喜诗只有8百万美元的净有形资产。所以,它只需要投入额外的8百万美元来支持通胀所强加的资本需求。而普通的业务,则有着两倍的负担,需要1800万美元的额外资本。    

 

After the dust had settled, the mundane business, now earning $4 million annually, might still be worth the value of its tangible assets, or $36 million. That means its owners would have gained only a dollar of nominal value for every new dollar invested. (This is the same dollar-for-dollar result they would have achieved if they had added money to a savings account.)    

 

尘埃落定之后,这个普通的业务,现在每年盈利4百万美元,可能仍然价值相当于其有形资产价值,即3600万美元。这意味着所有者投资的每一个美元,只产生了一个美元的名义价值增加。(这与他们把钱加到存款帐户中一样,都是一美元对一美元。)    

 

See’s, however, also earning $4 million, might be worth $50 million if valued (as it logically would be) on the same basis as it was at the time of our purchase. So it would have gained $25 million in nominal value while the owners were putting up only $8 million in additional capital – over $3 of nominal value gained for each $1 invested.    

 

喜诗同样也盈利4百万美元,用我们购买时同样的估值方法评估(逻辑上应该如此)可能价值5000万美元。所以喜诗获得了2500万美元的名义价值增加,而所有者仅仅投入了8百万美元的额外资本,这相当于每投入1美元获得超过3美元的名义价值。    

 

Remember, even so, that the owners of the See’s kind of business were forced by inflation to ante up $8 million in additional capital just to stay even in real profits. Any unleveraged business that requires some net tangible assets to operate (and almost all do) is hurt by inflation. Businesses needing little in the way of tangible assets simply are hurt the least.    

 

记住,即使是这样,喜诗的拥有者也由于通胀被迫付出8百万美元的额外资本,这也才仅仅是维持真实利润。任何不用杠杆而且需要一些净有形资产来运营(几乎所有的业务都是如此)的业务都会被通胀伤害。只需要很少有形资产的业务只不过受的伤害最少。    

 

And that fact, of course, has been hard for many people to grasp. For years the traditional wisdom – long on tradition, short on wisdom –held that inflation protection was best provided by businesses laden with natural resources, plants and machinery, or other tangible assets (“In Goods We Trust”). It doesn’t work that way. Asset-heavy businesses generally earn low rates of return – rates that often barely provide enough capital to fund the inflationary needs of the existing business, with nothing left over for real growth, for distribution to owners, or for acquisition of new businesses.    

 

然而这个事实,当然一直很难被许多人领悟。多年以来,传统智慧,(长于传统, 短于智慧)认为充满天然资源,工厂,机器和其他有形资产(“我们信赖的商品”)的业务能够提供最好的通胀保护。其实根本不是这样。重资产的业务通常获得低 回报率,低到仅能提供足够的资本来满足现存业务的通胀下需求,而根本无法剩下任何东西来支持真正的增长,分配股息给所有者,或者并购新的业务。    

 

In contrast, a disproportionate number of the great business fortunes built up during the inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets. In such cases earnings have bounded upward in nominal dollars, and these dollars have been largely available for the acquisition of additional businesses. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the communications business. That business has required little in the way of tangible investment – yet its franchises have endured. During inflation, Goodwill is the gift that keeps giving.    

 

与之相反,不成比例的大量商业财富在通胀时期积累起来。这些财富是通过拥有一 些业务运营而实现的,这些运营结合了具有持久价值的无形资产与相对很少的有形资产需求。在这些例子里,名义盈利大幅增加,这些资金可以用来并购其他的业 务。这种现象在通讯行业尤为明显。这一行业仅需要很少的有形资产投资,但是却能保持特许经营权。在通胀时期,商誉是不断奉献的礼物。    

 

But that statement applies, naturally, only to true economic Goodwill. Spurious accounting Goodwill – and there is plenty of it around –is another matter. When an overexcited management purchases a business at a silly price, the same accounting niceties described earlier are observed. Because it can’t go anywhere else, the silliness ends up in the Goodwill account. Considering the lack of managerial discipline that created the account, under such circumstances it might better be labeled “No-Will”. Whatever the term, the 40-year ritual typically is observed and the adrenalin so capitalized remains on the books as an “asset” just as if the acquisition had been a sensible one.    

 

但是这一论断自然只适用于真正的经济商誉。欺骗性的会计商誉(有很多这样的例 子)是另外一码事。当一个过度兴奋的管理层用愚蠢的高价购买一个业务时,前面描述的同样的会计细节也能被观察到。因为它无处可去,愚蠢的买价最终留在商誉 帐户。考虑到由于缺乏管理纪律而创造的这样一个帐户,在这种情况下,应该称之为“无誉”。无论期限,通常可以观察到40年的仪式性摊销。管理层追求刺激的肾上腺素被资本化保留在帐面上作为一项“资产”,就好像这个并购是一个明智的举动。    

 

If you cling to any belief that accounting treatment of Goodwill is the best measure of economic reality, I suggest one final item to ponder.    

 

如果你坚持相信对商誉的会计处理是衡量经济现实的最佳方式,我建议你思考最后一个例子。    

 

Assume a company with $20 per share of net worth, all tangible assets. Further assume the company has internally developed some magnificent consumer franchise, or that it was fortunate enough to obtain some important television stations by original FCC grant. Therefore, it earns a great deal on tangible assets, say $5 per share, or 25%.    

 

假设一个公司有每股20美元的净资产,全部是有形资产。进一步假设公司内部发展了一个绝妙的消费者特许经营权,或者这个公司足够幸运,获得了一些重要的FCC最初授予的电视台许可。所以,这个公司于有形资产上盈利丰厚,比如每股5美元,或者25%的回报。    

 

With such economics, it might sell for $100 per share or more, and it might well also bring that price in a negotiated sale of the entire business.    

 

有这样的经济状况,这支公司的股票可能卖价每股100美元或更高。而且还有可能在一个谈判卖出整个业务中获得如此的价格。    

 

Assume an investor buys the stock at $100 per share, paying in effect $80 per share for Goodwill (just as would a corporate purchaser buying the whole company). Should the investor impute a $2 per share amortization charge annually ($80 divided by 40 years) to calculate“true” earnings per share? And, if so, should the new “true” earnings of $3 per share cause him to rethink his purchase price?    

 

假设一个投资者支付了每股100美元购买股票,实际上是用每股80美元支付了商誉(正如一个企业并购整个公司时那样)。这个投资者是否应该每年拿出2美元的摊销费用,用于计算“真实”每股盈利?如果是这样,新的3美元“真实”盈利是否应该促使他重新思考购买价格?    

 

We believe managers and investors alike should view intangible assets from two perspectives:    

我们相信经理人和投资者应该从两个视角看待无形资产:   1. In analysis of operating results – that is, in evaluating the underlying economics of a business unit – amortization charges    should be ignored. What a business can be expected to earn on    unleveraged net tangible assets, excluding any charges against    earnings for amortization of Goodwill, is the best guide to the    economic attractiveness of the operation. It is also the best guide to the current value of the operation’s economic Goodwill.      

在分析运营结果,也就是评估一个业务单元的内在经济状况时,摊销费用应该被忽略。一个业务预期在净有形资产上所能获得的利润,除去任何商誉的摊销费用,才是衡量业务运营在经济上是否有吸引力的最佳指导。这也是衡量业务运营的经济商誉的当前价值的最佳指导。    

2.

In evaluating the wisdom of business acquisitions, amortization charges should be ignored also. They should be deducted neither from earnings nor from the cost of the business. This means forever viewing purchased Goodwill at its full cost, before any    amortization. Furthermore, cost should be defined as including the full intrinsic business value – not just the recorded accounting  value – of all consideration given, irrespective of market prices of the securities involved at the time of merger and irrespective of whether pooling treatment was allowed. For example, what we truly paid in the Blue Chip merger for 40% of the Goodwill of See’s and the News was considerably more than the $51.7 million entered on our books. This disparity exists because the market value of the Berkshire shares given up in the merger was less than their intrinsic business value, which is the value that defines the true cost to us.

           

  在 评估商业并购是否明智时,摊销费用也应被忽略。摊销费用既不应该从业务的盈利中减去,也不应该从业务的成本中扣除。这意味着永远视所购买的商誉为在任何摊 销之前的全部成本。更重要的是,并购成本应该被定义为,包含所支付代价的全部内在商业价值,而不仅是其记录的会计价值,不论合并当时所涉及的证券的市场价 格,也不管是否允许用合并会计处理。比如,我们在合并Blue Chip 40%的喜诗和Buffalo Evening News的商誉时,真正支付的代价远超过我们记录在账面上的5170万美元。这种不一致的存在是由于在合并时,伯克希尔股票的市场价值低于其内在商业价值,对我们来说这才是决定真实成本的价值。  

 

 

 

Operations that appear to be winners based upon perspective (1) may pale when viewed from perspective (2). A good business is not always a good purchase – although it’s a good place to look for one.    

 

从视角(1)看似乎是赢家的业务运营,有可能从视角(2)看却黯然失色。一个好的业务不一定是一个好的并购对象,虽然好业务是寻找好并购的地方。    

 

We will try to acquire businesses that have excellent operating economics measured by (1) and that provide reasonable returns measured by (2). Accounting consequences will be totally ignored.    

 

我们将寻求并购那些用(1)衡量是优秀的运营状况,而且用(2)衡量能产生合理回报的业务。会计后果将完全被忽略。    

 

At yearend 1983, net Goodwill on our accounting books totaled $62 million, consisting of the $79 million you see stated on the asset side of our balance sheet, and $17 million of negative Goodwill that is offset against the carrying value of our interest in Mutual Savings and Loan.    

 

在1983年底,在我们会计帐面上的净商誉是6200万美元,包括7900万美元标明在资产负债表的资产一侧,以及1700万美元负的商誉以冲销我们持有的Mutual Savings and Loan的权益价值。    

 

We believe net economic Goodwill far exceeds the $62 million accounting number.    
我们相信净经济商誉远超过这6200万美元的会计数字。   (1983年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信附录)


商譽 及其 攤銷 規則 現實 Barrons
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樂視網的版權成本該不該直線攤銷 二月立春

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6cba21780100zqtx.html

一直以來市場對樂視網的會計準則都有質疑,而且幾乎每幾個月就拿出來說一次,鑑於這個問題成為很多人懷疑樂視網的心病,那就很有必要細究一番,看看這個擔憂是不是合理;

 

前一段的21世紀經濟報導的一篇文章,主題也是表達這個質疑,非常引人注目,因為其時樂視網正是市場的當紅股,而最近,一位私募經理的話再次表達了相同的問題:「樂視網的盈利模式是寅吃卯糧,把目前的成本分攤到未來,這種經營模式很難持續。」

 

有點遺憾的是,這位私募經理的話有概念上的混淆,會計記入方式屬於財務準則概念下的問題,這不是企業的盈利模式,更不是經營模式,這個概念上的混亂,出於一位私募經理是很不應該的;

 

樂視網的主要收入之一是版權分銷,但版權成本攤銷是按照幾年直線攤銷的,由此很多人認為公司業績水分嚴重。

 

這個看法,看似有一定的合理性,實際上有很大的誤導,誤導在哪裡?誤導在對版權的認識不足,版權不是一般商品,它有自己的特殊性;另外,公司的發展階段不同,解讀財務數據的側重也不同;

 

首先版權成本記入究竟是應該按照直線攤銷法還是加速法,要看兩點,其一是會計制度是怎麼規定的,其二是看同行業其他公司是怎麼做的,這樣比較,一目瞭然;

 

會計制度規定,版權成本攤銷是直線的,而不是一次性加速的,因為版權本質上不是一次性使用價值盡失的消耗品,而是具有多次創造剩餘價值能力的商品,版權作 為資產組合的一部分,也有折舊的要求,但同時版權很特殊,部分版權反而會隨時間增長而增值,因此會計政策做出直線攤銷的規定,是充分考慮到版權並不隨時間 流逝而簡單減值這個特殊性的,在國際上也是如此,全球視頻行業的領軍企業NETFLIX,其版權分銷業務佔據絕對主導,該公司的版權成本攤銷採用的也是直 線法,而像優酷這類企業,基本就是走盜版起家或者短視頻路線的企業,它就沒有什麼正版的儲備和投入,採用直線法意義不大,如果今後優酷也要走以版權為主並 大規模投入的路線,他再用一次性加速攤銷法必然把業績增長曲線打一個大大的窟窿,話說回來,真到那時,他自己不會這麼做,制度也不允許他這麼做;

 

另外,對於一個高速發展行業中的具體公司,解讀其財務數據是有一定的側重的,樂視網目前實際上應該是輕盈利,重營收,成熟的資本市場對高速發展的新企業都 是這麼沽值地,這也是優酷土豆在美國市場上雖然虧損但仍能獲得高股價的原因所在,樂視選擇落地本土,資本市場在這個時候苛求其業績,本身就是一種短視的表 現,說白了就是「不懂」,上市不足兩年的樂視,居然已經有兩次現金分紅,這是完全沒必要的,也是被市場環境逼得,做大作強是當下一切要務,不必被資本市場 牽著鼻子走,當然在這個大環境下,也不得不低頭,只要不影響公司的發展軌跡就好。

 

視頻行業最後會分成兩類,一個傳播,一個是內容,更厲害的是內容+傳播,所以創新能力,在內容上佈局的先手,是制勝的關鍵,由此我說版權才是一切,尤其在中國這個視版權為無物的國度裡,一旦成就,回報是不可想像的巨大;

 

其時迄今為止,樂視分銷的版權都在PC端,手機和TV端還是空白呢,這難道不是一筆巨大的隱性財富麼,從這個角度看,直線攤銷真的是很負責的做法,否則一次性記入成本,未來爆發起來,一些人可能又要叫著說,這是欺騙了吧!

 

有些認識上的問題,如果是因為短視和弱視造成的,那麼盡快補課,改正看法,還是有獲得利潤的機會的,一個不斷被質疑的企業,多數情況下,是一個相對信任係數高的企業,在質疑中成長,是最健康的。


視網 版權 成本 不該 直線 攤銷 二月 立春
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