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fb遊戲私隱大公開 累己累友 增網銀被盜風險 專家籲停玩

1 : GS(14)@2011-03-19 15:36:24

http://www.hket.com/eti/article/1841cb45-f147-4df1-a8eb-b79163ca580d-501665



本港370萬名facebook「國民」,私隱隨時大公開;有專家指出,即使用戶將私隱設定調至最高,但一旦安裝fb遊戲App,私隱設定即如隱形,個人帳戶內所有資料會被全部收集,包括朋友名單以至生日日期等,累及朋友之餘,甚至可危及網銀戶口安全。

專家及律師均建議fb用戶,為保障自己及朋友的私隱,即時停用fb的App。本報綜合了8大fb必改私隱設定,供讀者參考。

fb遊戲熱爆全球,如Zynga推出的City Ville Facebook遊戲,玩家人數將突破9,500萬大關,幾乎每7個用戶有1個玩該遊戲,當中不乏本港玩家。惟去年底有外國玩家稱Zynga將收集到的玩家個人資料,轉售予第三方後,引起用家私隱被出賣騷動。

私隱設定最高 仍如虛設

互聯網專業協會(iProA)常務理事陳家豪直言,就算用戶將私隱設定調至最高,一旦安裝fb遊戲,開發商仍有機會突破封鎖取得最隱密私隱,所有設定等同隱形,再經此取得好友名單,在News Feed發布信息,吸引好友安裝;若果對方私隱設定低,個人資料即時會被盡取。

隨着本地遊戲開發商涉獵fb遊戲,陳料成為未來本地用戶私隱資料洩露大危機,其中特別關注出生日期洩露問題。

洩出生日 可危及信用卡

現時部分本地銀行服務,如啟動信用卡時需使用出生日期、部分網上銀行在登入時須輸入出世日期。假設fb遊戲開發商收集資料後,再轉售予第三者,即時增加網銀、信用卡被盜風險。

開發商蒐資料 fb不負責

為保障個人及朋友資料外洩,他極力建議用戶停玩fb遊戲,皆因開發商使用經App蒐集得來的個人資料時導致的用戶損失,facebook經已毋須負擔風險。

律師莊耀洸坦言,現時若要向開發商追究困難重重,主要是大部分為外國開發商,個人資料私隱專員公署難以登門追查及蒐集證據,認同最佳自保方法,是即時停玩。

撰文:梁愚瀚
2 : idsdown(1658)@2011-03-19 18:25:23

自己唔嘗試去保障自己的私隱, 信facebook, 勁
3 : abbychau(1)@2011-03-19 21:09:23

你情我願有咩好講, 我又唔覺fb d 私隱setting 有幾多陷阱, 好多時都係用戶一手一腳放出去
4 : 龍生(798)@2011-03-21 01:54:12

又要玩, 又要賴....

最過癮係的人乜都放晒上網, 轉個頭又話要私隱....
PermaLink: https://articles.zkiz.com/?id=273474

Webb公開身份證編號 富豪私隱大曝光

1 : GS(14)@2013-02-15 11:08:26

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20130215/18165933
HKIDs and Government secrecy
12th February 2013

There's been a lot of attention recently on the proposed implementation of changes to the Companies Ordinance to allow the Companies Registry (CR) to withhold full HKID or passport numbers and "usual residential" addresses from public inspection at the registry.

Webb-site first wrote about the HKID issue back in 2010, when the Financial Services and Treasury Bureau had issued conclusions from its consultation on a draft Bill. The ordinance was amended last summer before the end of the 2007-12 session. The full ordinance can be found here. Now we have a new LegCo and the Government needs subsidiary legislation to map out the details, without which, this Division of the ordinance (Division 7 of Part 2, Sections 47-60) will presumably not be brought into effect. So on 2-Nov-2012 the Government published a consultation on the Companies (Residential Addresses and Identification Numbers) Regulation (CRAINR), amongst other things. The consultation closed on 14-Dec-2012, and conclusions have not yet been published.

So we still have a chance to stop it. Media articles in the last few months on the assets of families of state leaders (including Xi Jinping, Wen Jiabao and the 8 immortals) were facilitated by access to the CR, and that has brought this issue to global attention. Closer to home, sub-divided apartments held by a company owned by a HK official's wife have also been in the news. But there are much broader issues at stake, including the entire approach of the HK Government to access to information.

HKIDs should be seen, not hidden

In our 2010 article, we opposed the proposal to blank out the last 3 digits of ID numbers, because it makes it impossible to know for sure who you are dealing with. 1,000 people could have the same partial HKID, and in some cases, they will have the same name. Family names in HK, like Scottish clans, don't have a lot of variety, particularly when Romanised (there is a many-to-one relationship between Chinese characters and English words). Take out the Chans, Cheungs, Leungs and Wongs and you would be missing more than one third (24/70) of the Legislative Council. In mainland PRC, the top 3 family names cover 21% of the population, and many of them have only two characters in their name, such as "Li Wei", of whom we currently have 16 in Webb-site Who's Who (WWW), the leading public database on HK people.

Like any other culture, some given names are also quite popular. For example, we currently have 19 "Chan Chi Keung"s in WWW, of which 9 have no English given name, so they appear identical. The only way we can distinguish between them is using an identifier from another source, such as the SFC, where each licensee has a separate code. That doesn't help much though, because the same person could have been licensed with the HKMA, MPFA or insurance self-regulators, but he would have a different license number at each regulator. He might also have a disciplinary history as a licensed estate agent, a solicitor, or a certified public accountant. If all regulators published HKID numbers, then we would know whether we are looking at the same person. Without HKIDs, we are often unable to connect the dots and know for sure whether it is the same person or a different person with the same name.

As the Law Society put it in their submission in 2010 (page 4):

"Identification numbers should be recorded and disclosed in full as it is a unique piece of information for identifying a person; the name of a person is not. Persons with identical names are not uncommon. An identification number is not a reliable tool for authenticating the identity of a person in electronic or telephone transactions. Use of identification number for authentication purpose is itself a misuse and should be discouraged."

The Government, in its conclusions paper, said "the remaining digits (together with the name) should be sufficient to identify the individual persons". That directly contradicts the Government's own consultation paper of 17-Dec-2009, which said (p54):

"The option of masking 3 or 4 digits of an identification number would not serve the purpose of identifying a person as there are cases of persons with the same name having similar identity card numbers".

By treating HKIDs as secrets, the Government is encouraging the misuse of the HKID as an authenticator (particularly by phone) rather than an identifier, and thereby incentivising identity fraud. The Government should be doing the opposite, and requiring the service providers it regulates, such as telecoms and pay-TV providers, to find other ways to authenticate their customers.

The HKID index

The easiest way to stop abuse of HKIDs as authenticators would be to give clear notice that in say, two years' time, the full register of all HKIDs and the corresponding names will be published, so that nobody will rely on them as authenticators. Two years ought to be enough time for all commercial users to modify their systems to use more reliable authentication when dealing with customers by phone.

The Government should embark on a publicity campaign to remind people that HKIDs are not secrets and should not be used as authenticators. Through the Communications Authority, the HKMA and the SFC, Government can also require regulated service providers not to use ID numbers to authenticate people by phone or online. If they need to authenticate a customer by phone, they should ask the customer something that only she and the service provider would know, such as a pre-arranged password, or the balance on the last bill.

The Government should amend the Privacy Ordinance to make clear (if it isn't already) that an ID number is not a piece of personal data, it is an identifier. It does not in itself contain material personal information about a person, it merely identifies them.

The Government should also publish full HKID numbers alongside the name of any person it appoints to a statutory or advisory body. These posts are like directorships of companies, and the public has a right to know exactly who has been appointed, rather than just a common name (see this notice, for example - who is Wong Wai Man, or Chan Chi Hung?). The HKIDs can then be used at the CR, Land Registry and other public sources to know more about the person and check on any conflicts of interest. Regulators, likewise, should use HKID numbers in their online directories of licensees and in disciplinary matters. That includes the HKICPA, HKMA, SFC, MPFA, Medical Council, Estate Agents Authority and any other licensor you can think of.

We published our founder's ID number, P135143(9) back in 2010, to prove that this is not in any way a secret. Today, we are launching an index of HKIDs which are (or have been) available on the web, not behind any pay-wall, and not as a result of any security breach. There are over 1,100 people in that index, mostly still alive, including some well-known billionaires whose HKID numbers can readily be found online. Interestingly, the most popular prefix is "D", and the rarest is "Y". Judging from the names, it seems that persons born outside HK are more likely to have a P or an R (including some mainland arrivals), and the XA, XD, XE and XG series are almost exclusively non-Chinese but have been here for decades - possibly all before the handover, so perhaps those series are no longer issued.

We have compiled this index without (yet) paying to obtain data in the CR - but we reserve the right to do so. Filings with the CR are public filings, and the data are provided for the purposes of making them available for public inspection and identifying who the directors of companies are. You don't have to be a company director if you don't want to, but if you are, then the public has a right to know exactly who you are. You direct your company with its privilege of limited liability. The only reason that the CR data are not used more widely is the pay-wall that stands in the way.

Tear down that wall

The CR has a monopoly on filings from companies registered in HK. The Land Registry has a monopoly on the registration of real estate transactions. Each operates behind a pay wall, a pay-per-view document scheme which harks back to the days when providing copies of documents from the registries actually cost money, and involved counter service staff, acetate microfiches and reading rooms to enlarge, view and print said microfiches. In the 21st century though, the registries receive a lot of documents electronically, and those which are on paper are promptly scanned and digitised for internal records. The incremental cost of making all those files available for public search is nearly zero - just a matter of local bandwidth and software maintenance.

So there is no "user pays" excuse here. The greater public interest would be served by demolishing the pay-wall and opening the registries, and all their documents, to public access. In the words of Ronald Reagan in Berlin, "tear down this wall". A good example of this open access is the New Zealand Companies Registry, where all documents are online. They do have the complication that NZ has no national ID number scheme, so instead they distinguish between "John Smith"s by using their residential addresses. Another option would be to use dates of birth, to almost eliminate duplicates.

The CR makes a monopolistic profit. Accounts for the year to 31-Mar-2012 show that the CR had turnover of HK$483.2m and pre-tax profit of $257.6m, or 53% of turnover. Only $61.1m of turnover came from search and copying fees, so it would still have made a huge profit even if it charged nothing for searches. Incorporation fees, annual filing fees, and registration of charges (mortgages) amounted to $384.0m of turnover. So in fact the CR should cut those fees as well.

Meanwhile at the Land Registry, accounts for the year to 31-Mar-2012 show turnover of $426.8m, sharply reduced because of Special Stamp Duty which reduced transactions and filings, but still making a profit before tax of $116.5m, which was more than the search fees of $82.2m. In the previous year, turnover was $573.4m, with profit before tax of $242.2m and search fees of $100.9m. So in both years, the Land Registry would have made a profit without charging search fees.

Both registries are essential Government services and are natural monopolies. They should not be run for-profit but to cover their costs, including amortisation of infrastructure. The Basic Law calls for the Government to balance its budget, not rack up surpluses by abusing natural monopolies.

Regardless of that, the public interest calls for opening the registries and all their documents to free online search. For example, the controversy over the defaulted sales of luxury flats at 39 Conduit Road would have been avoided if it had been obvious, from looking at the online sale and purchase agreements, that each sale was to a shell company with only a 5% deposit. In effect, those shells were call options - if the value of the flats went down more than 5%, then the owner of the shell would walk away from the deal, and if not, then they would complete the purchase. The buyers and the developer knew that, but the public did not. Journalists had to pay to see each and every transaction agreement before they could build the picture.

Mistaken identity

Similarly, researching the assets and potential conflicts of interest by government officials, both from the mainland and HK, involves paying to see records of each company and property they are involved with - if you can identify them in the first place. In a first-hand example of why the use of HKIDs would improve transparency and reduce mistaken identity, we can tell you that on 18-Apr-2007, Ming Pao reported that Webb-site founder David Webb had sold a house in Mount Kellett Road for HK$75m, upon which he had made a profit of $12m. Nice story - but it wasn't us. The newspaper didn't bother to call us - they assumed that the property agents feeding them the story had got the correct David Webb. To our knowledge, there are at least three "David Webb"s in Hong Kong. Incidentally, the same house was resold in 2012 for HK$155m. If only we had held on to the house we didn't own to start with!

Now, if this story had been about the secret assets of a Chinese politburo member or a HK Chief Executive, he would probably have sued the newspaper for defamation. The risk of such mistaken identity is enough to intimidate the media into not reporting - there is a rule of thumb: "if in doubt, leave it out".

A media exemption would mean media controls

On 29-Jan-2013, after a meeting with Government, the HK News Executives Association said that the Government had suggested an exemption in the law for journalists. The fact that the Government even suggested such an exemption shows how little they have thought about the Basic Law issues at stake here. Yet they have clearly been planning it in some detail - each "media organisation" would be given its own password to access the HKIDs and residential addresses, but only if it was used for the purpose of news reporting. It is a blatant attempt to "buy off" opposition from the media, and we are glad that the Hong Kong Journalists Association has rejected this move outright.

A media exemption is completely unacceptable. Unlike in mainland China, where the Government controls all the media and censors free speech, Hong Kong has "freedom of speech, of the press and of publication" guaranteed by Article 28 of the Basic Law. There is no licensing scheme which says who is a journalist and who is not, and what is a media organisation and what is not, nor should there be (although there is still the antiquated Registration of Local Newspapers Ordinance). The grant of any privileged access would imply a licensing or recognition scheme which could become a tool to suppress the media. The ability to withdraw privileged access to the registries by revoking recognition of a journalist or organisation would mean that the Government had the ability to impede freedom of the media. Bloggers, freelance investigative journalists, and operators of independent sites like Webb-site, would have a particularly tough time. The Government could simply refuse to recognise someone as a "journalist" or "media". Members of the public who wanted to conduct their own research would be locked out.

The situation is bad enough already, in that the Government already releases some information via a Government News & Media Information System (GNMIS) that is not open to the general public, only to organisations lucky enough to receive a password. You will notice a complete absence of any "register here" button on the site that would allow you to sign up. GNMIS is a little known fact - you don't see regular media ever mentioning it, perhaps because they fear losing access. We believe the system is used, amongst other things, to give notice of media conferences at which new policies will be announced.

People working in private banks or IPO sponsors, seeking to do due diligence on their potential clients, would also have difficulty, as would businesses seeking to know more about their customers or suppliers. The result would be more money-laundering, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest than is presently the case. So what next - will the Government propose exemption for all these categories? Who does that leave?

Addresses

We have sympathy with the proposal to allow display of a correspondence address rather than a "usual residential address". As long as a person has a designated correspondence address at which they can be sued (whether or not they are physically at that address) then we see no reason why that address should also be his home. It could even be a P.O. Box, because that is little different from the "virtual office" addresses that thousands of private companies use. The law can be clarified that the designated address is valid for any legal proceedings, and if the person then does not check his mail and has a judgment awarded against him in his absence, that is his choice.

Although there is very little, if any, evidence that the disclosure of residential addresses has been abused, it can be a personal security issue. People conducting investigative journalism might not like the idea that the people they criticise can find out where they and their children sleep at night. If you are a director of a news organisation or association, or a freelancer who directs your own company, then your residential address should be in the CR. That risk in turn might work against the public interest in a free and incisive media. If you are a director of a private bank who has just declined to open an account for a suspected triad, then your address is in the CR too.

However, we note that residential addresses are also available in other public documents. For example, the (mostly residential) addresses of candidates for election to the Election Committee, District Councils and the Legislative Council are published in the Gazette. There you will find the addresses of the CPPCC nominees to the Election Committee in 2011, including Leung Chun Ying, and here are the addresses of property tycoons. The full list of nominations is here.

What the Government should do
1.Abandon the proposal to restrict access to IDs in the CR.
2.Amend the draft subsidiary legislation to focus only on correspondence addresses, and simultaneously table amendments to repeal the provisions of the new Companies Ordinance relating to IDs.
3.Adopt a Government-wide policy of promoting the use of HKIDs to uniquely identify a person, including in appointments to Government boards and committees.
4.Require the HKMA, SFC, Estate Agents Authority, Medical Council, Dental Council and other regulators to include HKID numbers in public registers of licensees, and require that regulated service providers cannot use HKIDs to authenticate individuals by telephone.
5.Amend the privacy ordinance to clarify that identifiers, including HKIDs and passport numbers, are not personal data.
6.Tear down the pay-walls and open the Companies Registry and Land Registry to free online access for all data and documents.

If the Government does all of the above, then it will promote HK as a fairer, more transparent and open economy, and at the same time reduce fraud, corruption and money-laundering.

© Webb-site.com, 2013
2 : GS(14)@2013-02-15 11:08:39

http://webb-site.com/dbpub/HKIDindex.asp
ID 號碼
3 : GS(14)@2013-02-15 11:09:02

http://orientaldaily.on.cc/cnt/news/20130215/00176_040.html
「股壇長毛」揭富豪個人資料

再有人公開挑戰公司法的查冊限制,有「股壇長毛」之稱的獨立股評人David Webb日前就在其網站中發表文章,抨擊政府修例限制公眾查閱公司註冊紀錄的董事個人資料,並在網站公開一千一百五十名市民身份證號碼以示抗爭,當中包括一眾富豪,如恒基地產主席「四叔」李兆基、新鴻基地產聯席主席郭炳江、東亞銀行主席李國寶及電訊盈科主席李澤楷等。

包括李兆基李國寶李澤楷
David Webb指有關資料均從網上公開途徑中免費取得,包括由美國證券交易委員會網站、港府憲報等。David Webb在其網站解釋,由於擁有相同中國姓名的人數眾多,而且重複,難以單從姓名來核實公司董事身份,故身份證號碼可作為核實身份的憑據,他又不認同公開身份證號碼代表披露該人士更多具敏感性資料的私隱,而這類核實過程對商業機構及監管機構尤其重要。

David Webb促棄限查冊
他同時又建議港府放棄限制市民查冊,尤其是不應限制查閱登記冊上的身份證號碼等資料;另又建議修改有關的附屬法例,不應只是使用通訊地址登記,還要有其他地址資料。
4 : GS(14)@2013-02-15 11:09:52

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20130215/18165933

【惡法阻查冊】
【本報訊】政府修例限制公眾查閱公司董事身份證號碼等個人資料,有「股壇長毛」之稱的獨立股評人David Webb發動網上抗爭,近日在網站發佈「身份證號碼索引」(The HKID Index),公開包括李澤楷、郭炳江、李國寶等1,150名市民的身份證號碼。個人資料私隱專員公署擔心資料落入不法之徒手中。Webb反駁,資料全部從網上公開途徑免費取得。政府限制公眾查冊,反而助長行騙、貪污和洗黑錢。
記者:白琳 張嘉雯




該批網上資料冊的來源,主要來自美國證券交易委員會網站、港府憲報的清盤人資料等。長實副主席李澤鉅、電訊盈科主席李澤楷及新地聯席主席郭炳江等人都榜上有名,他們的英文全名及身份證號碼一目了然。





政府變相鼓勵犯罪

Webb上月底發起身份證號碼公開大行動,呼籲網民在Twitter貼出自己的身份證號碼,以抗議政府限制公司查冊。Webb指出,外國傳媒早前透過本港查冊,揭發中共領導人習近平及溫家寶家族的身家,現時港府修訂《公司條例》,限制公眾查冊已成國際新聞,「我們還有機會阻止」。
他今次的抗爭,反映身份證號碼極容易取得,只能用作「辨識」身份,根本不適宜讓銀行或電訊商等公司用來「驗證」客戶,「政府視身份證號碼為私隱,只會鼓勵業界繼續以此作驗證用途,變相鼓勵犯罪」。
Webb促請政府要求業界改用其他驗證方法,例如私人密碼,杜絕不法之徒濫用身份證號碼。他建議政府把全民身份證號碼變成公開資料,設兩年過渡期給業界轉換驗證系統,並修改私隱條例,把身份證號碼剔除私隱之列。政府公佈公職人員名單也應附上身份證號碼,以便公眾追查其公司及物業交易紀錄,確保沒利益衝突。此舉也令傳媒有效辨識目標人物身份,避免報道出錯。
個人資料私隱專員公署發言人表示,任何人或機構收集個人資料,須告知當事人收集資料目的,縱使某些身份證號碼可公開取得,但仍屬個人資料,「任意」讓公眾查閱,未必與當初收集資料原意相關。

非牟利用途無違法

署理個人資料私隱專員張如萌警告,身份證號碼現時常用作識別個人身份真偽,獨一無二和高度敏感,須加以保護。假若身份證號碼連同姓名落入不法之徒手中,「將大大增加犯罪風險」。警方前年處理104宗使用他人身份證的罪案。
民主黨立法會議員涂謹申表示,Webb並無違反私隱條例。八達通事件後,政府修訂私隱條例,規定直銷活動公司使用或轉移資料須獲當事人同意,今年4月生效。不過Webb的抗爭非作牟利用途,不受新例規管,加上其網站與傳媒類似,而使用資料作新聞用途已獲條例豁免。
本報向長實、恆基、新鴻基地產及電訊盈科,查詢上述遭公開身份證號碼的人士會否向私隱專員求助或要求David Webb刪除有關資料。但至截稿前只有李澤楷透過公關公司表示不予評論。
5 : GS(14)@2013-02-15 11:10:50

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20130215/18165936

【本報訊】獨立股評人David Webb在個人網站公佈城中富豪的身份證號碼。為了證明身份證號碼不是私隱,他刻意不採用要付費的公司查冊系統,改為透過多種免費渠道,找出他們的身份證號碼與住址,包括美國證券交易委員會查冊系統(EDGAR System)、廉政公署的《被通緝人士名冊》、政府憲報和香港聯交所「披露易系統」。




政府網站需繳費查閱

David Webb披露逾千名人資料,大部份都是採用美國證券交易委員會的免費查冊系統。該系統相當完善,市民在公司搜尋一欄只需輸入美國上市公司名稱,便找到1994年至今的重要文件,例如董事變更。文件也會記載董事的香港身份證號碼和住址,記者嘗試搜尋東亞銀行(The Bank of East Asia),即成功找到董事的香港身份證和住址,效果等同要付費的公司註冊處查冊,但搜索並不適用於未有在美國上市的公司。
Webb也從本港多個免費渠道「搵料」,包括港交所「披露易系統」。公眾人士只要輸入上市公司名稱,即可獲得公司董事名單和公司資料報表,如新增董事;公司亦需提交新董事履歷表和在其他公司擔任董事職位資料,但不提供董事的身份證號碼和住址。
廉政公署執法欄目有《被通緝人士名冊》,公開被通緝人士的身份證號碼、護照號碼、職業、出生日期和相片,提供最詳細的資料,現時有31位通緝人士資料在冊。
政府一站通提供憲報搜索,市民可翻查2000年起政府公告,政府機構要遵照條例公開公司資料,例如公司註冊處按《放債人條例》,在憲報公開財務公司地址,但財務公司其他資料,仍需在公司註冊處放債人註冊小組繳付17元查閱。





公司法專題
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/apple/index/16635518
6 : GS(14)@2013-02-15 11:12:58

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20130215/18165938






【特稿】
現時公眾查閱註冊公司資料,須向公司註冊處付費,該處上年度收益達4.3億元。David Webb指出,新西蘭政府早已網上公開註冊公司董事個人資料,免費讓公眾查閱。港府不但沒有順應國際潮流,反而進一步限制公眾查冊,港人反對修例之餘,也應推倒這道收費高牆(tear down that wall)。由於新西蘭沒全國統一的身份證號碼系統,公司董事註冊只能以住址及出生日期辨識,只要在當地政府公司註冊網頁輸入董事名字,所有同名人士的註冊紀錄均一目了然。




Webb反對政府提出遮蓋身份證號碼最尾三個數字或只容許傳媒等個別界別查冊,指建議「完全不能接受」。字母連首三個數字相同的組合涉及1,000人,不能用作辨識身份;給予個別傳媒機構特權查閱資料,亦對博客和獨立記者不公。
《蘋果》記者
7 : GS(14)@2013-02-15 11:13:39

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20130215/18165939

【本報訊】新《公司條例》推手、公司註冊處前處長鍾悟思(Gordon Jones)公開向政府「開火」,暗指新例限制查冊,縱容公司董事有權無責,公司執笠可以全身而退,卻連公開部份個人資料予公眾監察都嚴限,影響香港作為國際金融中心的地位。他認為身份證號碼是董事獨一無二的識別碼,並非機密,應該公開。




2008年退休的鍾悟思,是公司法重寫的推手;退休後,當局就附屬條例向公眾諮詢,鍾兩度提交書面意見,反對限制查冊,理據是香港情況與英國不同,未曾有董事受嚴重滋擾;而在香港同名同姓非常普遍,限制取覽身份證號碼會剝削公眾唯一查證個人身份的途徑,並會讓不誠實的人逃避債權人;惟意見未獲採納。
他今日在報章撰文,重申上述理據,批評當局未有考慮公司董事應權責一致,他指出,有限公司董事毋須承擔一旦公司倒閉所衍生的責任,理應公開部份個人資料讓公眾監察作為代價,又指當局諮詢文件內容「非常惹人誤解(very misconceived)」。






「風險轉嫁畀巿民」

鍾在文章批評支持收緊查冊的商會並不中立,相反,認為應維持現有做法的團體,包括銀行公會及香港會計師公會等,均屬監督公司及處理企業詐騙的重要組織。
他進一步批評本港容許私人公司擔任董事,這類公司毋須提交經審核賬目,非常不透明和難以問責,即使新條例要求私人公司委任至少一名自然人任董事,但若這名董事毋須披露個人住址及完整身份證號碼,公司透明度只會下降。
財經事務及庫務局發言人未有正面回應私人公司提交審計賬目的安排,只表示新例參照英國《2006年公司法》,訂明其他私人公司均須有至少一名屬自然人的董事。
反對限制查冊的香港記者協會主席麥燕庭稱鍾是「良心官員」,希望當局聆聽前人意見,「你(董事)以有限責任,毋須上身咁去搵錢,而呢個搵錢嘅風險轉嫁咗畀巿民,一旦公司執笠,董事毋須上身,所以你係需要負番嗰個有限度嘅責任,就係要俾人哋access你啲資料;但新諮詢文件,完全冇提呢樣嘢」。





公司註冊處前處長鍾悟思文章重點

1.公司董事毋須承擔公司倒閉的所有財務責任,有權利亦應有義務公開部份個人資料,讓公眾監察

2.身份證號碼是董事獨一無二的識別碼,不屬機密

3.支持收緊查冊的商會不中立,相反,支持現有做法的團體,包括銀行公會、香港會計師公會、香港律師會等,均屬監督公司及處理企業詐騙的重要組織

4.政府諮詢文件非常令人誤解

5.英國有董事曾受愛護動物組織成員滋擾,但香港未曾出現類似情況

6.本港容許私人公司擔任董事,私人公司毋須提交經審核賬目,若私人公司委任的個人董事也毋須披露個人資料,公司的透明度將進一步下降

資料來源:鍾悟思文章





公司法專題
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/apple/index/16635518
8 : GS(14)@2013-02-15 11:13:48

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20130215/18165941






【本報訊】公司註冊處前處長鍾悟思不單是重寫公司法的推手,更是網上查冊功臣,在公司註冊處擔任主管的14年間推動該處電腦化,在2005年2月推出電子搜尋服務,至2008年5月正式退休。

鍾悟思1973年畢業於牛津大學,隨即加入香港政府擔任行政主任;1993年5月起出任公司註冊處處長;於2000年初和2004年分別完成公司法改革常務委員會的公司條例檢討及企業管治檢討。
61歲的鍾悟思,離職前接受《香港證券》訪問,表明自己是重寫公司條例的骨幹成員之一,認為有關工作是非常重大的成就,是確保香港今後作為主要國際商務與金融中心的關鍵因素,但他擔心部份內容被淡化,「既得利益者當利益受損時會提出反對,尤其是涉及董事條文,他們在立法會中具有非常強大的游說力」,惟未有指明涉及那些條文。





公司法專題
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/apple/index/16635518
9 : Dict(36611)@2013-02-15 18:27:30

對我地這些蟻民查資料會有什麼影響?

很多人會用身份証做密碼, 可能是一個問題
10 : 自動波人(1313)@2013-02-15 19:39:43

9樓提及
對我地這些蟻民查資料會有什麼影響?

很多人會用身份証做密碼, 可能是一個問題


一禁唔俾查,連傳媒都查唔到

用身份証做密碼係自己問題.....
11 : VA(33206)@2013-02-15 20:07:48

我覺得佢用呢個方法玩大左

不過典解冇䛋哥嘅id?
12 : Dict(36611)@2013-02-15 21:15:03

11樓提及
我覺得佢用呢個方法玩大左

不過典解冇䛋哥嘅id?


我又覺得玩大D好, 多D人注意壓力才大, 多人討論先會有好結果
13 : greatsoup38(830)@2013-02-16 13:15:35

12樓提及
11樓提及
我覺得佢用呢個方法玩大左

不過典解冇䛋哥嘅id?


我又覺得玩大D好, 多D人注意壓力才大, 多人討論先會有好結果


就玩大佢,一人一信投訴私隱專員公署,Webb的ID 有無留影
14 : greatsoup38(830)@2013-02-16 13:15:41

刪幾多貼幾多
15 : passby(15493)@2013-02-17 00:59:00

13樓提及
12樓提及
11樓提及
我覺得佢用呢個方法玩大左

不過典解冇䛋哥嘅id?


我又覺得玩大D好, 多D人注意壓力才大, 多人討論先會有好結果


就玩大佢,一人一信投訴私隱專員公署,Webb的ID 有無留影


有得搞,但向邊個投訴?
16 : greatsoup38(830)@2013-02-17 10:46:10

15樓提及
13樓提及
12樓提及
11樓提及
我覺得佢用呢個方法玩大左

不過典解冇䛋哥嘅id?


我又覺得玩大D好, 多D人注意壓力才大, 多人討論先會有好結果


就玩大佢,一人一信投訴私隱專員公署,Webb的ID 有無留影


有得搞,但向邊個投訴?


私隱專員公署
17 : passby(15493)@2013-02-17 22:00:16

同警察投訴警察?
無用ga喎
18 : GS(14)@2013-02-18 21:33:00

17樓提及
同警察投訴警察?
無用ga喎


群眾壓力
19 : greatsoup38(830)@2013-02-22 00:48:27

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20130221/18171890


【本報訊】個人資料私隱專員公署對David Webb的身份證號碼索引展開「循規審查」,又指滙集已公開的身份證號碼供人查閱或觸犯私隱條例。Webb昨去信公署,批評公署說法等於資訊封鎖,令香港大陸化,「在香港圍起資訊防火牆,離內地的防火長城僅一步之遙」。
獨立股評人David Webb從網上免費收集逾千名富豪及市民的身份證號碼,製成網上索引讓公眾查閱,上周接獲公署審查通知後感到受「恐嚇」,暫時抽起索引。Webb昨書面回覆公署的查詢,同時在網上公開信件。
日後或篩選瀏覽者IP

現時彭博商業周刊及維基百科等多個海外大型網站,公開大量名人的個人資料。Webb指出,若公署說法成立,港人經這些網站收集資料,即受私隱條例規管。內地封鎖敏感網站的荒謬情景將會在香港出現,日後海外網站或須篩選瀏覽者的IP位址,專門封鎖港人並發出警告:「對不起……我們不能確定你使用本站的個人資料是否符合當事人意願,因此你不能瀏覽本站。」
Webb指出,私隱條例理應只規管向當事人收集個人資料,藉以提供服務的公司,使用已公開的個人資料不應受規管,也毋須向當事人徵求同意,否則只會踐踏言論及出版自由。
Webb要求公署盡快澄清,以便他重新上載身份證號碼索引。對於公署早前指去年有約100宗使用他人身份證罪案,Webb直指公署誤導,因此統計包括盜用他人身份證,與身份證號碼索引無關。
20 : passby(15493)@2013-02-22 04:19:35

香港無david webb真係收得皮
21 : greatsoup38(830)@2013-02-23 11:22:21

壓他們啦
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