翻回公司的公告，文中述及「When the aggregate voting control of Messrs. Page and Brin falls below 15%, the Board shall take steps to cause the Class C shares to convert into Class A shares if it determines, in good faith, that it is no longer in the best interests of Google to maintain a class of nonvoting stock. 」，其實是指幾位創辦人及管理層投標權少於15%的時候，並不是持股量低於15%。所以是指，如果管理層不願再維持公司經營的時候，就可以取消B股，所以這是一項創辦人及管理層自願的措施吧。 2.小股東一同意蝕底點，放權讓利，後果是牢牢控制董事會的創辦人，有日想你再捱義氣，而到時連集體訴訟都未必可以推翻。
翻閱報導，句子其實是話，「The scheme allows News Corp (and 21st Century Fox) to flood the market with shares, which News Corp investors as of June 21 (when it was adopted) can buy at half price, if a hostile bidder acquires 15% of the stock. Rupert Murdoch also can buy shares to keep his voting stake at about 40%.」，其實詳細來睇，其實就是毒丸(poison pill)，如果有人在2013年6月21日(或實施日)以後的股東持有多於15%，這批在2013年6月21日(或實施日)的股東可以原價一半購入股票，所以並不指是梅鐸，只是因為梅鐸一定會維持控股，所以擁有最大權利認購新股。但如果一些基金原本持有股權的話，其實都可利用此機制維持股權矣。這句說話其實和蘋果日報一向的手法一樣，例如話我去搞丘亦生或者大頭蔡，妖魔化成zkiz.com 搞無主孤魂差唔多，我覺得好無謂。 5. 查實無論是合夥人或AB股這些以小控大機制，還有一個風險，就是一旦明星創辦人全退，其欽點的接班人，又缺乏前人的星味及高瞻遠矚時，這時讓其獨攬大權，對公司而言就由助力變成阻力，屆時股價的下跌風險，可能比正常股份更大。 其實邏輯同(3)那個一樣，我只要把「查實無論是合夥人或AB股這些以小控大機制」，改為「無論任何情況」，其實這句仍然生效，所以又是一句廢話中的廢話，這個理論又是可以無視之。
主因係老共的GDP growth 純靠capital investment, 以 financial statements計, Capex growth (expense side) 大於 Revenue growth (income side), 亦未計因政治問題 GP margin趨嚮往下走 導致 GP growth (net income side)直頭負增長
呢個問題, 基本上係大陸學者都明白老共純砌GDP條數, 只係出面死都要用 developed countries 的 growth path去放在大陸身上, 學者甚至明言 capital investment好大部份比官賊食左, 導致以工資伝導印鈔也大為削弱....要以政策指導工資升幅, private business 分不到印鈔但要頂政策工資升幅...squeeze all margin .... Game over !!!!
所謂10年上升10倍股, 睇睇下面 formula 就明
GDP = C + I + G + (X - M)
印鈔炒不多全去了 I + G, 而 I (infrastructure not business investment) 有 70-80% 被官賊落格 / G亦係乩開公數, 變相 P1 luxurious / P1 properties (每官賊 >100套房) / 豪賭 分曬瘋狂印鈔
另外, high efficiency / high utilization rate 會令大陸13億人就業不足繼而影響穩定, 所以相比10年前 efficiency/utilization rate 係大幅降低了
Thatcher's privatisation legacy
How the promise of increased British competitiveness and greater prosperity has not materialised, and why I didn’t get to grow up in Hawaii.
By Nick Ferguson | 11 April 2013
Keywords: margaret thatcher | privatisation | cable & wireless | pccw
I was 10 when the company my dad worked for became one of the first state-owned firms privatised under Margaret Thatcher.
Cable & Wireless was one of those venerable old bastions of empire, tracing its origins back to the dawn of the telegraph. In one form or another, the company had been operating a global communications business since 1860 — until it ceased to exist last year.
Of course, Cable & Wireless is just one example, but Thatcher herself repeatedly claimed to have diagnosed the ills of government planning through the lens of her father’s greengrocers in Lincolnshire. “There is no better course for understanding free-market economics than life in a corner shop,” she claimed.
That just about sums it up. At the core of Thatcher’s monetarist project was the parochial claim that the high inflation and low growth of the 1970s was entirely domestic in origin — the “British disease”. News of the oil crisis or the end of the gold standard or IMF-enforced austerity clearly didn’t make it to the Lincolnshire fruit-and-veg industry, and why would it?
My dad spent most of his career at Cable & Wireless, working as an engineer on the fleet of ships that strung thousands of miles of cables around the planet, connecting Britain to the far-flung corners of its former empire. Its assets included Hong Kong Telecom, as well as businesses in Japan, Singapore, South Africa and the Caribbean.
Thatcher came to power in 1979, having identified the solution to the country’s stagflation as public spending cuts and more austerity. Privatisation, she argued, would help to raise money for the public coffers and give managers the freedom to cut costs and re-invest the proceeds.
Brilliantly, she also managed to seduce workers into believing that it would hand the means of production to the people — a kind of “popular capitalism” that was so seductive it was adopted by governments around the world.
"It was taken as a matter of faith that financial gains would be invested in upgrading the enterprises once they were privatised, installing new machinery and hiring more labour to provide better service while increasing output at falling prices," writes Michael Hudson, a research professor of economics at University of Missouri, Kansas City, the home of modern monetary theory, in a long essay on British privatisation. "Workers were invited to think of themselves as finance-capitalists-in-miniature, earning dividends and capital gains by investing their savings in the shares in these companies."
The big public utilities were the most controversial targets, while companies such as Cable & Wireless were low-hanging fruit — its assets were mostly outside the UK, few people had ever heard of it and its various businesses around the world were a potential goldmine. Even the sceptics raised few objections to its sale.
By the time of my dad’s last posting in the mid-1990s, to a repair ship that spent most of its time idling at port in Victoria, on Canada’s Vancouver Island, the company was still one of the biggest in the industry and its shares were worth about £5 — a steady increase from the IPO price of £1.68 in 1983 (after an initially rapid increase due to the mis-pricing that characterised most privatisations).
Most of the early profits came easily. Before privatisation, for example, the company had paid for our family to follow my dad around the world, first class. We lived in Hawaii twice and briefly in Spain. Taxes and school fees were also taken care of.
Freed from the constraints of the public sector, management cut costs after privatisation, transferring such allowances from their employees to themselves, in the form of dividends and salaries that were among the highest in the industry. But employees also owned shares, so there was still a wealth effect, at least for a while (and I’m sure my dad didn’t mind travelling the world without four kids in tow).
In retirement, he watched as executives turned the company into a dot.com bubble stock, selling profitable assets to pay rich prices for flimsy investments.
In Hong Kong, in 2000, I had a ringside seat for the very worst of those trades: the sale of Cable & Wireless’s lucrative stake in the local phone operator to Li Ka-shing’s son, Richard, in exchange for shares in his 10-month old startup, Pacific Century CyberWorks, which was valued at an irrationally exuberant $26 billion — making it bigger than Amazon at the time.
The deal was an almost immediate disaster for both companies, as was abundantly obvious even before the ink was dry. Indeed, this is what Cable & Wireless HKT’s board had to say as they recommended the deal to shareholders:
“The financial risk profile of HKT will change from that of a company with substantial cash reserves, little debt and a history of regular dividend payments, to being part of a group with significant debt and which is unlikely to be able to pay dividends in the foreseeable future.”
It also had a share price that was heading south in a hurry. And, as a result, so did Cable & Wireless. After briefly reaching £15, the company’s shares finally slumped below the IPO price in 2002 and never really recovered — though management continued to pay themselves millions anyway.
Vodafone bought what was left of the business last year for about £1 billion, after the Caribbean assets were spun off in 2010 and now go by the name Lime.
Her legacy will be debated for years to come, but one thing is sure: almost none of Thatcher’s promises came true. Workers did not become better off, unemployment never returned to the levels of the early 1970s, trade surpluses did not come to pass and utility bills did not get cheaper.
And I swapped life in Hawaii for the northeast of England. Thanks Maggie.
雜誌《大西洋城市（The Atlantic Cities）》最近一篇文章，引述牛津大學一名學者Bent Flyvbjerg的研究，他曾調查全球20個國家共258個大型運輸基建項目，發現十個有九個都超支，鐵路項目的情況尤為嚴重，平均超支45%，最「有譜」的公路項目，亦要超支兩成。整體而言，平均超支28%。
發現超支問題的不獨是Flyvbjerg，連世界銀行多年前也留意到這一現象，甚至把這現象形容為「一切按計劃進行原則」（Everything Goes According to Plan Principle），諷刺官員沒有預設任何可能風險如建造材料漲價等，結果一切總是不按計劃進行。
Why Mega-Projects Always End Up Costing More Than Expected
Last week the San Francisco Chronicle reported that the Transbay Transit Center, a massive transportation hub calling itself the "Grand Central Station of the West," will cost at least $300 million more than project officials estimated. One city official characterized the situation as unfortunate but said it wouldn't have a "meaningful impact" on the project. The comment may have been meant as optimism, but it also reflects the fact that enormous cost overruns have become such a normal part of urban mega-projects that they barely even register as a problem.
So how did it get to the point where the only thing we can confidently expect from a big infrastructure project is that it will cost way more than expected?
One thing's for sure: the people who predict the cost of urban mega-projects do a terrible job. Several years ago the University of Oxford scholar Bent Flyvbjerg, who's made a career researching mega-project mismanagement, analyzed 258 transportation infrastructure projects from around the world and found that nine in ten exceeded their cost estimates. The overruns were greater on rail projects than road projects but averaged 28 percent across the board.
What struck Flyvbjerg most about the problem was how very un-random it was. If people were simply very bad at estimating the costs of huge projects, then one might expect some projects to come in under budget and others over. But an under-budget mega-project is about as rare as a dodo riding a unicorn. Instead, wrote Flyvbjerg and some collaborators in 2002, it's more likely that when it comes to mega-projects, public officials engage in "strategic misrepresentation" — aka lying:
The policy implications are clear: legislators, administrators, investors, media representatives, and members of the public who value honest numbers should not trust cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and their analysts.
Flyvbjerg's explanation is no doubt true in some cases, but there's also a less sinister reason why people associated with a project might be bad at predicting its costs. From a psychological standpoint, people are saddled with a cognitive bias that causes them to be unjustifiably upbeat (some might say delusional) about the prospects of their own plans. So they do whatever it takes to get them approved — certain that whatever problems have plagued others in the past will be avoided.
Writing in the late 1970s, the psychologists (and would-be Nobel Laureates) Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky called this problem the "planning fallacy" . At its root is a tendency for people to see their plans from the inside rather than evaluating them as an external referee might. Whereas an outside observer might consider a project and recognize its "distributional" risks — the combined possibility of a delivery delay or a worker strike or plain bad weather, for instance — the person directly involved might be blind to these possibilities, write Kahneman and Tversky:
The prevalent tendency to underweight, or ignore, distributional information is perhaps the major error of intuitive prediction.
Whatever the underlying causes of cost overruns may be, there seems to be one promising means of addressing them: creating a "reference class" of similar projects to serve as a platform for comparing costs. The idea, as explained by Kahneman in 2003, is that old outcomes can serve as a barometer for recognizing just how unrealistic a biased new prediction might be — and help adjust it accordingly. Such a strategy controls for both political chicanery and cognitive biases alike.
In 2005, Flyvbjerg put this theory into practice at the request of Dutch officials who were considering a massive rail project called the Zuiderzee Line, reported Ryan Blitstein in a great 2008 profile for Miller-McCune. Flyvbjerg predicted that the officials had underestimated construction costs by $2.5 billion and also miscalculated the chance of an additional cost overrun (they put it at 20 percent; Flyvbjerg, at 65 percent). The project was canceled before bids even went out.
Therein may lie the practical flaw with the "reference class" response to the cost overrun problem. More canceled projects means fewer ribbon-cuttings, fewer consulting gigs, fewer construction jobs, and so on. One more thing that's easy to underestimate is the power of the status quo.3 : GS(14)@2013-08-05 23:19:32