經歷一波三折，眾望所歸的耶倫終於被提名擔任下一任美聯儲主席。WSJ編輯VICTORIA MCGRANE回顧了耶倫的「優秀」事蹟，展現了一個行事果斷、不畏權威、先知先覺、勇於承認錯誤，並著有良好溝通能力和創新精神的耶倫：

1.她一直推動美聯儲使用激進的新政策來促進經濟增長。耶倫在學術研究上一直更多地專注於失業的成本和成因，並一直呼籲美聯儲對高失業作出強而有力的應對。她認為，經濟處於如此疲軟的狀態下，通脹是不大可能出現的——至今，她的這個觀點一直都是正確的。在今年2月的演講中，耶倫表示：「對我來說，這些不只是統計結果。我們知道，長期失業對工人和他們的家庭來說是毀滅性的。」

2.她曾經一度擔憂通脹過高。耶倫的公開言論和過去的行動顯示，她致力於保持低通脹水平。在2011年的演講中她表示，美聯儲「決心確保不會重滔60年代末和70年代的覆轍，當時美聯儲並沒有強而有力地應對上升的通脹水平。」

耶倫是美聯儲採取2%通脹目標的長期支持者，並在2012年美聯儲公佈該通脹目標背後起了重要的作用。在1996年，時任美聯儲官員的耶倫就和當時美聯儲主席格林斯潘爭論合理的通脹水平問題，耶倫認為過低的通脹水平和過高的通脹水平一樣，都會損害經濟——現在這個觀點已經得到美聯儲的廣泛認同，但那時並沒有。1996年的晚些時候，耶倫呼籲格林斯潘上調短期利率，因為擔憂過熱的經濟可能導致過高的通脹，但據前美聯儲官員Laurence Meyer表示，格林斯潘否決了耶倫的建議。

3.她是一個優秀的預測者。美聯儲必須預測經濟增長、通脹和失業率水平來制定政策。據WSJ的分析發現，在2009-2013年之間，耶倫的預測準確率是現任美聯儲官員中最高的。

4.金融危機使她成為更嚴格金融監管的信奉者。耶倫已經表示，2008年金融危機（當時她擔任舊金山聯儲主席）使她從一位有些「溫和的」地區性銀行監管者，轉變成相信嚴格監管比直到麻煩即將到來監管者再去反應是更為有效的信奉者。

在2010年接受國會成立的金融危機調查委員會的訪問中，耶倫表示了對美聯儲和其它監管者需要很長時間談判和發佈新監管規則的失望。「這個經歷已經使我強烈地傾向於（建立）更嚴格的標準和內建的規則——當像這樣的危機發生的時候，這些規則將自動生效，使收緊（規則）變成沒有那麼可自由判定的事情。」

在6月的講話中，耶倫表示美聯儲可能需要要求最大最複雜的銀行持有更多資本緩衝來吸收損失，比國際監管者的新要求更高。而這個計劃受到了美國大銀行的強烈反對。

5.她堅信透明度，而市場認為她是個優秀的溝通者。2010年，伯南克任命耶倫領導一個內部溝通委員會，而該委員會已經在央行向公眾傳達其政策目標和計劃的方法上，作出了若干創新。這些創新包括所謂的前瞻指引——美聯儲公佈未來政策最可能的發展走勢，而前瞻指引現在已經演化到給出具體的失業率和通脹門檻；伯南克主持的定期的新聞發佈會；以及2012年1月首次公佈的長期目標和策略文件——美聯儲認為與國會授予其使命一致的失業和通脹水平。

在今年4月的演講中，耶倫表示：「貨幣政策的效用關鍵取決於公眾獲得的關於美聯儲未來幾個月或幾年將實施什麼政策的信息。我希望並相信，那些『永不提供解釋和理由』的日子將永遠過去了。」

市場參與者認為，耶倫在解釋央行想法上做得很好。在去年兩個獨立的調查中，一級交易商的高管——那些直接與美聯儲進行交易的銀行，在回應關於美聯儲溝通政策的問題中表示，耶倫的講話特別有幫助。

11月24日，伊朗與伊核問題六國（美國、英國、法國、俄羅斯、中國和德國）就限制伊核計劃並放寬對伊制裁達成協議。協議自稱，

對伊朗核項目的介入監控和透明度前所未有。

西方國家官員稱，這份協議將制止伊朗繼續發展核項目，打擊伊朗建立核設施關鍵組成部分，對伊進行監控，使伊朗生產武器用核燃料的時間延長。

伊朗稱，協議打破了經濟制裁，表明國際社會認同伊朗追求開發民用核項目。

協議賦予雙方哪些權利？讓我們看看華爾街日報歸納的協議要點：

鈾濃縮：

   · 伊朗承諾終止所有提取純度5%以上濃縮鈾的活動。

   · 伊核問題六國承認伊朗人民有權使用和平用途的核能源。

鈾庫存

   · 伊朗將開始將目前存貯的純度20%濃縮鈾轉變為無法適用於武器的氧化物，或者降低其純度。

華爾街見聞註：純度達到20%即可用於武器，原子彈需要的核原料純度達到90%。

   · 伊朗不得增加低濃縮鈾。

離心機

   · 可生產純度高於5%的濃縮鈾的離心機都將停工。

   · 伊朗不會安裝任何新的離心機，不會用新設備替代老設備。伊朗不得增加國內濃縮設施數量。

   · 如長期談判破裂，伊朗不會大批裝備可迅速使用就位的離心機。

審查

   · 對進行和濃縮作業的納坦茲（Natanz）研究發展基地與福爾多（Fordow）地下基地，將增加審查頻率，首次由每週檢查改為每日檢查。新增檢查地區包括離心機生產場所、鈾礦和鈾冶廠，檢查還將收集阿拉克（Arak）重水核反應堆的信息。

   · 伊朗同意與聯合國觀察機構國際原子能組織（IAEA）達成協議。應該協議要求，伊朗將提供更多的信息，披露核反應堆及生產場所相關計劃。

阿拉克核反應堆

   · 實施中期協議期間，該核電站不會進一步開展工作。

   · 實施中期協議期間，伊朗不會開始拆除阿拉克反應堆，今後也不會拆除。

制裁

   · 實施中期協議期間解除的對伊制裁合計規模相當於60-70億美元.

   · 如要進行人道活動，伊朗會得到更好的渠道動用自己的資金。

   · 伊朗出口石化產品的制裁暫停。

   · 伊朗交易黃金及其他貴金屬的制裁暫停。

   · 大多數影響伊朗汽車業的制裁暫停。

   · 對一些飛機零部件的制裁解除，包括保證航空安全的零部件，但不包括軍用雷達使用的部件。

   · 解除一切對伊朗購買醫療設備的資金限制。西方國家將監督這類採購，以保證設備來自得到認可的公司，並非動機可疑的公司。

   · 所有解除制裁的規定都是短期的有限解除，均可撤銷。銀行和石油的核心制裁都將維持不變。如伊朗未履行承諾，則任何解除規定都會撤銷。

新制裁

   · 如伊朗違反協議規定，西方國家保留施加新制裁的權力。

「突襲」效果

西方官員稱，實施中期協議後，如伊朗迅速生產武器級材料所需的時間將從幾週延長到幾個月。

這意味著伊朗擁有的高純度濃縮鈾和離心機更少了，面對的審查員更多了，國際社會將得到更多的時間和必要手段發起突然襲擊。

以下為白宮發佈的核協議內容：

First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program

The P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, and China, facilitated by the European Union) has been engaged in serious and substantive negotiations with Iran with the goal of reaching a verifiable diplomatic resolution that would prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

President Obama has been clear that achieving a peaceful resolution that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is in America's national security interest. Today, the P5+1 and Iran reached a set of initial understandings that halts the progress of Iran's nuclear program and rolls it back in key respects. These are the first meaningful limits that Iran has accepted on its nuclear program in close to a decade. The initial, six month step includes significant limits on Iran's nuclear program and begins to address our most urgent concerns including Iran's enrichment capabilities; its existing stockpiles of enriched uranium; the number and capabilities of its centrifuges; and its ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium using the Arak reactor. The concessions Iran has committed to make as part of this first step will also provide us with increased transparency and intrusive monitoring of its nuclear program. In the past, the concern has been expressed that Iran will use negotiations to buy time to advance their program. Taken together, these first step measures will help prevent Iran from using the cover of negotiations to continue advancing its nuclear program as we seek to negotiate a long-term, comprehensive solution that addresses all of the international community's concerns.

In return, as part of this initial step, the P5+1 will provide limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible relief to Iran. This relief is structured so that the overwhelming majority of the sanctions regime, including the key oil, banking, and financial sanctions architecture, remains in place. The P5+1 will continue to enforce these sanctions vigorously. If Iran fails to meet its commitments, we will revoke the limited relief and impose additional sanctions on Iran.

The P5+1 and Iran also discussed the general parameters of a comprehensive solution that would constrain Iran's nuclear program over the long term, provide verifiable assurances to the international community that Iran's nuclear activities will be exclusively peaceful, and ensure that any attempt by Iran to pursue a nuclear weapon would be promptly detected. The set of understandings also includes an acknowledgment by Iran that it must address all United Nations Security Council resolutions – which Iran has long claimed are illegal – as well as past and present issues with Iran's nuclear program that have been identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This would include resolution of questions concerning the possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear program, including Iran's activities at Parchin. As part of a comprehensive solution, Iran must also come into full compliance with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its obligations to the IAEA. With respect to the comprehensive solution, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Put simply, this first step expires in six months, and does not represent an acceptable end state to the United States or our P5+1 partners.

Halting the Progress of Iran's Program and Rolling Back Key Elements

Iran has committed to halt enrichment above 5%:

· Halt all enrichment above 5% and dismantle the technical connections required to enrich above 5%.

Iran has committed to neutralize its stockpile of near-20% uranium:

· Dilute below 5% or convert to a form not suitable for further enrichment its entire stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium before the end of the initial phase.

Iran has committed to halt progress on its enrichment capacity:

· Not install additional centrifuges of any type.

· Not install or use any next-generation centrifuges to enrich uranium.

· Leave inoperable roughly half of installed centrifuges at Natanz and three-quarters of installed centrifuges at Fordow, so they cannot be used to enrich uranium.

· Limit its centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines, so Iran cannot use the six months to stockpile centrifuges.

· Not construct additional enrichment facilities.

Iran has committed to halt progress on the growth of its 3.5% stockpile:

· Not increase its stockpile of 3.5% low enriched uranium, so that the amount is not greater at the end of the six months than it is at the beginning, and any newly enriched 3.5% enriched uranium is converted into oxide.

Iran has committed to no further advances of its activities at Arak and to halt progress on its plutonium track. Iran has committed to:

· Not commission the Arak reactor.

· Not fuel the Arak reactor.

· Halt the production of fuel for the Arak reactor.

· No additional testing of fuel for the Arak reactor.

· Not install any additional reactor components at Arak.

· Not transfer fuel and heavy water to the reactor site.

· Not construct a facility capable of reprocessing. Without reprocessing, Iran cannot separate plutonium from spent fuel.

Unprecedented transparency and intrusive monitoring of Iran's nuclear program

Iran has committed to:

· Provide daily access by IAEA inspectors at Natanz and Fordow. This daily access will permit inspectors to review surveillance camera footage to ensure comprehensive monitoring. This access will provide even greater transparency into enrichment at these sites and shorten detection time for any non-compliance.

· Provide IAEA access to centrifuge assembly facilities.

· Provide IAEA access to centrifuge rotor component production and storage facilities.

· Provide IAEA access to uranium mines and mills.

· Provide long-sought design information for the Arak reactor. This will provide critical insight into the reactor that has not previously been available.

· Provide more frequent inspector access to the Arak reactor.

· Provide certain key data and information called for in the Additional Protocol to Iran's IAEA Safeguards Agreement and Modified Code 3.1.

Verification Mechanism

The IAEA will be called upon to perform many of these verification steps, consistent with their ongoing inspection role in Iran. In addition, the P5+1 and Iran have committed to establishing a Joint Commission to work with the IAEA to monitor implementation and address issues that may arise. The Joint Commission will also work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present concerns with respect to Iran's nuclear program, including the possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear program and Iran's activities at Parchin.

Limited, Temporary, Reversible Relief

In return for these steps, the P5+1 is to provide limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible relief while maintaining the vast bulk of our sanctions, including the oil, finance, and banking sanctions architecture. If Iran fails to meet its commitments, we will revoke the relief. Specifically the P5+1 has committed to:

· Not impose new nuclear-related sanctions for six months, if Iran abides by its commitments under this deal, to the extent permissible within their political systems.

· Suspend certain sanctions on gold and precious metals, Iran's auto sector, and Iran's petrochemical exports, potentially providing Iran approximately $1.5 billion in revenue.

· License safety-related repairs and inspections inside Iran for certain Iranian airlines.

· Allow purchases of Iranian oil to remain at their currently significantly reduced levels – levels that are 60% less than two years ago. $4.2 billion from these sales will be allowed to be transferred in installments if, and as, Iran fulfills its commitments.

· Allow $400 million in governmental tuition assistance to be transferred from restricted Iranian funds directly to recognized educational institutions in third countries to defray the tuition costs of Iranian students.

Humanitarian Transactions

Facilitate humanitarian transactions that are already allowed by U.S. law. Humanitarian transactions have been explicitly exempted from sanctions by Congress so this channel will not provide Iran access to any new source of funds. Humanitarian transactions are those related to Iran's purchase of food, agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices; we would also facilitate transactions for medical expenses incurred abroad. We will establish this channel for the benefit of the Iranian people.

Putting Limited Relief in Perspective

In total, the approximately $7 billion in relief is a fraction of the costs that Iran will continue to incur during this first phase under the sanctions that will remain in place. The vast majority of Iran's approximately $100 billion in foreign exchange holdings are inaccessible or restricted by sanctions.

In the next six months, Iran's crude oil sales cannot increase. Oil sanctions alone will result in approximately $30 billion in lost revenues to Iran – or roughly $5 billion per month – compared to what Iran earned in a six month period in 2011, before these sanctions took effect. While Iran will be allowed access to $4.2 billion of its oil sales, nearly $15 billion of its revenues during this period will go into restricted overseas accounts. In summary, we expect the balance of Iran's money in restricted accounts overseas will actually increase, not decrease, under the terms of this deal.

Maintaining Economic Pressure on Iran and Preserving Our Sanctions Architecture

During the first phase, we will continue to vigorously enforce our sanctions against Iran, including by taking action against those who seek to evade or circumvent our sanctions.

· Sanctions affecting crude oil sales will continue to impose pressure on Iran's government. Working with our international partners, we have cut Iran's oil sales from 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) in early 2012 to 1 million bpd today, denying Iran the ability to sell almost 1.5 million bpd. That's a loss of more than $80 billion since the beginning of 2012 that Iran will never be able to recoup. Under this first step, the EU crude oil ban will remain in effect and Iran will be held to approximately 1 million bpd in sales, resulting in continuing lost sales worth an additional $4 billion per month, every month, going forward.

· Sanctions affecting petroleum product exports to Iran, which result in billions of dollars of lost revenue, will remain in effect.

· The vast majority of Iran's approximately $100 billion in foreign exchange holdings remain inaccessible or restricted by our sanctions.

· Other significant parts of our sanctions regime remain intact, including:

o Sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran and approximately two dozen other major Iranian banks and financial actors;

o Secondary sanctions, pursuant to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) as amended and other laws, on banks that do business with U.S.-designated individuals and entities;

o Sanctions on those who provide a broad range of other financial services to Iran, such as many types of insurance; and,

 Restricted access to the U.S. financial system.

· All sanctions on over 600 individuals and entities targeted for supporting Iran's nuclear or ballistic missile program remain in effect.

· Sanctions on several sectors of Iran's economy, including shipping and shipbuilding, remain in effect.

· Sanctions on long-term investment in and provision of technical services to Iran's energy sector remain in effect.

· Sanctions on Iran's military program remain in effect.

· Broad U.S. restrictions on trade with Iran remain in effect, depriving Iran of access to virtually all dealings with the world's biggest economy.

· All UN Security Council sanctions remain in effect.

· All of our targeted sanctions related to Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism, its destabilizing role in the Syrian conflict, and its abysmal human rights record, among other concerns, remain in effect.

2014年被稱為美國經濟突圍的一年。一旦經濟復甦開始，各方的角力將決定未來的經濟發展。經濟是否真的能突破緩慢增長？華爾街日報的Sudeep Reddy 列舉了關於2014年美國經濟的五大問題並予以解答。

1. 企業界是否能放開手腳？

自從經濟危機開始，企業老闆和公司主管們在用人、購買設備方面處處小心。或者擔心各國政策變動；或者巴望著消費者保持著微薄而穩定的支出，用小小的刺激引誘他們多花點錢。

由於企業的過度謹慎，美國市場上對一些領域的投資達到歷史最低，例如設備產業。現在緩慢增長的就業和居民財富應當能引發更強的一輪消費良性循環，增加商業信心，刺激投資。反之，2014年將會成為又一個令人失望的年份。

2. 政府是否會繼續削減開支？

12月美國政府發佈的預算案很難帶給市場信心。不過至少它給過去三年的一系列小打小鬧的邊緣政策按下了暫停鍵，不再威脅到經濟復甦。

根據美國國會預算辦公室，2013年增加稅收和削減開支的雙重政策，至少將全年經濟增長拉低了1.5%。多方預測2014年美國財政開支的削減可能只有去年的1/3，甚至更少。但牛津大學的美籍經濟學家Gregory Daco說，「今年，政策上的信心會比較大。」

（圖為美國政府節省開支對經濟的影響。藍線為目前的經濟增長，紅線為沒有節省預算情況下的經濟增長。）

3. 美聯儲退出QE之路是否會崎嶇不平？

上個月，美聯儲公佈了2014年減少購買債券數量的時間表。從2012年底開始，美聯儲每個月購買850億美元的美國國債和MBS，現在計劃每月減購100億美元債券。

之前由於經濟快速下滑和艱難的復甦，美聯儲的設想很少能進行到底。因此，美聯儲公開承認「我們對經濟增長的速度十分失望，我們也不知道為什麼是這樣。」——伯南克在他離職前的最後一次新聞發佈會上如是說。

2013年，美聯儲花了六個月以上的時間反覆暗示市場，他們將逐步結束QE3，縮減QE預期每次都讓市場受挫。而實際上，美聯儲縮減QE的進程現在只進行到第一階段。儘管放緩QE的進程十分緩慢，這一年中美聯儲也必須和提升利率的市場預期進行搏鬥。

目前美聯儲資產負債表上的數字已經突破了4萬億美元：

4. 房市能否應對高利率？

2013年美國房地產市場充滿了問題，高利率帶來的憂慮，供給不足，貸款苛刻……等等。

據全美地產經紀商協會，7月開始，二手房的銷售量每個月都在下滑，而美國的貸款利率也在美聯儲削減QE的信號中不斷升高。

全美地產經紀商協會的首席經濟學家Lawrence Yun預測，30年期房貸固定利率將在2014年末達到5.5%，超過2013年末的4.5%和2013上半年的3.5%。貸款利率短期內的快速上漲將會讓更多人買不起房。

圖為美國貸款利率和房屋銷售情況：

5. 其他國家是否合作？

2009年美國經濟剛剛開始復甦的時候，世界各國的經濟也都有各自的問題。

歐洲深陷債務危機；日本遭遇大規模海嘯地震；一度是世界看點的新興經濟體也失去了光芒；政局震盪從意大利、埃及蔓延到泰國，全球形勢的前景不甚穩定。

2013年世界範圍內的動盪稍稍減少，但是危險仍然存在。如果美國想要在2014年實現真正的經濟復甦，這種相對穩定的國際環境需要延續下去。

如果你看過華爾街見聞本週分享的下面這幅圖，應該會有些「失落」：去年除了巴西、俄羅斯、印度和中國這「金磚四國」（BRIC）和丹麥，全球其他地區的製造業增長都有好轉。

摩根大通的下面這幅圖讓我們看到了全球21個國家地區從2012年1月到2013年12月的製造業採購經理人指數（PMI），其中中國的數據來自匯豐中國製造業PMI。

如果只截取去年12月的表現，我們會看到21個國家地區裡只有4個低於50，表明只有4個國家製造業增長呈收縮態勢。

這「四大金剛」分別是：PMI製造業指數為47.0的法國，49.6的希臘、47.6的澳大利亞和48.8的俄羅斯。

如果與11月比較，環比上升的有13個國家地區，金磚四國裡只有巴西是環比增長，由49.7升至50.5。

就算以中國官方製造業PMI來參考，12月中國也是半年來首次回落。

當然，不能僅憑PMI判斷全球製造業形勢。

去年9月，美銀美林就發佈報告質疑PMI數據的「神話」。

報告認為，要知道這類PMI調查有多原始，這點很重要。

每個月都有那麼幾百名採購經理接受調查，要回答各類行業活動變量的問題，根據這些答案制定指數的結果。

這項調查在一個月還沒結束時就開始進行，有些問題會涉及到受訪採購經理來不及準備好給出答案的領域。

製造業和非製造業PMI指數相對穩定，很容易解讀。美銀美林指出，從另一個角度看，這種簡明的特色反而是這類數據的缺點，並不算長處。

報告認為，調查樣本不能代表整個經濟體，有的調查樣本集中在大企業。而且，這類調查根本沒有試圖根據企業成立和倒閉的現狀做調整。

所以我們就看到了下圖這樣強勁增長的「軟」數據。

按美國國務卿克里北京時間昨晚所說，以美國的估計，俄羅斯目前在烏克蘭部署的兵力還沒有吞併烏克蘭的能力。

克里一方面警告，對克里米亞公投，美國和歐盟在準備嚴厲的應對措施，具體措施取決於俄羅斯的反應，一方面又說，美國估計俄羅斯在克里米亞部署了2萬軍人，低於美國與俄羅斯協商的2.5萬人上限。

克里稱，俄羅斯並未在關鍵性位置部署佔領整個烏克蘭，目前俄羅斯沒有足夠的資源接管烏克蘭。

究竟俄羅斯在烏克蘭邊境部署了多少兵力？基輔一家軍事及政治研究組織Center of Military and Political Research的創始人、前烏克蘭軍官Dmitry Tymchuk用一幅圖展示了俄羅斯在烏克蘭全國邊境的所有兵力部署。

從中可以看到，俄羅斯軍事武裝力量達到8萬人，軍事裝備合計有坦克270輛，裝甲戰鬥車1980輛，多管火箭系統18部，火炮系統380部，軍用飛機140架，武裝直升機90架，軍用船艦25艘。

在烏克蘭北面，俄羅斯可能出動合計8000人的兩支部隊，配備170輛坦克、裝甲戰鬥車520輛、軍用飛機40架、武裝直升機20架。

在烏克蘭東面，俄羅斯可能出動4300人的部隊，其中包括三支特種戰術部隊。

在烏克蘭南面，俄羅斯可能出動7600人的兩支部隊，軍事裝備包括裝甲戰鬥車320輛、火炮系統80部、軍用飛機40架、武裝直升機20架。

另外，俄軍在克里米亞已有1.9萬官兵，軍事裝備有裝甲戰鬥車300輛、火炮系統40部、武裝直升機20架、軍用船艦19艘。

不管俄羅斯有沒有可能真正調動上述部隊，至少俄羅斯總統普京已經因其對烏克蘭及克里米亞局勢的立場獲得「高分」：全俄民調中心All-Russia Public Opinion Research（VTsIOM）調查顯示，普京的支持率現在達到71.6%，自去年2月月中以來，支持率漲了9.7個百分點，而且很可能保持這樣的高位，甚至更高。

俄羅斯國際文傳電訊社（Interfax）採訪的專家Nikolai Mironov認為：

總統的支持率穩步上升是因為兩屆索契奧運會，一屆冬奧會一屆殘奧會。但主要源於總統對烏克蘭和克里米亞的政治立場。