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一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（2） Barrons

http://blog.caing.com/article/9137/

　　内在价值的回归与卖出时机    　　被低估股票的价格何时能回归内在价值？如何才能回归内在价值？在什么情况下要卖出所投资的股票？巴菲特的回答如下：    　　“Some times these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. Over the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.”    　　“有 时候很快就能实现。更多的时候，需要几年。在买入的时候很难知道有哪一个具体的原因让股票价格应该上涨。但是，正是由于这种缺乏魅力或者没有期待，才有可 能创造出当前有利的市场机会。这些股票可以用非常便宜的价格获得。通过支付低价，我们能获得很多价值。这种大量的超额价值在每个交易中创造出一个相当大的 安全边际。这种个股的安全边际加上投资的分散性，创造出了一个最有吸引力的组合，具有安全性和升值潜力。在过去几年，我们买入的时间点一直远好于卖出的时 机。我们买入这些股票时并没有想获得最后一分钱的利润。我们往往满足于在买入价和合理价位中间卖掉。我们认为的合理价位是对私人业主来说公平的价格。”    　　(1961年给合伙人的信)      　　价值投资的安全性    　　价值投资的安全性不是来自于高超的卖点选择，而是来自于买入的低价。    　　By buying assets at a bargain price, we don't need to pull any rabbits out of a hat to get extremely good percentage gains. This is the cornerstone of our investment philosophy: “Never count on making a good sale. Have the purchase price be so attractive that even a mediocre sale gives good results. The better sales will be the frosting on the cake.”    　　通过低价买入资产，我们无需施展魔术才能得到非常好的百分比回报。我们投资哲学的基石是：“绝不指望好的卖出。而是让购买价格如此之诱人，即使一个平庸的卖出也能带来良好的回报。更好的卖出将会是锦上添花。”    　　(1962年给合伙人的信)      　　股市下跌的情况    　　价值投资，安全边际，购买便宜的股票也不能避免下跌。市场涨跌左右短期表现。    　　The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market.    　　我们的股票倾向与市场表现一致。便宜并不意味着不会进一步下跌。在市场突然下跌的时候，这些股票完全可能与道琼斯指数一样，下降同样的百分比。从长期看，我相信这些股票将超过道琼斯指数的表现。在1961年那样猛烈上涨的市场，这部分股票在我们的投资组合中表现是最佳的。当然，在一个下跌的市场，这部分也是最容易受到损失的。    　　(1961年给合伙人的信)      　　对投资人的承诺    　　结果无法保证，目标可以承诺，投入全部身家，与合伙人利益保持高度一致。    　　I can not promise results to partners. What I can and do promise is that:    　　a.Our investments will be chosen on the basis of value, not popularity;    　　b.That we will attempt to bring risk of permanent capital loss (not short-term quotational loss) to an absolute minimum by obtaining a wide margin of safety in each commitment and a diversity ofcommitments;and    　　c.My wife, children and I will have virtually our entire net worth invested in the partnership.      　　我无法对合伙人承诺结果。我能够承诺而且确定承诺的是：    　　a.我们投资的选择是基于价值，而不是流行。    　　b.我们会试图把资本永久损失（而不是短期账面损失）的风险降到绝对最低。而这是通过每个投资的大的安全边际和投资的分散性达到的。    　　c.我的妻子，孩子和我将把我们几乎全部的净值都投资在合伙基金中。    　　(1962年给合伙人的信)      　　对投资业绩的检验    　　市场下跌是对投资是否保守的客观考验。无需患得患失，少输胜过多赢。    　　I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow.    　　我认为通过评估在下跌市场中的业绩，我们可以得到最客观的关于投资方式有多保守的检验。最好是道琼斯指数下跌很多的时候。    　　(1962年给合伙人的信)    　　Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%.    　　我们的任务是积累年复一年超越道琼斯指数的业绩，而不是过度担心某一年的绝对结果是正还是负。我认为道指下跌25%而我们只下跌15%的一年要远好于道指和我们都上涨20%的一年。    　　(1962年给合伙人的信)

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一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（3） Barrons

http://blog.caing.com/article/9259/

　复利的威力    　　在投资中，巴菲特逐渐体会到了复利的威力。实际上，巴菲特最终成为首富就是靠长期高速的复利增长。关于复利的威力这一点，巴菲特在32岁的时候就非常清楚。   　　I have it from unreliable sources that the cost of the voyage Isabella originally underwrote for Columbus was approximately $30,000. This has been considered at least a moderately successful utilization of venture capital. Without attempting to evaluate the psychic income derived from finding a new hemisphere, it must be pointed out that even had squatter's rights prevailed, the whole deal was not exactly another IBM. Figured very roughly, the $30,000 invested at 4% compounded annually would have amounted to something like $2,000,000,000,000 (that's $2 trillion for those of you who are not government statisticians) by 1962. Historical apologists for the Indians of Manhattan may find refuge in similar calculations. Such fanciful geometric progressions illustrate the value of either living a long time, or compounding your money at a decent rate. I have nothing particularly helpful to say on the former point.    　 　我从不太可靠的消息来源得知，当年西班牙女王伊萨贝拉资助哥伦布远航的成本大约是3万美金。这被认为至少是一个相当成功的运用风险资本的例子。不考虑发 现一个新半球的精神上的收获，即使算上强占的土地的权利，这个投资也比不上IBM的例子。简单估算，3万美金投入4%复利增长，到了1962年将会是2万 亿美元。同情曼哈顿岛的印第安人的人们也会找到类似的计算。这种奇异的几何级数增长揭示了两种事物的价值：长寿或者让你的金钱以相当好的速度复利增长。我 对前一个事情没什么可讲的。    　　The following table indicates the compounded value of $100,000 at 5%, 10% and 15% for 10, 20 and 30 years. It is always startling to see how relatively small differences in rates add up to very significant sums over a period of years. That is why, even though we are shooting for more, we feel that a few percentage points advantage over the Dow is a very worthwhile achievement. It can mean a lot of dollars over adecade or two.    　 　下面的表格显示的是10万美元以5%，10%和15%的速度复利增长10，20和30年。让人吃惊的是，相对较小的速度差别，经过多年的积累，逐渐变为 巨大的数字差异。这就是为什么虽然我们的目标是更高的增长，但我们感觉，对于道指的几个点的优势是非常有价值的成就。假以时日，10年或20年，这意味着 很多钱。  　　

 
一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（3）

 　　（1962年给合伙人的信）    　　Since the whole subject of compounding has such a crass ring to it, I will attempt to introduce a little class into this discussion by turning to the art world. Francis I of France paid 4,000 ecus in 1540 for Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. On the off chance that a few of you have not kept track of the fluctuations of the ecu 4,000 converted out to about $20,000.    　　由于复利这个话题牵扯的范围很广，我就试着把这个讨论转向艺术世界，来引入一门小课程。1540年，法国的弗兰西斯一世花了4000克朗把达芬奇的蒙娜丽莎买下。你们可能没关注克朗的波动，这4000克朗相当于今天的2万美金。    　　If Francis had kept his feet on the ground and he (and his trustees) had been able to find a 6% after-tax investment, the estate now would be worth something over $1,000,000,000,000,000.00. That's $1 quadrillionor over 3,000 times the present national debt, all from 6%. I trust this will end all discussion in our household about any purchase of paintings qualifying as an investment.    　　如果弗兰西斯还活着，他（和他的受托人）当时能够找到一个税后6%的投资，这笔财产现在会价值超过1000万亿。这是目前国债的3000倍，都是从这6%而来。我相信这将结束所有家庭中关于购买画作算不算投资的讨论。    　　（1963年给合伙人的信）      　　基金无法战胜市场    　　巴菲特发现即使是领先的大基金也无法战胜市场指数。他认为这源于这些投资机构的机制。   　　The results continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment advice has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue-chip stocks. This in no sense condemns these institutions or the investment advisers and trust departments whose methods, reasoning, and results largely parallel such investment companies. These media perform a substantial service to millions of investors in achieving adequate diversification, providing convenience and peace of mind, avoiding issues of inferior quality,etc. However, their services do not include (and in the great majority of cases, are not represented to include) the compounding of money at a rate greater than that achieved by the general market.    　 　这些结果继续显示，那些获得最高额收入和最受尊敬的投资建议也很难比得上一个无人管理的蓝筹股指数的业绩。这并不是指责这些机构或投资顾问，以及与这些 投资公司有着大体上类似的方法、推理，和结果的信托部门。这些机构给成百万的投资者起到了重要的服务作用，以获得足够的分散投资，提供便利，让人感到踏 实，避免质量低下的问题等。但是，他们的服务不包括（在大部分情况下也不声称包括）以高于市场的速度复利增长金钱。    　　Our partnership's fundamental reason for existence is to compound funds at a better-than-average rate with less exposure to long-term loss of capital than the above investment media. We certainly can not represent that we will achieve this goal. We can and do say that if we don't achieve this goal over any reasonable period excluding an extensive speculative boom, we will cease operation.    　 　我们的合伙基金存在的根本原因就是要以高于平均水平的速度复利增长基金，而且与上面所说的投资公司相比，我们要有更少的长期资本损失的风险。我们当然无 法声称会达到这一目标。我们能说的而且是确实说的是，除了在长时间的投机性牛市中，如果我们在相当长的一段时期内，达不到这一目标，我们将停止运营。    　　（1963年上半年给合伙人的信）    　　The repetition of these tables has caused partners to ask: "Why in the world does this happen to very intelligent managements working with (1) bright, energetic staff people, (2) virtually unlimited resources, (3) the most extensive business contacts, and (4)literally centuries of aggregate investment experience?" (The latter qualification brings to mind the fellow who applied for a job and stated he had twenty years of experience - which was corrected by the former employer to read “one year's experience -twenty times.”)    　 　这些重复出现的表格让一些合伙人不禁问道：“这些聪明的投资经理究竟怎么了？他们有（1）聪明而精力充沛的手下（2）几乎无限的资源（3）最广泛的商业 联系（4）加在一起几个世纪的投资经验。”（这最后一点让我想起一个家伙在求职时声称有20年的经验。后来前任雇主纠正说是“1年的经验，20次”。）    　　This question is of enormous importance, and you would expect it to be the subject of considerable study by investment managers and substantial investors. After all, each percentage point on $30 billion is $300 million per year. Curiously enough, there is practically nothing in the literature of Wall Street attacking this problem, and discussion of it is virtually absent at security analyst society meetings, conventions, seminars, etc. My opinion is that the first job of any investment management organization is to analyze its own techniques and results before pronouncing judgment on the managerial abilities and performance of the major corporate entities of the United States.    　 　这个问题极其重要。你可能会认为投资经理和大投资者们对这个议题有着很多的研究。毕竟300亿美元的百分之一就是一年3亿美元。令人好奇的是，实际上在 华尔街没有任何文章探讨这个问题。在证券分析师会议和讲座等活动中也几乎没有讨论。我的想法是，任何一个投资管理机构的首要任务都是分析自己的技术和结 果，而不是判断整个美国的主要投资机构的管理能力和业绩。    　　In the great majority of cases the lack of performance exceeding or even matching an unmanaged index in no way reflects lack of either intellectual capacity or integrity. I think it is much more the product of: (1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations;(3) an institutional framework whereby average is "safe" and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational;and finally and importantly, (5) inertia.    　 　在大多数情况下，投资机构缺乏超越无人管理的指数的业绩，甚至连与指数一致的业绩都少见。这绝不是由于缺少智慧或者诚信。我认为这主要是以下几个原因的 结果：（1）集体决策-我的可能有些偏颇的看法是：如果所有成员都真正参与决策，出色的投资管理几乎不可能从任何大小的集体中产生。（2）希望与其它备受 尊重的大型投资机构的投资政策保持一致，甚至在某种程度上与其投资组合保持一致。（3）机构的体制让平均成为“安全”。对个人的回报与激励无法补偿独立行 动所带来的全面风险。（4）拘于某些不合理的分散投资做法。最后，也是最重要的是（5）惰性。    　　（1964年给合伙人的信）      　　关于保守的问题    　　那些著名的大型投资公司，号称保守，以传统的方式行事。但巴菲特认为真正的保守来自于事实和逻辑，而不是投资方式。   　　In looking at the table of investment company performance, the question might be asked: “Yes, but aren't those companies run more conservatively than the Partnership?" If you asked that question of the investment company managements, they, in absolute honesty, would say they were more conservative. If you asked the first hundred security analysts you met, I am sure that a very large majority of them also would answer for the investment companies. I would disagree. I have over 90% of my net worth in BPL, and most of my family have percentages in that area, but of course, that only demonstrates the sincerity of my view - not the validity of it.    　 　阅读那些投资公司的业绩表格，有人可能会问：“确实，你的业绩更好。但是那些投资公司难道不比你的合伙基金运营的更保守吗？”如果你对那些投资公司的经 理问这个问题，他们绝对会诚实的回答他们更保守。如果你问你所碰到的前100个分析师，我确信他们当中的很大一部分也都会认为那些投资公司更保守。但我不 同意。我把我自己超过90%的净值放在巴菲特合伙基金中。我大部分的家庭成员也差不多把90%的净值投入了合伙基金。当然，这只表明了我看法的真诚度，而 不是证明我的看法的正确性。    　　It is unquestionably true that the investment companies have their money more conventionally invested than we do. To many people conventionality is indistinguishable from conservatism. In my view, this represents erroneous thinking. Neither a conventional nor an unconventional approach, per se, is conservative.    　　的确，那些投资公司比我们投资的方式更加传统。对许多人来说传统与保守没有区别。但在我看来，这是错误的思维。无论是传统的还是非传统的方式，在本质上都不能说是保守的。    　　Truly conservative actions arise from intelligent hypotheses, correct facts and sound reasoning. These qualities may lead to conventional acts,but there have been many times when they have led to unorthodoxy. In some corner of the world they are probably still holding regular meetings of the Flat Earth Society.    　　真正保守的行为来自于聪明的假设，正确的事实和合理的推理。这些特点有可能导致传统的投资行为，但在很多时候也会指向非正统的方式。在世界的某个角落有些人可能仍然坚持曾经的“正统”理念，认为地球是平的，并定期开会。    　　We derive no comfort because important people, vocal people, or great numbers of people agree with us. Nor do we derive comfort if they don't. A public opinion poll is no substitute for thought. When we really sit back with a smile on our face is when we run into a situation we can understand, where the facts are ascertainable and clear, and the course of action obvious. In that case - whether conventional or unconventional – whether others agree or disagree - we feel - we are progressing in a conservative manner.    　 　仅仅因为重要人物，评论家，或者非常多的人赞同我们，这并不能让我们感到安心。反之，如果他们都不同意我们的做法，也并不能让我们感到安心。民意测验无 法替代思考。只有当我们能理解我们的形势，事实清晰确定，行动方案显而易见的时候，我们才能真正放松，面带笑容。这时候，无论传统与否，无论他人同意与 否，我们都认为自己是以一种保守的方式取得进展。    　　（1964年给合伙人的信）      　　耐心与保密    　　投资需要耐心与保密。   　　(1)Our business is one requiring patience. It has little in common with a portfolio of high-flying glamour stocks and during periods of popularity for the latter, we may appear quite stodgy.    　　It is to our advantage to have securities do nothing price wise for months, or perhaps years, while we are buying them. This points up the need to measure our results over an adequate period of time. We suggest three years as a minimum.    　　我们的生意必须耐心。这与满是高高在上的热门股的投资组合不同。在这些热门股票流行的时期，我们会显得非常古板枯燥。    　　在我们购买股票的时候，这些股票的价格几个月，甚至几年不变，这对我们来说是个优势。这清楚的表明在衡量我们结果的时候，需要足够长的时间。我们建议三年是最短的时间。    　　(2)We cannot talk about our current investment operations. Such an open-mouth policy could never improveour results and in some situations could seriously hurt us. For this reason, should anyone, including partners, ask us whether we are interested in any security, we must plead the “5th Amendment.”    　　我们不能谈论我们目前的投资运营。这种公开张扬的政策永远也无法提高我们的结果，在某些时候还可能严重损害我们自己。由于这个原因，如果任何人，包括合伙人，问我们是否对某个股票感兴趣，我们必须援引“宪法第五修正案”，保持沉默。    　　（1963年给合伙人的信附录）  　　


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新能源汽车的两个巨人：一个叫鲁冠球，一个叫王传福

http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2010-9-27/5NMDAwMDE5OTE5NQ.html

当黑色尾气刺穿了头顶天空，当轰鸣声音麻痹了你的耳朵，反省从另一种技术的角度姗姗来迟。

新能源汽车的概念让人耳目一新，好像这个机器也能变得亲近起来。

当下的新能源汽车技术主要分为三大类：混合动力、电动车以及燃料电池汽车。混合动力和电动车是目前各大厂家攻关的重点，而燃料电池汽车掣肘于氢动力燃料电池，虽然被认为是新能源汽车的终极目标，却难以实现。

这依然是一块鲜美的蛋糕。

2008年科技部部长万钢曾在一个新能源汽车论坛上编织过这样一个市场美梦，到2012年，国内汽车市场上10%的新车为新能源汽车，即100万辆。

今年年初，国务院公布汽车产业调整振兴规划，将这个数字确定为50万辆，即5%的新车。

市场的曙光终于照进，你才蓦然发现那些先知先觉的企业家早已在十年前就打下了产业布局。鲁冠球正是这样低调的先行者。

商海里半生戎马，66岁的他仿佛不曾老去。皱纹出现在脸上，他依然能够爽朗而笑，向你讲述他的雄心未竟。

四十年，鲁冠球称自己为农民企业家，他是一个时代的财富标本。万向系已然是一个庞大的帝国，在汽车配件行业坐拥龙头地位，又在资本市场暗筑城邦。

筚路蓝缕，以启山林的年代早已过去。时光迟迟，曾经连展览会大门都进不去的鲁冠球始终不肯淡漠造车的梦想，而这个梦正在电动车上一瓣瓣绽开。

吴晓波与鲁冠球甚为相熟，他曾经概括那个年代的鲁冠球、柳传志等都是乌龟型企业家，他们都有一张坚硬的外壳，屡经敲打，无数的企业在敲打中碎裂了，而有一些，每一年身上都张一层茧，直到再也踩不烂。

电动车布局

鲁冠球操劳了近大半辈子的事业，一直是在给汽车提供零部件设备，他在公共场合从来都未曾掩饰过他对造整车的强烈渴望。这种渴望就像他始终未能改掉的萧山口音，如影随形。

当外界开始风传万向在造电动车的时候，鲁冠球笑容满面地告诉记者，今年我们的电动车已经可以下线了。那一年是2004年，他在电动车埋首耕耘了快五年。

1999年，东南亚各国还在金融危机的漩涡里艰难逃生，俄罗斯爆发金融危机，而中国，经济却如雨后春笋般生机勃勃。彼时，比亚迪成立不过四年，距离2003年收购西安秦川汽车有限责任公司（现比亚迪汽车有限公司），就此杀入汽车制造与销售领域还要4年。

这一年，鲁冠球不动声色地成立了万向电动汽车项目组。

2002年，鲁伟鼎31岁。他在21岁的时候进入父亲的万向集团，任总经理助理。他进入公司十年后，万向动力电池有限公司正式注册成立，鲁伟鼎出任董事长。

时间再回到2004年，鲁冠球春风满面。他习惯性地竖起大拇指，告诉前来采访的记者，实力，最重要的就是实力。他语气飞扬，眼睛里光彩灼人。如此底气十足自有其事实依据。西湖边，万向研制出的电动客车成功试运行。而这一年，比亚迪还是刚刚进入汽车领域的新人。

次年，5辆万向研制的纯电动公交车在西湖边的Y9线正式投入载客运营。

2008年，万向的纯电动电力服务车、电力工程车、纯电动微型车、公务车通过国家发改委车辆公告试验，获准上牌照。此时，通过与国家电网合作，万向建立了26座充电站，向15个省市投入了63辆纯电力专用车。

四十年商海屹立不倒，鲁冠球的精明与谨慎早已在商业谋略中表露无遗。

多年来在数十起万向的并购中，鲁冠球更关注的是成本，宁愿从二股东做起，他也不会为了企业管理权而多付一分钱。万向的复合增长率常年维持在25.89%，稳步前行。

电动车对鲁冠球来说却不一样。你会看见，四十年过去，风雨沧桑以后，鲁冠球作为一代商人豪情未灭。那是一种对未知的积极进取，就像他当年领着6个农民创办宁围公社农机修配厂一样，勇敢而激情。

电动车投入十余年下来，累计投资接近5亿，毫无盈利。鲁冠球对总经理陈军说：“赚钱不是你要考虑的事情。”

除此之外，鲁冠球还计划将零部件产品的生产导向新能源产业。对于电动车需要的零部件才增加投资，加强研发，扩大规模。

锂电池最突出

2009年，万向的财报数字并不好看。3月开完两会，鲁冠球从北京回到位于杭州萧山的公司。4月，万向举办了一场声势浩大的庆典，欢腾热闹的气氛撕开了笼罩在公司上下的灰色迷雾。

这次庆典是给万向的锂电池生产基地举办奠基仪式。基地的投资超过13亿，到2010年就能达到年产1000辆纯电动商用车、10亿瓦时锂离子动力电池的产业规模。

同年年底，万向的生产基地正式投产。此后，接踵而至的是上海世博会的订单。

世博会园区内计划运行120辆电动汽车，其中一半的锂电池来自北京理工大学的锰酸锂动力电池，另外一半则来自于万向的磷酸铁锂动力电池。

这个基地成为鲁冠球的得意之作。他非常乐于把记者带去基地参观，展示他的最新成果。

1999年的电动车项目组现在已经变成了万向电动车有限公司，下设动力总成事业部、整车项目部、动力电池事业部三个单位。较之电动车，锂电池先一步成为刺激资本市场的利器。

今年二季度开始，锂电池板块成为市场焦点，相关个股都一再飙升。4月7日，万向钱潮增发2亿股，发行价为9.29元，两个星期后，股价突破12元，之后升高稳定在15元区间。在万向的半年报上可以看到，前十大流通股中基金占了7个，“华夏系”尤其抢眼，占据5个席位。

锂电池这个重点是鲁伟鼎一早确立下来的。那还是2001年，电动车有限公司尚未注册成立。

鲁伟鼎的经历与他父亲截然不同。

鲁 伟鼎出生的时候，鲁冠球的农机厂正小有起色。21岁时，鲁冠球拿出全部家底1150元钱开办了集体性质的农机厂。21岁时，鲁伟鼎走进了父亲的万向集团。 两年后他接任集团总裁，正当23岁。在同辈的富二代中，他被视为最“长袖善舞”的一个。也就是从这个时候开始，万向走上了多元化经营的道路。

鲁伟鼎不再像鲁冠球一样专注于汽车零配件一个市场。他显然对金融有着浓厚的兴趣。通过万向财务和联通资本，他控股了民生保险、万向期货、万向租赁，并参股浙商银行、浙商基金和浙江工商信托。

60多岁的鲁冠球出现在公共场合谈电动汽车，热情澎湃。他曾许下豪言壮语，现在对电动车只投资了几个亿，未来要投100亿下去，资金就是实力。他也曾动情诉说：“我搞了十年的电动车，但从来没有赚钱。但我一定继续投入，一辈子投入。”

39岁的鲁伟鼎低调，他关注电动车的发展，更热衷于在资本市场暗筑城邦。

我们看到，万向电动车的整车研制被王传福后来者居上。

万向与比亚迪

深圳的大街上，车如流水马如龙。的士往来穿梭，奔流不息。间或你能看见一辆红色的士驶过，体积比普通车大。它们是比亚迪e6。

今年5月，比亚迪联合深圳鹏程出租车公司，投放30辆e6进入深圳作为出租车。此车号称在充满电的情况下能跑300公里，15分钟就能充满80%的电。更让人激动的是，今年下半年e6预计登陆美国市场，直接面对普通消费者，而价格估计为4万美元。

那边厢，万向电动车有限公司副总经理李向雷无奈的表示即使是现在，公司内部都还没有市场部，目前只是示范推广的概念。

王传福是一个技术狂人，他迫不及待地冲向世界，去打破由来已久的技术壁垒。在投资电池生产线时，钱不够。他就将生产线分解成一道道可以由人工完成的工序，用人力来弥补资金的缺口。

2003年，他从如日中天的电池行业转到汽车业，并于同年成立了电动汽车研究部。2006年比亚迪正式成立电动汽车研究所，计划未来三年投资超过10亿来建设电动车生产研发基地。

2008年巴菲特以战略投资者的身份入股比亚迪，2009年，王传福一跃成为中国大陆首富。

相较于比亚迪积极扩张的市场攻坚，万向更像一个两耳不闻窗外事的潜心修炼者。他们要面对的不是彼此，而是市场，是技术，是更广更深的合纵联合者。

e6 不是比亚迪推出的唯一一款电动车，F3DM也于今年上市。市场却并没有因为这些产品的到来而兴奋。网易汽车今年4月做过一份36000个样本的抽样调 查，77%的消费者近两年内都不选择购买新能源汽车。万向的电动车至今行驶在西湖边的Y9线上，并有更多车型进入试用，却始终尚无一辆真正面向过市场。

技术短板也在逐渐显现。关于e6续航里程、充电时间的质疑纷至沓来。这是初级市场必经的技术迷惑。

就在上个月，16家央企宣布成立电动车产业联盟。除了一汽、东风、长安这三家整车企业宣布加入，多家油企、电企等上下游企业也囊括其中。


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一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（4） Barrons

http://blog.caing.com/article/9372/

　　投资的本质  

 　　投资的本质是什么？是与自身人性的博弈。只有时时刻刻记住投资的终极目标“最快的长期复利增长”，时时刻刻保持从零开始的态度，不断学习，不断修正自己，才有可能达到目标。    　　Buying activities during the first half were quite satisfactory. This is of particular satisfaction to me since I consider the buying end to be about 90% of this business.    　　在上半年我们的买入活动相当令人满意。这对我来说尤其感到满足，因为我认为投资这门生意大约90%在于买入。    　　（1964年上半年给合伙人的信）    　　More investment sins are probably committed by otherwise quite intelligent people because of "taxconsiderations" than from any other cause. One of my friends - a noted West Coast philosopher maintains that a majority of life's errors are caused by forgetting what one is really trying to do.

  　　更多的由于“税务考虑”，很多其实非常聪明的人犯了太多的投资罪过。我的一个朋友—一个著名的西海岸哲学家认为人一生所犯的大部分错都是由于忘记了自己真正想要做什么。  　　　　
（1964年给合伙人的信）　　  　　
It is obvious that the performance of a stock last year or last month is no reason, per se, to either own it or to not own it now. It is obvious that an inability to "get even" in a security that has declined is of no importance. It is obvious that the inner warm glow that results from having held a winner last year is of no importance in making a decision as to whether it belongs in an optimum portfolio this year.  　　
显然，一个股票去年或者上个月的业绩，本质上并不是现在拥有或者不拥有这只股票的原因。同样，不能在一只已经下跌的股票上“翻本”也并不重要。当然，拥有一支去年的赢家股票会让自己的内心感到喜悦，但这在决定这只股票是否属于今年的最优组合时毫不重要。  　　
（1964年给合伙人的信）  　　
I don’t mention this because I am proud of such performance – on the contrary, I would prefer it if we had achieved our gain in the hypothesized manner. Rather, I mention it for two reasons: (1) you are always entitled to know when I am wrong as well as right; and,(2) it demonstrates that although we deal with probabilities and expectations, the actual results can deviate substantially from such expectations, particularly on a short-term basis.  　　
（虽然业绩很好，但实现的方式与我们的预期不一致。）我举这个例子并不是我们对此感到自豪。正好相反，我更希望我们以事先假设的方式获得收益。我提这个是由于两个原因：（1）你有权知道我何时错了，何时对了。（2）这表明虽然我们与概率和预期打交道，但实际的结果有可能大范围的偏离这些预期，在短期内这更是如此。  　　
（1964年上半年给合伙人的信）  　　
After last year the question naturally arises, "What do we do for an encore?” A disadvantage of this business is that it does not possess momentum to any significant degree. If General Motors accounts for 54% of domestic new car registrations in 1965, it is a pretty safe bet that they are going to come fairly close to that figure in 1966 due to owner loyalties, dealer capabilities, productive capacity, consumer image, etc. Not so for BPL. We start from scratch each year with everything valued at market when the gun goes off. Partners in 1966, new or old, benefit to only a very limited extent from the efforts of 1964 and 1965. The success of past methods and ideas does not transfer forward to future ones.  　　 
去年的好业绩之后，一个很自然的问题就是：“我们怎么才能重复这一好的业绩？”投资这门生意的坏处就在于无法保持一定的势头。如果通用汽车在1965年占有54%的国内汽车市场，那么很有可能他们在1966年的数字也会非常接近。因为他们有消费者的忠诚，经销商的能力，生产能力，在消费者心中的形象等因素。但巴菲特合伙基金不是这样的。每年我们都是从零开始，由市场估值。在1966年的合伙人，无论新旧，都只能从我们1964年和1965年的努力中获得非常有限的好处。过去的成功方法与想法无法转移到未来。  　　
（1965年给合伙人的信）
 　　
 

复利的悲哀

 

  　　成也萧何，败也萧何。巴菲特享受到了复利的好处，也很快感受到了复利的悲哀。当基金越来越大，复利增长也就越来越难。到了1965年，巴菲特向新投资者关闭了合伙基金。　　  　　

Nevertheless,as circumstances presently appear, I feel substantially greater size is more likely to harm future results than to help them. This might not be true for my own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your results.　  　　
但是，基于目前的情况，我认为基金越大，则越有可能伤害而不是帮助我们未来的业绩。这对我自己的收入可能不是如此（因为我的管理费和分成会随之增加），但对你的业绩确实如此。　　  　　
Therefore, unless it appears that circumstances have changed (under some conditions added capital would improve results) or unless new partners can bring some asset to the Partnership other than simply capital, I intend to admit no additional partners to BPL.

 　　所以，除非这种情况得到改变（即在某种情况下增加的资本会改善业绩），或者合伙人不仅能给合伙基金带来资金，我有意停止接收新的合伙人进入巴菲特合伙基金。  　　

（1965年给合伙人的信）  　　

　　

 

集中投资

  　　这是巴菲特投资理念中极其重要的一部分。与传统的“分散投资”相反，巴菲特崇尚集中投资。在35岁的时候，他就清晰的认识到，要想超越指数，就必须集中投资。这种集中投资不仅与预期的回报高低有关，更与潜在的损失相关。最新的《数学研究

》也表明，巴菲特的这种集中持股方式符合最优的长期复利增长，具有最高的几何平均增长速度。　  　　

This year in the material which went out in November, I specifically called your attention to a new Ground Rule reading, "7. We diversify substantially less than most investment operations. We might invest up to 40% of our net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could drastically change the underlying value of the investment."　　  　　
今年11月发出的材料里，我特意让你注意一条新的基本原则。“7.我们比大部分投资机构都要较少的进行分散投资。如果我们的事实与逻辑推理有极高的可能性是正确的，而且投资的内在价值剧烈变化的可能性极低，我们最多可能把净值的40%投入单支股票。”　　  　　
We are obviously following a policy regarding diversification which differs markedly from that of practically all public investment operations. Frankly, there is nothing I would like better than to have 50 different investment opportunities, all of which have a mathematical expectation (this term reflects the range of all possible relative performances, including negative ones, adjusted for the probability of each - no yawning, please) of achieving performance surpassing the Dow by, say, fifteen percentage points per annum. If the fifty individual expectations were not intercorrelated(what happens to one is associated with what happens to the other) I could put 2% of our capital into each one and sit back with a very high degree of certainty that our overall results would be very close to such a fifteen percentage point advantage.　　　　    　　
很明显，我们的分散投资政策与绝大多数公众投资机构有着显著的不同。坦率的讲，我最愿意拥有50个不同的投资机会，每一个都有每年超过道指15%的数学期望。（这里的数学期望是指所有可能的相对业绩的范围，包括负值，经过概率调整后的结果。）如果这50个期望不是相互关联的（一个的结果与其它结果的联系），我能把2%的资本平均分配给每个机会，然后就能高枕无忧而且非常确信我们的整体业绩将非常接近对道指15%的优势。　  　　
It doesn't work that way.  　　
根本不是那么回事。　　　　    　　
We have to work extremely hard to find just a very few attractive investment situations. Such a situation by definition is one where my expectation (defined as above) of performance is at least ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. Among the few we do find, the expectations vary substantially. The question always is,“How much do I put in number one (ranked by expectation of relative performance) and how much do I put in number eight?" This depends to a great degree on the wideness of the spread between the mathematical expectation of number one versus number eight. It also depends upon the probability that number one could turn in a really poor relative performance. Two securities could have equal mathematical expectations, but one might have .05 chance of performing fifteen percentage points or more worse than the Dow, and the second might have only .01 chance of such performance. The wider range of expectation in the first case reduces the desirability of heavy concentration in it.　　　　    　　
我们必须极其努力才能找到仅有的几个有吸引力的投资机会。这种机会是指我的预期（如上面的定义）是业绩至少每年超过道指10个 百分点。在找到的仅有的几个机会中，我们的预期非常不同。问题总是在于“我在第一个投多少（这里的第一是指按预期的相对业绩排），在第八个投多少？”这取 决于第一和第八的数学期望的差异度有多大。这也取决于第一个会取得非常差的相对业绩的概率。两只股票可能有相同的数学期望，但是一个有0.05的概率低于道指15%或更差的业绩，而第二个则只有0.01的概率会有这样差的业绩。由于第一个例子中数学期望的范围差异度很大，这就减少了重仓集中在这个股票的意愿。　　　　    　　
The above may make the whole operation sound very precise. It isn't. Nevertheless, our business is that of ascertaining facts and then applying experience and reason to such facts to reach expectations. Imprecise and emotionally influenced as our attempts may be, that is what the business is all about. The results of many years of decision-making in securities will demonstrate how well you are doing on making such calculations – whether you consciously realize you are making the calculations or not. I believe the investor operates at a distinct advantage when he is aware of what path his thought process is following.　　  　　
以上的论述让整个过程显得非常精确。其实不是的。但是，我们的投资生意就是搞清事实，然后运用经验和逻辑推理，从而得出预期。我们的努力可能不精确，并受到情感的影响，但这就是投资。多年股票投资决策的结果将证明我们在做那些计算时有多精确— 无论你是否意识到，你都在进行计算估计。我相信当投资者意识到他自己所遵从的思路时，他在投资方面就有了明确的优势。　　　　    　　
There is one thing of which I can assure you. If good performance of the fund is even a minor objective, any portfolio encompassing one hundred stocks (whether the manager is handling one thousand dollars or one billion dollars) is not being operated logically. The addition of the one hundredth stock simply can't reduce the potential variance in portfolio performance sufficiently to compensate for the negative effect its inclusion has on the overall portfolio expectation.　　　　    　　
我能向你保证一件事。即使基金的业绩表现是一个次要目标，一个有着100支股票的投资组合是不合理的（无论基金经理是管理1千美金或者10亿美金）。增加第100支股票根本无法把投资组合业绩的潜在波动足够降低，反而无法弥补加入这支股票对整个投资组合的预期回报所带来的负面效应。  　　
Anyone owning such numbers of securities after presumably studying their investment merit (and I don't care how prestigious their labels) is following what I call the Noah School of Investing - two of everything. Such investors should be piloting arks. While Noah may have been acting in accord with certain time-tested biological principles, the investors have left the track regarding mathematical principles. (I only made it through plane geometry, but with one exception, I have carefully screened out the mathematicians from our Partnership.)　　　　    　　
任何拥有这么多股票的人，估计是学了某种投资价值观（我才不管这些人有多著名），我 称之为诺亚学派的投资哲学，就是任何东西都来一对儿。这种投资者应该去开诺亚方舟。虽然诺亚每种生物都选一对儿的方式是根据了经过时间检验的某种生物规 律，但投资者这么做却是偏离了数学的基本原理。（我只学过平面几何，但是我已经仔细筛选过我们的合伙基金，把数学家排除在外了。）　　　　    　　
Of course, the fact that someone else is behaving illogically in owning one hundred securities doesn't prove our case. While they may be wrong in overdiversifying, we have to affirmatively reason through a proper diversification policy in terms of our objectives.　　　　    　　
当然，别人不合逻辑的拥有100支股票，这并不能证明我们是对的。他们可能过度分散是错的，而我们则必须确实推理出基于我们自己目标的合适的分散投资策略。　　　　    　　
The optimum portfolio depends on the various expectations of choices available and the degree of variance in performance which is tolerable. The greater the number of selections, the less will be the average year-to-year variation in actual versus expected results. Also, the lower will be the expected results, assuming different choices have different expectations of performance.　  　　
最优的投资组合取决于现有的不同投资选择的数学期望，以及我们所能容忍的业绩变化的程度。选取的股票越多，平均每年的业绩与预期的结果差异越小。但是，假定不同的投资选择有不同的预期业绩，随着选取股票数量的增加，则预期的业绩也将降低。　　　　    　　
I am willing to give up quite a bit in terms of leveling of year-to-year results (remember when I talk of “results,” I am talking of performance relative to the Dow) in order to achieve better overall long-term performance. Simply stated, this means I am willing to concentrate quite heavily in what I believe to be the best investment opportunities recognizing very well that this may cause an occasional very sour year - one somewhat more sour, probably, than if I had diversified more. While this means our results will bounce around more, I think it also means that our long-term margin of superiority should be greater.　　　　    　　
 

为了取得总体更好的长期业绩，我愿意 放弃相当一部分的年度结果（记住当我说“结果”时，我指的是相对于道指的业绩）。简而言之，这意味着我愿意相当集中的重仓持有我坚信是最好的投资机会。与 此同时，我清楚的意识到，与更加分散的投资相比，我这种方式有可能造成偶尔一个业绩非常糟糕的一年。虽然这意味着我们的业绩将上下波动，但我坚信这也意味 着我们长期的优势将更大。　　　　    　　

You have already seen some examples of this. Our margin versus the Dow has ranged from 2.4 percentage points in 1958 to 33.0 points in 1965.If you check this against the deviations of the funds listed on page three, you will find our variations have a much wider amplitude. I could have operated in such a manner as to reduce our amplitude, but I would also have reduced our overall performance somewhat although it still would have substantially exceeded that of the investment companies. Looking back, and continuing to think this problem through, I feel that if anything, I should have concentrated slightly more than I have in the past. Hence, the new Ground Rule and this long-winded explanation.　  　　
你已经看到了一些例子。我们对道指的优势从1958年的2.4个百分点到1965年的33个 百分点大范围波动。你如果把这个与第三页的投资基金与道指的差异相比，你就会发现我们业绩变化的范围更广。我本来可以按那些基金的方式运营，以减少业绩变 化的范围，但是那样会降低我们的整体业绩，虽然我们也能大范围的超过那些投资基金公司。回顾过去，我对这个问题经过持续深入思考后认为，如果要改变什么的 话，我会比过去的方式稍稍更加集中持股。所以，我就制定了这个新的基本准则，并且花了这么大的篇幅进行解释。　　　　    　　
Again let me state that this is somewhat unconventional reasoning (this doesn't make it right or wrong - it does mean you have to do your own thinking on it), and you may well have a different opinion - if you do, the Partnership is not the place for you. We are obviously only going to go to 40% in very rare situations – this rarity, of course, is what makes it necessary that we concentrate so heavily, when we see such an opportunity. We probably have had only five or six situations in the nine-year history of the Partnership where we have exceeded 25%. Any such situations are going to have to promise very significantly superior performance relative to the Dow compared to other opportunities available at the time. They are also going to have to possess such superior qualitative and/or quantitative factors that the chance of serious permanent loss is minimal (anything can happen on a short-term quotational basis which partially explains the greater risk of widened year-to-year variation in results). In selecting the limit to which I will go in anyone investment, I attempt to reduce to a tiny figure the probability that the single investment (or group, if there is intercorrelation) can produce a result for our total portfolio that would be more than ten percentage points poorer than the Dow.　　　　    　　
让我再次声明，这是有些反传统的推理思考（这并不决定其对错，但这意味着你必须对此做自己的的思考）。你完全可能有不同的看法。如果你有不同的看法，那么这个合伙基金不适合你。很明显，我们只会在非常罕见的情况下把净值的40%投入单支股票。当然，正是这种罕见的机会才让我们必须如此集中重仓。在合伙基金的9年历史中，我们可能只有5到6次超过25%集中持股的情形。任何这些情况，与当时其他的机会相比，都具有更大幅度超越道指的希望。不仅如此，它们还具有如此优异的定性和/或 定量因素，以至于严重的本金永久损失的机率是最小的。（在短期内，在账面价值上，任何事情都有可能发生。这也是为什么我们的风险更高，年度业绩波动扩大的 部分原因。）在选择任何单一投资的限度时，我意图把单一投资（或者一组投资，如果有内部的相关性）使我们整个投资组合的业绩低于道指10个百分点的概率减到极小。　　　　    　　
（1965年给合伙人的信）　　　　    　　
Interestingly enough, the literature of investment management is virtually devoid of material relative to deductive calculation of optimal diversification.　　　　    　　
有趣的是，有关投资管理的文献几乎没有推理计算最优分散投资的材料。  　　
All texts counsel "adequate" diversification, but the ones who quantify "adequate" virtually never explain how they arrive at their conclusion. Hence, for our summation on overdiversification, we turn to that eminent academician Billy Rose, who says, "You've got a harem of seventy girls; you don't get to know any of them very well.”　　　　    　　
所有的教科书都建议“足够”的分散投资。但是量化“足够”的人从来没有解释他们如何得到其结论。所以，为了总结我们关于过度分散投资的论述，我引用知名学者Billy Rose的话“如果你的后宫有70个女孩，那么你对哪一个也不会有深入的了解。”　　　　    　　
（1965年给合伙人的信）


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比尔·鲁安：一个真正的开拓者-- 一只花蛤

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_624077750100lqjb.html

最早知道比尔·鲁安(Bill Ruane) 这个名字是在沃伦·巴菲特在1984年哥伦比亚大学商学院的那次著名演讲里。当时，哥伦比亚商学院为了庆祝本杰明·格雷厄姆与戴维·多德合著的《证券分 析》一书发行50周年召开了一个大型研讨会。在这个研讨会上，巴菲特为了说明价值投资为什么能够持续战胜市场，列举了9份资金经理人的投资业绩线图，其中 就有比尔·鲁安。

    青年时代的鲁安原先毕业于哈佛大学商学院，因为对格雷厄姆和戴维·多德的教学很感兴趣，于是选修了格雷厄姆的证券分析课程。1952年鲁安首次遇见巴菲特。当时俩人都在上格雷厄姆的课。从此两人一直保持着联系，巴菲特非常关注着鲁安的投资业绩，心里充满敬慕之情。

    1969年，在合伙投资公司成立12年之后，因为股市持续高涨，巴菲特决定关闭了这家公司。而原来一些投资于他的合伙人希望能与另一位券商继续合作，于是 巴菲特邀请他的好友、同学鲁安来管理他们的资金。“我问鲁安是否愿意接手我们的投资伙伴”，鲁安同意了，“于是他成立了红杉基金。”他俩都知道当时成立基 金的时机不对，但鲁安还是硬着头皮上。股市在1969年正分裂成两层市场。绝大多数投资者都朝着“漂亮50”公司“成长”股云集，价值股被远远地甩在了后 面，成为时代的弃儿。巴菲特说，尽管那时价值投资者的相对业绩在开始时很难看出来，但是他还是很高兴地看到他的合伙人不仅跟定了他鲁安，而且还追加了投 资，这让巴菲特多少有些惊讶。当然，他们最终均获得快乐的投资回报。

    不过，鲁安刚开始时确实很艰难。由于成立基金的时机不对，鲁安说，“曾经有过几年，我们成了当之无愧的亏本大王。在70年代中期创办红杉基金本来就是缺乏远见之举，并连续四年遭受低于标准普尔业绩的类似中国的 水患之灾。”到1974年，红杉基金已比市场落后了令人咋舌的36个百分点。“我们躲在桌下，不敢听电话，心里盘算着风暴是否已平息。”风暴的确已平息 了。“成长”股泡沫破灭后，价值股却大放光芒。到了1976年底，红杉基金在第五个半年期的业绩评估中已超出市场50个百分点。到了1978年，红杉基金 已获利220％，而不是标准普尔500指数的60％。
    有人认为红杉基金是一个真正的开拓者，因为这是第一家以集中投资为指导原则进行投资的基金。从红杉基金持股的公布纪录看，它清楚地表明鲁安和他的合伙人里 克·卡尼夫(Rick Cuniff) 管理着一家高度集中、低度周转率的证券投资公司。红杉基金平均拥有6-10家公司的证券，这些证券占了总体投资的90％以上。即使如此，证券所涉及的经济 领域在过去是，今后还将是广泛而多元化的。鲁安曾多次指出，尽管红杉基金是一家集中证券投资公司，但它拥有各种各样的企业，包括商业银行、制药、汽车和财 产损失保险。
    鲁安的投资观点从很多方面讲都在共同基金管理者中独树一帜。一般情况下多数投资管理都是以某种事先想好的投资组合概念作为出发点，然后用各种不同的股票去 填充投资组合。而在鲁安-卡尼夫公司，他们从选择最佳的好股这一观念出发，然后让投资组合围绕着这些选择进行。选择尽可能的好股当然需要做大量高水平的研 究，在这点上鲁安-卡尼夫公司又一次有别于本行业的其他公司。这家公司已经建立起资金管理行业最聪明的作坊之一的美誉。它避而不用华尔街为券商准备的研究 报告，而是依赖本公司自己对公司进行的广泛调查。鲁安认为他不是为公司的头衔而做调查分析，如果是这样，那么他的名片上就会写着“比尔·鲁安——研究分析 家”。这个观点在华尔街也是独特的。他解释说：“在华尔街典型的做法是，人们以‘分析员’的身份开始其事业生涯，但他们不断激励自己，以便能被提拔到更有名望的‘投资券商’的地位。这个地位被认为更独特也更有用。相反，我们一直认为，如果你是一位长期的投资者，分析员的地位是至关重要的，有了正确的分析，资金管理工作就水到渠成了。”

    鲁安独特的方略究竟为公司的投资者带来多少好处呢？有人曾经检视红杉基金1971-1997年的投资业绩。在此期间，红杉基金与标准普尔500的 14.5％的回报相比，挣得了平均年回报19.6％的业绩。像其他集中投资一样，红杉基金取得了高于平均回报的成绩，但却有较大的波动。在此期间，市场的 标准偏差是16.4％，而红杉基金为20.6％。有些人将此称之为高风险，但以鲁安-卡尼夫公司选股的细腻和努力，这个传统的定义在此并不适用。

    巴菲特对于包括自己在内的9名资金经理人是这样描述的：“我们全都是格雷厄姆—多德理论的追随者，如果要玩投掷硬币的游戏，我们在过去20年的时间里都能 让硬币的人头一面朝上，这一点我们很确信”。巴菲特这样一番有理有据的陈词让现场的所有人相信，他们能够取得今天的成就，完全是靠自身的努力，而不是凭借 所谓的运气，这其中自然包括了比尔·鲁安。

    从1969年至今40多年来，鲁安一直是鲁安-库尼夫投资管理公司的总裁，经营着庞大的红杉基金，同时他还担任《华盛顿邮报》公司的董事，在巴菲特收购政 府雇员保险公司其余的下属公司之前，也曾担任这家公司的董事。因此鲁安开玩笑说，他自己和巴菲特之间惟一的区别在于成亿美元的财富和智商上的100点。


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一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（5） Barrons

http://blog.caing.com/article/9653/

市场分析与投资
 
巴菲特的投资原则非常清晰，对公司做分析判断，不对市场进行预测。
 
Ground Rule No.6 (from our November packet) says: “I am not in the business of predicting general stock market or business fluctuations.If you think I can do this, or think it is essential to an investment program, you should not be in the partnership.”  
 
第六条基本原则（来自于11月份的材料）提到：“我不从事预测整个股票市场或者商业波动的事业。如果你认为我可以做预测，或者认为这对投资是必不可少的，那你不应该在这个合伙基金。”
 
Of course, this rule can be attacked as fuzzy, complex, ambiguous, vague, etc. Nevertheless, I think the point is well understood by the great majority of our partners. We don't buy and sell stocks based upon what other people think the stock market is going to do (I never have an opinion) but rather upon what we think the company is going to do. The course of the stock market will determine, to a great degree, when we will be right, but the accuracy of our analysis of the company will largely determine whether we will be right. In other words, we tend to concentrate on what should happen, not when it should happen.
 当 然这条原则会被人批评是模糊、复杂、含混、不清楚。但是，我认为大多数合伙人都非常理解这一原则。我们不根据其他人所认为的股票市场将如何表现（我从来对 此没有意见）而买入和卖出。我们根据我们认为公司将如何表现而买入和卖出。股票市场的进程将很大程度上决定我们何时会正确。而我们对公司分析的精确程度将 主要决定我们是否正确。换句话说，我们倾向于集中精力分析什么能发生，而不是何时能发生。    （1966年上半年给合伙人的信）      I resurrect this "market-guessing" section only because after the Dow declined from 995 at the peak in February to about 865 in May, I received a few calls from partners suggesting that they thought stocks were going a lot lower. This always raises two questions in my mind: (1) if they knew in February that the Dow was going to 865 in May, why didn't they let me in on it then; and, (2)if they didn't know what was going to happen during the ensuing three months back in February, how do they know in May? There is also a voice or two after any hundred point or so decline suggesting we sell and wait until the future is clearer. Let me again suggest two points: (1) the future has never been clear to me (give us a call when the next few months are obvious to you – or, for that matter the next few hours); and, (2) no one ever seems to call after the market has gone up one hundred points to focus my attention on how unclear everything is, even though the view back in February doesn't look so clear in retrospect.    我把“猜测市场”这部分又重新提出来是因为道指从2月份995点的高峰跌到5月的865点，之后我接到了几个合伙人的电话，认为股票还将继续下跌很多。这总会在我脑海里引发两个问题：（1）如果他们在2月份知道，道指将在5月份跌到865点，为什么当时他们不阻止我投资。而且（2）如果他们不知道2月份之后接下来的三个月将发生什么，他们怎么知道5月之后将发生什么？也有几个人在道指大跌百点后建议我们卖出，等待未来更加清晰后再行动。让我再次建议两点：（1）对我来说，未来从没有清晰过（如果未来几个月对你非常显而易见，给我们打个电话，在接下来的几个小时就打）（2）在市场上涨百点后没人给我打电话，让我注意任何事情都是不清晰的，即使回过头来看2月份的情形其实并不清晰。    （1966年上半年给合伙人的信）      十年总结      从10万到5千万，巴菲特的第一个10年是幸运的。他的投资哲学得到了实践，个人财富也大大增长，成为了一个有经验的成功投资人。但是，随着规模的扩大，投资变得越来越难，好的投资想法则越来越少。即便如此，巴菲特还是坚守自己的原则，不随波逐流。      The results of the first ten years have absolutely no chance of being duplicated or even remotely approximated during the next decade. They may well be achieved by some hungry twenty-five year old working with $105,100 initial partnership capital and operating during a ten year business and market environment which is frequently conducive to successful implementation of his investment philosophy.    第一个10年的结果，在下一个10年绝对无法复制，甚至连接近都不可能。这些结果完全有可能由一个25岁，充满渴望，却只有10万5千100美元初始资金的年轻人取得。而且还得有10年常常是有助于成功实施他的投资哲学的商业和市场环境。    
They will not be achieved by a better fed thirty-six year old working with our $54,065,345 current partnership capital who presently finds perhaps one-fifth to one-tenth as many really good ideas as previously to implement his investment philosophy.
 
这些成绩无法由一个相对富足的36岁的人取得。他运营着5千4百万美元的合伙人资金，与以前相比，却可能只有五分之一到十分之一的好想法去实施他的投资哲学。
 
Buffett Associates. Ltd. (predecessor to Buffett Partnership. Ltd.) was founded on the west banks of the Missouri. May 5. 1956 by a hardy little band consisting of four family members, three close friends and $105,100. (I tried to find some brilliant flash of insight regarding our future or present conditions from my first page and a half annual letter of January, 1957 to insert as a quote here. However, someone evidently doctored my file copy so as to remove the perceptive remarks I must have made.)
 
巴菲特联合有限公司（巴菲特合伙有限公司的前身）于1956年5月5日，在密苏里河西岸成立，主要由四个家庭成员，三个亲密的朋友组成，外加10万5千100美元。（我曾经想从写于1957年1月的第一份年度信中，找到揭示我们目前或者未来的光辉的闪光点而引用到这。但是，显然有人对我的文件作了手脚，抽走了我当时所做的洞悉未来的评论。）
 
At that time, and for some years subsequently, there were substantial numbers of securities selling at well below the "value to a private owner" criterion we utilized for selection of general market investments. We also experienced a flow of “workout” opportunities where the percentages were very much to our liking. The problem was always which, not what. Accordingly, we were able to own fifteen to twenty-five issues and be enthusiastic about the probabilities inherent in all holdings.
 
那时，以及后面的几年里，有相当多股票的价格都远低于我们所用的“私人拥有的价值”衡量的投资标准。在“Workout”类别的投资机会中有很多的百分比都是我们喜欢的。对于我们来说，问题总是选哪一个，而不是选什么。所以，我们能够拥有15到25个投资，对所有机会的内在可能性充满热情。
 
In the last few years this situation has changed dramatically. We now find very few securities that are understandable to me, available in decent size, and which offer the expectation of investment performance meeting our yardstick of ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. In the last three years we have come up with only two or three new ideas a year that have had such an expectancy of superior performance. Fortunately, in some cases, we have made the most of them. However, in earlier years, a lesser effort produced literally dozens of comparable opportunities. It is difficult to be objective about the causes for such diminution of one's own productivity. Three factors that seem apparent are: (1) a somewhat changed market environment; (2) our increased size; and (3)substantially more competition.
 
在过去几年，这种情况发生了重大改变。我们现在发现只有很少的股票我能理解，而且规模足够大，能提供满足我们的投资业绩预期，即每年增长高于道指10个百分点。在过去3年里，我们每年只找到了2-3个符合这样出色业绩预期的新的投资想法。幸运的是，在一些情况下，我们充分利用了大部分这些机会。但是，在早些年，很少的努力就能产生几十个类似的投资机会。在探讨一个人自己的生产效率下降的原因时，很难做到客观。有三个因素可能是明显的：（1）市场环境有了相当的改变；（2）我们的规模增加了；（3）大幅度增加的竞争。
 
It is obvious that a business based upon only a trickle of fine ideas has poorer prospects than one based upon a steady flow of such ideas. To date the trickle has provided as much financial nourishment as the flow. This is true because there is only so much one can digest(million dollar ideas are of no great benefit to thousand dollar bankaccounts - this was impressed on me in my early days) and because a limited number of ideas causes one to utilize those available more intensively. The latter factor has definitely been operative with us in recent years. However, a trickle has considerably more chance of drying up completely than a flow.
 
显然，一个只是基于涓涓细流式的好想法的生意，其前景比不上有着源源不断的稳定的好 想法的生意。到今天为止，这涓涓细流提供了与滚滚洪流一样的财务营养。这只是因为一个人的消化能力有限（百万美元的想法对只有一千美元的银行账户没什么益 处—这在早期我深有体会）而且正是因为想法有限，才会尽量充分利用这些现有的想法。在最近几年，我们一直在充分利用有限的投资想法。但是，涓涓细流与滚滚 洪流相比，有更大的可能完全枯竭。
 
These conditions will not cause me to attempt investment decisions outside my sphere of understanding (I don't go for the "If you can'tlick 'em, join 'em” philosophy - my own leaning is toward "If you can't join ‘em, lick 'em”). We will not go into businesses where technology which is away over my head is crucial to the investment decision. I know about as much about semi-conductors or integrated circuits as I do of the mating habits of the chrzaszcz.(That's a Polish May bug, students - if you have trouble pronouncing it, rhyme it with thrzaszcz.)
 
这些状况并不能让我尝试在我所理解的范围之外进行投资决策。（我的哲学不是“不能战胜他们，就加入他们”。我自己倾向于“不能加入他们，就战胜他们”。）我们不会投资科技对投资决策有决定性作用的业务，科技远远超出了我的理解。我对半导体或芯片的了解与我对chrzaszcz虫子的交配习惯的了解差不多。（这是一种波兰的虫子，发音是thrzaszcz。）
 
Furthermore, we will not follow the frequently prevalent approach of investing insecurities where an attempt to anticipate market action overrides business valuations. Such so-called "fashion" investing has frequently produced very substantial and quick profits in recent years (and currently as I write this in January). It represents an investment technique whose soundness I can neither affirm nor deny. It does not completely satisfy my intellect (or perhaps my prejudices), and most definitely does not fit my temperament. I will not invest my own money based upon such an approach hence, I will most certainly not do so with your money.
 
而且，我们不会追寻盛行的投资方式，那些方式意图预测市场而不是业务估值。那些所谓的“流行”投资方式在近些年经常取得了高额而快速的利润（在我写这封信的1月就是如此）。对这种投资方式的可靠性，我无法接受也无法否认。这种方法不能完全达到我的思考的标准（或者是我的偏见），而且绝对不适合我的禀性。所以，我不会用我自己的钱去进行此种投资。我当然也不会用你的钱去进行此种投资。
 
Finally, we will not seek out activity in investment operations, even if offering splendid profit expectations, where major human problems appear to have a substantial chance of developing.
 
最后，我们不会寻求投资于有很大可能会造成严重人类问题的机会，即使这些机会能提供无与伦比的利润预期。
 
What I do promise you, as partners, is that I will work hard to maintain the trickle of ideas and try to get the most out of it that is possible – but if it should dry up completely, you will be informed honestly and promptly so that we may all take alternative action.
 
我所能向你保证的是，作为合伙人，我将努力工作，保持投资想法的涓涓细流，并从中获得尽可能多的回报。但是，如果投资想法的涓涓细流一旦枯竭，你将及时得到通知，我们都将选择各自的其他出路。
 
（1966年给合伙人的信）
 
 
坚持集中投资
 
巴菲特式的集中投资，用短期波动换取长期业绩，但绝不冒资本金重大损失的风险。这是典型的符合凯利判据的投资方式。而1966年，凯利判据也正好诞生10年。
 
The sort of concentration we have in this category is bound to produce wide swings in short term performance – some, most certainly, unpleasant. There have already been some of these applicable to shorter time spans than I use in reporting to partners. This is one reason I think frequent reporting to be foolish and potentially misleading in a long term oriented business such as ours.
 
我们所进行的集中投资必然导致短期内大范围的业绩波动，这有时候肯定是令人不愉快的。在比我向合伙人汇报的时间段更短的时期里，已经有了一些大范围波动的情况。这就是为什么我认为在我们这种注重长期的生意里，频繁的汇报是愚蠢而且有可能是误导的。
 
Personally, within the limits expressed in last year's letter on diversification, I am willing to trade the pains (forget about the pleasures) of substantial short term variance in exchange for maximization of long term performance. However, I am not willing to incur risk of substantial permanent capital loss in seeking to better long term performance. To be perfectly clear - under our policy of concentration of holdings, partners should be completely prepared for periods of substantial underperformance (far more likely in sharply rising markets) to offset the occasional over performance such as we have experienced in 1965 and 1966, and as a price we pay for hoped-for good long term performance.
 
从个人来讲，在去年的信中所说的极限之内，我愿意用短期波动带来的痛苦（忘记快乐 吧）来换取长期的业绩。但是，我不会承担资本金重大永久损失的风险来换取更高的长期业绩。必须明确指出，在我们目前的集中重仓持有的策略下，为了我们所希 望的好的长期业绩，合伙人必须完全准备好迎接业绩严重不佳（在暴涨的牛市更有可能）的时期，虽然我们偶尔也会有像1965和1966年这样的好业绩。
 
All this talk about the long pull has caused one partner to observe that“even five minutes is a long time if one's head is being held underwater." This is the reason, of course, that we use borrowed money very sparingly in our operation. Average bank borrowings during 1966 were well under 10% of average net worth.
 所有这些关于长期的说辞引起了一位合伙人的评论“如果一个人的头被按在水下，即使五分钟也是一段很长的时期。”这就是为什么我们很少借钱投资。在1966年，我们的平均银行贷款远低于平均净值的10%。    
（1966年给合伙人的信）
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一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（6） Barrons

http://blog.caing.com/article/9761/

 
坚持原则拒绝投机
 
 
 
当投机盛行，而且获利颇丰的时候，对坚持价值投资原则的人是很大的考验。投机的迅速高额回报是极具诱惑的，而只有内心强大的投资者才能拒绝这种诱惑。
 
 
Last year I said:
 
 
“A few mutual funds and some private investment operations have compiled records vastly superior to the Dow and, in some cases, substantially superior to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Their investment techniques are usually very dissimilar to ours and not within my capabilities.”
 
 
去年我说过：
 
 
“有些共同基金和私人投资公司获得了大大超越道指的业绩，有些还大范围的超越了巴菲特合伙基金的业绩。他们的投资技术通常与我们的非常不同，这超越了我的能力范围。”
 
 
In 1967 this condition intensified. Many investment organizations performed substantially better than BPL, with gains ranging to over 100%. Because of these spectacular results, money, talent and energy are converging in a maximum effort for the achievement of large and quick stock market profits. It looks to me like greatly intensified speculation with concomitant risks - but many of the advocates insist otherwise.
 
 
在1967年，这种情况加剧了。很多投资机构大范围的超越了巴菲特合伙基金，有的收益超过100%。由于这些惊人的业绩，金钱、人才、精力都以最大的程度汇集到一起，来取得大量而迅速的股票市场收益。这在我看来更像是加剧的投机，同时伴随着风险。但很多这些投资方式的倡导者并不这么看。
 
 
My mentor, Ben Graham, used to say. “Speculation is neither illegal, immoral nor fattening (financially).” During the past year, it was possible to become fiscally flabby through a steady diet of speculative bonbons. We continue to eat oatmeal but if indigestion should set in generally, it is unrealistic to expect that we won’thave some discomfort.
 
 
我的导师，格雷厄姆曾经说。“投机不是非法的，不是不道德的，也不是（金钱上）增肥的。”在过去一年，通过连续吃投机的巧克力夹心可以在金钱上变胖。而我们继续吃燕麦片，但是如果大家整体都消化不良，希望我们不会感到不舒服也是不现实的。
 
 
（1967年给合伙人的信）
 
 
Essentially I am out of step with present conditions. On one point, however, I am clear. I will not abandon a previous approach whose logic I understand (although I find it difficult to apply) even though it may mean foregoing large and apparently easy, profits to embrace an approach which I don’t fully understand, have not practiced successfully and which, possibly, could lead to substantial permanent loss of capital.
 
 
我基本上是跟不上目前的形势了。但是，我非常清楚一点。即使放弃大量而明显的容易挣的利润，我也不会放弃我以前的方法，因为我理解这种方法的逻辑（虽然我发现这种方法难以应用）。我不会接受一种我不完全理解，没有成功实践的方法，因为这有可能导致资本的重大永久损失。
 
 
（1967年给合伙人的信）
 
   
 
定性与定量
 
 
 
证券分析与决策总是结合了定性与定量，定性赚大钱，定量赚稳钱，缺一不可。
 
 
The evaluation of securities and businesses for investment purposes has always involved a mixture of qualitative and quantitative factors. At the one extreme, the analyst exclusively oriented to qualitative factors would say. "Buy the right company (with the right prospects, inherent industry conditions, management, etc.) and the price will take care of itself.” On the other hand, the quantitative spokesman would say, “Buy at the right price and the company (and stock) will take care of itself.” As is so often the pleasant result in the securities world, money can be made with either approach. And, of course, any analyst combines the two to some extent – his classification in either school would depend on the relative weight he assigns to the various factors and not to his consideration of one group of factors to the exclusion of the other group.    为 了投资目的而对证券与业务进行的估值，向来混合了定性和定量的因素。在一个极端，完全偏向定性因素的分析者会说：“买好的公司（有好的前景，好的内在行业 状况，好的管理等），价格自己会上涨。”在另一个极端，定量分析一方会说：“买在合适的价位，公司（和股票）自己会努力。”在证券世界里，良好的业绩往往 证明，这两种方式都可以赚钱。当然，任何分析师在某种程度上都综合了这两种方式，他对这两种学派的划分要看他对不同因素所给予的权重，而不是只考虑一类因 素而拒绝其他一类因素。    
Interestingly enough, although I consider myself to be primarily in the quantitative school (and as I write this no one has come back from recess - I may be the only one left in the class), the really sensational ideas I have had over the years have been heavily weighted toward the qualitative side where I have had a "high-probability insight". This is what causes the cash register to really sing. However, it is an infrequent occurrence, as insights usually are, and, of course, no insight is required on the quantitative side - the figures should hit you over the head with a baseball bat. So the really big money tends to be made by investors who are right on qualitative decisions but, at least in my opinion, the more sure money tends to be made on the obvious quantitative decisions.
 
 
有趣的是，虽然我自认为主要是定量这一学派的（在我写这封信的时候，大家都还没从休 假回来，我可能是这一派唯一剩下的一个人），但是在过去这么多年，那些真正绝妙的投资想法都严重倾向于定性一端，对那些想法我有着“高概率的深刻见解”。 这才是赚钱的真正原因。但是，这种机会并不常见。因为洞察、深入见解通常并不是定量分析所必须的。数字是直来直去的，就像你的头被棒球棒击中一样。所以， 至少在我看，真正的大钱是靠投资者在定性分析上决策正确而赚的，而可靠而稳定的赚钱则要靠明显而直接的定量决策。
 
 
Such statistical bargains have tended to disappear over the years. This may be due to the constant combing and recombing of investments that has occurred during the past twenty years, without an economic convulsion such as that of the ‘30s to create a negative bias toward equities and spawn hundreds of new bargain securities. It maybe due to the new growing social acceptance, and therefore usage (or maybe it's vice versa - I'll let the behaviorists figure it out) of takeover bids which have a natural tendency to focus on bargain issues. It may be due to the exploding ranks of security analysts bringing forth an intensified scrutiny of issues far beyond what existed some years ago. Whatever the cause, the result has been the virtual disappearance of the bargain issue as determined quantitatively - and thereby of our bread and butter. There still maybe a few from time to time. There will also be the occasional security where I am really competent to make an important qualitative judgment. This will offer our best chance for large profits. Such instances will. however, be rare. Much of our good performance duringthe past three years has been due to a single idea of this sort.
 
 
这些便宜的机会在过去一些年逐渐消失。这可能是由于在过去20年里，投资公司不断合并，而且又缺乏像30年 代那样的大的经济震荡来产生对股票的负面偏见，因此无法大量产生成百的便宜股票。这也可能是因为社会的容忍度逐渐增加，所以收购兼并的使用逐渐增加（也可 能是反过来，收购兼并增加而导致社会越来越容忍，让行为学者想明白吧。）这些收购兼并自然集中在便宜的投资机会上。这还可能是由于证券分析师数量的暴增， 对证券的仔细深入研究程度远超过多年前的水平。无论原因是什么，结果是通过量化分析就能判断是便宜的股票几乎消失了，而这是我们投资的基本生计。偶尔，也 会有几个便宜的机会。有时候，有的股票我确实有能力做出重要的定性判断。这将带来巨额盈利的最好机会。但是，这些情况都非常少见。我们过去三年的好业绩很 大一部分都是由于一个这种好的投资想法。
 
 
（1967年给合伙人的信）
 
 
 
 
 
投资与生活的平衡
 
 
 
投资并不是生活的全部，人需要平衡，巴菲特也不例外。放弃追求最大化，也给自己留出了空间。
 
 
Elementary self-analysis tells me that I will not be capable of less than all-out effort to achieve a publicly proclaimed goal to people who have entrusted their capital to me. All-out effort makes progressively less sense. I would like to have an economic goal which allows for considerable non-economic activity. This may mean activity outside the field of investments or it simply may mean pursuing lines within the investment field that do not promise the greatest economic reward. An example of the latter might be the continued investment in a satisfactory (but far from spectacular) controlled business where I liked the people and the nature of the business even though alternative investments offered an expectable higher rate of return. More money would be made buying businesses at attractive prices, then reselling them. However, it may be more enjoyable (particularly when the personal value of incremental capital is less) to continue to own them and hopefully improve their performance, usually in a minor way, through some decisions involving financial strategy.
 
 
基本的自我分析告诉我，我无法不全身心投入去实现一个对大家公开宣称的目标，这些人 们把资本托付了给我。但全身心投入的方式越来越不明智了。我希望设立一个容许相当多的非经济活动的经济目标。这有可能意味着投资领域以外的活动，或者只意 味着追寻不具有最大经济回报的投资。后一个的例子，比如持续投资于一个令人满意（但远不是绝妙）的控股业务。即使有其他投资机会能提供预期更高的回报率， 我也会投资于这样的生意，因为我喜欢管理者和生意本身。在好的价位买入业务，然后卖掉能挣更多的钱。但是，持续拥有生意，并通过财务决策有希望稍微改善它 们的业绩，这更有乐趣（尤其当个人不必持续投入精力时）。
 
 
Thus, I am likely to limit myself to things which are reasonably easy, safe, profitable and pleasant. This will not make our operation more conservative than in the past since I believe, undoubtedly with some bias, that we have always operated with considerable conservatism. The long-term downside risk will not be less; the upside potential will merely be less.
 
 
所以，我将会把我的工作限于比较容易、安全、盈利，而且愉快的业务。这不会让我们的运营比过去更加保守。因为我坚信（毫无疑问这有些我自己的偏见）我们一直以相当保守的方式运营。长期的下行风险不会更少，而向上的潜力将更少。
 
 
（1967年给合伙人的信）


PermaLink: https://articles.zkiz.com/?id=18512

最近的投资风格，以及一个感想 value91

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_504dc8080100me27.html

最近的投资比较顺，回顾这一段历程发现所选股票完全没有遵循老巴对公司质量的要求。

为什么呢？因为高质量公司的价格难以感动我。

 

于是，我转向低pe公司，期望找到风险较低的品种。这期间，我感悟到的一个最大的感想，就是市场涨得越高，剩余的低pe公司中问题越多。因为整个市场较低 时，有许多低pe公司不是因为自己发展前景不好，而仅仅是因为市场整体不好。这时，如果我们对个股前景一无所知，但是选一组低pe个股，很可能捞到好的。

但是，随着市场高涨，那些不涨的剩余的低pe公司最终会越来越少，这些剩余公司出问题的概率就大多了（当然也有尚未发掘的珍珠）。

这些剩余的低pe公司最大的问题就是前景不好，如美国双反对钢管、铝材的影响，棉花价格上升对纺织与oem服装厂的影响，如果你用预估的盈利考察其pe，实际上不低。我现在对此类公司至少要等到报表出来，大幅下跌才考虑。

 

由于市场较高，再加上上述原因，我实在不太敢随便投一个低pe公司，但我也不投高pe公司。这时，我转向了一个策略，就是尽可能了解这些低pe公司的前 景，比如，从澳门赌场数据以及柬埔寨游客人数增长，推测金界的预估盈利。从瑞士行业协会发布的对各地出口数据以及香港政府发布的统计数据了解香港和中国钟 表珠宝销售数据，寻找一些尚在低pe（指预估的pe）的公司，如果公司管理层没问题，我会进入。

 

最后悔的是没有早一些注意瑞士钟表协会每月发布的数据，否则投资收益会更好。

 


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一個套子 讓iPod Touch變身iPhone 中國新山寨 「蘋果皮」大熱賣

2010-10-11  TWM



正當iPhone4在中國熱賣而一度缺貨，一款能把iPod Touch變成為iPhone的﹁蘋果皮520﹂，則搭上這趟順風車，已經開始進行全球預售。這款在網路上暴紅的產品，是顛覆性創新，還是山寨模仿？

撰文‧林宸誼

在中國的十一黃金周，位在廣東深圳的天虹商場，擠滿人潮；許多人圍在手機攤位前，目不轉睛地看著老闆像變把戲似的，把原本聽音樂用的蘋果iPod Touch，裝進一個黑色套子，然後在螢幕上按了幾下，沒多久就傳來了客服人員甜美的聲音：您好，需要什麼幫助。讓蘋果迷簡直不敢相信，iPod Touch竟然成了能打電話的iPhone！

因iPhone太貴想出的創意關鍵就在﹁蘋果皮﹂，外形類似手機的保護套，裡頭配有內置的通訊模組，具有ＳＩＭ卡槽、聽筒、麥克風、電池與天線；除了沒有 鏡頭、不能上網外，其他功能與iPhone一樣。

﹁蘋果皮520﹂的原創者，是一對來自深圳的二十多歲兄弟；弟弟潘泳是主要的技術開發者，哥哥潘磊則負責宣傳推廣。

但他們萬萬沒想到，不等﹁蘋果皮520﹂上市，山寨版的﹁蘋果皮﹂早已經充斥在深圳的電子商場與淘寶網；光在淘寶網上，就有三百三十個賣家，宣稱代理或是 預訂﹁蘋果皮520﹂的資格；這個被中國網友封為﹁最具創意的『山寨』﹂，也被﹁山寨﹂了。

﹁我以弟弟的創意為榮。﹂潘磊表示，潘泳從小到大就是個破壞狂，不管是電視機、電風扇，甚至是電腦、ＤＶＤ播放器，都被拆解過，然後又裝了回去。

﹁第一次接觸電腦是在初中。﹂潘泳說，當時做生意的父親給他買了一台電腦，從此就迷上網路遊戲。高二時因為遊戲帳號被盜，﹁一怒之下決心要當駭客。﹂一年 多之後，就能輕易改變網咖的計費系統，也就是說可以上網而不用交錢，﹁結果當然沒被發現。﹂潘泳搔了搔頭不好意思地表示。

潘泳表示，大學時最大的夢想，就是能擁有一台iPhone手機，﹁但價格太貴。﹂他曾在淘寶網上買了一台二手iPhone，用不到一周螢幕卻壞了；接著他 上eBay向一名美國賣家購買，沒想到卻被騙走人民幣兩千多元。

大學剛畢業的潘泳，在深圳一家電子公司找到一份工作，某一天經過電子商場，發現櫥窗裡的iPod Touch，從外觀到功能，與同期推出的iPhone相差無幾，唯一的差異是不能通話和發簡訊，﹁如果把這兩項功能補上，不就可以當成iPhone使 用？﹂潘泳把這樣的想法告訴哥哥潘磊，潘磊除了支持，還鼓勵潘泳不妨買個iPod試試。

二○○九年四月潘泳花了人民幣二千多元，買了一台十六Ｇ的iPod Touch水貨，還從二手市場買來電烙鐵等工具，開始他的實驗；然而學軟體出身的他，連電路圖怎麼畫，甚至電阻、電容都弄不明白，就靠著一點一點自學完 成。讓潘泳印象最深刻的，就是拿電烙鐵焊接時一不留意，燙到左手大拇指，他趕緊沖水降溫，但還是起了一個大水泡，整整持續了兩周才消失。

﹁所有資訊都在網上搜的，沒有買一本書。﹂潘泳表示靠Google找到不少國外的工程師幫忙，而這些工程師也透過通訊軟體，毫無保留地傳授，幫他解決不少 技術難題。

只是白天既要上班，晚上下班後又要編寫軟體，尋找各種材料，潘泳索性在○九年十二月把工作辭了，搬到姑父的舊倉庫專心研發。在廣東江門的哥哥潘磊，不時會 到深圳看看潘泳的狀況，後來拒絕不了弟弟的請求，決定與弟弟一同創業。

﹁光是買零件就花好多錢。﹂潘磊表示，大部分電子零件因為都不零賣，他們只好一打一打地買，像是買一個電阻，就要花上十倍的價錢，﹁這段時間投下去的錢， 至少超過人民幣十萬元。﹂潘泳表示，這些錢都是他和潘磊在工作時存下來的，不夠，只好再跟家裡借。

還沒量產 仿冒品搶先上市今年七月，﹁蘋果皮﹂大部分技術難題已經解決，可以進行通話和發簡訊的功能。兄弟倆決定試探一下市場反應，製作了六十九秒影片放在網路上， 引發熱烈討論；兄弟倆因為憂心﹁是否侵權﹂而沒有量產時，山寨版的﹁蘋果皮﹂，卻搶先一步在市場流竄。對這樣的結果，潘泳表示﹁很生氣但卻無可奈何。﹂﹁ 我們還是希望產品走上正途。﹂潘磊苦惱地說，除了請美國一家公司代為申請專利，也諮詢過不少律師，但沒有人能告訴他們明確的答案。

有國外媒體從美國專利與商標局公開資料上查到，蘋果公司早在今年年初，註冊了一項名為﹁附件接收器﹂的設備專利，主要內容是通過附件為iPod Touch增加電話功能。擅長智慧財產權的眾達國際法律事務所律師陳世杰指出，如果蘋果公司早已向中國申請﹁附件接收器﹂專利註冊，潘氏兄弟恐怕會涉及侵 犯蘋果公司的專利。

細心的潘磊為了保護弟弟，這位二十五歲的男孩，把所有對外公開的資料都寫上了自己的名字，﹁如果蘋果真要告我們，我也認了，只希望不要傷害我弟弟。﹂潘磊 淡淡地表示。

十一黃金周，潘磊與潘泳已經從深圳回到老家河南信陽；心裡卻還掛念著﹁蘋果皮﹂，從開始到現在，他們還沒有從中賺回一塊錢，因為山寨產品早已經搶先開賣。 看來蘋果皮的商機再大，兩兄弟徒有創意，恐怕目前還很難吃到口！

潘 磊

出生：1985年

現職：衍生科技負責人

學歷：河南黃河科技學院裝潢設計系

經歷：室內設計公司

潘 泳

出生：1988年

現職：衍生科技研發

學歷：河南黃淮學院軟件開發系


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一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（7） Barrons

http://blog.caing.com/article/10012/

 
灵感的枯竭
 
 
 
作为一个投资者，到了1968年，巴菲特的投资灵感已经枯竭。在1968年给合伙人的信中， 已经很难找到让人豁然开朗的语句。终于，面临危机的巴菲特在1969年5月决定解散合伙基金。
 
 
 
Everyone makes mistakes.
 
 
 
At the beginning of 1968, I felt prospects for BPL performance looked poorer than at any time in our history. However, due in considerable measure to one simple but sound idea whose time had come (investment ideas,like women are often more exciting than punctual), we recorded an overall gain of $40,032,691.  
 每个人都会犯错。   在1968年初，我感觉巴菲特合伙基金的业绩看起来比历史上任何时候都要差。但是，由于一个简单而可靠的投资想法起了显著的作用（投资想法如同女人，常令人激动，却很少准时），我们的整个盈利达到了4千万美金。   （1968年给合伙人的信）     解散合伙基金    巴菲特解散合伙基金的决定不仅是由于当时市场的状况，更是其个人诉求。在全身心投入18年后，巴菲特面临着人生与投资的双重平台期，需要对自己的人生与事业做出重大调整。  
 
To My Partners:
 
 
致我的合伙人：   
 
About eighteen months ago I wrote to you regarding changed environmental and personal factors causing me to modify our future performance objectives.
 
 
 
大约18个月前，我给你们写信，讲了由于环境改变和个人因素，致使我修改我们未来的业绩目标。
 
 
 
The investing environment I discussed at that time (and on which I have commented in various other letters) has generally become more negative and frustrating as time has passed. Maybe I am merely suffering from a lack of mental flexibility. (One observer commenting on security analysts over forty stated: “They know too many things that are no longer true.”)
 
 
 
随着时间的推移，当时我提到的投资环境（我在其他多封信中也多次提到）已经进一步恶化并令人沮丧。也许我只是受困于头脑缺乏灵活性。（有一个观察者对40岁以上的证券分析师的评论是：“他们知道过多已经不再正确的事情。”）
 
 
 
However, it seems to me that: (1) opportunities for investment that are open to the analyst who stresses quantitative factors have virtually disappeared, after rather steadily drying up over the past twenty years; (2) our $100 million of assets further eliminates a large portion of this seemingly barren investment world, since commitments of less than about $3 million cannot have a real impact on our overall performance, and this virtually rules out companies with less than about $100 million of common stockat market value; and (3) a swelling interest in investment performance has created an increasingly short-term oriented and (in my opinion) more speculative market.
 
 
 
但是，对我来说：（1）在过去20年里，侧重量化因素的分析师的投资机会逐渐枯竭，已经完全消失。（2）我们1亿美元的资产规模进一步排除了本来就贫瘠的投资世界的一大部分。因为任何少于3百万美元的投资都无法对整体业绩产生真正的影响。这实际上就排除了市值低于1亿美金的公司。（3）不断增加的对投资业绩的兴趣催生并加剧了注重短期和（在我看来）投机的市场。
 
 
 
The October 9th, 1967 letter stated that personal considerations were the most important factor among those causing me to modify our objectives. I expressed a desire to be relieved of the (self-imposed) necessity of focusing 100% on BPL. I have flunked this test completely during the last eighteen months. The letter said: I hope limited objectives will make for more limited effort. It hasn't worked out that way. As long as I am “on stage”, publishing a regular record and assuming responsibility for management of what amounts to virtually 100% of the net worth of many partners, I will never be able to put sustained effort into any non-BPL activity. If I am going to participate publicly, I can't help being competitive. I know I don't want to be totally occupied with out-pacing an investment rabbit all my life. The only way to slow down is to stop.
 
 
 
在1967年10月9日的信中，我提到，个人考虑是致使我修改我们投资目标的最重要因素。我表达了希望不再（我自己强加的）必须100%集中在巴菲特合伙基金。在过去18个月，我彻底没有通过这一测试。在信中，我曾经说我希望有限的目标将导致有限的努力。但现实并不如我想象那样。只要我在投资的“台上”，定期发布记录，承担管理几乎是很多合伙人100%净值的资金的责任，我将永远不能把精力持续的投入巴菲特合伙基金以外的活动中去。如果我参与公开活动，我无法不争强好胜。我知道我不想一生都完全沉迷于与投资的兔子赛跑。慢下来的唯一方式就是停止。
 
 
 
Therefore, before yearend. I intend to give all limited partners the required formal notice of my intention to retire.
 
 
 
所以，在年底前，我将给所有的有限合伙人发出必须的正式通知，告知我有意退休。
 
 
 
（1969年5月给合伙人的信）
 
 
 
Quite frankly, in spite of any factors set forth on the earlier pages. I would continue to operate the Partnership in 1970, or even 1971, if I had some really first class ideas. Not because I want to, but simply because I would so much rather end with a good year than a poor one. However. I just don't see anything available that gives any reasonable hope of delivering such a good year and I have no desire to grope around, hoping to "get lucky" with other people's money. I am not attuned to this market environment and I don't want to spoil a decent record by trying to play a game I don't understand just so I can go out a hero.
 
 
 
非常坦率的讲，除了前面说的因素，如果有真正一流的投资想法，我本来想继续运营合伙基金到1970年，甚至是1971年。并不是因为我想继续运营，而是我更想用好的一年而不是差的一年来结束。但是，我根本看不到任何能有希望产生好的一年业绩的机会，而我并不想胡乱尝试，用他人的钱去碰运气。我不适合目前的市场环境，而且我不会为了逞能而尝试做我不懂的事情，我不想破坏一个良好的记录。
 
 
 
（1969年5月给合伙人的信）
 
 
 
Some of you are going to ask, "What do you plan to do?" I don't have an answer to that question. I do know that when I am 60, I should be attempting to achieve different personal goals than those which had priority at age 20. Therefore, unless I now divorce myself from the activity that has consumed virtually all of my time and energies during the first eighteen years of my adult life, I am unlikely to develop activities that will be appropriate to new circumstances in subsequent years.
 
 
 
你们中的有些人将会问“你计划去做什么？”对此我没有答案。我肯定知道的是，当我60岁的时候我将尝试达到不同的人生目标，这些人生目标与我二十多岁时优先考虑的事情不同。所以，除非我现在脱离投资活动，否则我将无法发展适合以后新情况的新的活动。因为投资这项活动完全占据了我作为一个成年人的第一个18年。
 
 
 
（1969年5月给合伙人的信）
 
   
 
结束语
 
 
 
到1969年解散合伙基金，巴菲特已经走完了作为一个投资者的第一段历程。人生的问题，投资的停滞，让他不得不重新思考，彻底改变。
 
 
 
当我们再次读到巴菲特写给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信，巴菲特已经由一个简单的股票投资者蜕变为一个实业家和投资者，并逐渐脱离了导师格雷厄姆的光环，发展了自己独特的投资理念与投资体系。


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