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上任雅虎半年 股價狂飆三三% 梅爾 拚勁、智慧兼具的性感CEO

2013-02-25  TWM
 
 

 

去年接任雅虎執行長的瑪莉莎.梅爾,集智慧與美麗於一身,自史丹佛大學資訊研究所畢業即進入谷歌工作,三十三歲時就已擁有超過一百億元新台幣的財富。去年七月,她被雅虎挖角聘為執行長,在短短半年內,扭轉營收連續五年下跌的頹勢,到底這位被喻為「全美最性感執行長」是如何辦到的?

撰文‧乾隆來

雅虎(Yahoo!)執行長瑪莉莎.梅爾(Marissa Mayer)是媒體瘋狂追逐的明星,她年輕、美麗,三十三歲時就已蓄積一百億元新台幣的財富。

去年七月十六日梅爾挺著六個月的身孕,臨危受命接任雅虎執行長,半年內,她不僅生下健康的男寶寶,同時推動業務、財務、組織全面改革,更讓雅虎股價上漲三三%,總市值從一八○億美元,增加到二三三億美元。

梅爾接任執行長後,立刻被﹁商業內幕﹂(Business Insider)網站選入「當今最性感的執行長」;《財星》雜誌則是連續四年將她選入全美最有影響力的五十位女性。從她第一天到雅虎上班,到九月底分娩,每一次新主管挖角、法說會、記者會,美國的媒體幾乎天天報導。無疑地,二○一二年最熱門的兩家科技公司,一家是沒有賈伯斯以後的蘋果,另一家就是梅爾領導的雅虎。

不過,今年一月二十八日梅爾向投資人舉行電話法說會之後,雅虎的股價當日暴跌三%,主因就是梅爾發布相對保守的營收成長預估,大家開始懷疑「蜜月期是否已經過了?」雅虎這位「全美最性感的執行長」,終於遇到上任後的第一場亂流。

頭頂績優生光環就業

不選大公司 反去初創的谷歌梅爾的成長經歷,猶如一部現代版的「白雪公主」故事。她的母親是美術教師,從小就給梅爾最好的教育,芭蕾舞、音樂、運動各方面的學習一項也不馬虎。她的學業成績頂尖,更突出的是,她的數學成績優異,高中畢業那年,威斯康辛州長欽點最優秀的學生參加全國科學競賽營,梅爾就是全州兩位代表之一。

這樣優秀的學生,申請大學當然易如反掌,梅爾申請十一所大學,全部獲得錄取;接著她用六年的時間,在史丹佛大學完成大學與研究所,專攻頂尖的人工智慧。一九九九年畢業後,有十四家大公司的工作讓她選,梅爾很聰明,沒有去微軟、雅虎,也沒飛去華爾街搞衍生性金融操作,反而選了剛剛創立的谷歌(Google)。

這個選擇,讓她在三十三歲時,跟著谷歌股票上市獲得驚人財富,媒體估算她有超過三億美元、約新台幣一百億元的財富。

更重要的是,雖然梅爾工作的殺伐之氣絕不亞於谷歌的宅男們,但她是宅男創業團隊中,唯一一位美麗高雅、口才便給、又喜歡上流社交活動的女生,很自然地成為媒體追逐的焦點。

○八年,《財星》雜誌遴選梅爾為全球最有影響力的五十位女性,當年她才三十三歲,立刻成為全球最知名的超級科技明星。

隔年,三十四歲的梅爾與律師柴克.柏谷(Zachary Bogue)結婚,婚禮大宴三天三夜,所有科技界的名人,乃至好萊塢的明星都擠入婚禮慶賀,梅爾成為明星中的超級明星。

梅爾喜愛高調的時尚活動,她經常在舊金山四季飯店頂樓舉行時尚派對,穿著高檔時尚設計師的新款服飾,效果堪與超級名模相媲美。當然,她精於運用媒體,在達沃斯世界論壇等最頂尖人物群集的活動上,總是可以見到她上台發表高見的身影。

去年六月雅虎宣布梅爾將會接掌執行長,新聞發布後,她運用巧妙的公關操作,對外宣布她已經懷有六個月的身孕。「一位即將臨盆的少婦,到底能不能夠重振雅虎雄風?」如此戲劇性的議題,立刻成了全球投資界與新聞界瘋狂追逐的焦點。

辦公室戀情告吹

被冷凍迫退位 轉而效力雅虎雅虎堪稱網路世紀的開創者,而台灣人對於雅虎創辦人楊致遠,主觀上更有濃得化不開的感情。但雅虎輝煌不過十年,就已經被谷歌、臉書(Facebook)等後起之秀打得鼻青臉腫。

股價能說話,雅虎在一九九五年創立,○五年營運達到最高峰,股價達到四十五美元,但是在金融海嘯的○八年底跌到剩下十美元,隨後雖然跟著大盤回升,但一直在業績與經營權紛擾中躊躇,股價在十五至十八美元遊走,只剩高點時的三分之一。

雅虎至今仍然有七億個活躍用戶,但是它的搜尋引擎已經賣給了微軟,電子郵件一哥地位被谷歌搶走,廣告營收欲振乏力;在○八年,雅虎曾經創下年營收七十二億美元的高峰,但是到了一一年底已經跌破五十億美元,營收連續四年逐季衰退。此外,過去兩年爆發的行動網路應用市場,雅虎即使不算繳了白卷,也是遠遠落臉書、推特(Twitter)這些後起之秀。

雅虎當然也運用它網路霸主的地位,早期投資了不少新興網路公司,最著名的就是中國最大的電子商務網站阿里巴巴,雅虎持有四○%股權,而阿里巴巴旗下擁有的支付寶網站,是中國最大的第三方網路支付平台最值錢的金雞母。但是,中國基於所謂的戰略性發展,硬是逼迫雅虎退出支付寶。

雅虎吃了大虧,卻也無處申訴,只得在一一年底與阿里巴巴達成和解,和解內容公告當天雅虎股價跌了將近三%,又吃了中國的悶虧。

此時,在谷歌已經十三年的梅爾,雖然不到四十歲,卻也碰到她的第一個「中年危機」。

一一年賴瑞.佩吉(Larry Page)接替艾瑞克.施密特(Eric Schmidt),成為谷歌的執行長,隨即進行劇烈地組織重整,一直負責搜尋引擎部門的梅爾,從谷歌的業務核心被轉調至相對冷門的「當地服務」(Local),負責地圖、餐廳搜尋等服務。佩吉基本上就是希望梅爾讓位給更多後起之秀,這當然讓一向站在舞台最前端的梅爾難以接受。

還有一件媒體不願報導的八卦,就是梅爾曾經與佩吉是情侶,兩人雖然有過美好的時光,卻沒有結成正果。

佩吉做了組織調整,大家都認為是為了公司發展最大的利益。不過,在組織調整後,梅爾重要性大減,卻是不爭的事實。

於是,當獵人頭公司正式向梅爾提出挖角條件後,她就帶著創設谷歌的經驗,及陸續加入的新團隊,誓言重新打造雅虎。

四十五億美元買庫藏股

豪氣引爆雅虎股價上漲

梅爾知道媒體與投資人要什麼,她接任雅虎執行長後立刻宣布,將原本從阿里巴巴公司私有化後售股所得的四十億美元現金,拿來買進雅虎庫藏股。

去年九月底,梅爾宣布已買回三十億美元的雅虎股票,第四季又買了十五億美元,總共買回約一千三百億元新台幣的庫藏股,引爆了雅虎股價上漲的動能。

梅爾同時還展現超強工作能力,她在去年九月三十日星期日生產,隔日上午雅虎公關發布她生產消息的同時,還特別強調:「梅爾已經在家中開始工作,她持續領導公司,並且參與所有公司重大決策。」等於梅爾產假只休不到兩個禮拜就正式上班。

除了提振員工士氣、宣布巨額庫藏股推升股價,梅爾也主導網路行動軟體公司Stamped的購併。Stamped是一家小公司,但該公司三位創辦人都曾在谷歌與梅爾共事。梅爾利用熱門的相片分享網站Instagram宣布購併,藉此宣示她在雅虎內部推動行動業務的強烈企圖心。

這位全美最性感執行長,在接任雅虎半年後,繳出連續兩季盈餘成長、營收也扭轉連續五年下跌頹勢、股價上揚三成的成績。三十八歲的梅爾還很年輕,而且抱著與傳聞中的老情人、谷歌執行長佩吉一較長短的決心。

過往,網路公司從高峰跌下後,幾無東山再起的案例。梅爾背水一戰,好戲還在後頭!

(本文作者為紐約大學金融碩士、曾任金控公司副總經理)

瑪莉莎.梅爾

(Marissa Mayer)

出生:1975年

現職:雅虎執行長

經歷:歷任谷歌各個部門,也曾擔任公司發言人學歷:美國史丹佛大學資訊系、資訊研究所家庭:已婚,育有1子

「全美最性感的CEO」

瑪莉莎‧梅爾的傳奇經歷:梅爾從小就是頭頂光環,站在舞台最前端的資優生,她在Google創立初期就加入,33歲就已經擁有超過新台幣100億元的財富。非凡的經歷,讓《財星》雜誌連續四年評選她為全美最有影響力的50位女性,美麗的容貌,讓她一出任執行長就被「商業內幕」網站列入「最性感的CEOs」榜單。

以下,就是梅爾童話故事般,完美的資歷:1975 05/30 梅爾在威斯康辛州華梭鎮出生。母親是美術老師,芬蘭後裔。

1993 高中畢業,申請11所頂尖大學,全部上榜。

被威斯康辛州長欽點參加全國青年科學營代表。

1999 史丹佛大學資訊系、資訊研究所。碩士畢業時,同時有14個工作機會,最後她選擇Google,成為公司第20位員工、第一位女性工程師。

1999-2012 Google 工作13年,歷任各個部門,也曾擔任公司發言人。

2008-2011 連續四年被《財星》選為最有影響力的女性。

2008年被選任時年僅33歲,為該項評選有史以來最年輕的上榜女性。

2009 12/12 與律師Zachary Bogue結婚,婚禮持續三天,冠蓋雲集。

2012 06/12 宣布辭去Google,轉任雅虎執行長。在轉任記者會上,梅爾同時宣布懷孕的消息。

2012 09/30 順利產下男嬰。

2013 01/23 梅爾接任執行長半年,股價上漲33.3%。

照片來源:翻攝自網路

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教育 (1) – 三三四 港股博弈

http://clcheung.wordpress.com/2013/03/16/%E6%95%99%E8%82%B2-1-%E4%B8%89%E4%B8%89%E5%9B%9B/

昨晚兒子就讀的學校舉辦了家長會討論高中如何選科,畢竟三三四是新東西,所以都勉強參加了。唉,真係…..。香港學生高分低能,高官就是高薪低能。

 

因為兒子就讀的是一般普通津校,資源十分有限,校長擘頭一句便是:我們的教學安排主要是為提升學生入大學的機率:非常正確。比哪些將自己子女放洋的高官說什麼愉快學習求學不是求分數等等廢話好得多。

 

去年是大學收新學制的學生第一年,學校開始了解大學如何看新學制了。首先,什麼希望學生能夠「文中有理、理中有文」都是廢話。文還是文,理還是理。你要修讀理科,就是要選理科的科目。你要修讀文科,當然要選文科的科目。

 

通識科又如何?似乎不是重要的科目。今年學校會將英文成績較低的學生編入中文通識科班,原因是大學一般沒有指定要英文通識科,似是說明合格就可以了。

 

選修科目方面,絕大部分學院只要求2個選修,只有律師醫生精算等等的要求較高,需要3個選修。

 

中文科要小心了,有不少名校生死在中文科上。

 

理科仍然是首選

 

首先,現時中學生跟以前的沒有很大不同,理科依然是普遍學生在中學時的首選科目。當然,大學裡理學院科學工程等等已降至不受歡迎級別,但是一般中學生還是喜歡修讀理科。

 

昨晚有家長問,既然本校理科是傳統上較強,為何依然是兩班文科兩班理科一班商科,為何不增加理科班別?校長坦言,理科生用資源較文科生多,政府沒有增加相對資源,所以沒有辦法。

 

即是說只有真正喜讀文科的同學,又或是中學成績較低或是遲起步而又沒有錢入讀直資學校的同學,才會選讀文科。而大學亦要爭奪好學生,所以收生模式其實沒有太大改變。

 

套餐A B C D … Z

 

普通津校資源十分有限,所以新學制下,一般學校是提供特定教學套餐,「幸好」理科還是主流,理科一向是較為簡單:有數學1,數學2(較深的數學理論如Calculus);物理,化學,生物,經濟。合起來大概4個套餐便足夠了。如果你的子女較為喜歡理科而成績可以的話,選科較為容易,跟以前分別很少。可以的話,修讀較深的數學也不錯,將來修讀高深學問很有幫助。〔不過我觀察所得,時下學生的數學能力似乎下降中。〕

 

文科的話,昨日校長列出三十多個套餐,學生可以跟自己喜好去排優先次序,然後學校根據資源及學生成績去分派。不幸的是,如果你的子女不喜歡文科而又成績不太好的話,又沒有錢放洋或入直資,幾拾個餐,真係好慘。資源不足下,有很多選擇的後果最後可能是等於沒有選擇。

 

選錯了,怎麼辦?

 

有家長問,如果中四時,發現選擇的科目不對勁,完全不合學生的性格,可以怎麼辦?校長坦言,學校一般不會讓學生轉科。如果開出先例,幾拾個套餐下的學生都轉來轉去,學校沒有資源去配合。

 

 

咁,即係點呀

 

-有錢人,繼續沒有問題

-成績好的學生 (~20%),沒有問題,教育生態沒有太大改變

-成績好差的學生,可以選擇一些較為實用的課程

-無咩錢,遲發力,成績一般,又想讀大學的話,新學制似乎沒有特別照顧

 

都係咁諗:算把啦,唔好搞咁多嘢喇。將d錢,直接增加中學資源,增加大學學位,好過搞埋呢d無謂嘢喇。可惜頭已濕了,大家只有適應適應。

 

 

〔還有,分數制度 **級別,點解咁煩?又是要自欺欺人嗎?還是有特別原因?記得以前中學5Band制度,後來變成3個,從此沒有Band 4  Band 5 學生了,真是自欺欺人。〕

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二十一歲創辦社交網站 六年後被雅虎用三三○億買下 大衛.卡普 輟學少年變身六十億富豪


2013-06-03  TWM  
 

 

Tumblr的創辦人大衛.卡普,一位孤僻的社交網站創辦人。對於產品有幾近苛刻的完美標準,對於自己相信的事物堅持到底,對於網路趨勢的預測始終命中標的。從紐約興起的他,能不能超越矽谷,所有人都在看。

撰文‧蔡曜蓮

大衛.卡普︵David Karp︶,才二十六歲,身價卻已高達兩億美元︵折合新台幣約六十億元︶。十四歲輟學,二十一歲創辦小網誌Tumblr,距今不過六年,Tumblr已成為美國熱門的社交網站,包括女神卡卡與美國總統歐巴馬都是他的忠實用戶,更讓雅虎的新任執行長瑪莉莎.梅爾捧著十一億美元︵折合新台幣約三三○億元︶購併,她甚至保證不干預網站的未來走向,給予大衛完全的主導權。面子裡子雙贏的他,瞬間成為紐約科技圈內引人注目的焦點。

母親的鼓勵造就網站奇才

大衛的母親是老師,他也順理成章在母親任教的學校就讀。自從十一歲開始學習電腦語言後,他對電腦的熱愛就沒有停止過。礙於體制,白天他不得不在學校中度過,放學後他會對著電腦研究一整個晚上。當時的他對自己的人生已經有明確的方向,他就是篤定要朝電腦科技的領域發展。母親眼見他在學校非常無聊,與其強迫他待在學校,不如正視他的志向,於是母親鼓勵他輟學,並且引薦他到佛瑞德.賽博的科技公司實習。

有趣的是,他曾經被記者問到:「如果有小孩像他一樣是個電腦天才,他會鼓勵對方輟學嗎?」他說不會,「我覺得自己錯過很多正常的、社交的童年經驗。」只是,當時的他非常確定,網路發展就是他想走的路,而學校無法提供他需要的相關資源,加上幸運地得到實習的機會,老闆佛瑞德的啟蒙對他後來的成功有很大的幫助。

原本就有點內向的他,青少年輟學加深了他的孤僻。直到今日,他仍然習慣避開其他員工,提早到公司工作。在他創業之前,曾任職於「都市寶貝」︵urbanbaby︶,這是一家親子網站。在這段期間內,他曾帶著工作到日本旅行,直到他離開紐約三個月,同事才發現他人在日本。大概就是這種不善與人交往的特質,讓大衛決心創建Tumblr。

大衛是Tumblr的重度使用者,Tumblr的設計完全按照大衛對社交網站的要求。友人形容,Tumblr的網站風格就是大衛本人個性的展現,沒有太多文字,以圖片、影像串流為主。換句話說,如果他不是有點孤僻的人,也許不會有今日的Tumblr。

不同於其他科技公司一窩蜂地湧向矽谷,大衛喜歡紐約的程度勝過矽谷,因為社交網站主要是設計給都市人使用,你活在都市裡,才會知道都市人的需要。

對科技趨勢有獨到看法

他在網站上發表的生活照,有時相當露骨,似乎試圖藉由刺激官能的照片吸引人們注意,在紐約的科技圈內被認為是個愛慕虛榮的傢伙。

即使大衛身價有兩億美元,但他的生活卻相當儉樸。他住在龍蛇混雜的布魯克林區,可以算是那一帶最有錢的人,而房子裡幾乎空蕩蕩,沒什麼家具,客廳也只有一張沙發與一架電視;偌大的臥室裡,衣櫃也只半滿。他說:「我很意外人們在自己的家裡能夠裝滿東西。」周遭親近他的人,常用「有禮貌、固執」來形容他。在財經雜誌︽富比世︾的訪談裡,說到他的固執,他皺著眉頭表示自己並不以這個特質為榮:「當我對某件事固執的時候,那是因為我真的非常、非常相信我是對的,我希望我能實現那件事。」和他一起創辦Tumblr的馬克.亞曼,形容大衛固執己見,對產品苛求的程度幾乎媲美賈伯斯。

即使很多人常常試圖說服大衛改變主意,卻往往爭不過他,最後事實證明大衛是對的。「他對於Tumblr應該要走的方向非常敏銳,幾乎沒有出錯。當我回顧和大衛一起創辦Tumblr的時光,我的心情非常複雜。不想再經歷那種壓力,因為他是會一直逼你的人,但是最後你往往會發現成果出乎意料的好。」關於大衛的固執,從他還是實習生的時候就看得出來。當他輟學在佛瑞德手下工作,佛瑞德要他做一款新網站﹁新世紀網路﹂。但大衛覺得老闆對網站規畫與YouTube太過相似,他堅持網站的創新性不夠,兩人爭執了一番,即使對方是老闆,他還是絲毫不退讓,始終拒絕建置網站,佛瑞德只當是青少年的古怪脾氣在作祟。

過了兩周,大衛走到佛瑞德面前,從身上抽出索尼的掌上型遊戲機,指著遊戲機對他說:「不久以後,蘋果將會推出具有影片播放功能的iPod,這才是未來的趨勢,將來的消費者只會用隨身的裝置看影片,你應該想的是如何在這塊領域捷足先登。」最後佛瑞德採以了他的意見。

大衛的預言對了,﹁新世紀網路﹂後來成為率先在iTunes使用的影音軟體,最後被谷歌用五千萬美元收購。

他對科技趨勢獨到的看法,能不能讓他在變動快速的社交戰場上洞燭機先,超越臉書在社交網站上的龍頭地位,所有人都拭目以待。

大衛.卡普

︵David Karp︶

出生:1986年

現職:Tumblr執行長經歷︰Tumblr創辦人

科技公司實習生

學歷:卡爾霍恩中學


PermaLink: https://articles.zkiz.com/?id=56955

台彩總經理黃志宜出新招 造就三三二位百萬富翁 引爆刮刮樂熱潮背後的財神爺

2014-02-17  TWM
 
 

 

今年農曆春節,刮刮樂在全台一炮而紅,業績突破去年紀錄,締造兩倍佳績,台彩新春打出漂亮一仗,有賴成功的行銷策略與產品結構調整,而這些策略的背後,則有賴台彩總經理黃志宜努力居間協調與排除障礙。

撰文‧張舒婷

「你刮了沒?」今年農曆春節,帶動投注站業績成長的主力並非每次過年皆熱銷的大樂透,而是刮刮樂。

過年期間若打開臉書,不時就會看到親友上傳中獎的刮刮樂照片;更特別的現象是,進入彩券相關討論網站,幾乎七、八成網友的留言都是「好希望我被扣稅!」(註:不論電腦型彩券或刮刮樂,中獎獎金若超過兩千元,須扣稅兩成)是以往從沒出現過的現象。

「今年大樂透加碼,為買氣帶來一倍成長,但光是刮刮樂,就帶來五倍成長!」台北市和平東路飛來富彩券行老闆蔡天富表示。對全台灣最大「莊家」||台灣彩券公司來說,刮刮樂確實成為今年農曆春節最肥的金雞母,根據台彩統計數據顯示,去年(二○一三年)春節檔期,刮刮樂批售總金額約一五二億元,今年成長近兩倍,來到近三百億元。

溝通魔人

促成三十對有情人結良緣

關於刮刮樂的狂銷熱賣,不能不提到這位重要幕後推手——在台彩公司超過七年的總經理黃志宜。

黃志宜是老銀行人,一九七○年在彰化銀行擔任行員,八○年轉戰中信銀行,一做就是二十七年,陸續累積行銷、零售金融、法人金融等業務經驗,○七年退休前,他的身份是中信銀行台中區域經理。

在同仁眼中,黃志宜是典型的魔羯座個性,沉穩內斂、腳踏實地,「他的溝通力和執行力超強,不管再複雜難解的事,他都不怕麻煩。」也因為如此,二十二年前中信金控董事長辜濂松的夫人辜林瑞慧成立「中華民國兒童慈善協會」時,她和女兒辜仲玉異口同聲選上黃志宜擔任中區分會會長。

關於黃志宜的溝通力與執行力,最為人津津樂道的例子,就是他三十年來扮演無數次的「月老」角色。擔任台中分行經理期間,行內一對男女職員感情甚篤,但因兩人同姓氏,女方家長堅持「同姓不能成婚」,黃志宜則以主管身份三度拜訪女方家長,前兩次取得對方信任,第三次見面時才談到這門婚事,說服對方「兩邊若無血緣關係,不應該反對。三個月後,雙方順利成婚。

近三十年來,黃志宜為無數員工、部屬、客戶扮演月老的角色,至今已有近三十對有情人因為他終成眷屬。由此,也能看見他熱心與執行力兼具的一面。

從中信銀退休後,在全球個金執行長黃思國推薦下,黃志宜出任台灣彩券總經理。他回憶,當接到黃思國的電話時,起初相當吃驚,轉念一想,如果能用自己的執行力,把各種天馬行空的想法轉化為實際可行的方案,或許也能得到過去沒有的成就感。

執行高手

實現「點子王」薛香川構想「把創意變成現實。」黃志宜這樣的自我定位,在一○年薛香川來到台彩擔任董事長後,得到了最完整的發揮。相較於黃志宜,薛香川則隨時都有創意十足的點子發想,在台彩內部有「點子王」之稱,兩人合力打響的第一炮,就是一一年首度推出的大樂透「百組百萬」活動。

讓大樂透一券兩玩,另開出一百組號碼,「當時幾乎所有台彩員工都覺得,這個點子的執行難度太高,不過黃志宜還真是發揮了當年不怕麻煩的本領,硬是把董事長的點子執行到位。」台彩員工回憶。

熟稔台彩業務的黃志宜,決定先從協調內部團隊著手,發想執行細節,也發揮自己溝通協調能力。在各場會議中,他鼓勵各部門員工都要暢所欲言,詳述執行面的所有難處,不漏掉一絲一毫可能發生的執行障礙;對外,他則不厭其煩的與當時負責開獎的非凡新聞台溝通協調,最後終於掙得了長達一小時的新春開獎節目,又自己敲定了安心亞、蔡黃汝(豆花妹)等開獎活動代言明星,最後果然一炮而紅。

「百組百萬獎金」加碼活動締造當年一到二月業績超過三○二億元的驚人業績,連薛、黃兩人都感到意外,從此黃志宜也成為薛香川發想各式各樣點子時,最信賴的執行幫手。

「百組百萬」不僅大幅拉抬了大樂透買氣,也因為吸引人潮湧入彩券行,連帶為刮刮樂日後的熱銷奠定基礎。而在這個農曆春節,薛、黃兩人又是用了哪幾招,能讓刮刮樂的買氣熱到發燙?

首先是「檔期提前開跑」。有鑑於去年專為農曆年節檔期設計的兩千元「$2,600萬大紅包」刮刮樂賣翻天,今年台彩一改農曆年前一週才發行的模式,特地提早至國曆一月一日就上市。

踏實戰將

調整獎金結構衝出好業績

黃志宜表示,刮刮樂上市時間提早的好處,在於吸引民眾和親友在過年前,即可「揪團」集資搶購,而不是在「放假期間」才以「家庭」為單位的小額購買。不少經銷商在過年前就把批來的刮刮樂售罄,手上的現金又可拿去買下周發行的刮刮樂,在台彩加期加量的基礎下,經銷商又有充裕的現金流,周轉率自然衝高。

除了檔期提前開跑之外,彩券工會全國聯合會榮譽理事長林俊福認為,台彩這次致勝的關鍵策略是「一舉拉高高面額產品發行量」。

根據台彩統計,今年高面額刮刮樂佔整體批購量的五成五以上,包括「$2,600萬超級紅包」今年發行五十億元,是去年的二.五倍;一千元面額也首度推出新款「大麻將」,所有一千元面額刮刮樂(大麻將、$1,200萬大吉利)發行量從去年的十五億元,激增至今年的五十五億元,成長近四倍。

每張一百到三百元的刮刮樂,有穩定的客源,但要如何吸引高面額刮刮樂的買氣?台彩採取最直接的方式:提高中獎率。面額一千元的「大麻將」、「$1,200萬大吉利」等產品,中獎率皆在七○%以上,兩千元「超級紅包」超過八○%,面額五百元的「金馬獎」中獎率更是百分百。

但台彩的聰明之處也在這裡;雖說「中獎」,但如果一張要價兩千元,中了一千元,到底是莊家贏?還是買家贏?答案很清楚。「台彩完全抓住了過年期間,民眾想討個好綵頭的心態!」林俊福以保證中獎的「金馬獎」為例:「如果刮的人一定有獎,中獎時告訴自己:我運氣不錯嘛!這是過年期間大家都想要的好兆頭,所以很適合作為紅包送人。」也難怪農曆春節一上市,初一、初二就賣到缺貨。

偏高的中獎率,還要搭配精心設計的獎金結構,才能奏效。黃志宜就說,「一個上億元獎金的吸引力,往往還不如一大堆的十萬、一百萬元獎項!」除了增設許多千元以下的小獎外,薛香川這次對刮刮樂的「超級紅包」也特地調整獎金結構,將二獎(一百萬元)增至三百個、三獎(十萬元)增至兩千五百個;首度上市的「大麻將」二獎(一百萬元)名額也多達三十二個。

薛香川解釋,就一般人的心理層面來說,「一百萬」、「十萬」是重要關卡,增設十萬元、百萬元獎項,對彩迷來說極富吸引力。

二○一四年是第四屆公益彩券的第一年,本屆經銷權期間長達十年,在薛、黃二人的聯手推動下,台彩公司一開春就透過刮刮樂繳出漂亮的成績單,也算是討到一個「好綵頭」了。

今年少做2周卻有2倍業績

時間 2013年

(1/1~2/19) 2014年

(1/1~2/6)

一般面額總計 89.83 134.22 高面額總計 62.5 165 批售金額 152.33 299.22

單位:億元

註:高面額刮刮樂為售價500元以上者,包含500元、1000元、2000元。

資料來源:台彩公司

PermaLink: https://articles.zkiz.com/?id=91483

[創業板]中國三三傳媒(8087)專區

1 : GS(14)@2011-01-09 16:03:36

http://www.hkgem.com/listing/pre ... 101224-layout_c.htm
http://www.hkgem.com/listing/prelist/CWP33MED-20101224-full.pdf
招股書

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... TN20110221002_C.pdf
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20110222006_C.HTM
正式招股書

http://realforum.zkiz.com/thread.php?tid=12284
新聞專區
2 : GS(14)@2011-01-09 16:09:35

又是福建假野...
http://www.hkgem.com/listing/prelist/CWP33MED-20101224-10.pdf

http://www.hkgem.com/listing/prelist/CWP33MED-20101224-13.pdf
公司祕書做346非執董
3 : reference(1610)@2011-01-09 22:11:36

2樓提及
又是福建假野...
http://www.hkgem.com/listing/prelist/CWP33MED-20101224-10.pdf

http://www.hkgem.com/listing/prelist/CWP33MED-20101224-13.pdf
公司祕書做346非執董


湯兄可否講下假喺邊?
4 : jjolean(1007)@2011-01-09 22:29:13

我都想知假係邊度
湯兄俾D hints?
5 : GS(14)@2011-01-10 21:02:13

3樓提及
2樓提及
又是福建假野...
http://www.hkgem.com/listing/prelist/CWP33MED-20101224-10.pdf

http://www.hkgem.com/listing/prelist/CWP33MED-20101224-13.pdf
公司祕書做346非執董


湯兄可否講下假喺邊?


無交稅的
6 : GS(14)@2011-02-13 13:55:14

2011-2-10 HT
高鐵免費雜誌 月底上創板   

  自中國宏橋(新上市編號:01378)暫時擱置招股計劃,加上內地加息增添不明朗因素,市場亦對新股抱持觀望態度。不過,於內地高鐵綫免費派發雜誌的三三傳媒集團,將於本月底在創業板掛牌,集資3億至4億元,料可為兔年新股市場測試水溫。

  三三傳媒於內地所有高鐵綫派發雜誌《旅伴》、《報林》和《旅客報》,市佔率第一。此外,公司亦於內地常規列車播放音頻節目「和諧鐵路之聲」,並擁有於內地民航機場的航空管制塔出售廣告位的獨家權利。

三三傳媒 集資最多4億

  集團計劃未來通過收購,或於常規列車及和諧號動車組列車的火車站安裝廣告燈箱。同時,集團亦會拓展網上平面媒體廣告。

  消息指,截至去年上半年,三三的純利為3,000萬元人民幣,預計全年純利逾7,000萬元人民幣,較2009年的868萬元人民幣增長逾7倍。消息稱,三三將於下周舉行小型投資者推介會。由於此次招股不設公開發售部分,公司擬於本月28日在創業板掛牌。保薦人為招銀國際及大和證券。

配售形式上市 基金看好

  中央出招加息,加上資金撤出新興市場,大市表現相當反覆。有見今年以來掛牌的新股至今表現未見突出(見表),基金經理均表示近期新股估值過高,上升水位有限,故對新股沒有信心。不過,由於三三集資額有限,加上只會分配予機構性投資者,基金經理均表示在貨源集中下,此股有上升空間,有望打破新股悶局。
7 : GS(14)@2011-02-22 07:40:08

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20110222002_C.pdf
中國三三傳媒集團有限公司
(於開曼群島註冊成立的有限公司)
配售
配售股份數目: 162,000,000股股份,
包括150,000,000股新股
及12,000,000股待售股份
(視乎超額配股權而定)
配售價: 不超過每股配售股份2.38港元,
另加1%經紀佣金、0.003%證監會
交易徵費及0.005%聯交所交易費
面值: 每股股份0.001美元
股份代號: 8087
8 : GS(14)@2011-02-26 16:36:40

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20110225002_C.pdf
配售
配售股份數目: 162,000,000股股份,
包括150,000,000股新股及
12,000,000股待售股份
(視乎超額配股權而定)
配售價: 每股配售股份1.80港元,
另加1%經紀佣金、
0.003%證監會交易徵費及
0.005%聯交所交易費
面值: 每股股份0.001美元
股份代號: 8087
9 : GS(14)@2011-04-02 18:05:21

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20110328100_C.pdf
好強勁,但第一年看不出甚麼
10 : GS(14)@2011-07-01 17:25:18

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20110630152_C.pdf
誠 如 招 股 章 程 所 述,董 事 隨 後 預 計,償 付 未 支 付結 餘、解 散 五 家 運 營 實 體 及 其 後 自 動 終 止 相 關 結 構 協 議 將 於2011年6月 底 前 完成。然 而,鑒 於 以 下 原 因,於 本 公 佈 日 期 尚 未 完 成 解 散 五 家 運 營 實 體 及 自 動 終止 相 關 結 構 協 議。


成 都 旅 伴 及 廣 州 旅 伴
於2011年4月,支 付 集 團 內 結 餘 後,本 公 司 已 向 有 關 機 構 遞 交 申 請,解 散 成 都 旅伴 及 廣 州 旅 伴。預 期 解 散 成 都 旅 伴 及 廣 州 旅 伴 將 於2011年 底 前 完 成。

北 京 旅 伴、濟 南 旅 伴 及 上 海 旅 伴
於2011年4月 及5月,北 京 旅 伴、濟 南 旅 伴 及 上 海 旅 伴 從 相 關 稅 務 檢 查 局 收 到 稅務 檢 查 通 知,要 求 進 行 稅 務 記 錄 檢 查,據 董 事 所 知,有 關 檢 查 屬 當 地 稅 務 檢 查局 的 例 行 程 序。北 京 旅 伴、濟 南 旅 伴 及 上 海 旅 伴 須 於 解 散 程 序 開 始 前 遵 守 檢 查規 定。截 至 本 公 佈 日 期,概 無 由 稅 務 檢 查 局 遵 循 上 述 規 定 通 知 執 行 的 檢 查,因此 本 集 團 無 法 確 定 此 三 家 公 司 何 時 可 申 請 解 散。

鑒 於 上 述 情 況,解 散 五 家 運 營 實 體 及 自 動 終 止 相 關 結 構 協 議 將 不 會 於2011年6月 底 前 完 成。

誠 如 招 股 章 程 所 披 露,倘 未 能 於2011年6月 底 前 完 成 解 散 五 家 運 營 實 體,本 集 團計 劃 其 後 向 林 先 生 及 阮 先 生 或 獨 立 第 三 方 出 售 五 家 運 營 實 體 的 經 濟 利 益 及 權益。然 而,由 於 延 誤 的 原 因 與 行 政 性 質 有 關,加 上 五 家 運 營 實 體 已 停 止 營 運,董 事 認 為,遵 守 稅 務 檢 查 規 定 及 解 散 申 請 程 序 後,解 散 五 家 運 營 實 體 應 並 無 障礙。因 此,董 事 認 為,本 公 司 毋 須 於 現 階 段 向 林 先 生 及 阮 先 生 或 獨 立 第 三 方 出售 五 家 運 營 實 體 的 經 濟 利 益 及 權 益。

本 公 司 將 進 一 步 公 佈 有 關 解 散 五 家 運 營 實 體 的 重 大 發 展。
11 : GS(14)@2011-09-03 10:30:05

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20110902136_C.pdf
遲D會唔會買野?
12 : CHAUCHAU(1254)@2011-12-08 12:14:21

8087 福建野想偷錢?
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20111207011_C.pdf
本集團與中國相關鐵路局授權的廣告公司已就上述權利訂立七項協議。除其中一項協議的有效期將於2013 年2 月28日屆滿外,餘下六項協議的有效期將於2012 年12 月31日屆滿。根據該等協議,本集團須向該等廣告公司支付廣告代理費、保養費及╱或媒體服務費,總額約人民幣75,530,000 元,須於2012 年6 月15 日或之前分期支付。
13 : GS(14)@2012-01-21 18:38:17

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20120120055_C.pdf
so laughing this company

本公司董事(「董事」)會(「董事會」)謹此知會本公司股東及有意投資者,根據董
事會對截至2011 年12 月31 日止年度本公司未經審核綜合管理賬目(有關資料既
未經本公司審核委員會正式審閱,亦未經核數師審核)的初步評估,截至2011
年12月31日止年度之本公司擁有人應佔純利,可能顯著低於2010年同期之數字。
董事會相信,純利下滑主要是由於2011 年7 月23 日發生溫州高鐵追撞事故打擊
了廣告需求,加上中國政府對房地產業實施調控措施,導致物業發展商及其
他相關公司的廣告訂單減少所致。
14 : jjolean(1007)@2012-01-22 00:14:25

nevermind..they just want to change to main board..reach the requirement is ok
15 : GS(14)@2012-01-22 09:58:51

14樓提及
nevermind..they just want to change to main board..reach the requirement is ok


have you read the news in Money Times?
16 : jjolean(1007)@2012-01-23 22:58:23

15樓提及
14樓提及
nevermind..they just want to change to main board..reach the requirement is ok


have you read the news in Money Times?


no, where can I read it?
17 : GS(14)@2012-01-23 22:59:09

16樓提及
15樓提及
14樓提及
nevermind..they just want to change to main board..reach the requirement is ok


have you read the news in Money Times?


no, where can I read it?


等我一陣,我把它上線
18 : GS(14)@2012-01-24 00:55:59

2012-01-16 im

 到底三三傳媒的背景有多勁?「哈哈哈……這個事情我可以跟你談,去年2月我們做路演的時候,鐵道部的領導
就出事了(原鐵道部長劉志軍被免職),基金公司當時都在問,我們跟他有甚麼關係?我說,真的沒有關係!」公
司行政總裁兼執行董事韓文前,在接受本刊專訪時坦白回應。
  「我們做這個媒體,不是因為甚麼關係。為甚麼呢?這個行業初期經營水平真的很低,但我們管理層有經驗
,懂得怎樣去做,也就投資進去了,用了很多年時間才令人認同,才令旅客滿意,這才是最關鍵。我們是靠自己去
打拼,就是這個意思。」
  的確,三三傳媒上市至今不算一帆風順,上市時遇着鐵道部領導被捕,去年7月剛推出新刊物《旅客報1318》
,卻又遇上「723溫州事故」,難免對公司拓展廣告網絡帶來影響。
  「723事故對我們是有影響的,主要在兩個方面。第一,原定開通的綫路沒開通,也令我們一些刊物無法開通
;第二,廣告客戶以為高鐵人流減少,廣告的價值下跌,也就取消了廣告。」

...
 自京滬高鐵正式通車後,公司每月共印製約10萬本刊物於京滬高鐵上供乘客閱覽。「一般刊物的傳閱率是2至
3個人,但我們每本卻可以每月有100個人看到,是正常的幾十倍以上。由於列車上屬封閉空間,我們又伴隨高鐵發
行,可大大縮短培養讀者的周期,最重要是國家十二五仍支持鐵路規劃,我們對前景仍充滿信心!」
19 : iniesta(1400)@2012-05-07 19:59:28

其實呢隻野同550, 品牌中國做的東西好似差唔多
20 : GS(14)@2012-05-07 21:12:03

19樓提及
其實呢隻野同550, 品牌中國做的東西好似差唔多


都是平面雜誌廣告代理,只是受眾有些不同
21 : iniesta(1400)@2012-05-08 20:02:15

唔知會唔會好似550咁發展呢
22 : GS(14)@2012-05-08 20:35:16

21樓提及
唔知會唔會好似550咁發展呢


福建野唔信
23 : GS(14)@2012-07-28 13:56:34

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20120727083_C.pdf
本公司董事(「董事」)會(「董事會」)謹此知會本公司股東及有意投資者,根據董
事會對本公司現時可供參閱之財務資料(有關資料既未經本公司審核委員會
審閱,亦未經本公司核數師審核)的初步評估,本集團預期於截至2012 年6 月30
日止六個月將錄得虧損,而2011 年同期則為錄得利潤。
董事會相信,虧損主要歸因於高速鐵路列車上頭枕巾、摺枱及海報框架廣告
項目而支付的代理費用、維護費用及媒體服務費用攤銷而導致利潤率下跌、
員工數目增加及員工成本增加、平面媒體業務印刷成本增加,以及應付本集
團出版夥伴的代理費用增加。此外,由於往年發生溫州動車撞車事故連同中
國經濟持續不明朗的情況,對廣告的需求減少,加上中國政府亦對房地產業
實施調控措施,來自房地產開發商及其他相關公司的廣告訂單減少,令期間
內的收益較2011 年同期大幅下降。
有關本集團截至2012 年6 月30 日止六個月的中期業績的詳情,將遵照創業板上
市規則載於中期業績公佈內。
24 : GS(14)@2012-10-28 10:09:22

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20121026024_C.pdf
本公司董事(「董事」)會(「董事會」)謹此知會本公司股東及有意投資者,根據董
事會對本公司現時可供參閱之財務資料(有關資料既未經本公司審核委員會
審閱,亦未經本公司核數師審核)的初步評估,本集團預期於截至2012 年9 月30
日止九個月將錄得虧損,而2011 年同期則為錄得利潤。
董事會相信,虧損主要歸因於高速鐵路列車上頭枕巾、摺枱及海報框架廣告
項目而支付的代理費用、維護費用及媒體服務費用攤銷而導致利潤率下跌、
員工數目增加導致員工成本增加、平面媒體業務印刷成本增加,以及支付本
集團出版夥伴的代理費用增加。此外,中國政府亦對房地產業實施調控措施,
來自房地產開發商及房地產開發相關公司的廣告訂單減少,令期間內的收益
較2011 年同期大幅下降。
25 : GS(14)@2012-11-01 00:02:55

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20121031062_C.pdf
中國三三傳媒集團有限公司(「本公司」)董事(「董事」)會(「董事會」)謹此宣佈,
梁廷育先生(「梁先生」)因其個人事業發展而辭任本公司財務總監、公司秘書
及獲授權代表之職務,自2012 年10 月31 日起生效。梁先生已確認,其並無與董
事會意見不合,亦無任何有關其辭任而須知會本公司股東之事宜。
董事會欣然宣佈,李文泰先生(「李先生」)已獲委任為本公司之財務總監、公司
秘書及獲授權代表,自2012 年10 月31 日起生效。李先生於2000 年畢業於嶺南大
學工商管理學士學位,並於2010 年獲得香港理工大學工商管理(金融服務)碩
士學位。李先生自2004 年起亦為香港會計師公會之會員及自2007 年起為英國
特許公認會計師公會之會員。於2012 年,李先生獲認可為英國特許公認會計
師公會之資深會員。李先生在會計及審計方面擁有逾十年專業經驗。李先生
自2000 年6 月至2001 年7 月任職於魏穎楠會計師事務所。彼其後自2001 年9 月至
2006 年4 月任職於均富會計師行(現稱香港立信德豪會計師事務所有限公司)。
在加入本公司之前,自2006 年10 月至2012 年10 月,李先生擔任中國元邦房地產
控股有限公司(一家於百慕達註冊成立的公司)之財務總監兼公司秘書,該公
司股份在新加坡股票證券交易所有限公司主板上市,股份代號為B2X。

民企財技人
26 : jjolean(1007)@2012-11-01 01:22:34

the people down grade jor...
27 : GS(14)@2012-11-03 09:15:34

26樓提及
the people down grade jor...

隻野福建野你仲想點?
28 : GS(14)@2013-01-08 00:28:43

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20130107036_C.pdf
本公佈乃由中國三三傳媒集團有限公司(「本公司」,連同其附屬公司統稱「本
集團」)根據香港聯合交易所有限公司創業板證券上市規則第17.10 條作出。
本集團為《旅客報》、《旅伴》和《報林》的獨家廣告代理,而該等報刊為鐵道部批
准在列車車廂內分銷的五種出版物其中三種。本公司董事(「董事」)會(「董事會」)
謹此宣布,根據中國廣告協會鐵路分會於2012 年11 月29 日發出的公告(「中國廣
告協會鐵路分會第一項公告」),該會邀請合資格參與者參加中國所有旅客列
車雜誌分銷權的公開招標。
根據中國廣告協會鐵路分會第一項公告,公開招標的有興趣參與者應於2012
年12 月24 日下午4 時或之前提交標書,而招標將於2012 年12 月29 日進行。其後,
2012 年12 月31 日,中國廣告協會鐵路分會宣布將提交標書的最後期限押後至
2013 年1 月17 日下午4 時,而招標將於2013 年1 月19 日進行(「中國廣告協會鐵路
分會第二項公告」)。然而,中國廣告協會鐵路分會並無宣佈招標結果的刊登
日期。
董事會獲悉,《旅伴》的出版夥伴中國鐵道出版社以及《報林》與《旅客報》的出版
夥伴人民鐵道報社擁有參加公開招標所需的資格。
就董事會所知悉,根據公開招標的結論和結果,倘若上述報紙和期刊的有關
出版商選擇不參加該項公開招標,或有關出版商參加該項公開招標而並未中標,
有關出版商可能無法繼續於旅客列車分銷其報紙和期刊。在這種情況下,有
關出版商可能需另覓途徑分銷上述報紙和期刊,甚或停止刊印有關報紙和期刊。

在2011年12月31日止年度內,印刷媒體廣告業務佔本集團總收益約83.1%。因此,
倘上述任何出版夥伴決定不參加公開招標,或未能藉公開招標取得分銷權,
則《旅伴》、《報林》及╱或《旅客報》未能在旅客列車分銷及╱或在其他可為其招徠
相若數量廣告的分銷渠道分銷,又或任何出版夥伴日後選擇停止出版該等報
紙和雜誌,本集團的收益及盈利能力將可能會受到重大不利影響。
29 : GS(14)@2013-01-24 01:25:00

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20130123030_C.pdf
中國旅客列車雜誌分銷權公開招標的結果
茲提述本公司日期為2013 年1 月7 日的公佈,內容有關中國旅客列車雜誌分銷
權公開招標。
本公司董事(「董事」)欣然宣佈,《旅伴》的出版夥伴中國鐵道出版社透過公開招
標已成功取得《旅伴》的分銷權。中國鐵道出版社將於2013 年2 月28 日或之前與
各個鐵路局的廣告公司訂立正式協議。
董事會(「董事會」)獲悉,《旅客報》及《報林》的出版夥伴人民鐵道報社尚未就《旅
客報》及《報林》提交標書。於招標結果公佈後,《旅客報》已停止在中國高速鐵路
網絡分銷,而《報林》已停止在中國高速鐵路網絡及經挑選常規列車分銷。本公
司了解到,《旅客報》及《報林》的出版夥伴正就繼續於中國高速鐵路及常規列車
的分銷權與相關國家及若干地方鐵路局進行磋商。
於截至2011 年12 月31 日止年度內, 印刷媒體廣告業務佔本集團的總收益約
83.1%,而《旅客報》及《報林》佔本集團於印刷媒體廣告業務分部的收益合共
50%。因此,倘《旅客報》及《報林》未能恢復在旅客列車分銷及╱或在其他可為其
招徠相若數量廣告的分銷渠道分銷,又或人民鐵道報社日後選擇停止出版該
等報紙和雜誌,本集團的收益及盈利能力將可能會受到重大不利影響。
本集團將就《旅客報》及《報林》的前景以及與人民鐵道報社訂立的合作協議情
況進行商討。本公司將就有關本集團與人民鐵道報社針對上述報紙和雜誌的
前景進行商討後作出的決定的任何重大發展作出進一步公佈。

盈利預警
茲提述本公司日期為2012 年10 月26 日的公佈,內容有關截至2012 年9 月30 日止
九個月之盈利預警,以及本公司日期為2012年12月13日的公佈(「2012年12月公佈」),
內容有關向本公司全資附屬公司北京奧神傳媒廣告有限公司(「北京奧神」)發
出傳票(「北京奧神合約爭議」)。
董事會謹此知會本公司股東及有意投資者,根據董事會對本公司現時可供參
閱之財務資料(有關資料既未經本公司審核委員會審閱,亦未經本公司核數師
審核)的初步評估,本集團預期於截至2012 年12 月31 日止全年將錄得虧損,而
2011 年同期則為錄得利潤。
董事會相信,虧損主要歸因於高速鐵路列車上頭枕巾、摺枱及海報框架廣告
項目而支付的代理費用、維護費用及媒體服務費用攤銷而導致利潤率下跌、
員工數目增加導致員工成本增加、平面媒體業務印刷成本增加,以及支付本
集團出版夥伴的代理費用增加及北京奧神合約爭議,其中北京奧神可能須支
付損害賠償約人民幣4,700,000 元(詳情載於2012 年12 月公佈)。此外,中國政府
亦對房地產業實施調控措施,來自房地產開發商及房地產開發相關公司的廣
告訂單減少,令期間內的收益較2011 年同期大幅下降。
有關本集團截至2012 年12 月31 日止全年業績的詳情,將遵照聯交所創業板證
券上市規則載於本公司業績公佈內。
30 : greatsoup38(830)@2013-01-27 12:07:14

中國三三傳媒至是

全國旅客列車雜誌擺放權招標結果近日揭曉。原計劃招標8本雜誌,最終僅有奧神傳媒的《旅伴》和沃美傳媒的《旅遊地理》兩本雜誌競標獲得擺放權。

「雖然中標了,但心情並不能輕鬆起來。」昨日,沃美傳媒相關負責人在接受《第一財經日報》採訪時稱,「這樣的價格,我想對目前參與競標的雜誌社來說太高了,我們所能接受的競標費是在1000萬以下。」

該負責人告訴本報記者,《旅遊地理》2012年的營業收入只有2000多萬元,按照規定,競標成功後實行分期付款,但首付需要支付一年競標費用的75%,也就是1837.5萬元。「企業利潤都拿去競了標。」

有業內人士對此分析稱,雖然鐵路雜誌擺放權招標可為鐵道部帶來一定收益,但動車三年最少7000多萬元的擺放權費價位過高,與目前紙質雜誌的年盈利環境不相符。操之過急,可能欲速則不達。

不堪擺放費之貴

2012年11月29日,中國廣告協會鐵路分會發佈了《全國鐵路旅客列車雜誌擺放權聯合招商公告》。根據招商文件規定,列車雜誌擺放權費分兩種,一種是動車擺放權費,一種是既有列車(非動車)擺放權費。動車擺放權費底價為每種雜誌3.5萬元/組/年,目前全國有700組動車,如此計算,每年要上架的雜誌至少需要支付2450萬元渠道費。

按照公告規定,招標一次至少簽約3年,如此計算,3年至少需要花費7350萬元。如果擺放在既有列車(非動車)上,既有列車擺放權費底價為0.1萬元/組/年,目前既有列車全國有1.3萬輛,則每年至少需要支付1300萬元。按照3年計算,3年至少需要花費3900萬元。

上述沃美傳媒負責人介紹,2010年10月,公司與中國鐵路文藝雜誌社合作,聯合推出《旅遊地理》。在2012年12月上旬鐵道路宣佈將進行擺放權招標之前,「《旅遊地理》基本上是免費擺放在火車上。現在進行招標也可,但招標價格太貴了,雜誌承擔不了。」

不單是《旅遊地理》盈利能力單薄,參與競標的其他企業也是如此。在動車上一直有發行《和諧之旅》的北京賽迪傳媒投資股份有限公司(下稱「賽迪傳媒」,000504.SZ)1月21日發佈公告稱退出此次競標。公司方面表示:「目前鐵道媒體業務佔公司主營業務收益近40%,從目前《和諧之旅》業務收入及利潤增長情況看,無法負擔上述巨額的渠道費用和融資財務成本。」

賽迪傳媒財報顯示,2012年扣除非經常性損益後的淨利潤為-1191.75萬元,2013年媒體業務板塊預計總收入也只有4200萬元。

中投顧問文化行業研究員沈哲彥認為,目前我國高鐵、動車方面的廣告發展正處於起步階段,定價機制尚未成熟。由於高鐵、動車修建完成時間較短,有關部門為了盡快回本,抬高廣告定價,並沒有給雜誌充足的孕育期,不符合時下的紙質傳媒環境。

債務高企急找錢

2012年12月上旬,北京產權交易所正式對外發佈全國鐵路旅客列車雜誌擺放權聯合招商公告,這是鐵路廣告資源首次通過產權市場對外招商。

當時業界普遍認為,全國列車上供旅客閱讀的報刊將打破由鐵路媒體壟斷的現狀,鐵路外媒體將有機會進入鐵路系統。

不過也有人士稱,2014年鐵道部將進入還債高峰,2013年被認為是至關重要的一年,鐵道部面臨轉型和擴大資金來源的壓力。

公開資料顯示,目前鐵道部債務高企,資金壓力嚴峻。截至2012年三季度,鐵道部的資產為43044億元,負債為26607億元,資產負債率為61.81%,稅後利潤則為-85.41億元。

近來,鐵道部支出費用還在不斷上升。日前,鐵道部計劃給一線工人漲工資,這是繼2011年4月和2012年1月兩次漲工資後第三次漲工資。此外,今年,鐵道部還計劃全年開工建設10萬套、基本建成7.5萬套職工保障性住房,這些項目無一還需要較大的資金來源。

此次雜誌擺放權的招標,對鐵道部而言不失為一種「開源」渠道。按照《全國鐵路旅客列車雜誌擺放權聯合招商公告》,此次鐵路雜誌擺放權招標共有兩個包件,包件一是動車擺放權,包件二是非動車擺放權。

按照北京產權交易所相關人士的說法,留給兩個包件的共有4個名額。如果4個名額全部競標動車擺放權,1個名額競標7350萬元,4個名額至少將達到2.94億元。如果動車擺放權4個名額滿額,其餘雜誌可競爭包件二。包件二也可競標4個名額,如果包件二4個名額滿額,鐵道部則可獲取1.5億元的競標額。兩個包件相加,鐵道部至少能獲得4.44億元的競標收入。

北京交通大學經濟管理學院教授趙堅昨在接受本報記者採訪時稱:「對雜誌擺放權進行公開招標,一定程度上可達到開源的效果,雖然它對鐵路龐大的負債而言十分微小。」

相關報導:

鐵路廣告首次招標 動車雜誌擺放權底價2450萬

「每份(雜誌擺放權)在動車組上的底價一年2450萬,在普通線路上的則是1300萬元。」 負責此次招標的中國廣告協會鐵路分會負責人鄧經理告訴記者,一個擺放權須簽三年,則每個媒體至少付出3900萬元才可能獲得上火車的機會。

鐵路媒體招標規則存爭議

本次招標的《全國鐵路旅客列車雜誌擺放權聯合招商公告》顯示,投標的雜誌須為月刊,總頁數不超過200頁,每期雜誌廣告篇幅不得超過總頁數的三分之一;必須有報導鐵路行業的新聞、服務信息等內容,不得少於總篇幅的15%。還規定,十八個鐵路局將委託中廣協鐵路分會成立編輯部,對雜誌中的鐵路行業內容進行編輯,並負責報送鐵路主管部門審批。
31 : greatsoup38(830)@2013-03-31 20:23:02

8087

轉盈為虧蝕1.05億,9,800萬現金
32 : GS(14)@2013-04-09 09:14:26

seems 550 did it before
33 : GS(14)@2013-08-13 19:09:12

8087
3個月轉虧為盈600萬,6個月轉虧為盈900萬,8,200萬現金
34 : greatsoup38(830)@2013-09-10 23:59:18

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ ... LN20130910042_C.pdf
拍電影
35 : jjolean(1007)@2013-09-11 10:41:53

steal money?
36 : greatsoup38(830)@2013-09-11 22:57:44

35樓提及
steal money?


或許是
37 : iniesta(1400)@2013-09-12 04:28:04

但係拍電影真係唔講得少, D垃圾到不堪的戲在大陸, 都可以收成幾億
38 : GS(14)@2013-09-12 22:21:22

37樓提及
但係拍電影真係唔講得少, D垃圾到不堪的戲在大陸, 都可以收成幾億


更多的戲蝕好多錢
39 : iniesta(1400)@2013-09-13 03:31:16

你講得冇錯的
http://media.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2013/0531/c40606-21683157.html
40 : greatsoup38(830)@2013-09-14 10:21:10

根本有些同香港以前一樣,用拍戲來識女仔
41 : greatsoup38(830)@2013-09-18 23:56:03

8087
42 : GS(14)@2014-03-04 01:01:31

盈警
43 : GS(14)@2014-03-30 00:03:35

8087

虧損降65%,至2,800萬,8,200萬現金
44 : GS(14)@2014-06-03 23:24:54

財技人
45 : GS(14)@2014-07-21 23:20:20

盈警
46 : GS(14)@2014-08-16 23:33:51

8087

3個月轉虧700萬,6個月轉虧2,500萬,6,200萬現金
47 : GS(14)@2014-10-24 00:27:18

盈警
48 : greatsoup38(830)@2015-01-17 01:12:08

盈警
49 : greatsoup38(830)@2015-01-28 00:55:07

賣盤?
50 : GS(14)@2015-04-12 00:39:08

配售1.2億股@0.22,開始賣
51 : GS(14)@2015-04-26 01:31:21

盈警
52 : GS(14)@2015-04-30 12:50:38

buy rubbish
53 : GS(14)@2015-05-21 01:00:21

搞新野
54 : GS(14)@2015-06-02 03:02:10

拍電影
55 : greatsoup38(830)@2015-07-05 03:15:53

電影
56 : greatsoup38(830)@2015-07-25 12:19:58

1供7@10仙
57 : Banana Republic(1499)@2015-07-25 23:52:33

咁供法,好狼下喎。
58 : GS(14)@2015-08-16 14:24:32

3個月虧增8%,至860萬,6個月虧降28%,至1,700萬,5,100萬現金
59 : greatsoup38(830)@2015-09-06 22:20:11

搞新電影,不搞舊電影
60 : greatsoup38(830)@2015-09-28 23:13:06

Bubbles and troubles in Hong Kong
24th September 2015

As readers may recall, last year, Lerado Group (Holding) Co Ltd (Lerado, 1225) announced the proposed sale of its core business of baby strollers and infant car seats to Canadian listed firm Dorel Industries Inc (Dorel) for HK$930m. Lerado was planning to squat on most of the cash proceeds and only pay out $0.30 per share, or $228m. For this reason, we opposed the sale, because of concern that Lerado would become a cash shell trading at a discount to its net asset value. Your editor, David Webb, is a disclosed substantial shareholder currently holding over 8%. However, the sale was approved by shareholders on 16-Sep-2014 and completed on 31-Oct-2014.

Our concerns have now proven justified, culminating in current egregious proposals not just by Lerado but by other listed companies. We hope to stop them, if the regulators will require certain parties to play fairer. This article is long and complicated, and we thought about breaking it into pieces, but the picture becomes clearer if you assemble the whole jigsaw, so here it is. Apart from Lerado, this article covers transactions by numerous other listed companies in which you may have an interest, and several billion US dollars of bubbles.

So pour yourself a large coffee and let's get started.
Lerado share movements

The first sign of movement in Lerado came on 25-Nov-2014. Intelligence Hong Kong Group Ltd (IHK) is a company owned 68.27% by Lerado Chairman Henry Huang Ying Yuan (Mr Huang) and 31.73% by his wife, Jamy Huang Chen Li Chu. IHK owns 148,353,540 shares which was 19.50% of Lerado at 31-Dec-2014, before the recent dilutions. On 25-Nov-2014, our system shows those shares moving from CTBC Asia Ltd (the local subsidiary of a Taiwan bank) where they had rested since 30-Dec-2009, to Convoy Investment Services Ltd (Convoy IS), the brokerage sister of Convoy Financial Holdings Ltd (Convoy FH, 1019). Convoy IS is in the process of trying to list on the GEM in the form of CIS Holdings Ltd, which filed an application proof on 23-Mar-2015, sponsored by Quam Capital Ltd.

There can be any number of reasons for such transfers, but one possibility is that the shares are security for a loan. Banks and brokers are exempt from disclosing security interests in shares pledged to them. It wouldn't be so worrying were it not for the fact that Mark Mak Kwong Yiu (Mr Mak), CEO of Convoy FH and a director of Convoy IS, is also claimed to be an INED of Lerado since 25-Apr-2014. Mr Mak joined Convoy as CFO in 2002.

You may recall that in Some bubbles for New Year (31-Dec-2014) we warned about a bubble then called Finsoft Corporation (Finsoft, 8018), which was then trading at $1.235 (adjusted for the subsequent 2:1 split), with a market value of HK$4.94bn, or 110 times its net asset value. Convoy FH owned over 5% of Finsoft. The stock didn't stop there though. It reached a high of $2.92 on 20-May-2015, when Finsoft was valued at HK$11.68bn. Since then, it has crashed 94.8% to its close on Wednesday (23-Sep-2015) at $0.139, down a net 88.7% since our article. Finsoften aren't what they seem.

The Finsoft bubble allowed Convoy FH to book unrealised gains of HK$238.4m for 2014. It sold 40m shares (2%) of Finsoft on 20-Jan-2015 for about $73.5m (split-adjusted: $0.919 per share) and went below the 5% disclosure threshold. The sale was purportedly on-market but it was far larger than market volume that day of 1.925m shares so the disclosure must be wrong.

Returning to Lerado, another large chunk of 96,805,800 shares (12.71% at 31-Dec-2014) was held by Hwa Foo Investment Ltd (Hwa Foo), 30% controlled by Patrick Chen Chun Chieh (Mr Chen), an Executive Director and the son of the late co-founder of Lerado, and 70% by his mother. He joined the board on 3-Apr-2008 following his father's death on 14-Feb-2008. On 8-Sep-2014 those shares moved from HSBC (where they had rested since 27-Jun-2007) to UBS Securities HK Ltd , and then, more interestingly, they moved to small broker Win Fung Securities Ltd (Win Fung) on 9-Dec-2014, two weeks after IHK's holding moved to Convoy IS. So the Huangs and the Chens had moved custody of 32.21% of Lerado after leaving it untouched for years. More on Win Fung below.
Dispute with Dorel

First let's mention that on 10-Feb-2015, Lerado announced that it was in dispute with Dorel over the final net asset value of the business, which may lead to a partial repayment of the purchase price, in an unspecified "significant" amount.

On 27-Mar-2015, Lerado announced that it could not reach agreement with Dorel, so under the terms of the sale they had agreed to go to arbitration with an independent accountant, not yet appointed. In the 2014 annual results announcement on 30-Mar-2015, Lerado revealed that the disputed amount was HK$307m, which accordingly had been booked as a liability in the balance sheet. Still, Lerado ended 2014 with cash of $797m or HK$1.048 per share and no bank borrowings. The disputed amount was about $0.404 per share, so even if they have to pay all of that back, there would have been $0.644 per share of cash, and net assets of $633m or $0.832 per share.

On 20-Jul-2015, Lerado announced that it and Dorel had appointed RSM Nelson Wheeler as the independent accountant to determine the disputed items. Two months later, the result has not yet been announced. If Lerado were to win all of it, then the pro forma net asset value at 31-Dec-2014 increases to $1.236 per share.
Lerado swaps shares for property from CIFG

The day after the results, 31-Mar-2015, Lerado announced the acquisition of a property in Guangzhou from China Investment and Finance Group Ltd (CIFG, 1126) for HK$39m, but despite being flush with cash, only HK$1m was payable in cash and the rest in 76m new Lerado shares (9.49% of then existing shares) issued under the general mandate at $0.50 each, again a discount to cash and NAV per share.

The intended use of the property is as premises for the residual business of Lerado, which is mainly mobility scooters for the elderly and disabled, or what it calls "medical products". However, even if intended use of the property sounds plausible, the issue of shares at a discount to net cash and NAV was entirely inappropriate. The deal completed on 17-Apr-2015, giving CIFG a 8.59% stake in Lerado. Our system shows that CIFG deposited the shares into CCASS with Astrum Capital Management Ltd (Astrum) on 5-May-2015.

CIFG is not a regular listed company, but is a closed-end investment company listed under Chapter 21. This prohibits taking controlling positions (over 30%) in companies, and requires it to adhere to its stated investment restrictions. We asked the Stock Exchange why CIFG was allowed to invest in property in the first place. The result was this "clarification announcement" on 7-Aug-2015, admitting that investment properties were outside the scope of CIFG's Investment Policy and blaming it on the former Chairman and Vice Chairman. They had been removed by the Board on 14-Sep-2012, 6 months after becoming uncontactable.
Lerado begins money-lending and stockbroking

The "Prospects" section of Lerado's 2014 results indicated a new direction. The board had "concrete financial knowledge and background" and had decided to diversify into "securities trading, money lending business and other financial and property investment." It revealed that on 23-Feb-2015, Lerado had agreed to buy an unnamed target company, for HK$1.6m plus its net asset value. The target was a securities broker and planned to engage in margin financing business after the acquisition was completed. On 17-Apr-2015, Lerado announced that it would reallocate HK$300m of its cash pile for these activities.

On 2-Jul-2015 Lerado announced the name of the target, Yim Cheong Share Broking and Investment Co Ltd, and that the acquisition was completed that day. This was then renamed Black Marble Securities Ltd (Black Marble Securities), and Lerado intended to pump HK$200m into it. This small, nearly-dormant broker at that point had a minimal two licensed staff and minimal holdings in its CCASS account shown here.

Policy note: This highlights a defect in the Listing Rules: if you make a "Major Acquisition" (over 25% of your total assets), then you need shareholders' approval, but if you buy or establish a small company and then pump your funds into this new line of business, then this is completely exempt, even though shareholders are exposed to very new and different risks.

Lerado had also established BlackMarble Capital Ltd, incorporated 28-Jan-2015, a licensed money-lender. The application was gazetted on 27-Feb-2015 and the license was granted on 22-May-2015.
Lerado option grants

On 12-Feb-2015, Lerado granted options over 75m new shares (equivalent to 9.86% of the existing shares), of which half went to an unspecified number of employees, and half to "5 consultants". The options were exercisable for 2 years at $0.592 per share. It makes no sense whatever to be granting options which exercise at less than net cash per share, and much less than NAV per share, diluting both. Staff could have been incentivised with a restricted share purchase scheme to use the company's cash to buy stock in the market, which closed at $0.58 on the date of the option grants.

Despite being options of 2 years duration, 48m of the 75m were quickly exercised. We arranged an inspection of the share register on 14-Apr-2015 to discover who had been in such a hurry. We combined that with two filings of allotments by Lerado, which did not name the recipients. Here are the results:
Shareholder   Shares   Date entered   Status
Chu Chun Ting   7,500,000   11-Mar-2015   1 employee, 1 consultant
Kung Yiu Fai   7,500,000   11-Mar-2015
Chan Kam Fuk   7,500,000   17-Mar-2015   employee
Law Yee Man, Thomas   3,000,000   17-Mar-2015   employee
Wang Zewei   7,500,000   20-Mar-2015   consultant
Wong Sin Fai, Cynthia   7,500,000   20-Mar-2015   consultant
Kwok Wai Leung   7,500,000   2-Apr-2015   consultant
Total so far   48,000,000   14-Apr-2015   3 employees, 4 consultants

That leaves 1 more consultant who has not exercised the options. We recognise some of these names:

  Chan Kam Fuk is Dominic Chan Kam Fuk (Dominic Chan), proprietor of accountancy firm Dominic K.F. Chan & Co. He was appointed as Company Secretary of Lerado on 1-Aug-2014.
  Thomas Law Yee Man (Mr Law), an architect, is an INED of two listed companies, AcrossAsia Ltd (AcrossAsia, 8061) and Sage International Group Ltd (Sage, 8082). Here's a connection: Mr Law joined AcrossAsia on 28-May-2010, replacing Mr Mak of Convoy, who resigned as INED four days earlier. Perhaps Mr Mak helped to arrange Mr Law as his replacement at AcrossAsia. And here's another connection: Leung Tin Fu (Mr Leung), founder and Chairman of Sage until 14-Dec-2007, is also a pre-IPO holder of 10% of Convoy IS. Dominic Chan was an INED of Sage, resigning the same day as Mr Leung. We don't know what role Mr Law plays as an "employee" of Lerado.

  Cynthia Wong Sin Fai (Cynthia Wong) is a solicitor who consults for Robertsons and has been Company Secretary of Suncorp Technologies Ltd (Suncorp, 1063) since 15-Feb-2011. We'll come back to that. We don't know what role she plays as a "consultant" to Lerado.

  Wang Zewei (Mr Wang) is the name of the person who in 2014 sold 22.5% of Sincere Smart International Ltd to Hao Wen Holdings Ltd (Hao Wen, 8019) for HK$69m, valuing the business at $306.7m when it had net assets of $2.9m. Two other companies, Capital VC Ltd (Capital VC, 2324) and Unity Investments Holdings Ltd (Unity, 0913), bought 14% and 29.5% for $42.7m and $90m respectively, without naming the vendor(s). For more, see our article Hao Wen, Capital VC and Unity today. We don't know what role Mr Wang plays as a "consultant" to Lerado. He was the only mainlander on the list, and he gave an office address at 10 Gaoxin South 4th Road, Nanshan District, Shenzhen.

Incidentally, Mr Mak was also an Executive Director of Computech Holdings Ltd, now named China Mobile Games and Cultural Investment Ltd (CMG, 8081), from 30-Jul-2008 to 28-Apr-2014, three days after he joined Lerado. In fact he was the only ED of CMG from 17-Sep-2009 to 8-Nov-2011. The Convoy FH IPO prospectus dated 29-Jun-2010 said that despite this, Mr Mak considered Convoy his main focus and "has devoted more than 80% of his time to his duties" at Convoy during 2007-2009 and he would continue to allocate a similar proportion of his time to Convoy after listing. That basically meant that CMG only had about 0.2 Executive Directors!

Win Fung acted as the placing agent for CMG in a placing on 22-Apr-2015.

The option shares were deposited into CCASS via various brokers as follows. Click on the dates to see the movements in CCASS:
Date   Broker   Number
15-Apr-2015   SBI China Capital Financial Services Ltd (SBI CCFS)   7,500,000
29-Apr-2015   Win Fung   7,500,000
8-May-2015   Gransing Securities Co Ltd (Gransing)   7,500,000
27-May-2015   Gransing   7,500,000
24-Jun-2015   Prudential Brokerage Ltd   7,500,000
4-Aug-2015   Convoy IS   3,000,000
13-Aug-2015   UOB Kay Hian (HK) Ltd   7,500,000
Total      48,000,000

It appears likely that Mr Law deposited his 3m shares with Convoy IS, as all the other deposits matched the 7.5m option grants.

Incidentally, the other pre-IPO investor in 10% of Convoy IS is Howard Jiang Qi Hang, who featured in several previous investigations on Webb-site Reports.

Gransing is a name you will see again - it has acted 4 times as a placing agent for Convoy FH, in a bond placing on 21-Jan-2015 and a bond placing on 16-Sep-2014 as well as two unannounced bond placings on 8-Jul-2014 and 14-Nov-2014 mentioned in Convoy FH's annual report. Gransing's client list in Webb-site Who's Who also shows that it has acted as placing agent for Hao Wen, Suncorp and WLS Holdings Ltd (WLS, 8021), a company which we cover below.
CIFG-Lerado cross-holding

On 22-Apr-2015, probably in response to queries from the regulators, Lerado made a "voluntary announcement" trying, and in our view failing, to justify its decision to use shares rather than cash to buy the property from CIFG.

On 21-May-2015, Lerado announced that it had agreed to subscribe for 130m shares (12.44%) of CIFG at at $0.275, or $35.75m in total, setting up a cross-holding between the two, as CIFG still held 8.59% of Lerado. This was, incidentally, highly dilutive to CIFG, a 66.9% discount to its NAV per share at 30-Apr-2015 of $0.83. This fact was omitted from the CIFG announcement. The issue completed on 2-Jun-2015. Our system indicates that Lerado deposited 70m CIFG shares with Gransing on 23-Jun-2015, and deposited 60m CIFG shares with Kingston Securities Ltd (Kingston) the next day.

On 11-Aug-2015, Lerado cut its holding in CIFG from 128.8m shares (12.32%) to 103.392m shares (9.89%), selling the shares at an average $0.196, a 29% loss. As the stake was cut below 10%, Lerado is no longer a "substantial shareholder" and "connected person" of CIFG under the Listing Rules.

Policy note: the disclosure threshold for substantial shareholdings in HK-listed companies was reduced by law from 10% to 5% on 1-Apr-2003, but the Listing Rules have never been updated to match this.
Lerado issues shares to CAID (0048)

On 26-May-2015, Lerado announced the acquisition of Brilliant Summit Ltd from China Automotive Interior Decoration Holdings Ltd (CAID, 0048), for HK$45m, but again, not using any of the cash pile. Instead, it issued 75m shares at $0.60 each, or 7.82% of the enlarged issued shares of Lerado, further diluting existing shareholders. The target was "engaged in the trading of garment accessories, such as nylon tape, polyester tape and polyester string". It had net assets of just $7.24m and a net profit in the year to 31-Mar-2015 of $0.9m.

In giving reasons, Lerado claimed that "certain fabric products and expertise knowledge of the Target Group can be utilised in the Group's business of manufacturing medial products, including but not limited to powered and non powered mobility aid, wheel chairs and other durable equipment". Stretching the polyester tape further, they claimed that the Target Group's "sizable clientele" would allow Lerado to "penetrate into a new market." This rather ignores the fact that Lerado already had its own expertise in sourcing fabrics for baby strollers, infant car seats and mobility aids over many years.

CAID had purchased Brilliant Summit from its manager, a Mr Cheung Ngai, for HK$42m on 15-May-2013. He apparently goes by the name of "Elman" and apart from Brilliant Summit (products here), he runs another company in the same line of business called San Wah Holdings Ltd. CAID, announcing the sale of Brilliant Summit to Lerado, said that "as a result of the constantly increasing costs of sales and competition, the Company is of the view that its business is not expected to grow at its current rate without further investments and developments." CAID intended to hold the Lerado shares "to achieves earnings in the form of capital appreciation."

The transaction completed on 16-Jun-2015. We can see that CAID deposited the 75m new Lerado shares with Win Fung in two batches, 40m on 23-Jun-2015 and 35m on 14-Jul-2015. Of all the brokers it could use, why this little firm, and why is this the same firm in which Mr Chen and one of the option holders also deposited their Lerado shares? The shares are positioned in the same custodian ahead of an important vote on Lerado's future. To summarise those deposits of shares with Win Fung:
Shareholder   Shares   Deposit date
Mr Chen (Hwa Foo)   96,805,800   9-Dec-2014
An exercised option holder   7,500,000   29-Apr-2015
CAID   40,000,000   23-Jun-2015
CAID   35,000,000   14-Jul-2015
Total   179,305,800   

CAID's new INED or mooncake coordinator

For some light relief, on 4-Sep-2015 CAID appointed a new INED and audit committee member, Ms Adeline Ng Li La, who "has over 10 years of experience in human resources and corporate management". She also has a Certificate of Human Resources Management from HK Baptist University and is "a senior administrative officer of a renowned international technology company in Hong Kong". Wow, she sounds highly qualified, doesn't she?

A quick search discovers her Linked In page (copy here). Since May 2015, she has been personal assistant to the General Manager of Amadeus Hong Kong Ltd - and her duties include "supervise the receptionist and the cleaning lady", "coordinate mooncake distribution", "manage pantry cabinet" and planning the Christmas party. Now this of course is all important work, but probably not that relevant to the duties of a listed company director and audit committee member. We wonder how she was introduced to CAID. This is probably not what HKEx had in mind when it started promoting board diversity, but it's what you get when as a regulator, you let controlling shareholders vote on INED elections.
CAID and Convoy

On 30-Jun-2015, CAID announced a placing via Convoy IS, listing the Financial Adviser as Opus Capital Ltd (Opus Capital) and using the full 20% general mandate of 276.48m shares at $0.485, a 19.2% discount to the closing price of $0.60. However, the price then collapsed, and on 9-Jul-2015, they cut the placing price to $0.345, a 42.5% discount to the original closing price. The placing completed on 21-Jul-2015. Our CCASS analysis shows that 125.48m shares were deposited with Astrum, only 68m with Convoy IS and 25m with Kingston, with the remaining 58m to 4 other brokers.

CAID's interim results for 30-Jun-2015 disclosed a huge unrealised gain of RMB 448.6m (HK$561m) on "held-for-trading investments" which then had a market value of RMB564.0m (HK$705m). In other words, a gain of about 389% in 6 months. No normal stock will give you that, but a bubble stock will. Net tangible assets at 30-Jun-2015 were RMB761.9m (HK$952m) or about $0.689 per share, so the investments accounted for 74% of that.

CAID's interim report contains the following statement, which we regard as false and misleading:

"At 30 June 2015, there was no significant investment held by the Group."

Policy note: Some of the listed companies which have recently reported exceptionally large percentage gains on listed securities must own bubble stocks. If you know what stocks a listed company owns, then you would be able to take the SFC's concentration warnings into account and discount those investments to what you regard as fair value, rather than relying on inflated market valuations. But unfortunately, the Stock Exchange and SFC do not require such disclosure, even when inflated listed investments make up the bulk of a companies net assets. They simply rely on the company having to announce losses as inside information after the bubble has burst, rather than telling you that they hold bubble stocks in the first place.

This is despite the fact that Listing Rules Appendix 16 paragraphs 32(4) and 40(2) (or on GEM, Rules 18.41(4) and 18.59) require that companies disclose "significant investments held, their performance during the financial [year/half-year] and their future prospects". It seems that SEHK just doesn't want to enforce this.

Although the Listing Rules which require such disclosure contain no definition of "significant", it should be seen in the context of the size of the holder's balance sheet and therefore the potential impact on shareholder value if the market value of the investments were to change. Whether the investment is "held-for-trading" or as a long-term "available for sale" asset is irrelevant to the potential impact on shareholder value, except for the fact that profits tax applies to trading.

Separately, many listed companies have avoided the notifiable transaction rules in Chapter 14 by declaring themselves to be "in the business" of trading securities. This then allows them to invest as much of their shareholders' money as they like on purchasing "held-for-trading" securities without announcing the transactions, because they are deemed transactions "of a revenue nature in the ordinary and usual course of business" under Listing Rule 14.04(1)(g). The Stock Exchange should close this loophole. Investments in securities, regardless of how they are booked, should be subject to the notifiable transaction rules.

You might wonder then why CAID did not just cash in some of its $705m of investments rather than raise $94.2m in a placing of 20% new shares, claiming that it needed the money. The results failed to identify these spectacular investments, but noted that by 31-Aug-2015, the value had decreased by 23.5% since the end of June. That's about HK$224m of loss.
CIFG and Lerado: parallel open offers

On 17-Aug-2015, Lerado announced a massive 3:1 open offer of new shares at $0.15 each, a 68% discount to the market price of $0.47, with no excess applications. The primary underwriter is Gransing, the Financial Adviser is Octal Capital Ltd (Octal Capital) and the IFA is Opus Capital, the same as the Financial Adviser to CAID.

As we've said before, deep discount open offers are a form of extortion of existing shareholders, because they are faced with the choice of either being heavily diluted economically, or putting in cash to prevent the dilution. Unlike rights issues, the holder does not have the third option of selling his entitlements to recover the discount and thereby mitigate the economic damage. For this reason, the UK Listing Rules include a limit (set decades ago) of not more than a 10% discount on open offers. Hong Kong, still in many ways a developing market, allows this extortion to continue. See UK Listing Rule 9.5.10.

Adding to this abuse is that an open offer often involves no ability for shareholders to make "excess application" for unsubscribed shares. Nor are the unsubscribed shares sold in the market to capture the premium above the issue price for the benefit of passive shareholders. This leaves the underwriter with the benefit of the discount on shares which shareholders cannot or do not subscribe. In these circumstances, the open offer in practice is a conditional placing of deeply discounted shares with the "underwriter", subject to a right of first refusal by existing shareholders pro rata to their holdings.

Gransing cannot end up as a controlling shareholder of Lerado, so it has to have sub-underwriters. From a disclosure of interest, we can see that Capital VC (mentioned above) is a sub-underwriter for 370m shares, or 9.64% of the enlarged capital. Another disclosure shows that Barry Lau Wang Chi is a sub-underwriter for 370m shares. He is a Responsible Officer of Adamas Asset Management (HK) Ltd (Adamas), which will feature below.

On 9-Sep-2015, CIFG announced a huge 8:1 open offer with no excess applicatoins, "underwritten" by Black Marble Securities, which is owned by Lerado. The Financial Adviser to CIFG is Akron Corporate Finance Ltd (Akron) and the IFA is Opus Capital, the same as Lerado's IFA and CAID's FA.

As Lerado owns less than 10% of CIFG, the underwriting is not a "connected transaction". However, it is blatantly clear that Lerado has a "material interest" in the CIFG transaction and should be prohibited from voting in the EGM of CIFG to approve the open offer. Furthermore, Lerado stands to benefit from any unsubscribed shares at the discounted offer price. As there are no excess applications, this is in effect a discounted placement with Lerado subject to clawback by existing holders.Listing Rule 2.15 states:

"Where a transaction or arrangement of an issuer is subject to shareholders' approval under the provisions of the Exchange Listing Rules, any shareholder that has a material interest in the transaction or arrangement shall abstain from voting on the resolution(s) approving the transaction or arrangement at the general meeting."

Correspondingly, we submit that CIFG should not be permitted to vote in the Lerado EGM, because obviously Lerado is engaged in a commercial transaction with CIFG to provide it with funding under the CIFG open offer.
Mr Chen's "disposal" at a 53% loss

Now, according to a disclosure of interest, on 9-Sep-2015, Mr Chen, ED of Lerado, sold his entire interest of 97,823,800 shares, including a personal holding of 1,018,000 shares and those held by Hwa Foo. Some of it was on-exchange at $0.25, but most of it was off-market at $0.22 because total market volume that day was only 7,625,800 shares. When we look at CCASS movements, on the settlement date of 11-Sep-2015 we see his personal holding of 1,018,000 shares leaving Core Pacific Yamaichi, and only 2,805,800 shares leaving Win Fung, and there have been no reductions in Win Fung's balance since then. So it appears that the other 94,000,000 shares were transferred, off market, to other clients of Win Fung and remain there.

As an ED of Lerado, Mr Chen would have been prohibited from voting in favour of the proposed open offer, so it is a matter of great concern that these shares may have been placed in friendly hands, along with the positions held by CIFG and CAID, to vote in favour (if they are not required to abstain).

This disposal, at a deep discount to cash and to net asset value, of a key block of shares, really makes no economic sense for Mr Chen. If he was unhappy with the effects of the proposed open offer, he could have joined us in voting against the proposal. He was only prohibited from voting in favour. At a purported disposal price (for most of his shares) of $0.22, he appears to have accepted a loss of 53% since the open offer was announced. We find this hard to believe. Accordingly we urge the SFC to investigate the true nature of the transactions and who has bought the shares. We would be surprised if the "buyers" had not been mentioned elsewhere in this article.

China 33 Media (8087)

There's another open offer we need to tell you about, and the background is this.

On 26-Jan-2015, China 33 Media Group Ltd (C33M, 8087) announced that its controlling shareholder, Lizhong Ltd (Lizhong), which had held 243.756m shares (43.13%) had 5 days earlier pledged 192m shares (32.00%) to a lender and on 22-Jan to 26-Jan Lizhong had sold its remaining 66.756m shares (11.13%) in the market. They didn't say who the lender was, but a subsequent disclosure of interest shows that it is funds managed by Adamas, which was mentioned above. Our analysis shows the average price received by Lizhong in the 3 days was $0.4192 per share, a total of $27.98m. Now, why did Lizhong need to sell those shares and borrow that money by pledging the remainder? Read on.

On 10-Apr-2015, CIFG, via its 100% subsidiary New Express Investment Ltd, agreed to subscribe 120m shares (16.67%) of China 33 Media Group Ltd (C33M, 8087) at $0.22, exhausting its general mandate, for a total of HK$26.4m. The deal completed on 22-Apr-2015, diluting Lizhong from 32.00% to 26.67%. Our system shows that on 6-May-2015, CIFG deposited its C33M shares with Gransing.

Three months later, on 24-Jul-2015, C33M announced a massive 7 for 1 open offer at $0.10, a 75.6% discount to the closing price of $0.41, without excess applications. The Financial Adviser was Octal Capital (the same as for Lerado's open offer), and the underwriters were Gransing, Kingston and RHB OSK Securities HK Ltd (RHB OSK). The IFA again was Opus Capital, the same as for Lerado. Lizhong undertook to take up part of its entitlement amounting to 844,799,700 shares, which to the nearest thousand is 4.4 shares for each share it owns, not 7. That would cost it $84.5m, but of course, it had already raised about $27.98m by selling shares in the market in January, so there was a funding gap of $56.5m, or about $0.294 per existing share, which it might have borrowed from Adamas funds.

If CIFG was to maintain its holding, it would have to put in another $0.70 for each share it held. It had sold a few shares but still held 113.622m (15.78%). The share price dived 26.8% on the day after the news, but the prospect strangely seemed to delight CIFG, which undertook not to sell any more and to take up all its entitlements to 795.354m shares at a cost of $79.5m. However, on 4-Aug-2015, C33M announced that it and Gransing had agreed to cut CIFG's commitment to 290m shares. As a result CIFG would be diluted to 7.01% of C33M.

Under GEM Listing Rule 10.39(1) or Main Board Listing Rule 7.24(5)(a), if an open offer is at a ratio higher than 1 for 2 then it must be approved by "independent" shareholders excluding the controlling shareholder or, if none, the executive directors and their associates. So the largest holder of C33M, Lizhong, could not vote in favour at the EGM, as it is an associate of the Chairman.

How convenient, then, that there was another "independent" shareholder who could vote in favour. Look at the EGM results on 31-Aug-2015. CIFG almost certainly voted its 113.622m shares in favour, and only 2,050 other shares voted in favour, while 28,638,000 shares voted against. The open offer was thereby approved, and the prospectus was published on 14-Sep-2015.
Update, 26-Sep-2015

The C33M open offer prospectus discloses that several sub-underwriters have been engaged. Gransing, with a commitment of 1,905,200,300 shares (33.07% of the enlarged shares), engaged SBI CCFS for 800m shares (13.89%) and 3 other unnamed sub-underwriters for a total of 540m shares (9.37%), each with less than 5% of enlarged shares. RHB OSK, with a commitment of 500m shares (8.68%) had engaged 2 unnamed sub-underwriters to take all of them.

Kingston, with an underwriting commitment of 1500m shares (26.04%), had engaged but then terminated 4 sub-underwriters to take all of it. One was Harvest Aspect International Ltd, which a filing shows is owned by William Yu Tsung Chin, for 644.64m shares (11.19%). The remaining 3 each had less than 5% but totaled 14.85%. After these 4 were terminated, Kingston engaged a single sub-underwriter for the whole lot. Guess who? Black Marble Securities (owned by Lerado).

SBI CCFS and Black Marble have each failed to file a disclosure of interest.

The denominator in the calculation of percentage for disclosure of interests under s308 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance is based on the number of "issued shares", not the number which may be in issue in the future. So in a 7:1 open offer, there are new shares equivalent to 700% of existing shares. All the filings by the underwriters and sub-underwriters in the C33M case use the wrong denominator (the number of shares which will be in issue if the open offer completes) and hence show the wrong percentage, which should be multiplied by a factor of 8. Anyone with an underwriting commitment equal to 5% or more of the existing shares (in the case of C33M, 36m shares) should make a filing, and clearly, that has not happened, with several sub-underwriters of Gransing, RHB OSK and Kingston. The SFC should require them to correct their filings and to procure filings by their sub-underwriters, including those which have now been terminated.
GreaterChina Professional Services (8193)

Now let's look at how Lerado (via Black Marble Securities) and Akron (Financial Adviser to CIFG on its open offer) have been working together in another transaction.

GreaterChina Professional Services Ltd (GPS, 8193) is listed on GEM and owns Greater China Appraisal Ltd, which values real estate and other assets. On 13-Nov-2014, GPS began to deviate from its core business, by buying 80% of Golden Vault Ltd, which indirectly owns a mainland advertising business with in-elevator poster frames and LCD displays in Changshu, PRC, for HK$110m in promissory notes.

Golden Vault had turnover of RMB 7.34m in 2013 and net assets of RMB 5.73m (HK$7.16m) at 30-Sep-2014. This business was valued by Roma Appraisals Ltd at $184m, because, hey, elevators are difficult to get into - especially when they are going up. That valuer is owned by Roma Group Ltd (Roma, 8072) and the financial adviser on the profit forecast was Akron.

A disclosure of interest shows that on 11-May-2015, China Environmental Energy Investment Ltd (CEEI, 0986) increased its holding in GPS from 2.63% to 5.13%, buying 21.495m shares at $0.556 per share. From our CCASS system we see the shares deposited with Southwest Securities (HK) Brokerage Ltd (SWSHK, formerly Tanrich Securities Co Ltd).

On 8-Jul-2015, Roma announced that it had agreed to lend up to HK$58m to Brilliant One Holdings Ltd (Brilliant One) for 12 months at 12% p.a., secured by 310.85m shares in an unnamed GEM-listed company and guaranteed by persons named Ip Kwok Kwong and Wong Chi Keung, the ultimate owners of Brilliant One. That non-disclosure of the GEM company's name was silly, because it was easily determined that Brilliant One was the 36.23% controlling shareholder of GPS, which eventually announced the loan facility on 4-Aug-2015. Ip Kwok Kwong is the MD of GPS, while Wong Chi Keung (this one) is an accountant with 13 INED positions. The loan facility includes a maximum loan-to-value ratio of 65%. So if they draw the full loan, then the share price falling below $0.287 would trigger a top-up obligation. The shares were moved from Emperor Securities Ltd to Infast Brokerage Ltd on 9-Jul-2015.

On 9-Jul-2015, the day after the share pledge, GPS announced a huge proposed placing of shares under a specific mandate, 2.6bn shares at $0.10, a 74.4% discount to the market price of $0.39, via Black Marble Securities, which is owned by Lerado. The Financial Adviser is Akron (the same as for Lerado's open offer). That represents 303% of the existing shares, and they are not even bothering to make the shares available to existing shareholders by an open offer or rights issue. Simultaneously, it was proposed that SEEC Media Group Ltd (SEECM, 0205) would subscribe 1.4bn shares at the same price, a total of $140m, for 28.82% of the enlarged shares.

Policy note: As we mentioned above, open offers or rights issues larger than 1 for 2 (a 50% enlargement of issued shares) must be subject to shareholders' approval with controlling shareholders abstaining, or if there are none, then with executive directors and their associates abstaining. That does provide some small measure of protection, (unless the vote is being manipulated with warehoused shares). However, this protection is negated by the fact that a massive placing under a "specific mandate" can be approved without requiring controllers or executive directors to abstain. The Listing Rules should be amended to close the loophole so that controllers/executive directors should be required to abstain from voting in favour of any proposal to approve a "specific mandate" that enlarges the issued shares by more than 50%.

Brilliant One, which has pledged its controlling shareholding to Roma, was allowed to vote to approve this outrageous proposal.

Of the $395.1m net proceeds, GPS intends to use $100m in its money-lending subsidiary, Colbert Finance Ltd, and $150m to develop its securities brokerage business. It doesn't own a stockbroker yet, but it plans to either buy one or set one up. The EGM approved the placing on 14-Sep-2015 without objection. With an avalanche of shares due to hit the market at $0.10, it is quite impressive that the stock still closed at $0.495 on 23-Sep-2015.
SEECM (0205)

Now let's look at a fourth open offer involving Lerado (via Black Marble Securities) and Opus Capital.

SEECM is, or was, principally engaged in advertising agency, distribution of books and magazines. And securities trading, of course, like all shoddy companies should be. It announced its investment in GPS on 10-Jul-2015.

On 17-Jul-2015, SEECM announced that it had agreed to subscribe 103.02m shares (16.67%) of China New Economy Fund Ltd (CNEF, 0080) at $0.385, for a total of HK$39.66m, exhausting CNEF's general mandate. CNEF is another Chapter 21 investment company, and that was a 61.5% discount to the NAV of CNEF at 30-Jun-2015 of $1.00. As we noted in our article Some Bubbles for New Year on 31-Dec-2014, CNEF had shares in the Finsoft bubble alongside Convoy FH, and Tony Tai Man Hin, the CFO and Company Secretary of CNEF, was an INED of Finsoft. He retired from Finsoft on 5-May-2015. The CNEF announcement of the subscription named Astrum as the placing agent and did not mention the discount to NAV.

Also on 17-Jul-2015, SEECM announced that it is applying to the SFC to set up a stockbroker. Now everyone wants to be a broker. Lerado, GPS and SEECM.

On 19-Aug-2015, SEECM announced a huge open offer, 3 for 1 at $0.10, a 61.5% discount to the market price of $0.26. The Financial Adviser is Opus Capital (the FA of CAID and the IFA of C33M and Lerado), the IFA is Hercules Capital Ltd (Hercules) and the underwriter is Black Marble Securities, owned by Lerado. Again there will be no excess applications, so the "underwriter" gets the benefit of discounted unsubscribed shares. Of net proceeds of $624m, SEECM plans to use HK$365m to set up a stockbroker, $30m to set up a corporate finance advisory and asset management firm and $225m for the acquisition and operation of an unspecified e-commerce platform.

The shares dived on the news, dropping 35.4% to $0.168 the next day. But they weren't done yet. On 9-Sep-2015, they decided to increase the carnage by consolidating the shares 2:1 and then changing the offer terms to 5 new shares for each consolidated share at $0.10, equivalent to $0.05 before the consolidation. So the offer discount becomes an effective 80.8% discount to the original closing price of $0.26. This will raise a bit less though, HK$519m. This news caused another drop in the price, by 16.7% from $0.156 to $0.13 the next day. So the stock price had now halved even before putting the plan to a vote.

A circular for the capital reorganisation went out on 18-Sep-2015 for an EGM on 12-Oct-2015. We urge shareholders to vote against the resolutions. They are special resolutions that require a 75% majority to pass, so blocking it is more feasible than usual. If it passes, then a circular to propose the open offer is due out on 28-Oct-2015.
Chan Cheong Yee and CESHK

There is a common person to a number of these companies. Chan Cheong Yee (C Y Chan) is a Responsible Officer of China Everbright Securities (HK) Ltd (CESHK). CESHK is the investment manager of four Chapter 21 companies: CIFG, CNEF, China Innovation Investment Ltd (CII, 1217) and China Investment Development Ltd (CID, 0204). C Y Chan is an ED of all 4 companies, and he is also an ED of Capital VC.
CID (0204)

CID is in its own little bubble - it closed on 23-Sep-2015 at $0.157, compared with NAV of $0.024 at 31-Aug-2015.
CEEI (0986)

Now remember we mentioned CEEI, the investor in GPS? On 12-Nov-2014, CEEI announced a placing of 48,190,489 shares at $0.97 per share to raise HK$46.28m, exhausting the general mandate, followed by a huge 8:1 rights issue at $0.195 per share, an 82.4% discount to the market price of $1.11, to raise between $376m and $451m. Excess applications were allowed. At the time, CEEI had no substantial shareholders.

Win Fung was both the placing agent and the rights issue underwriter. The placing was on a best efforts basis, and on 27-Nov-2014, the placing price was cut to $0.66. The placing was completed on 3-Dec-2014, and all the shares were deposited into the CCASS account of Win Fung for its clients. Not a single share moved out of that account until after the EGM to approve the rights issue. And guess what, the EGM results on 18-Dec-2014 show that the number of shares voted in favour of the rights issue was 48,437,576, just 247,087 more than the number of placing shares.

On 12-Mar-2015, CEEI announced that it would start investing in "quality stock and other financial products", so don't say you weren't warned! On 17-Apr-2015, CEEI announced that it had bought 51m shares (0.337%) of Suncorp (mentioned above) that day in the market for HK$61.45m at an average of $1.205 after a huge run up in the share price following completion of a placing at $0.245 per share on 13-Apr-2015. The stock closed at $0.204 on 23-Sep-2015, down 83% since the purchase by CEEI. Some of the other investments by CEEI are covered below.
WLS (8021)

Now let's tell who may have benefitted from a huge bubble in the shares of WLS Holdings Ltd (WLS, 8021), a construction company.

As background, on 21-Oct-2014, WLS announced that CIFG would subscribe for 79m shares (16.67% of enlarged) at $0.177, a 0.6% premium to market, exhausting the general mandate. On the face of it, WLS had no other substantial shareholders. The deal completed on 31-Oct-2014. The shares were deposited with Fordjoy Securities and Futures Ltd (Fordjoy) on 5-Nov-2014. CIFG rapidly sold off the shares, from 12-Nov-2014, dropping below 5% on 3-Dec-2014.

WLS owns a licensed money-lender, Gold Medal Hong Kong Ltd, incorporated on 19-Mar-2014 and licensed on 26-Nov-2014.

On 21-Jan-2015, WLS announced a 5:1 share consolidation and a proposed massive placing of 540m consolidated shares (563.16% of the existing shares) at $0.30 via SWSHK (then Tanrich Securities Co Ltd). The Financial Adviser was Akron. This placing price was a 42.3% discount to the adjusted closing price of $0.52. At the 5-Mar-2015 SGM to approve the placing, votes in favour were 89,597,500, or 18.69% of the issued shares. Total turnout was only 19.00%. We suspect most of those votes in favour were shares previously held by CIFG, but we'll never know for sure.

Of the 540m shares, we know that CEEI took 63m shares (9.91% of enlarged), because it announced the subscription on 18-Mar-2015. Disclosures of interests show that Samuel Chiu Se Chung, a licensed Representative of Roofer Securities Ltd, also subscribed 9.9%. Unity, mentioned above, subscribed 31.5m shares (4.95%), as did Capital VC, mentioned above and Avant Capital Management (HK) Ltd (Avant), as asset manager. Mr Ye Ruiqiang subscribed 4.95%. As of 31-Dec-2014, he owned 6.44% of Capital VC.

There are 4 subscribers whom we cannot identify. A person named Zhang Yan subscribed 40.67m shares (6.40%) which were probably deposited with Emperor Securities Ltd, and a person named Zheng Wanying subscribed 31.33m shares (4.93%). A person named Civic Cheung Sun Kei subscribed 54m shares (8.49%) and another named Cheung Kam Hong subscribed the same number.

A person named Wong Chun Wah subscribed 23m shares (3.62%). It's a common name but we see that the same number went to the custody of Henik Securities Ltd, where there is a licensee called Wong Chun Wah. Similarly a person named Ma Kin Lung subscribed 31.0m shares (4.88%), and we see that number deposited with Get Nice Securities Ltd, where Ma Kin Lung is a licensed representative.

A person named Tam Siu Ki subscribed 54m shares (8.49%), increasing his stake to 9.28%. That may or may not be the same as Simon Tam Siu Ki, who was a representative of RHB OSK (then known as Prudence Securities Co Ltd) until his license was revoked on 30-Oct-2003 for rat-trading and other trading malpractices. In summary, then after the placing, the holdings were:
  Name   Shares   Stake %
1   CEEI (0986)   63,000,000   9.91
2   Samuel Chiu Se Chung   63,000,000   9.91
3   Tam Siu Ki   59,000,000   9.28
4   Cheung Kam Hong   54,000,000   8.49   
5   Cheung Sun Kei, Civic   54,000,000   8.49
6   Zhang Yan   40,670,000   6.40
7   Avant   31,500,000   4.95
8   Capital VC (2324)   31,500,000   4.95
9   Unity (0913)   31,500,000   4.95
10   Ye Ruiqiang   31,500,000   4.95
11   Zheng Wanying   31,330,000   4.93
12   Ma Kin Lung   31,000,000   4.88
13   Wong Chun Wah   23,000,000   3.62
  Total   540,000,000   85.71

The WLS placing completed on 27-Mar-2015 and the CCASS deposits are here. By that time, the stock had more than doubled to $1.25. Unlike the allotments after the IPO, there was no concentration warning. Yet 13 holders held 85.71% of the stock.

The price continued to climb. On 15-May-2015, with the stock at $2.26, 7.53x the placing price, WLS announced a 7:1 bonus issue. The stock spiked again and was suspended at $4.27 on 17-Jun-2015, prompting the company to announce that it was negotiating for a possible share issue. After a brief correction to $2.50, it was suspended again on 19-Jun-2015, pending announcement on 23-Jun-2015 of a "framework agreement" for possible subscriptions by Avant and Shin Kong Capital Management Inc (SKCM) of 1920m and 5760m shares (post-bonus) at $0.06875, a 78% discount to the bonus-adjusted closing price of $0.3125, to raise $528m gross and enlarge the issued shares by 151%.

While the stock was suspended, it went ex-bonus on 23-Jun-2015 and the bonus shares were distributed on 3-Jul-2015, so for 10 days straddling the half-year point, only 1/8 of the company was tradable. When trading in those shares resumed on 24-Jun-2015, the stock shot up again on heavy volume, reaching a daily high of $1.22 on 26-Jun-2015. Remember that most of the existing shares had been issued at a bonus-adjusted $0.0375, so they were now up 32.5x. WLS closed at $1.05 on 30-Jun-2015, allowing those listed companies which held the stock to book enormous "fair value gains" in their interim results. At the end of June, WLS had a market capitalisation of HK$5341m, compared with net tangible assets at 30-Apr-2015 of HK$282m ($0.055 per share), so it was trading at 18.9x NAV.

Disclosures of interest indicate that SKCM was using a vehicle called SKCM TMT I, L.P., which was 50% owned by Chiang Chun Yi and 50% by Yam Tak Cheung, and managed by SKCM TMT GP Co. Ltd, which is 40% owned by SKCM. After all that excitement, SKCM backed out of the deal on 8-Aug-2015 citing disagreement over due diligence on WLS, but Avant signed a new agreement on 12-Aug-2015 to continue to subscribe 1920m shares at $0.06875, conditional on WLS issuing at least 252m shares in a fund-raising exercise so that Avant ends up with 29.48% of less - certainly under the 30% takeover trigger.

Now this long and winding road takes us back to Lerado. On 18-Aug-2015, WLS announced two placings via Black Marble Securities, owned by Lerado. The underwritten tranche is of 360m shares (7.08% of existing shares) at $0.06875, and there is a further "best efforts" placing of 5400m shares (106.15%) at the same price, at 82.1% discount to the closing price of $0.385. Together these could raise $389.22m mostly for, you guessed it, money-lending and securities business. The shares closed on 23-Sep-2015 at $0.27, down 74.3% since the end of June, but still at 4.9x NAV.
Raise the umbrellas: China Jicheng (1027)

Perhaps the most ridiculous bubble in our market at present (although there is a lot of competition for that title) is umbrella maker China Jicheng Holdings Ltd (CJ, 1027) which listed on 13-Feb-2015. It peaked on 18-Sep-2015 at $3.18 with a market value of HK$47.7bn, compared with net tangible assets in the 30-Jun-2015 interim results of $399.6m, or $0.0267 per share. So it was trading at 119x NTA.

Adjusting for a 25:1 stock split in June, CJ's IPO priced the shares at $0.044, so was up 72.3x since the IPO. This gives new meaning to the term "umbrella movement". The initial custody positions of the 150m IPO shares (25%) are in our records here. The top 3 brokers will now be familiar to you: Gransing (8.72% of CJ), Win Fung (8.18%) and SWSHK (3.73%), a total 20.64% or 82.54% of the float.

On 14-May-2015, the SFC warned that 16 shareholders owned 24.02% of CJ, or 96.08% of the float, leaving 0.98% of CJ for everyone else. The stock closed at $13.76 the day before that warning, or $0.5504 after the stock split, so it is up 5.14x since then.

In its annual results for 31-Mar-2015, CEEI (mentioned above) disclosed a holding of 12.67m shares (2.11%) in CJ at a purchase cost of $1.10 per share, which means they were allocated in the IPO, because they have never traded that low. After the stock split that will be 316.75m shares at $0.044. So CEEI doesn't always pay bubble prices for bubble shares - it occasionally gets in at the bottom.

The controlling shareholder of CJ is its Chairman, Huang Wenji, with 11.25bn shares (75%) which, on paper, makes him a US$ umbrella multi-billionaire. We note that on 17-Sep-2015, he deposited 1.5bn shares into CCASS with Black Marble Securities, owned by Lerado. That could be preparation for a placing of existing shares and possibly a subscription of new ones, if anyone is dumb enough to buy them.

Lerado interim results show massive gain

Lerado is one of several companies which have made enormous market gains in the first half of 2015 without disclosing what stocks it bought. In the 30-Jun-2015 interim results, it disclosed "held-for-trading investments" comprising "equity securities listed in Hong Kong" of HK$702.1m. It also said that by 28-Aug-2015, the value had declined by 11%. It booked an unrealised gain of $626.5m, implying a purchase cost of $75.6m and a gain of 829% in 6 months or less. No normal stock does that. Whatever stock(s) they hold, it must be bubble paper, and investors deserve to know what it is so that they can make their own assessment of "fair value" rather than relying on an artificial market price.

After providing for $105m of profits tax on the gains, Lerado had net tangible assets at 30-Jun-2015 of $1220m, or $1.27 per share. But if those gains evaporate, then the NTA drops to $698.5m, or $0.728 per share. Both figures are before dilution from the proposed open offer. If the offer proceeds, then that NAV would be diluted to about $0.430 (with the gains) or $0.295 (without the gains). Both figures assume that Lerado loses the Dorel arbitration, which is worth $307m, which is $0.320 per share before the open offer or $0.080 per share after the open offer.
Capital VC's open offer

On 13-Mar-2015, Capital VC announced a 5:1 share consolidation to be followed by a 7:1 open offer at $0.25 per consolidated share without excess applications. That was a 76.5% discount to the adjusted closing price of $1.065 per share. The Financial Adviser was Akron, and the "underwriter" was SBI CCFS. The last published NAV at 28-Feb-2015 was an adjusted $4.821, so the issue discount to NAV was 94.8%. The stock sold off on the news, down 39.9% the next day to an adjusted $0.64.

Policy note: Chapter 21 investment companies like Capital VC have to publish their NAV monthly. This involves valuing all their listed investments at market prices, so they know what they are. Until 2002, these announcements had to be published in newspapers, so space was at a premium. Now that announcements are online for the last 13 years, this is no longer the case. Yet the Listing Rules still only require Chapter 21 companies to disclose the top 10 investments once per year in the annual report. This is ridiculous. The top 10 investments should be disclosed every month so that shareholders know what risks they are taking.

Again, investors faced the extortion of having to either see the investment heavily diluted, or put in more cash, and no excess applications were allowed, so it is really a placing with the "underwriter" subject to first refusal of existing holders pro rata. The underwriter benefits from any unsubscribed shares at a discount to market. To eliminate the possibility of SBI CCFS holding a controlling stake, it had to arrange sub-underwriters. They included Gransing, for 180m shares, Jun Yang Securities Co Ltd (Jun Yang Securities), for 152m, Avant, for 142.5m, and Fordjoy, for 80m shares.

Incidentally, SBI CCFS is 52% owned by Cao Guo Qi, a director of several listed companies, and 48% by Zhang Xiongfeng, the current Chairman of CMG, mentioned above.

On 11-Jun-2015, Capital VC shareholders approved the consolidation and open offer without objection. Voting turnout was only 14.39% of the issued and eligible shares, probably including the 6.44% owned by Ye Ruiqiang.

Policy note: shareholders are often unaware of opportunities to protect themselves by voting against such egregious proposals, because the SFC does not require banks and brokers who hold their stock to inform them of EGMs and seek voting instructions. As a result, most banks and brokers, in the small print of the client contracts, state that they are not obliged to do so. This is a major barrier to investor participation in governance, and the SFC should act to resolve this, as we said in our submission Principles of Responsible Regulation (26-May-2015).

On 24-Jun-2015, six days before Capital VC's financial year-end, it announced that it was changing its year-end to 30-Sep-2015, so it would produce a second set of condensed "interim" results for the 12 months to 30-Jun-2015. The purported reason for this was:

"to align the Company's financial year end date with that of the Company's principal associate, CNI Bullion Limited, which is the Group's substantial investment."

This holds no water though. Remember, Capital VC is a Chapter 21 investment company, so under Rule 21.04(3)(a), it is not allowed to take "legal, or effective, management control of underlying investments" and under Rule 21.04(3)(b) it is required to maintain a "reasonable spread of investments". So there is no logical reason to align the year ends of Capital VC and any of its investments, including CNI Bullion Ltd, which only accounted for 9% of Capital VC's NAV at 31-Dec-2014.

So what was the real reason for extending the year-end? In our view, to delay the annual disclosure of the portfolio. It's so embarrassing to have to show that your castle is built on sand.

On 15-Jul-2015 Capital VC announced that its NAV at 30-Jun-2015 was $9.0782 per share, and on 27-Aug-2015 it announced the second interim results for the 12 months to June. Capital VC booked a pre-tax profit on financial assets of $1314m for the 12 months, compared with $163m in the first 6 months, so the second-half profit was $1151m. As an investment company, it does not distinguish between realised and unrealised gains, but we can deduce them from the amount of deferred tax, which is tax that is only payable when they cash out. Note 8 shows deferred tax of $132m, so as profits tax is 16.5% they have about $800m of net unrealised gains, probably in bubble stocks.

Anyway, with that NAV in mind, let's return to the open offer. 7:1 at $0.25, versus NAV of $9.0782, so the open offer would dilute NAV to $1.354 before expenses. Shareholders who did nothing would lose 85% of their net asset value. Yet, when the offer closed on 9-Jul-2015, only 23.7% of the shares were subscribed. That left the underwriters and whoever was behind them with 66.75% of the company, acquired at $0.25 per share. The market price closed that day at $0.32. Due to market losses in July, the NAV closed that month at $1.0292, and $0.8824 at the end of August. Amazingly there was nobody with a disclosed 5% shareholding after the offer closed.

Meanwhile, even in market price terms, the shareholders who did not subscribe (and most of them did not vote against the open offer) had seen the price collapse from $1.065 before the open offer to $0.32, even while Capital VC was racking up huge gains as a holder of the unnamed inflated stocks.
Jun Yang (0397)

Jun Yang Securities is owned by Jun Yang Financial Holdings Ltd (Jun Yang, 0397). Until August, this was known as Jun Yang Solar Power Investments Ltd, but that's out of fashion, so now, like everyone else, it wants to be a financial services powerhouse.

Note 24 on page 113 of Jun Yang's 2014 annual report reveals that it owned 2.49% of Tech Pro Technology Development Ltd (Tech Pro Technology, 3823) and 4.49% of Town Health International Medical Group Ltd (Town Health, 3886). Those had a market value of about HK$235m and $280m respectively, out of total listed equities of $854m. Jun Yang booked an unrealised gain on held-for-trading investments of HK$350m for 2014, without which it would have made a loss before tax of $98m.
Tech Pro Technology (3823)

This is another bubble stock, up 93.14% in 2014, and it has kept on going, up a net 22.62% this year so far. It closed on 23-Sep-2015 at $1.87, valuing the firm at HK$12.13bn. When a company includes the syllable "Tech" in its name twice, you know it is desperate for attention. The company makes LED lamps and losses. Oh and football. Yes, it has bought a French soccer club, FC Sochaux-Montbeliard SA. After all, why sponsor the shirts when you can buy the whole thing?

The interim report at 30-Jun-2015, shows net tangible assets of RMB475m (HK$594m) or about HK$0.092 per share. Turnover for the period was RMB111m, so if you annualize that you get RMB222m or HK$278m. So the shares are trading at about 20.4x NTA and about 44x turnover.

L&A (8195)

This is another bubble stock. L & A International Holdings Ltd (L&A, 8195) makes cashmere sweaters. It listed on 10-Oct-2014 after a placing at $0.06 per share (adjusted for the 10:1 split on 21-Apr-2015). In the placing, the top 10 placees received 89.74% of the float. It closed on 23-Sep-2015 at $2.92, up 48.7x since the listing. The market value is HK$11.68bn, compared with net tangible assets of HK$129m at 31-Mar-2015, or about $0.032 per share, so it trades at 90x book value. Revenue for the year was $350m, so it trades at 33x sales.

Despite this ridiculous valuation, or perhaps because of it, CEEI bought 69.384m L&A shares (1.73%) in the market from 17-Apr-2015 to 12-May-2015, spending a total of HK$112.7m or an average of $1.62 per share. This was announced on 12-May-2015. Of course, we don't know who the sellers were. Lucky them.

On 24-Jun-2015, the SFC issued a concentration warning, noting that 19 shareholders held 23.18% out of the 25% float.
Roundup

What you have seen here is a repeated pattern of abuse. The key steps in several transactions are:

  Position votes in friendly hands which are not visibly connected to controlling shareholders or executive directors, by issuance of new shares or transfer of existing shares.
  Arrange loan financing for any existing controller to take up entitlements, or even sell shares in the market with enough time gap to deter allegations of insider dealing.
  Announce either (i) a large, deep-discount open offer without excess applications; or (ii) a "special mandate" placing, which in the first case will need "independent" shareholders' approval and in the latter, just shareholders' approval.
  Use friendly votes to approve the proposal which damages the financial interests of anyone who cannot or does not put up cash (in the case of a placing, this isn't even an option).
  Complete the fund-raising and receive deeply discounted shares as the underwriter, sub-underwriter or placee of the shares.

Hong Kong deserves better if it wishes to make a claim to be a world-class financial centre.

© Webb-site.com, 2015
61 : GS(14)@2015-10-03 23:07:12

http://www.mpfinance.com/htm/finance/20151003/news/eb_ebc.htm
三三傳媒:董事投訴無事實根據
  2015年10月3日

【明報專訊】三三傳媒(8087)昨日中午收市後發出公告表示,確認已經於9月17日收到來自聯交所知會,收到一名董事投訴公司的函件。三三反駁稱,無意於可見將來收購金融資產管理公司,並且強調公司的公告及通函內容沒有誤導及欺詐成分,供股的包銷商均為獨立人士。對於被指無意發展電影業務及試圖欺騙股東的指控,該集團直指這純是投訴人個人揣測,毫無事實根據。

本報昨天報道。三三非執行董事王福清早前已經去信港交所及證監會,對三三作出投訴。三三昨日的股價收報0.108元,下跌3.57%。

三三的公告稱,從聯交所方面得悉,收到一名董事投訴公司的函件。該集團對於被指控披露發展電影業務的資料不準確,而且有誤導及欺侮詐成分,予以否認,更明言披露完備。

三三續稱,前任主席林品通及現任主席阮德清旗下力眾抵押及出售股份純私人商業決定,不應視為力眾擬撤出公司。三三強調,參與一供七集資的包銷商及分包銷商,以至在8月31日股東特別大會出席投票者,均與董事沒有關連。

62 : GS(14)@2015-10-08 01:49:14

咁就攤薄左
63 : GS(14)@2015-10-25 14:12:55

投資電影
64 : greatsoup38(830)@2015-10-27 02:04:06

盈警
65 : greatsoup38(830)@2016-01-26 20:30:18

8078同8087合作拍電影
66 : greatsoup38(830)@2016-01-26 20:30:24

8078同8087合作拍電影
67 : greatsoup38(830)@2016-01-26 20:32:32

盈警
68 : greatsoup38(830)@2016-03-26 03:39:41

8179虧損增277%,至3,400萬,3億可變現資產,持有8195、8193、1389、736、8087、1027、8109、1063,已成康健系
69 : GS(14)@2016-03-27 23:14:35

虧損降32%,至3,700萬,4.14億現金
70 : GS(14)@2016-08-15 17:05:19

虧,2.1億可變現資產
71 : greatsoup38(830)@2016-08-21 05:05:30

8120 holds 8195、1389、8193、986、8087、736、1027、8217
72 : GS(14)@2016-11-08 06:09:51

取得香港儲值支付牌
73 : greatsoup38(830)@2016-12-10 03:50:33

執了本來業務
74 : GS(14)@2018-08-11 22:24:27

虧,輕債
PermaLink: https://articles.zkiz.com/?id=272507

三三傳媒股東 控訴供股損權益 去信港交所證監 質疑電影投資無蹤影

1 : GS(14)@2015-10-04 00:42:56

http://www.mpfinance.com/htm/finance/20151002/news/ec_eca1.htm


【明報專訊】近期不少上市公司進行大比例供股集資,引來股東反彈。早前三三傳媒(8087)宣布以公開發售形式,以每一股供七股供股集資,每股供股價為0.1元,計劃發行50.4億股,集資5.04億元。由於是次三三供股比例大,供股價較7月底公布時股價大幅折讓,在三三持股6.35%的股東兼非執行董事王福清早前去信證監會及港交所(0388),質疑供股有損股東權益,更對公司多次披露投資電影項目後落實情存疑。



明報記者 陳偉燊

本報記者於上周五聯絡三三傳媒及旗下子公司,到截稿前只獲旗下子公司三七三金融職員回應稱盡快回覆,後來另一職員稱,負責同事放假,暫時未收到公司回應。港交所方面則稱,不會評論個別事件。證監會則未有就投訴三三傳媒事件作進一步回應。

據王福清給予港交所及證監會的投訴函指出,從公司董事會成員得悉三三的傳媒業務不景氣,擬出讓股份引入新業務。函件更顯示,早在三三在4月初進行每股0.22元配售1.2億股予中國投融資集團(1226)旗下公司,集資2640萬元之前,董事會內有人得悉三三擬引進外國知名財經雜誌品牌的新業務,但是會內存在異議,致配售計劃押後至4月底才告完成。

指有人想透過供股 收集85%股權

按照投訴函,在三三完成批股後,即於5月初醞釀供股大計,當時已經確定為一供七,並且確定以公開發售不派供股權的方式進行。該函件更質疑,有人務求透過供股,收乾貨源,擁有85%以上股份,方便日後將股價向上推。在董事會內更有人得悉,供股的分包銷商原來與該外國知名財富雜誌品牌相關。不過王福清在會內對供股計劃提出反對,並認為供股建議並非為三三的最佳利益,對小股東不利。他更對8月31日三三舉行股東特別大會、最終同意通過供股的部分獨立股東之獨立性,有所懷疑。根據當日公布投票結果,最終在79.87%贊成票及20.13%反對票下,通過供股。三三在6月26日公布與3名獨立第三方簽訂5份意向書,投資電影。在投訴函內,王福清質疑過往三三多次披露投資電影,最終未有落實(見表)。

股價自7月底累跌六成

三三股價已由7月底公布供股時的0.283元,跌至0.112元,跌幅達60%。本報記者向王福清查詢,他確認收到監管機構包括港交所的來函,要求他簽妥授權書進行跟進。他強調:「我及其他小股東利益一樣。」他認為,港股「向下炒」的歪風對小股東不利,因此需要遏止。但他未有透露會否參與供股。

王福清明言,他與前任、現任三三董事長林品通及阮德清均為朋友,他及一眾朋友以往均有認購股份支持公司,但他認為公司的表現日差,已有人微言。他不知今次通報監管機構後,跟兩任主席之間的關係有何變化,只明言有義務提醒朋友,公司的做法影響一眾小股東權益。
2 : GS(14)@2015-10-04 00:43:20

http://www.mpfinance.com/htm/finance/20151002/news/ec_eca2.htm
鼎成多次參與供股包銷
  2015年10月2日

【明報專訊】三三傳媒(8083)的包銷商之一的鼎成證券,近期活躍於供股的包銷生意。除了出任三三傳媒供股的包銷商之外,亦參與隆成集團(1225)、銳康藥業(8037)等細價股供股包銷活動。同時上市公司供股亦造就股權變易機會,但是亦因為包銷商在遇到突發事件時未必願意上身,隨時引用包銷條款脫身,致供股存在被叫停的風險。

近期港股出現不少三、四線股提出大比例供股集資,除靠大股東自己包銷,亦為一眾證券商開拓財路,透過出任供股包銷商賺佣金之餘,可以鋪路找新主承接控股權多賺一筆。包括鼎成等證券商,更密食當三番,參與不少供股包銷及分包銷活動。上市公司透過供股隨時易手,其中意科控股(0943)便是近期一例,提出4股合1股後,再以公開發售形式以1股供4股,每股供股價0.35元,集資3.37億元,找來包銷商中南証券包底。若中南找客戶全數承包,則會佔股高達80%,令意科易手。

雖然供股要大折讓才能進行,予人印象股價會因此向下炒,表面保障免受插穿供股價的風險,卻非全無風險。若遇上市場大波動,承購人不夠實力致中場退出,或公司的營運或管治頓時變壞,包銷商可以要求叫停。例如三三傳媒的供股包銷協議內,便有提出若聯交所停止股份買賣、停牌超過10日等情,包銷商可取消包銷,供股便難產。不過到本報截稿前,三三的供股方案仍在進行中。
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