值得再三反复細讀（二）
1）
Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably
certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.
- 股價會波動，這是正常的。
- 經歷無數次景氣循環，雖然盈利在不景氣時少許倒退，但是以10年或更久的經營歷史數據排列，盈利仍然能夠不斷增加，這樣的企業可以被稱為【對的企業】
- 找到【對的企業】，也要能夠了解它的業務，知道如何經營（例如performance keypoint)，才能買入，
- 找到【對的企業】， 也要配合便宜/合理價，才能買入，
- 如果【對的企業】，繼續以對的方式經營，才可以繼續持有
例子：渣打(2888)
| 股票數目 | 股價的波動 | 每股盈利 | 景氣循環 | 價值 |
| （百萬） | （每股港元） | （每股港元） |
| PE=10 |
| 2003 | 1,207 | 82-126 | 6.33 | SARS | 63 |
| 2004 | 1,210 | 116-149 | 9.78 |
| 98 |
| 2005 | 1,309 | 99-175 | 11.15 |
| 111 |
| 2006 | 1,349 | 182-231 | 12.66 |
| 127 |
| 2007 | 1,615 | 211-304 | 13.19 |
| 132 |
| 2008 | 1,638 | 88-287 | 14.54 | 金融風暴 | 145 |
| 2009 | 1,984 | 75-217 | 12.78 |
| 128 |
| 2010 | 2,192 | 176-244 | 14.82 |
| 148 |
| 2011 | 2,395 | 141-216 | 15.18 | 歐債風暴 | 152 |
以上，可以發覺：
- 如果已經找到【對的企業】，如果不充分了解它的業務，就算是買入，恐怕很快的就會被股價波動震走。
- 雖然股價會波動，但是價值是走在上升的軌道。市值+股息的增幅，如果無法超過通膨，也不能被稱為【對的企業】。所以，買入價非常重要。
- 每一天的市價，不代表是便宜/合理價，尤其是【對的企業】，都是溢價出售。
- 天上掉黃金，可遇不可求，一定要用大卡車來裝
（這是為了表達我的看法而舉的例子，可能某個事故，這家企業可以變樣）
（而且，PE=10，只是我的估計，不代表是對，也不代表所有企業都適合）
2）
Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably
certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.
～a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power.
巴老是說他的通膨數據是4.3%，如果【市值+股息】的增幅，無法超過通膨，應該是危險的投資。但是，以極便宜的價格買入，造成股息回報超過10%，就可以扭轉乾坤，化危為安。
3）
Under today’s conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.
- 這小段，說明了流動性的重要。好的企業，有哪一個不是流動性穩定？出問題的企業，那一個不是因為流動性乾枯？
- 反省自己，要成為成功的股票投資人，就必須學會理財，時時保持著充裕的生活費用，就算是超級金融風暴再來，也可以繼續持有投資部位，不必賣股買米，甚至股息再投資超值得的企業。
- 保持著充裕的生活費用，才不會過度在意股價的波動，才能專注於企業的價值增長。
4）
High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments – and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.
- 太美妙了，如果能擁有超越10%利息收入的【AAA級債券，匯豐的定期存款】。如果遇上，記得用大卡車去裝。
- 【AAA級債券，匯豐的定期存款】只是代名詞，表示超級穩定和不違約。只要用心，市場內多得是。
5）
- investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment.
- people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for【】
- Berkshire’s goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses.
- I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to
be the runaway winner among the three we’ve examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.
值得再三反复細讀（一）
再讀2011年巴郡致股東信， 個人認為以下這篇值得再三反复細讀，
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The Basic Choices for Investors and the One We Strongly PreferAssets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.
（1）
Investments that are denominated in a given currency include money-market funds, bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and other instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as “safe.” In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta may be zero, but their risk is huge.
Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing power of investors in many countries, even as the holders continued to receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly result, moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin out of control.
Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as “income.”
For tax-paying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-yearperiod, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7%（一只牛的計算：5.7%x75%=4.275% ，after tax）return would have yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor’s visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. It’s noteworthy that the implicit inflation “tax” was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. “In God We Trust” may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our government’s printing press has been all too human.
High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments – and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.
Under today’s conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.
Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchase currency-related securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain – either because a particular credit is mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we’ve exploited both opportunities in the past – and may do so again – we are now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: “Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free risk.”
（2）
The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer’s hope that someone else – who also knows that the assets will be forever unproductive – will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.
This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce – it will remain lifeless forever – but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.
The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.
What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As “bandwagon” investors join any party, they create their own truth – for a while.
Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the “proof” delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers – for a time – expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: “What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end.”
Today the world’s gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $1,750 per ounce – gold’s price as I write this – its value would be $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.
Let’s now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world’s most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?（$9.6 trillion美金，可以買多少家新鴻基？，長江？，九龍倉？，總而言之，所有的龍頭藍籌企業？）
Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices make today’s annual production of gold command about $160 billion. Buyers – whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened individuals, or speculators – must continually absorb this additional supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.
A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops – and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.（以上所買入的龍頭藍籌企業，可以派發多少的股息？）
Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it’s likely many will still rush to gold. I’m
confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.
（3）
Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard “cash is king” in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard “cash is trash” in the early 1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.
My own preference – and you knew this was coming – is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola, IBM and our own See’s Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies – think of our regulated utilities, for example – fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.
Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See’s peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.
Our country’s businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial “cows” will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of “milk” to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as well). Berkshire’s goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own them in their entirety – but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway winner among the three we’ve examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.