📖 ZKIZ Archives

以实业的方式估值 Barrons

http://blog.caing.com/article/4412/
　对有些人来说，股票估值是一场虚无的游戏。他们不相信有真正的估值，也不关心估值。但是，对于做实业的人来说，估值却是 实实在在的。只要有实业的转手交易，就必然涉及到估值的问题。　　 　　  　　假 如你盘下一个小店，你要支付股权购买价格，承担所有负债，但也得到所有现金。这就是“企业价值”（Enterprise Value) 的基本概念。这一个概念在实业中并不陌生。　 　 　　  　　那么，让 我们看看几个零售企业的估值，从实业的角度对他们进行比较。  　　 以实业的方式估值  　 　国美和苏宁是竞争对手，卖的产品非常类似。每个门店的年销售额都在6000万左右，平均每平米年销售额 1.5-1.6万元。但是，从估值来讲，购买者付出的价格则差了将近三分之一。这里面的原因可能有三个： 一、A股估值偏高 二、苏宁利润更高  三、国美有自身的问题。　　 　　  　　再看看国外的例子，沃尔玛和百思买的估值相对于国内的同类企 业更低。  　　 以实业的方式估值  　 　沃尔玛平均单店年销售额为3.3亿人民币，但是购买沃尔玛只要付出平均每个店1.75亿人民币就够了，只相当于年销售额的一半。百思买单店平均年销售额为8428万人民币，而购买价格是平均每个门店2879万人民币，只相当于年销售额的三分之一，并不贵。　　 　　  　　如果说贵， 物美的价格才是天价。  　 　 以实业的方式估值    　　物美的单店年销售额仅为2496万元，但 是购买价格是平均每个店4188万元，将近年销售额的2倍。物美的平均每平米年销售额为2万元，但是购买价格是平均每平米3.6万元。这在我们比较的所有零售企业中是最贵的。　　 　　  　　估值不是精确到小数点后十几位的精确计算，更多的是模糊的估计。但是，模糊的正确也要好于精确的错误。以实业的方式估计，比较不同的企 业，对估值就容易心里有数。因为从实业角度，从本质上说，购买沃尔玛与盘下一个小店没有太大的区别。
PermaLink: https://articles.zkiz.com/?id=15707

“实业之心”正在冷却 吴晓波


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001033646

今年上半年，让我印象最深刻的经历是这样的：

年 初，我去瑞士苏黎世旅游，那是全球公认的居住环境最好、也是物价最为昂贵的城市。在苏黎世的中心商业街上，我赫然被橱窗里的一只压力锅给吸引住了。它呈醒 目的深蓝色，是德国双立人品牌，而让我停住的原因则是它的标价：290欧元。一只压力锅竟可售卖到如此高价，让我不由惊叹。谁料，与我同行的一位企业家朋 友告诉我，这只锅在国内中心城市的售价是3200元人民币，他的太太日前刚好看中一只。为了求证，我用手机把这只锅拍了下来。

凑巧的是，回 到国内的几天后，我在一次座谈会上碰到了一家民营压力锅企业的董事长，这家企业位于东南沿海的一个小县城，二十年前我曾经去那里采访过，当时还是一间很不 起眼的街道小厂，替沈阳的双喜牌压力锅做贴牌生产。近十多年，这家企业自立品牌，扩张发展，赫然已成国内行业冠军，其产量在全球也排第四。座谈期间，我把 手机中的照片给那位董事长看，提出的问题是，你的工厂能否生产出这样的高价产品？他回答说，质量和功能应该可以接近，可是价格却怎么也定不到那么高，最多 不过千元。

接着，他突然告诉我，现在，他最大的兴趣已经从做压力锅转到资本经营了，前年，他已经把企业的大部分股份出售给法国的一个家电集 团，得二十多亿元。我问，那么你现在正在做什么？他说，在家乡投资了一个岛，准备开发房地产和码头，政府对他非常支持，其盈利前景大大的好过生产压力锅。



我听到这里，百感交集。当时在座的还有一位老资格的经济学家，我对他说，看来中国人十年之内再也做不出一口好锅了。

此后很长一段时间，我被这只压力锅的故事所缠绕。脑海之中，二十年前那个简陋的街道小工厂与苏黎世大道上的橱窗交叠出现，让人莫名惆怅。二十年，一代人，好不容易做到全球第四，一朝出售，中国人什么时候才能重新回到那个位置？

更让人担忧的问题是：在2010年的中国企业界，不愿意“再埋头做压力锅”的企业家到底有多少？

近 年以来，专心实业似乎已经是一件十分“落伍”的事情了。当年曾被视为偶像的松下幸之助、杰克·韦尔奇等实业家不再时髦，人们更津津乐道的是巴菲特、索罗斯 和李嘉诚。“用钱生钱”显然比实业来得轻松愉快。我近期时常碰到一些仍在实业界打拼的企业家，纷纷萌生退意，向往去做一个投资家，或VC，或PE，总之不 愿意再干实业。

这些景象似乎在显示，当今是自1990年以来民营企业家士气最低迷的时期。

究其原因，简略而言大抵有三。

其一，资本市场（包括股权投资和经营房地产等等）的回报大大高于工业经营。

其二，传媒过分渲染投资神话，打开报纸网站，随处可见哪位投资家看中一家小公司，仅仅几年就得数十倍、成百倍回报的“神话”，实业之心，不禁荡漾。

其三，实业投资的宏观环境未得改善，特别是去年以来出现了“国进民退”现象，极大地打击了民营企业家的信心。

这 种低迷的景象却与中国经济的实际需要产生了极大的落差。自全球金融危机以来，中国制造被迫向内需化转型，而国内消费市场确乎也出现了旺盛之势，而这其实正 是实业家可以大展雄心的时刻。同时，中国的产业经济面临升级转型的重大时刻，更需要实业家全力以赴，加大投入。而当其时，却出现了投机之风，这不得不让人 生出无限的担忧。

在未来相当长的时间里，中国经济要在全球竞争中有所作为，必须依赖实业经济的勃兴。当实业家都一一的被“逼”成了投资家，当“实业之心”一一冷却，那么，可持续发展以及产业结构调整又将从何说起？
PermaLink: https://articles.zkiz.com/?id=17172

正道控制新潮实业 意在汽车电池

http://epaper.nbd.com.cn/shtml/mrjjxw/20100827/1556332.shtml

　每经记者 丛刚 梅东哲 发自北京
日前，仰融旗下H股上市公司正道汽车（01188，HK）发布公告称，子公司天津正道股权投资管理有限公司将托管“烟台新潮”控股股东东润发展所持有的20.90%股权。
8月26日，正道汽车高层人士在接受《每日经济新闻》采访时证实了上述消息，并表示将会利用新潮实业运作电池项目，这也是仰融造车计划中关键性的布局。
公告中称，此举旨在推动烟台新潮发展汽车动力电池项目，并协助烟台新潮拟进军或拓展环保节能汽车相关业务领域创造条件。
时至今日，仰融的 “造车计划”已一步步浮出水面。8月8日宣布与江淮汽车签署合资的 《框架协议》，获得整车和动力总成的生产资质，下一步将借助新潮实业（600777，SH）的融资平台，或将电池业务纳入其中。从目前来看，仰融造车计划中的两个关键步骤已经完成。
上述正道汽车人士说，无论是与江淮的合作，还是未来股权托管新潮实业，都是正道汽车新能源发展战略的一部分。
今年5月，正道汽车宣布以1.8亿元收购浙江佳贝思绿色能源公司100%股权，这家公司的主营业务是开发及制造锂离子动力电池及动力电池组。有分析指出，佳贝思下一步将会被装入新潮实业中。
上述正道汽车人士对此传言不置可否，只表示，至于后续的动作，都将以发布的公告为准。
8月24日证监会的一纸调查令，使仰融进驻新潮实业的计划变得迷离。8月25日，新潮实业发布两则公告，一是表示新潮实业8月24日接到证监会调查通知 书，因其实际控制人常宗琳去世未披露，根据有关规定，决定对该公司进行调查；其二，因大股东烟台东润正在与相关方商谈股权转让事宜，股票停牌。
有报道指出，新潮实业“隐瞒”控制人离世信息，或与股权转让有关，烟台东润的火速套现也受到了质疑。

PermaLink: https://articles.zkiz.com/?id=17655

酷6董事长吴征：不擅长实业项目 长于投资

http://www.cb.com.cn/1634427/20100902/147392.html

　在“学历风波”中从新浪出局，逐渐淡出公众视野多年，此次携酷6归来能否不虚此行?

　　吴征简历

　　1966年11月出生于上海，1985年入复旦大学法国文学专业。1993年获华盛顿大学硕士。1994年至1996年就读于美国巴灵顿大学函授课程。1986年毕业于法国萨伏大学法国语言与文学进修学院，获“法国文学学习高级文凭”。

　 　吴征于1999年创办阳光媒体投资集团，至2007年8月一直担任集团主席。之后他以原阳光媒体投资集团的投资部门为基础，创建红岩资本集团，业务包括 创业投资、金融服务、债券发行及私募基金。今年8月17日，酷6传媒(前为华友世纪)股票在纳斯达克交易，吴征接替陈天桥出任酷6传媒董事长。

　　眼前的吴征，并没有印象中那么胖。酷6海外上市那天晚上，本刊记者与新任董事长吴征交谈间隙，他按时吃下了同事递过来的减肥药。他说还会定期运动，射击、打拳、网球都很擅长。这一次减肥的决心很大。

　　携酷6归来的吴征着力重塑的，还有公众形象。大约五年前的“学历”和“慈善”两场风波后，他淡出公众视野。而今因酷6借壳上市，他又重回媒体关注的前台。

　 　8月17日晚，在美国纳斯达克上市的华友世纪正式发布公告，更名为“酷6传媒”。陈天桥即日起辞去董事会主席一职，现任独立董事和审计委员会主席吴征担 任公司董事长，酷6网创始人李善友任公司首席执行官(CEO)。同时，陈天桥将出任董事会新设的薪酬委员会、企业发展及财务委员会的主席，陈天桥和原华友 代理首席执行官瞿海滨继续担任公司董事。

　　一位接近酷6的知情人士对本刊记者分析，这种局面是互相制衡的结果：持有逾10%股份的李善友个性强，团队控制力也很强，适合CEO之职;大股东陈天桥退居幕后，仍掌控着薪酬与财务大权;而吴征，正如他本人坦言，其身份更像李陈之间的缓和剂。

　　对于这次出任酷6董事长，吴征踌躇满志。他认为，自己过往横跨传统电视和网络新媒体的经历，是出任此职的重要砝码，“我上任的第一目标就是要实现酷6扭亏”。

　　目标扭亏

　　对陈天桥而言，也许这只是巧合——先用唐骏，携盛大上市;再用吴征，携酷6上市。二人都因学历问题遭遇争议。

　　不过，吴征拒绝将自己与唐骏相比。他强调从未对公众撒过谎。他承认在美国华盛顿大学获硕士学位后通过函授得到一个“博士”学位，但由此学习了金融方面的入门知识，而且，“在2000年从复旦大学国政系博士毕业之前，我没有称过自己为博士”。

　 　吴征自2006年10月起担任盛大董事，但主要身份仍是与杨澜创立的阳光媒体投资控股集团公司(Sun Media Investment Holding Group of Companies)的联合创始人、红岩资本集团董事长。2009年9月1日，吴征转任华友世纪(Nasdaq：HRAY)董事。

　　同为“海派” 商人，吴征陈天桥不和的传言，曾为外界所传。吴征对此一笑了之，他回忆称，是在盛大最困难的时候进入盛大董事会。当时机顶盒项目行将搁浅，‘传奇’游戏节目用户减少，“我从几方面向陈天桥提出建议，主要是帮助他策划盛大的战略转型。”

　　吴征的建议有三：一是把经营思路从“come(来)、pay(付费)and stay(停留)”变成“come、stay and pay”，也就是降低游戏进入门槛，先黏住用户，再通过收费来实现更大的效益。“后来天桥把这个叫做‘CSP’战略，这是我的原创。”

　　二是开放盛大的内容平台。“我认为盛大的渠道是很值钱的，不应该只为‘传奇’服务，谁愿意跟我们合作，都可以利用我们的渠道帮他去卖产品。”

　　三是聚焦于年轻用户群。

　　“一个舞台可以唱不同的戏，不同的演出剧团可以独立上市。这就有了后来盛大游戏的分拆独立上市，而盛大文学和现在的酷6都与这个思路吻合。”

　吴征将自己在酷6的使命设定为“扭亏”。中国的视频网站迄今没有找到盈利先例，酷6何时可实现扭亏，吴征也没有足够把握。“我上任后肯定会对酷6的盈利模式做出一些调整，不能只依靠广告。我的主要目标是盈利。”

　　酷6上市后，面临着更严峻的挑战。首先，成为公众公司后，一味靠盗版来节约成本的道路走不通了;其次，随着流量增加，带宽成本也不断增加;第三，视频网站持续增长的广告收入，仍难超过“烧钱”的速度。

　 　8月12日，乐视网登陆A股创业板，截至8月17日收盘，乐视网总市值约43.5亿元。而酷6网市值约0.65亿美元，约为前者十分之一。另有知情人士 透露，2011年将是优酷网海外IPO的关键年份。优酷网今年预计收入在2亿元左右，目标也是实现盈利。一旦它实现IPO，而酷6网如果还不能实现财务平 衡，其市值势必继续缩水。

　　易观国际的数据显示，今年上半年，中国网络视频市场规模仅为8.30亿元，不足同期中国网络广告市场规模 (101亿元)的十分之一。市场占有率的前五名，分别为优酷网(19%)、土豆网(15%)、CNTV(国家网络电视台)(11%)、酷6网(10%)和 搜狐视频(7%)。如果以此测算，酷6网今年收入预计在8000万元左右。

　　吴征认为，盛大每年强大的现金流，可为未来酷6的业务转型提供充足的财务保障;李善友富有激情和执行力，作为酷6的创始人，凝聚了很强的团队和人气。与陈天桥、李善友相比，吴征自认为“可以利用各种人脉关系与资源，帮助公司把握大的战略”。

　　吴征对本刊记者称，“现在酷6和国内视频网站都面临非常严峻的局面，我希望凭借互联网、电视和传统媒体的经验，能使酷6成为视频网站中财务表现比较好的公司”。他说，不排除未来也入股酷6的可能性。

　　弃实业，逐资本

　　在外界看来，吴征的经历证明他确有人脉资源和融资能力，对于资本市场的新概念也有敏锐反应，这带来很多商业上的机会，最终却未能结出硕果。吴征则这样对人生划界作评：“2005年之前是勉强苟活，之后才进入资源嫁接和资本运作的较好状态。”

　　吴征进一步自我总结优缺点道：领悟力强，但不擅长某项实业项目，更长于投资、资本运作和资源整合;“我如果和一个执行能力很强的团队合作，就定能成功。”阳光集团的发展已有十年历史，吴征坦承“前五年除投资外都不算成功，尤其阳光卫视在商业上非常失败”。

　　吴征乐意展示种种背景和人脉，办公室里贴满与各国政要的合影。他祖父吴凯生是上海滩资历最老的留法律师之一，吴征亦能说一口流利的英语和法语。

　 　但资源人脉并不等同于制胜法宝。阳光卫视在初始时曾打上中国官方的色彩。广电主管部门在香港的一个窗口公司与阳光集团签约，共同发展有线电视内容供应业 务，阳光卫视提出了“两条腿走路”和“片库”概念。不过政治资源嫁接的风险很快就出现，由于领导人事变更和香港回归后政治局势的变化，政府最终决定撤出吴 征的香港公司，签下的合约也没有执行。

　　“在阳光最低谷的时候，幸亏有后来入主新浪的资本操作。之后就带动了我们一系列投资，通过这些投资，在五年里能够勉强地生存下来。”吴征坦言。当年另一位充满争议的商人段永基，一同策划了对新浪的投资。之后双方陆续退出。

　　阳光集团近几年的发展中，媒体实业业务的收入比例其实很低，更多都来自吴征投资业务板块的操作。吴征称，“阳光卫视的资产从来没有超过阳光媒体的1%，阳光媒体在整个阳光红岩的体系里也是很小的比例。”

　　阳光集团另一位高层也表示，阳光的收益基本来自旗下投资公司做的项目。“2005年开始，我们逐渐意识到擅长什么和应该避免什么，这个公司的擅长跟这个公司的领导人的擅长、优点是连在一起的。”

　　阳光集团旗下除外界比较知名的阳光媒体，还包括红岩资本集团、红岩置地集团、红岩智库集团，主要从事债券投资、股权投资和土地、房地产投资。不过，红岩资本使吴征获得的投资收益，很大一部分仍体现为账面股权收益，尚未落袋为安。

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一个实业家的诞生——读巴菲特的信（8） Barrons


 
从投资到实业的转型
 
 
 
从70年代中期开始，巴菲特已经不仅是单纯的股票投资，他开始更多的从企业拥有者的角度思考问题，进行决策。从某种意义上讲，巴菲特更像一个精于投资的实业家。
 
 
 
在早期，巴菲特更注重买入价格和足够的安全边际。而到了这个阶段，他看重的因素是企业的经济前景，管理层，以及购买价格。前面两点在巴菲特早期的投资决策中并没有得到太多的体现。但是，他的投资方式仍然没有变，仍然是对确信度非常高的企业重仓集中投资。
 
 
Our equity investments are heavily concentrated in a few companies which are selected based on favorable economic characteristics, competent and honest management, and a purchase price attractive when measured against the yardstick of value to a private owner.
 
 
我们的股票投资重仓集中在少数几个公司。我们选择这些公司是基于有利的经济特征，有能力而且诚实的管理层，以及用私人拥有价值衡量有吸引力的购买价格。
 
 
When such criteria are maintained, our intention is to hold for a long time; indeed, our largest equity investment is 467,150 shares of Washington Post “B” stock with a cost of $10.6 million, which we expect to hold permanently.
 
 
当这些条件都满足时，我们有意长期持有。实际上，我们最大的股票投资是46万7千1百5十股华盛顿邮报的“B”股，成本为1千万美元。我们打算永远持有。
 
 
With this approach, stock market fluctuations are of little importance to us — except as they may provide buying opportunities — but business performance is of major importance. On this score we have been delighted with progress made by practically all of the companies in which we now have significant investments.    采用这种方式，股票市场的波动对我们毫无意义，只不过有时能提供买入的机会，但是业务表现对我们极为重要。在这方面，我们对所有我们有重大投资的企业的进展感到高兴。    （1975年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）  
 
 
You will notice that our major equity holdings are relatively few. We select such investments on a long-term basis weighing the same factors as would be involved in the purchase of 100% of an operating business: (1) favorable long-term economic characteristics; (2)competent and honest management; (3) purchase price attractive when measured against the yardstick of value to a private owner; and (4)an industry with which we are familiar and whose long-term business characteristics we feel competent to judge. It is difficult to find investments meeting such a test, and that is one reason for our concentration of holdings. We simply can't find one hundred different securities that conform to our investment requirements. However, we feel quite comfortable concentrating our holdings in the much smaller number that we do identify as attractive.
 
 
你会注意到我们的主要股票投资个数较少。我们选择这些投资是基于长期的考虑，按照我们购买100%的业务的情况权衡了各种因素：（1）有利的长期经济特征。（2）有能力而且诚实的管理层。（3）用私人拥有价值衡量有吸引力的购买价格。（4）我们熟悉的行业，而且我们有能力判断其长期业务特征。但是很难找到符合条件的投资，这也是为什么我们集中持股的一个原因。我们根本无法找到100个不同的股票，而且都能满足我们的投资要求。但是，我们对集中投资在如此之少的几个股票感到非常舒服自在，因为这几个股票我们确认是有吸引力的。
 
 
（1975年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
 
 
We are not concerned with whether the market quickly revalues upward securities that we believe are selling at bargain prices.  In fact, we prefer just the opposite since, in most years, we expect to have funds available to be a net buyer of securities.  And consistent attractive purchasing is likely to prove to be of more eventual benefit to us than any selling opportunities provided by a short-term run up in stock prices to levels at which we are unwilling to continue buying.   我 们不担心市场能否迅速向上重估我们坚信卖便宜了的股票。实际上，我们希望的正好相反，因为在大多数年份里，我们预期将获得资金，成为股票的净买入者。持续 以诱人的价格购买，这对我们最终的益处多于任何短期股价上涨所带来的卖出机会的好处。因为如果股票上涨到一定程度，我们就不愿继续买入。   Our policy is to concentrate holdings.  We try to avoid buying a little of this or that when we are only lukewarm about the business or its price.  When we are convinced as to attractiveness, we believe in buying worthwhile amounts.   我们的策略是集中持股。我们避免对业务或价格只是半信半疑，却这买一点儿，那买一点儿。当我们确信一个投资是有吸引力的，我们坚信，要买就要重仓买入。    
（1978年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
 
   
 
衡量公司业绩的标准
 
 
 
巴菲特在衡量公司业绩时，更多的是从一个长期拥有者的角度考虑，注重ROE，注重长期。
 
 
Most companies define “record” earnings as a new high in earnings per share.  Since businesses customarily add from year to year to their equity base, we find nothing particularly noteworthy in a management performance combining, say, a 10% increase in equity capital and a 5% increase in earnings per share.  After all, even a totally dormant savings account will produce steadily rising interest earnings each year because of compounding.
 
 
很多公司把“创纪录”的盈利定义为每股盈利创新高。由于企业通常年复一年的增加资本基数，我们觉得如果一个管理层的业绩包括了如10%的资本增加和5%的每股盈利增加，那么这没什么值得注意的。毕竟一个完全不动的存款帐户，由于复利的作用，每年还能产生稳定的利息收入增长。
 
 
Except for special cases (for example, companies with unusual debt-equity ratios or those with important assets carried at unrealistic balance sheet values), we believe a more appropriate measure of managerial economic performance to be return on equity capital. 
 
 
除了特殊的情况（如有异常的债务/资本比例，或者有重要的资产以不现实的价值体现在资产负债表上），我们相信权益资本回报率是衡量管理层业绩表现的更合适指标。
 
 
（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
 
 
“Earnings per share” will rise constantly on a dormant savings account or on a U.S. Savings Bond bearing a fixed rate of return simply because “earnings” (the stated interest rate) are continuously plowed back and added to the capital base.  Thus, even a “stopped clock” can look like a growth stock if the dividend payout ratio is low.    “每股盈利”将持续稳定增长，即使是一个完全不动的存款帐户，或者固定利率的美国储蓄债券也是如此。因为“盈利”（标称利率）将持续加回到本金中。所以，如果分红率足够低，一个“不走的钟表”也能看起来像一个成长股。    The primary test of managerial economic performance is the achievement of a high earnings rate on equity capital employed (without undue leverage, accounting gimmickry, etc.) and not the achievement of consistent gains in earnings per share.  In our view, many businesses would be better understood by their shareholder owners, as well as the general public, if managements and financial analysts modified the primary emphasis they place upon earnings per share, and upon yearly changes in that figure.    衡 量管理层经济业绩的最主要测试就是达到在使用的权益资本之上获得高的回报率（但没有过度的杠杆，会计花招等。），而不是获得每股盈利的持续稳定增长。在我 们看来，如果管理层和金融分析师能改变对每股盈利及每股盈利年度变化的重视，很多业务能被股东拥有者以及公众更好的理解。    
 
（1979年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    
In measuring long term economic performance - in contrast to yearly performance - we believe it is appropriate to recognize fully any realized capital gains or losses as well as extraordinary items, and also to utilize financial statements presenting equity securities at market value.  Such capital gains or losses, either realized or unrealized, are fully as important to shareholders over a period of years as earnings realized in a more routine manner through operations; it is just that their impact is often extremely capricious in the short run, a characteristic that makes them inappropriate as an indicator of single year managerial performance.   在衡量长期经济表现时，与年度业绩不同，我们相信把所有实现的资本增值/损失，以及特殊项目进行确认，并且用目前的市场价值体现财务报表中股票的价值是合适的。这些资本增值/损失，无论实现的还是未实现的，与日常运营中实现的盈利一样，在多年的时间里，对股东都具有同样重要的价值。只不过在短期内，这些资本增值/损失的影响极为多变，这让它们不适合作为某一年管理层业绩的指标。    
 
（1979年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    
As we have noted, we evaluate single-year corporate performance by comparing operating earnings to shareholders’ equity with securities valued at cost.  Our long-term yardstick of performance, however, includes all capital gains or losses, realized or unrealized.  We continue to achieve a long-term return on equity that considerably exceeds the average of our yearly returns.  The major factor causing this pleasant result is a simple one: the retained earnings of those non-controlled holdings we discussed earlier have been translated into gains in market value.   正如我们提到的，我们衡量某一年的企业业绩是用运营利润比上按成本估值的股东权益。但是我们长期的业绩衡量指标包括了所有的资本增值/损失，无论是实现的还是未实现的。我们不断取得显著超过年度平均回报的长期资本回报率。造成这个良好结果的主要的因素在于一个简单的事实：我们前面所讨论的非控股公司的存留收益已经转化为市场价值的增长。    Of course, this translation of retained earnings into market price appreciation is highly uneven (it goes in reverse some years), unpredictable as to timing, and unlikely to materialize on a precise dollar-for-dollar basis.  And a silly purchase price for a block of stock in a corporation can negate the effects of a decade of earnings retention by that corporation.  But when purchase prices are sensible, some long-term market recognition of the accumulation of retained earnings almost certainly will occur.  Periodically you even will receive some frosting on the cake, with market appreciation far exceeding post-purchase retained earnings.   当然，这种将存留收益转化为市场价格上涨的过程是高度不平均的（有时候方向甚至是相反的），在时间上无法预测，无法精确按照一美元兑一美元来实现。而且一个荒谬的股票购买价格能抵消企业10年的存留收益的效果。但是，当购买价格合理时，对存留收益积累的一定程度的长期市场确认几乎肯定会发生。    
 
（1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）      
 
买股票如同买整个业务
 
 
 
“买股票如同买整个业务”，这是巴菲特重要的投资哲学，也体现了他从一个纯粹的股票投资者向实业家，企业拥有者的转变。
 
 
Most of our large stock positions are going to be held for many years and the scorecard on our investment decisions will be provided by business results over that period, and not by prices on any given day.  Just as it would be foolish to focus unduly on short-term prospects when acquiring an entire company, we think it equally unsound to become mesmerized by prospective near term earnings or recent trends in earnings when purchasing small pieces of a company;i.e., marketable common stocks.
 
 
我们将长期持有大多数的重大股票投资。因此衡量我们投资决策的记分卡将会是那段时期 的业务表现，而不是任何一天的股价。这就如同并购一整个公司时过分关注短期前景是愚蠢的。同样，我们认为在购买一个公司的一小部分时（即购买股票时），痴 迷于近期盈利前景或者最近的盈利趋势，这也是不明智的。
 
 
（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
 
 
We select our marketable equity securities in much the same way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety.  We want the business to be (1) one that we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) available at a very attractive price.  We ordinarily make no attempt to buy equities for anticipated favorable stock price behavior in the short term.  In fact, if their business experience continues to satisfy us, we welcome lower market prices of stocks we own as an opportunity to acquire even more of a good thing at a better price.
 
 
当选择购买股票时，我们用非常类似于评估并购整个业务的方法来进行。我们想要的业务是（1）我们能懂的。（2）有利的长期前景。（3）由诚实而且有能力的人运营。（4）可以用非常诱人的价格获得。我们一般不因为预期的短期股价的良好表现而购买股票。实际上，如果公司的业务持续让我们满意，对拥有的股票，我们欢迎更低的市场价格，我们把这看成是用更好的价格购买更多的好东西。
 
 
Our experience has been that pro-rata portions of truly outstanding businesses sometimes sell in the securities markets at very large discounts from the prices they would command in negotiated transactions involving entire companies.  Consequently, bargains in business ownership, which simply are not available directly through corporate acquisition, can be obtained indirectly through stock ownership.  When prices are appropriate, we are willing to take very large positions in selected companies, not with any intention of taking control and not foreseeing sell-out or merger, but with the expectation that excellent business results by corporations will translate over the long term into correspondingly excellent market value and dividend results for owners, minority as well as majority.
 
 
我们的经验表明，相对于谈判并购整个公司的交易价格，真正优秀的业务的一部分有时会 在股票市场有很大的折价。因此，在拥有实业方面，便宜货在企业并购中根本不能直接获得，但却可以通过股票所有权间接获得。当价格合适的时候，我们愿意买入 精心挑选的一些公司很多的股份。我们无意控制公司，或者寻求整体出售及合并。但是我们预期公司优异的业绩将在长期转化为给拥有者的出色的市场价值和股息， 无论拥有者是少数股东还是大股东。
 
 
（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
 
 
Whatever the appellation, we are delighted with our GEICO holding which, as noted, cost us $47 million. To buy a similar $20 million of earning power in a business with first-class economic characteristics and bright prospects would cost a minimum of $200 million (much more in some industries) if it had to be accomplished through negotiated purchase of an entire company.
 
 
无论怎么说，我们都对GEICO的持股感到满意。这耗费了我们4千7百万美元。但如果谈判并购整个公司，要买一个类似的有2千万美元盈利能力的第一流经济特征和光明前景的企业，至少要耗资2亿美金（在某些行业要多得多）。
 
 
（1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
 
 
Since See’s was purchased by Blue Chip Stamps at the beginning of 1972, pre-tax operating earnings have grown from $4.2 million to $12.6 million with little additional capital investment.  See’s achieved this record while operating in an industry experiencing practically no unit growth.
 
 
喜诗巧克力公司是由Blue Chip Stamps公司在1972年初购买的。其税前运营利润从4百二十万美元增长到了1千2百6十万美元，而仅有非常少的额外资本投入。喜诗巧克力在一个正在经历着毫无数量增长的行业取得了如此的业绩。
 
 
（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）


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一个实业家的诞生——读巴菲特的信（9） Barrons

http://blog.caing.com/article/10365/

关于保险行业    巴菲特在1967年开始进入保险行业。他对这个行业有着深入的见解。保险业的资金也支撑了他进一步投资。保险资金的特点在于无利息，甚至是负利息。当保险亏钱时，与整体的浮存金（Float）相比，亏钱百分比很小，常常低于美国国债利息，所以还是划算。而当保险赚钱时，就相当于负利息，也就是借别人的钱，别人还倒贴给你利息。所以保险是否赚钱不是最重要的，浮存金才是关键。通过浮存金，巴菲特获得了无利息甚至负利息的杠杆，提高了投资的业绩。2009年伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东权益为1360亿美元，保险浮存金（float）为620亿美元，相当于1.46的负利率杠杆。    SAFECO probably is the best run large property and casualty insurance company in the United States.  Their underwriting abilities are simply superb, their loss reserving is conservative, and their investment policies make great sense.    SAFECO可能是美国运营最好的大型财产事故保险公司。他们的承保能力一流，赔款拨备保守，投资策略非常明智。    SAFECO is a much better insurance operation than our own (although we believe certain segments of ours are much better than average), is better than one we could develop and, similarly, is far better than any in which we might negotiate purchase of a controlling interest.  Yet our purchase of SAFECO was made at substantially under book value.  We paid less than 100 cents on the dollar for the best company in the business, when far more than 100 cents on the dollar is being paid for mediocre companies in corporate transactions.  And there is no way to start a new operation - with necessarily uncertain prospects - at less than 100 cents on the dollar.    SAFECO比我们的保险业务好很多（虽然我们坚信我们在某些方面远好过平均水平），好过我们自己所能发展的水平。同样，也远好过我们通过谈判购买控股权所能得到的业务。而且，我们对SAFECO的购买价格远低于帐面价格。对这个业界最好的公司，对每一美元的帐面资产我们支付了不到一美元的价格。与此同时，一些平庸的公司在企业并购中的价格远超过帐面价格。用少于帐面价格的花费，根本无法创建一个新的业务，而且新建业务还必然有不确定的前景。    Of course, with a minor interest we do not have the right to direct or even influence management policies of SAFECO.  But why should we wish to do this?  The record would indicate that they do a better job of managing their operations than we could do ourselves.  While there may be less excitement and prestige in sitting back and letting others do the work, we think that is all one loses by accepting a passive participation in excellent management.  Because, quite clearly, if one controlled a company run as well as SAFECO, the proper policy also would be to sit back and let management do its job.    当然，拥有少数股东权益，我们无权指导或者影响SAFECO的管理策略。但是，我们为什么要这样做呢？记录显示，他们自己管理的运营比让我们来管还更好。虽然撒手不管，让别人去做事不够令人激动，也缺少声望，但我们认为，这是接受被动参与优秀的管理层所能失去的唯一东西。因为，非常清楚，如果一个人完全拥有一个像SAFECO这样运营良好的公司，合适的策略也是撒手不管，让管理层自主管理。    （1978年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）  　　 Insurance companies offer standardized policies which can be copied by anyone. Their only products are promises.  It is not difficult to belicensed, and rates are an open book.  There are no important advantages from trademarks, patents, location, corporate longevity, raw material sources, etc., and very little consumer differentiation to produce insulation from competition.  It is commonplace, in corporate annual reports, to stress the difference that people make. Sometimes this is true and sometimes it isn’t. But there is no question that the nature of the insurance business magnifies the effect which individual managers have on company performance.  We are very fortunate to have the group of managers that are associated with us.
 
 保 险公司提供标准化保单，可以被任何人复制。他们惟一的产品就是承诺。执照不难获得，保费是公开的。保险公司在商标、专利、地点、企业的悠长历史、原材料来 源等方面没有重要的优势。他们很难把自己与竞争对手区分开来。在企业的年报中，常常强调人的作用。有时候，这是事实，有时候不是。但是，毫无疑问，保险业 的本质放大了个别经理人对于公司业绩的作用。我们很幸运，拥有一群好的经理人。
 （1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）  Nevertheless, we believe that insurance can be a very good business.  It tends to magnify, to an unusual degree, human managerial talent - or the lack of it.  We have a number of managers whose talent is both proven and growing. (And, in addition, we have a very large indirect interest in two truly outstanding management groups through our investments in SAFECO and GEICO.) Thus we expect to do well in insurance over a period of years.  However, the business has the potential for really terrible results in a single specific year.  If accident frequency should turn around quickly in the auto field, we, along with others, are likely to experience such a year.    但是，我们相信保险业可以是一个很好的业务。保险趋向于以非常大的比例放大管理人才（或者缺乏管理人才）的效果。我们有很多经理人，其才干不仅得到证实，而且正在不断增长。（而且我们通过投资SAFECO 和GEICO 而间接获得了两个真正优秀的管理团队的权益。）所以，我们预计未来一些年将在保险行业取得好业绩。但是，这一行业有潜在的可能性在某一年取得非常糟糕的业绩。如果汽车领域的事故频率突然升高，我们和同行业者都有可能遭遇这样糟糕的一年。    （1979年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）      保险行业的问题    在 极高通胀背景下，保险行业受到双重挤压。一方面，保费增长跟不上赔付成本的快速增长。另一方面，投资的债券又在通胀加息后损失惨重。为了不被迫卖掉债券而 实现损失，各个保险公司宁肯赔本卖保险，也要维持保费收入增加，从而引发价格战并进入了恶性循环，加重了保险业的问题。美国保险业过去的问题，对于有可能 进入高通胀时期的中国，也有借鉴意义。  　　
 
We estimate that costs involved in the insurance areas in which we operate rise at close to 1% per month.  This is due to continuous monetary inflation affecting the cost of repairing humans and property, as well as“social inflation”, a broadening definition by society and juries of what is covered by insurance policies.  Unless rates rise at a comparable 1% per month, underwriting profits must shrink. 
 
 我们估计我们的保险运营所涉及的成本正以每月1%的速度递增。这是由于持续的货币通胀影响了医治人和修复财产的成本，以及“社会通胀”，即社会和陪审团对什么是保险应该负责的定义越来越宽泛。除非保费能以类似每月1%的速度增加，承保盈利必然减少。
 （1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
 
 The insurance industry’s underwriting picture continues to unfold about as we anticipated, with the combined ratio (see definition on page37) rising from 100.6 in 1979 to an estimated 103.5 in 1980.  It is virtually certain that this trend will continue and that industry underwriting losses will mount, significantly and progressively, in 1981 and 1982.  To understand why, we recommend that you read the excellent analysis of property-casualty competitive dynamics done by Barbara Stewart of Chubb Corp. in an October 1980 paper. (Chubb’s annual report consistently presents the most insightful, candid and well-written discussion of industry conditions; you should get on the company’smailing list.) Mrs. Stewart’s analysis may not be cheerful, but we think it is very likely to be accurate.
 
 保险行业的承保情况如我们预期的一样发展。综合赔付率（译者注：综合赔付率是指：综合赔款，即理赔费用与发生的赔款总合，与相应的已赚保费的比率）从1979年的100.6%上升到1980年估计的103.5%。几乎可以确定，这个趋势将会继续，保险行业的承保损失将在1981年和1982年逐渐显著增加。想要了解为什么会这样，我建议读一读Chubb公司的Barbara Stewart写于1980年10月的文章，这是一篇对财产事故险行业竞争态势的出色分析。（Chubb的年报一直呈现了最深刻、坦率的文笔流畅的行业情况讨论。你应当加入其公司邮寄名单。）Stewart女士的分析可能不乐观，但我们认为很有可能是准确的。
 
 And, unfortunately, a largely unreported but particularly pernicious problem may well prolong and intensify the coming industry agony.  It is not only likely to keep many insurers scrambling for business when underwriting losses hit record levels - it is likely to cause them at such a time to redouble their efforts.
 
 不幸的是，一个未被报道，但却非常有害的问题有可能持续并加剧即将到来的行业困境。这不仅有可能让很多保险公司在承保损失达到创纪录的水平时忙于应对，而且还有可能迫使他们付出加倍的努力。
 
 This problem arises from the decline in bond prices and the insurance accounting convention that allows companies to carry bonds at amortized cost, regardless of market value.  Many insurers own long-term bonds that, at amortized cost, amount to two to three times net worth.  If the level is three times, of course, a one-third shrink from cost in bond prices - if it were to be recognized on the books - would wipe out net worth.  And shrink they have.  Some of the largest and best known property-casualty companies currently find themselves with nominal, or even negative, net worth when bond holdings are valued at market.  Of course their bonds could rise in price, thereby partially, or conceivably even fully, restoring the integrity of stated net worth.  Or they could fall further. (We believe that short-term forecasts of stock or bond prices are useless.  The forecasts may tell you a great deal about the forecaster; they tell you nothing about the future.)
 
 这 个问题出在下跌的债券价格和保险会计惯例允许公司不论债券的市场价值而用已摊销成本持有债券。很多保险公司拥有的长期债券按已摊销成本计算是其净资产的两 到三倍。如果是净资产的三倍，那么当债券的价值从成本价贬值三分之一后，在账面上体现出来就会把净资产全部消除。而这些债券确实已经贬值了。当持有的债券 用市场价估值时，一些最大，最有名的财产损失险公司目前发现自己仅有微不足道，甚至是负的净资产。当然，他们的债券有可能升值，部分，甚至是全部恢复规定 净资产的完整性。或者他们也有可能进一步恶化。（我们坚信对股票或者债券价格的短期预测是毫无用处的。预测可能更多的是告诉你很多关于预测者本身的情况， 而不是未来的情况。）
 
 It might strike some as strange that an insurance company’s survival is threatened when its stock portfolio falls sufficiently in price to reduce net worth significantly, but that an even greater decline in bond prices produces no reaction at all.  The industry would respond by pointing out that, no matter what the current price, the bonds will be paid in full at maturity, thereby eventually eliminating any interim price decline.  It may take twenty, thirty, or even forty years, this argument says, but, as long as the bonds don’t have to be sold, in the end they’ll all be worth face value.  Of course, if they are sold even if they are replaced with similar bonds offering better relative value - the loss must be booked immediately.  And, just as promptly, published net worth must be adjusted downward by the amount of the loss.
 
 对 有些人来讲，会觉得以下情况很奇怪：当保险公司的股票投资组合下跌到足够的程度，以至于严重减少净资产时，保险公司的生存就会受到威胁；但即使保险公司拥 有的债券价格下跌更多，保险公司却毫不受影响。保险业的反应可能是指出，无论目前的价格如何，债券在到期后将全额付清，所以最终将消除任何在这之间的价格 下跌。这个论点指出，债券可能持续20，30，甚至是40年，只要不必卖出，最终债券将回归面值。当然，如果债券被卖掉，即使是用有更好价值的类似债券替换，债券的损失也要立刻记入。而且，公布的净资产也将同时根据损失额相应向下调整。
 
 Under such circumstances, a great many investment options disappear, perhaps for decades.  For example, when large underwriting losses arein prospect, it may make excellent business logic for some insurersto shift from tax-exempt bonds into taxable bonds.  Unwillingness to recognize major bond losses may be the sole factor that prevents such a sensible move.
 
 在这种情况下，很多投资选择在几十年的时间里消失了。比如，当预计有大量承保损失时，非常符合商业逻辑的做法是保险公司从免税债券转向付税债券。保险公司不愿意做这样合理的转换，完全是由于不愿确认债券的重大损失。
 
 But the full implications flowing from massive unrealized bond losses are far more serious than just the immobilization of investment intellect.  For the source of funds to purchase and hold those bonds is a pool of money derived from policy holders and claimants(with changing faces) - money which, in effect, is temporarily on deposit with the insurer.  As long as this pool retains its size, no bonds must be sold.  If the pool of funds shrinks - which it will ifthe volume of business declines significantly- assets must be sold to pay off the liabilities.  And if thoseassets consist of bonds with big unrealized losses, such losses will rapidly become realized, decimating net worth in the process.
 
 但是大量的未确认债券损失所带来的问题远比仅仅失去投资智慧的灵活性严重。用于购买并持有那 些债券的资金来源是保险客户和保险索赔人（充满变化）的钱。这些钱实际上是暂时存在保险公司的。只要这些钱的多少保持不变，债券无需被卖出。但是如果这些 钱减少，如果业务流量急剧减少时就会如此，资产必须被卖掉以平衡负债。而且如果这些资产包含了大量未确认损失的债券，那么这些损失将迅速被确认，随之减损 净资产。
 
 Thus,an insurance company with a bond market value shrinkage approaching stated net worth (of which there are now many) and also faced within adequate rate levels that are sure to deteriorate further has two options.  One option for management is to tell the underwriters to keep pricing according to the exposure involved - “be sure to get a dollar of premium for every dollar of expense cost plus expectable loss cost”.
 
 所 以如果一个保险公司拥有的债券的市值减少接近规定的净资产（目前有很多公司是这样的），而且面临综合赔付率水平不足且肯定会进一步恶化的情况，这个保险公 司有两个选择。一个选择是管理层指示保险承保人依据所面临的风险定价，即“对每一美元的成本和预计赔付，一定要得到一美元的保费。”
 
 The consequences of this directive are predictable: (a) with most business both price sensitive and renewable annually, many policies presently on the books will be lost to competitors in rather short order; (b) as premium volume shrinks significantly, there will be alagged but corresponding decrease in liabilities (unearned premiums and claims payable); (c) assets (bonds) must be sold to match the decrease in liabilities; and (d) the formerly unrecognized disappearance of net worth will become partially recognized (depending upon the extent of such sales) in the insurer’s published financial statements.
 
 这个指示的后果可以预测：（a）由于大多数的业务对价格敏感而且是年度续约，很多目前的保单将在短期内丢失到竞争对手那里去。（b）当保费的数量严重减少，那就会有滞后但相应的负债减少（预收保费和应付索赔）。（c）资产（债券）必须被卖掉以平衡减少的负债。（d）之前未确认的净资产消失将在保险公司公布的财务报表中得到部分确认（还要看这些销售债券的情形）。
 
 Variations of this depressing sequence involve a smaller penalty to stated net worth.  The reaction of some companies at (c) would be to sell either stocks that are already carried at market values or recently purchased bonds involving less severe losses.  This ostrich-like behavior - selling the better assets and keeping the biggest losers -while less painful in the short term, is unlikely to be a winner inthe long term.
 
 这一恶性循环的一个变种会让规定净资产的减少较轻。有些公司对（c）的反应是卖掉已经以市场价值计的股票，或者最近购买的债券，这些债券较少涉及严重的损失。这种鸵鸟式的行为，卖掉更好的资产却留着最大的损失，在短期内痛苦较少，但长期看不太可能成功。
 
 The second option is much simpler: just keep writing business regardless of rate levels and whopping prospective underwriting losses, thereby maintaining the present levels of premiums, assets and liabilities -and then pray for a better day, either for underwriting or for bond prices.  There is much criticism in the trade press of “cash flow”underwriting; i.e., writing business regardless of prospective underwriting losses in order to obtain funds to invest at current high interest rates.  This second option might properly be termed“asset maintenance” underwriting - the acceptance of terrible business just to keep the assets you now have.
 
 第 二个选择简单多了：只要继续卖保险，不论综合赔付率水平，也不管巨大的未来承保损失。只要保持目前的保费水平，资产和负债状态，祈祷未来会更好，无论是承 保还是债券价格。在保险行业媒体有很多关于“现金流”承保的批评。这种方式不论未来的承保损失，只为了获得资金以目前的高利率投资。这第二种选择可以称为 “资产维持”承保，接受糟糕的业务只为了维持你目前现有的资产。
 
 Of course you know which option will be selected.  And it also is clear that as long as many large insurers feel compelled to choose that second option, there will be no better day for underwriting.  For if much of the industry feels it must maintain premium volume levels regardless of price adequacy, all insurers will have to come close to meeting those prices.  Right behind having financial problems yourself, the next worst plight is to have a large group of competitors with financial problems that they can defer by a“sell-at-any-price” policy.
 
 当 然你知道哪一个选择会被采用。而且，非常清楚，只要许多大型保险公司迫不得已选择这第二种方式，承保的好日子不会到来。如果行业中的大部分都认为不论价格 是否足够，必须维持保费的数量水平，那么所有保险公司都必须用接近的价格应对。在自己有财务问题之外，第二糟糕的困境就是，有着财务问题的一大群竞争对 手，能用“卖在任何价格”的方式延缓问题。
 
 We mentioned earlier that companies that were unwilling - for any of a number of reasons, including public reaction, institutional pride, or protection of stated net worth - to sell bonds at price levels forcing recognition of major losses might find themselves frozen in investment posture for a decade or longer.  But, as noted, that’s only half of the problem.  Companies that have made extensive commitments to long-term bonds may have lost, for a considerable period of time, not only many of their investment options, but many of their underwriting options as well.
 
 我前面提到，保险公司不愿以不得不确认重大损失的价格卖掉债券。他们这样做可能有很多原因，公众反应，机构的自尊，或者保护规定的净资产。他们这样做有可能导致束缚自己的投资方式长达10年，甚至更久。但是，如前面所说，这只是问题的一半。购买了大量长期债券的保险公司有可能在很长时期内已经失去了不仅是投资选择，而且是他们的承保选择。
 
 Our own position in this respect is satisfactory.  We believe our net worth, valuing bonds of all insurers at amortized cost, is the strongest relative to premium volume among all large property-casualty stockholder-owned groups.  When bonds are valued at market, our relative strength becomes far more dramatic. (But lest we get too puffed up, we remind ourselves that our asset and liability maturities still are far more mismatched than we would wish and that we, too, lost important sums in bonds because your Chairman was talking when he should have been acting.)
 
 在 这种情形下，我们自己的情况是令人满意的。用已摊销成本计价来评估债券，我们相信我们的净资产相对于保费，在所有的大型财产事故保险公司里是最强的。当用 市值评估时，我们的相对优势变得更加突出。（但别信心膨胀，我们提醒自己，我们的资产和负债仍然不匹配，离我们希望的差的很远。我们也在债券上亏了很多， 因为你们的董事会主席在需要行动的时候正在滔滔不绝的讲话。）
 
 Our abundant capital and investment flexibility will enable us to do whatever we think makes the most sense during the prospective extended period of inadequate pricing.  But troubles for the industry mean troubles for us.  Our financial strength doesn’t remove us from the hostile pricing environment now enveloping the entire property-casualty insurance industry.  It just gives us more staying power and more options.
 
 我们大量的资本和投资的灵活性让我们能够在长期定价不足的条件下做出我们认为最明智的决策。但是，行业的麻烦就意味着我们的麻烦。我们的财务优势并不能让我们免于目前席卷了整个财产事故险行业的恶性价格战环境。我们的优势只给了我们更好的持续能力与更多的选择。
 （1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）


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一个实业家的诞生——读巴菲特的信（9.1）Barrons

http://blog.caing.com/article/10474/

浮存的秘密   保 险是伯克希尔的主营业务，也是最重要的业务。保险的商业模式在于浮存和投资。浮存的成本以及投资回报率是关键。相对而言，某一年的承保损失并不重要。但 是，由于保险的复杂性，以及大量运用估计，保险业务的数字有可能变化很大，也给了不良公司巨大的空间来操纵数字。这对一般的投资者非常不利。     

 

TheEconomics of Property/Casualty Insurance

 

 

 

财产意外险的经济特性

 

 

 

Our main business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.

 

 

 

虽然我们有其他非常重要的业务，但我们的主要业务是保险。要了解伯克希尔，你必须知道如何评估一个保险公司。主要的决定因素是：（1）业务所产生的浮存的量；（2）浮存的成本；以及（3）最重要的因素是浮存量及其成本的长期前景。

 

 

 

To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.

 

 

 

首先，浮 存就是我们持有但不拥有的钱。在一个保险运营，浮存的产生是由于保费在赔付之前支付，之间的间隔有时长达许多年。在这期间，保险公司把钱投资。这一愉快的 活动有一个坏处：保险公司拿到的保费往往无法足够支付赔付和其最终必须支付的费用。这就导致保险公司的“承保损失”运营。这种损失就是浮存的成本。如果一 个保险公司的浮存成本在长期低于这个公司从别处获得资金的成本，那么这个保险业务是有价值的。但如果其浮存成本高于市场资金成本，那么这个业务是个没用的 业务。

 

 

 

A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. Both the income statements and balance sheets of insurers can be minefields.

 

 

 

一个特别 值得注意的事：由于赔付必须是估计的，保险公司在搞清其承保结果时有极大的自由度。这让投资者很难计算一个公司的真实浮存成本。估计错误可以非常大，通常 是无恶意的，但有时却不是。这些计算错误的结果直接影响盈利。一个有经验的观察者通常能察觉大规模的准备金错误。但是普通公众一般却只能接受呈现出的结 果。有时我都惊异于著名会计审计事务所无保留确认的数字。保险公司的资产负债表和利润表都有可能是雷区。

 

 

 

At Berkshire, we strive to be both consistent and conservative in our reserving. But we will make mistakes. And we warn you that there is nothing symmetrical about surprises in the insurance business: They almost always are unpleasant.
 在伯克希尔，我们努力做到在我们的准备金上稳定而保守。但是，我们将犯错误。而且我警告你们，在保险业务，没有什么意外是对称的：那些意外总是令人不快的。    （2000年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）      MeasuringInsurance Performance    衡量保险业绩  

 

 

 

In the previous section I mentioned "float," the funds of others that insurers, in the conduct of their business, temporarily hold. Because these funds are available to be invested, the typical property-casualty insurer can absorb losses and expenses that exceed premiums by 7% to 11% and still be able to break even on its business. Again, this calculation excludes the earnings the insurer realizes on net worth - that is, on the funds provided by shareholders.
 在前面部分我提到了“浮存”，即保险公司在进行其业务时暂时保管的他人资金。因为这些资金可以被用来投资，典型的财产意外险公司能吸收超过保费7-11%的赔付和费用，而仍能达到业务的盈亏平衡。当然，这个计算没有包括保险公司在净值之上的收益，也就是用股东的钱获得的收益。  

 

 

 

However, many exceptions to this 7% to 11% range exist. For example, insurance covering losses to crops from hail damage produces virtually no float at all. Premiums on this kind of business are paid to the insurer just prior to the time hailstorms are a threat, and if a farmer sustains a loss he will be paid almost immediately. Thus, a combined ratio of 100 for crop hail insurance produces no profit for the insurer.
 但是，在这7-11%的范围之外存在很多例外情况。比如承保农作物冰雹损失的保险几乎就根本没有浮存。这种业务的保费刚好在冰雹成为威胁的季节之前支付给保险公司，而如果农民受到了损失，他将几乎立即得到偿付。所以，一个综合赔付率为100%的农作物冰雹险不给保险公司产生利润。  

 

 

 

At the other extreme, malpractice insurance covering the potential liabilities of doctors, lawyers and accountants produces a very high amount of float compared to annual premium volume. The float materializes because claims are often brought long after the alleged wrongdoing takes place and because their payment may be still further delayed by lengthy litigation. The industry calls malpractice and certain other kinds of liability insurance "long- tail" business, in recognition of the extended period during which insurers get to hold large sums that in the end will go to claimants and their lawyers (and to the insurer's lawyers as well).
 另 外一个极端，执业过失险承保了医生，律师，和会计师的潜在责任，与每年的保费量相比，产生了大量的浮存。能够实现浮存是因为索赔经常是在声称的过失发生后 很久，而且还因为赔付往往被长时间的诉讼过程所拖延。保险行业把执业过失险和其他一些责任险称为“长尾”业务，意思是保险公司得以长期拿着大量的保费，而 最终这些保费都会流向索赔人及其律师（以及保险公司的律师）。  

 

 

 

In long-tail situations a combined ratio of 115 (or even more) can prove profitable, since earnings produced by the float will exceed the 15% by which claims and expenses overrun premiums. The catch, though, is that "long-tail" means exactly that: Liability business written in a given year and presumed at first to have produced a combined ratio of 115 may eventually smack the insurer with 200, 300 or worse when the years have rolled by and all claims have finally been settled.
 在长尾情况下，一个115%（或者更高）的综合赔付率可能是盈利的，因为由浮存产生的收益将超过15%的索赔和费用出超保费部分。但一个隐含的问题是，“长尾”顾名思义：某一年承保的责任险开始假定能产生115%的综合赔付率，但是当多年过去后，所有的索赔都终于被解决，最终综合赔付率可能高达200%，300%或者更高，从而打击保险公司。    

 

The pitfalls of this business mandate an operating principle that too often is ignored: Though certain long-tail lines may prove profitable at combined ratios of 110 or 115, insurers will invariably find it unprofitable to price using those ratios as targets. Instead, prices must provide a healthy margin of safety against the societal trends that are forever springing expensive surprises on the insurance industry. Setting a target of 100 can itself result in heavy losses; aiming for 110 - 115 is business suicide.
 这种业务的陷阱让其必须有一个运营原则，而这一原则常常被忽视：虽然某些长尾业务在110-115%的综合赔付率有可能盈利，但保险公司如果用这作为目标，他们将总是发现自己无法盈利。价格必须提供健康的安全边际，以应对永远给保险行业带来昂贵惊讶的社会趋势。设定100%的综合赔付率目标将带来严重亏损；目标设定在110-115是商业上的自杀。  

 

 

 

All of that said, what should the measure of an insurer's profitability be? Analysts and managers customarily look to the combined ratio - and it's true that this yardstick usually is a good indicator of where a company ranks in profitability. We believe a better measure, however, to be a comparison of underwriting loss to float developed.
 说了那么多，什么才应该是衡量一个保险公司盈利的标准？分析师和经理人习惯上看综合赔付率。确实，这个尺度通常是公司盈利排名的好指标。但我们我们相信，一个更好的衡量标准是承保损失与浮存的比。  

 

 

 

This loss/float ratio, like any statistic used in evaluating insurance results, is meaningless over short time periods: Quarterly underwriting figures and even annual ones are too heavily based on estimates to be much good. But when the ratio takes in a period of years, it gives a rough indication of the cost of funds generated by insurance operations. A low cost of funds signifies a good business; a high cost translates into a poor business.
 这个损失/浮存比率，就像任何用来评估保险结果的统计指标一样，用在短期是毫无意义的。季度承保数字，甚至年度数字都过于严重的依赖估计，意义不大。但是长达几年的比率，就大致显示出保险运营产生的资金成本。一个低成本的资金显示出一个好的业务；一个高成本则意味着糟糕的业务。  

 

 

 

On the next page we show the underwriting loss, if any, of our insurance group in each year since we entered the business and relate that bottom line to the average float we have held during the year. From this data we have computed a "cost of funds developed from insurance."
 在下一页我们列出了自我们进入保险这一行业以来，我们保险集团每年的承保损失（如果有的话），以及与之相对应的我们在那一年所持有的平均浮存。从这组数据我们计算出了“保险提供资金的成本。”         (1)       (2)           Yearend Yield                           Underwriting        Approximate  on Long-Term                                    Loss  Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds                        ------------ ------------ --------------- -------------                                    (In $ Millions)  (Ratio of 1 to 2)   1967 .........profit $17.3 less than zero   5.50% 1968 .........profit  19.9 less than zero   5.90% 1969 .........profit  23.4 less than zero   6.79% 1970 .........$0.37  32.4   1.14%       6.25% 1971 .........profit  52.5 less than zero   5.81% 1972 .........profit  69.5 less than zero   5.82% 1973 .........profit  73.3 less than zero   7.27% 1974 .........7.36   79.1  9.30%       8.13% 1975 .........11.35  87.6  12.96%       8.03% 1976 .........profit 102.6 less than zero   7.30% 1977 .........profit 139.0 less than zero   7.97% 1978 .........profit 190.4 less than zero   8.93% 1979 .........profit 227.3 less than zero  10.08% 1980 .........profit 237.0 less than zero  11.94% 1981 .........profit 228.4 less than zero  13.61% 1982 .........21.56  220.6   9.77%     10.64% 1983 .........33.87  231.3   14.64%     11.84% 1984 .........48.06   253.2  18.98%     11.58% 1985 .........44.23   390.2  11.34%      9.34% 1986 .........55.84  797.5   7.00%      7.60% 1987 .........55.43  1,266.7  4.38%      8.95% 1988 .........11.08  1,497.7  0.74%      9.00% 1989 .........24.40  1,541.3  1.58%      7.97% 1990 .........26.65  1,637.3  1.63%      8.24%     

 

The float figures are derived from the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. At some insurers other items should enter into the calculation, but in our case these are unimportant and have been ignored.
 浮存的数字是用赔款准备金，理赔费用准备金和预收保费准备金之和减去代理人余额，预付获得客户成本和承担的再保险的递延费用。在有些保险公司，其他项目也应该记入这个计算，但在我们的例子里这些都不重要，已经被忽略了。  

 

 

 

During 1990 we held about $1.6 billion of float slated eventually to find its way into the hands of others. The underwriting loss we sustained during the year was $27 million and thus our insurance operation produced funds for us at a cost of about 1.6%. As the table shows, we managed in some years to underwrite at a profit and in those instances our cost of funds was less than zero. In other years, such as 1984, we paid a very high price for float. In 19 years out of the 24 we have been in insurance, though, we have developed funds at a cost below that paid by the government.
 在1990年我们持有大约16亿美金的浮存，这些浮存最终将流到其他人手中。我们在这一年的承保损失是2700万美元。所以我们的保险运营所产生的资金，对于我们来说成本为1.6%。如表格所示，我们在一些年实现了承保盈利，在那种情况我们的资金成本低于零。而在另外一些年，如1984年，我们为浮存付出了极高的代价。我们在保险行业的24年中，有19年我们以低于政府支付的成本获得了资金。  

 

 

 

There are two important qualifications to this calculation. First, the fat lady has yet to gargle, let alone sing, and we won't know our true 1967 - 1990 cost of funds until all losses from this period have been settled many decades from now. Second, the value of the float to shareholders is somewhat undercut by the fact that they must put up their own funds to support the insurance operation and are subject to double taxation on the investment income these funds earn. Direct investments would be more tax-efficient.
 这个计算有两个重要的限定条件。首先，还远没到结束的时候。我们无法知道1967到1990年这段时间真实的资金成本，这要直到几十年后，所有这一时期的赔付都解决后才行。第二，浮存对于股东的价值有些降低。因为股东必须投入他们的资金来支持保险运营，而且在浮存资金所获得的投资收益上受到双重征税。直接投资在税收上更有效。  

 

 

 

The tax penalty that indirect investments impose on shareholders is infact substantial. Though the calculation is necessarily imprecise, I would estimate that the owners of the average insurance company would find the tax penalty adds about one percentage point to their cost of float. I also think that approximates the correct figure for Berkshire.
 由于间接投资而强加给股东的税务惩罚实际上很重。虽然计算不一定精确，但我估计保险公司的拥有者平均而言会发现税务惩罚加在一起大概是浮存成本的1个百分点。我认为这对伯克希尔也是个正确的估计数字。  

 

 

 

Figuring a cost of funds for an insurance business allows anyone analyzing it to determine whether the operation has a positive or negative value for shareholders. If this cost (including the tax penalty) is higher than that applying to alternative sources of funds, the value is negative. If the cost is lower, the value is positive - and if the cost is significantly lower, the insurance business qualifies as a very valuable asset.
 算出一个保险公司的资金成本能让任何人对此进行分析，以决定这个保险业务对股东的价值是正还是负。如果这个成本（包括税务惩罚）高于其他来源资金的成本，这一价值就是负的。如果这个成本更低，则价值为正。而如果这一成本显著低于其他来源的资金成本，这个保险业务够得上是一个非常有价值的资产。  

 

 

 

So far Berkshire has fallen into the significantly-lower camp. Even more dramatic are the numbers at GEICO, in which our ownership interest is now 48% and which customarily operates at an underwriting profit. GEICO's growth has generated an ever-larger amount of funds for investment that have an effective cost of considerably less than zero. Essentially, GEICO's policyholders, in aggregate, pay the company interest on the float rather than the other way around. (But handsome is as handsome does: GEICO's unusual profitability results from its extraordinary operating efficiency and its careful classification of risks, a package that in turn allows rock-bottom prices for policyholders.)
 目前为止伯克希尔的资金成本属于显著低于其他来源的一类。GEICO的数字更加突出。我们拥有GEICO48%的股份。他们通常的运营具有承保盈利。GEICO的增长产生了不断增加的大量资金用于投资，而这部分资金的实际成本远低于零。基本上，GEICO的保险客户作为一个整体向公司支付浮存的利息，而不是公司支付利息给保险客户。（但是GEICO不仅盈利，其内部运营才是根本：GEICO不同寻常的盈利能力来自于其卓越的运营效率及精心划分的风险，这一组合让给投保人的价格达到最低。）  

 

 

 

Many well-known insurance companies, on the other hand, incur an underwriting loss/float cost that, combined with the tax penalty, produces negative results for owners. In addition, these companies, like all others in the industry, are vulnerable to catastrophe losses that could exceed their reinsurance protection and take their cost of float right off the chart. Unless these companies can materially improve their underwriting performance - and history indicates that is an almost impossible task - their shareholders will experience results similar to those borne by the owners of a bank that pays a higher rate of interest on deposits than it receives on loans.
 很多知名的保险公司却不一样，其承保损失/浮 存成本与税务惩罚加在一起产生了对拥有者负的结果。另外，这些公司与行业中其他公司一样，容易受到有可能超出再保险保护的灾难性损失的打击，从而让浮存成 本大幅提高。除非这些公司能实实在在的提高承保业绩（历史表明这几乎是不可能完成的任务），他们的股东将遭受损失。这就如同一个银行股东的遭遇，这个银行 支付比贷款利息还高的存款利息。  

 

 

 

All in all, the insurance business has treated us very well. We have expanded our float at a cost that on the average is reasonable, and we have further prospered because we have earned good returns on these low-cost funds. Our shareholders, true, have incurred extra taxes, but they have been more than compensated for this cost (so far) by the benefits produced by the float.
 总而言之，保险业务对我们来说很不错。我们以平均而言合理的成本扩大了浮存。而由于我们在这些低成本资金上获得了良好的回报，我们进一步获利。我们的股东确实交了额外的税，但他们所获得的补偿，即由于浮存所获得的好处，目前为止远超过税务成本。  

 

 

 

A particularly encouraging point about our record is that it was achieved despite some colossal mistakes made by your Chairman prior to Mike Goldberg's arrival. Insurance offers a host of opportunities for error, and when opportunity knocked, too often I answered. Many years later, the bills keep arriving for these mistakes: In the insurance business, there is no statute of limitations on stupidity.
 一个尤其令人鼓舞的事情是，记录表明虽然你们的董事长在MikeGoldberg来之前犯下了巨大的错误，保险业仍然取得了如此业绩。保险有很多机会容易犯错，当这些机会出现时，我做出了应对。很多年以后，这些错误带来的帐单持续到来：在保险业务，没有对愚蠢的法律时限。  

 

 

 

The intrinsic value of our insurance business will always be far more difficult to calculate than the value of, say, our candy or newspaper companies. By any measure, however, the business is worth far more than its carrying value. Furthermore, despite the problems this operation periodically hands us, it is the one - among all the fine businesses we own - that has the greatest potential.
 我们保险业务的内在价值将一直比其他业务，如糖果和报纸公司的价值，更难计算。无论如何衡量，这一业务的价值都远超过其帐面价值。更重要是，虽然这一运营偶尔带给我们麻烦，但在我们拥有的所有优秀业务中，保险具有最大的潜力。    （1990年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）      

 

Berkshire's insurance business has changed in ways that make combined ratios, our own or the  industry's, largely irrelevant to our performance. What counts with us is the "cost of funds developed from insurance," or in the vernacular, "the cost of float."
 伯克希尔的保险业务已经改变，这让综合赔付率，无论是我们自己还是行业的综合赔付率，大体上与我们的业绩无关。对我们重要的是“保险产生资金的成本”，或者用白话说“浮存成本”。    

 

Float - which we generate in exceptional amounts - is the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. And the cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss.
 我们产生了大量的浮存。这是用赔款准备金，理赔费用准备金和预收保费准备金之和减去代理人余额，预付获得客户成本和承担的再保险的递延费用。而浮存成本则用我们的承保损失来衡量。  

 

 

 

The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the business in 1967.
 下面的表格显示的是自1967年我们进入这一业务以来我们的浮存成本。        (1)       (2)           Yearend Yield              Underwriting         Approximate   on Long-Term                  Loss    Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds              ------------ ------------- --------------- -------------                    (In $ Millions)   (Ratio of 1 to 2)   1967 ........profit $17.3 less than zero   5.50% 1968 ........profit 19.9 less than zero   5.90% 1969 ........profit 23.4 less than zero   6.79% 1970 ........$0.37 32.4  1.14%        6.25% 1971 ........profit 52.5 less than zero   5.81% 1972 ........profit 69.5 less than zero   5.82% 1973 ........profit 73.3 less than zero   7.27% 1974 ........7.36  79.1  9.30%       8.13% 1975 ........11.35 87.6  12.96%       8.03% 1976 ........profit 102.6 less than zero  7.30% 1977 ........profit 139.0 less than zero  7.97% 1978 ........profit 190.4 less than zero  8.93% 1979 ........profit 227.3 less than zero  10.08% 1980 ........profit 237.0 less than zero  11.94% 1981 ........profit 228.4 less than zero  13.61% 1982 ........21.56  220.6  9.77%      10.64% 1983 ........33.87  231.3  14.64%     11.84% 1984 ........48.06  253.2  18.98%     11.58% 1985 ........44.23  390.2  11.34%      9.34% 1986 ........55.84  797.5  7.00%      7.60% 1987 ........55.43 1,266.7  4.38%      8.95% 1988 ........11.08 1,497.7  0.74%      9.00% 1989 ........24.40 1,541.3  1.58%      7.97% 1990 ........26.65 1,637.3  1.63%      8.24% 1991 ........119.6 1,895.0  6.31%      7.40%     

 

As you can see,our cost of funds in 1991 was well below the U. S. Government's cost on newly-issued long-term bonds. We have in fact beat the government's rate in 20 of the 25 years we have been in the insurance business, often by a wide margin. We have over that time also substantially increased the amount of funds we hold, which counts as a favorable development but only because the cost of funds has been satisfactory. Our float should continue to grow; the challenge will be to garner these funds at a reasonable cost.
 正如你所看到的，我们在1991年的资金成本远低于美国政府新发行的长期债券的成本。实际上，我们在保险业务的25年里，有20年都好于政府的利率，常常是好很多。在那期间，我们还大规模的增加了我们持有的资金。这只有在资金成本一直令人满意的情况下才是对我们有利的发展。我们的浮存应该继续增长。而挑战将在于用合理的成本取得这些资金。    （1991年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）


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一个实业家的诞生——读巴菲特的信（10） Barrons

http://blog.caing.com/article/11037/

通胀的危害  

 对于通胀，企业家的感触很深。通胀不仅提高成本，还吞噬企业赖以发展的资本，最终减少企业给拥有者的回报。    Like virginity, a stable price level seems capable of maintenance, but not of restoration.    稳定的价格水平如童贞，看来是能保持，却不能修复。    （1981年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    But before we drown in a sea of self-congratulation, a further - and crucial - observation must be made.  A few years ago, a business whose per-share net worth compounded at 20% annually would have guaranteed its owners a highly successful real investment return.  Now such an outcome seems less certain.  For the inflation rate, coupled with individual tax rates, will be the ultimate determinant as to whether our internal operating performance produces successful investment results - i.e., a reasonable gain in purchasing power from funds committed - for you as shareholders.    在我们陷入自我夸奖之前，必须作进一步，而且是关键的一个观察。几年前，一个每股净资产以每年20%的复利增长的企业肯定能给拥有者带来高度成功的真实投资回报。目前，这种结果显得不那么确定。因为通胀和个人税率结合在一起，将最终决定内部运营业绩能否产生成功的投资结果，也就是说对你们股东来说，投入的资金有合理的购买力增加。    Just as the original 3% savings bond, a 5% passbook savings account or an 8% U.S. Treasury Note have, in turn, been transformed by inflation into financial instruments that chew up, rather than enhance, purchasing power over their investment lives, a business earning 20% on capital can produce a negative real return for its owners under inflationary conditions not much more severe than presently prevail.    正如原来的3%的储蓄债券，5%的存折帐户，或者8%的美国国债已经被通胀变为了在投资的生命周期内，吞噬，而不是提高购买力的金融工具。一个赢得20%资本回报率的企业，在比目前稍微严重的通胀条件下能给拥有者带来负的回报。    If we should continue to achieve a 20% compounded gain - not an easy or certain result by any means - and this gain is translated into a corresponding increase in the market value of Berkshire Hathaway stock as it has been over the last fifteen years, your after-tax purchasing power gain is likely to be very close to zero at a 14% inflation rate.  Most of the remaining six percentage points will go for income tax any time you wish to convert your twenty percentage points of nominal annual gain into cash.    如果我们继续取得20%的复利增长，无论如何这不容易也不确定。这种复利增长在过去15年转化成了相应的伯克希尔股票市场价值的增长。但是在14%的通胀条件下，你的税后购买力增长很有可能是零。任何时候你希望把20个百分点的名义年收入变为现金，剩下的六个百分点大部分将流向收入税。    That combination - the inflation rate plus the percentage of capital that must be paid by the owner to transfer into his own pocket the annual earnings achieved by the business (i.e., ordinary income tax on dividends and capital gains tax on retained earnings) - can be thought of as an “investor’s misery index”.  When this index exceeds the rate of return earned on equity by the business, the investor’s purchasing power (real capital) shrinks even though he consumes nothing at all.  We have no corporate solution to this problem; high inflation rates will not help us earn higher rates of return on equity.    通 胀，以及拥有者把自己企业的年度盈利转到自己口袋里时必须支付一定百分比的资本（比如正常分红的收入税和存留收益的资本利得税），这两者相加可以看成是 “投资者的痛苦指数”。当这个指数超过企业的资本回报率，投资者的购买力（真实资本）缩小为零，即使他没有消费任何东西。我们没有针对这个问题的企业对策；高通胀不会帮助我们获得更高的资本回报率。    One friendly but sharp-eyed commentator on Berkshire has pointed out that our book value at the end of 1964 would have bought about one-half ounce of gold and, fifteen years later, after we have plowed back all earnings along with much blood, sweat and tears, the book value produced will buy about the same half ounce.  A similar comparison could be drawn with Middle Eastern oil.  The rub has been that government has been exceptionally able in printing money and creating promises, but is unable to print gold or create oil.    一个友好但眼光敏锐的伯克希尔评论者指出，我们在1964年底的净资产大概能买半盎司的黄金。但15年后，当我们投入所有的盈利，外加血汗和泪水，所产生的净资产也只能买同样的半盎司黄金。同样的比较也可以用在中东石油上。一直让人恼火的是，政府向来尤其能印钱，创造承诺，却无法印金子或创造石油。    We intend to continue to do as well as we can in managing the internal affairs of the business.  But you should understand that external conditions affecting the stability of currency may very well be the most important factor in determining whether there are any real rewards from your investment in Berkshire Hathaway.    我们致力于继续管理好内部业务。但你应理解的是，影响货币稳定的外部环境有可能是决定你对伯克希尔·哈撒韦的投资是否有任何真实回报的最关键因素。    （1979年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    High rates of inflation create a tax on capital that makes much corporate investment unwise - at least if measured by the criterion of a positive real investment return to owners.  This “hurdle rate” the return on equity that must be achieved by a corporation in order to produce any real return for its individual owners - has increased dramatically in recent years.  The average tax-paying investor is now running up a down escalator whose pace has accelerated to the point where his upward progress is nil.    高 通胀创造了一个资本税，这个税让大多数企业投资变得不明智，至少如果用对拥有者正的真实投资回报的标准来衡量是如此。这个资本回报率的最低门槛，即企业给 个人拥有者产生任何真实回报所必须取得的最低资本回报率，在最近几年显著上升。一般纳税水平的投资者现在是在一个下行的自动扶梯往上跑。自动扶梯的节奏已 经加快到了一定程度，让投资者向上的进展为零。    （1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）

 
 

顺风行业易，扭亏为盈难    巴菲特意识到，处在一个顺风发展的行业非常重要，所谓的“扭亏为盈”极少成功，除非企业本身的优异本质仍然没有改变，否则就是巧妇难为无米之炊。    The textile industry illustrates in textbook style how producers of relatively undifferentiated goods in capital intensive businesses must earn inadequate returns except under conditions of tight supply or real shortage. As long as excess productive capacity exists, prices tend to reflect direct operating costs rather than capital employed.  Such a supply-excess condition appears likely to prevail most of the time in the textile industry, and our expectations are for profits of relatively modest amounts in relation to capital.    纺 织行业用教科书式的方式说明了，在一个产品无法差异化，资本投入巨大的行业中的企业，除非供应紧缺，否则其必然无法获得足够的回报。只要产能过剩存在，价 格就会反映直接运营成本，而不是所使用的资本。这种过度供应的情况在纺织行业长期广泛存在。而我们对纺织业的预期是与投入的资本相比获得一定的盈利。    

 

（1978年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    

 

It is comforting to be in a business where some mistakes can be made and yet a quite satisfactory overall performance can be achieved.  In a sense, this is the opposite case from our textile business where even very good management probably can average only modest results.  One of the lessons your management has learned - and, unfortunately, sometimes re-learned - is the importance of being in businesses where tailwinds prevail rather than headwinds.

 

 处 在一个可以犯错，却仍能取得相当满意的整体结果的行业，这令人感到宽慰。从某种意义上说，这与我们的纺织业务截然相反。在纺织行业，非常好的管理层可能平 均而言却只能取得一般的结果。你们的管理层所学到的，不幸的是有时是反复学到的一个教训就是，在一个处于顺风而不是逆风的行业有多重要。

 
 

（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）

 
 

Harking back to our textile experience, we should have realized the futility of trying to be very clever (via sinking funds and other special type issues) in an area where the tide was running heavily against us.

 
 

回忆在纺织业的经历，我们应当意识到在一个潮流强势逆你而动的领域，想耍小聪明（通过储备金或其他特殊的项目）是毫无益处的。

 
 

（1979年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）

 

Both our operating and investment experience cause us to conclude that “turnarounds” seldom turn, and that the same energies and talent are much better employed in a good business purchased at a fair price than in a poor business purchased at a bargain price.    我们的运营和投资经验都让我们明确意识到“扭亏为盈”极少成功。把同样的精力和才干，投入到一个用合理价格购买的好的业务中，会有好得多的结果，远超过投入一个差的业务的效果，即使差的业务的购买价格非常便宜。    （1979年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    We have written in past reports about the disappointments that usually result from purchase and operation of “turnaround” businesses.  Literally hundreds of turnaround possibilities in dozens of industries have been described to us over the years and, either as participants or as observers, we have tracked performance against expectations.  Our conclusion is that, with few exceptions, when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.    我 们在过去的报告中写到了通常情况下购买及运营“扭亏为盈”业务的失望结果。在过去一些年，在很多行业的几百个扭亏为盈的机会曾经呈现给我们，或者邀我们参 与，或者让我们入股作为旁观者。我们追踪了这些扭亏为盈机会的表现，并与之前的预期相比较。我们的结论是，除了少数例外情况，当具有卓越名声的管理层去着 手解决一个有着糟糕经济基本面名声的业务时，业务的糟糕名声原样不动（而管理层则名声扫地）。    GEICO may appear to be an exception, having been turned around from the very edge of bankruptcy in 1976.  It certainly is true that managerial brilliance was needed for its resuscitation, and that Jack Byrne, upon arrival in that year, supplied that ingredient in abundance.    GEICO似乎是个例外，已经被从1976年的破产边缘拯救回来。当然，它的复兴需要卓越的管理。当Jack Byrne从到达的那年起，就贡献了大量的卓越管理。    But it also is true that the fundamental business advantage that GEICO had enjoyed - an advantage that previously had produced staggering success - was still intact within the company, although submerged in a sea of financial and operating troubles.    同样重要的是，GEICO曾经享有的业务基本面优势，一个曾经创造了令人难以置信的成功的优势，历经大量的财务和运营问题，仍然存留于公司内部，毫发无损。    GEICO was designed to be the low-cost operation in an enormous marketplace (auto insurance) populated largely by companies whose marketing structures restricted adaptation.  Run as designed, it could offer unusual value to its customers while earning unusual returns for itself.  For decades it had been run in just this manner.  Its troubles in the mid-70s were not produced by any diminution or disappearance of this essential economic advantage.    GEICO当初的设计就是在一个大市场（汽车保险）中低成本运营。这个市场充斥了各种公司，这些公司的市场营销结构限制其模仿GEICO的运营方式。如果按照设计运营，GEICO能给客户提供异乎寻常的价值，同时自己获得异乎寻常的盈利回报。在几十年的时间里，它就是这么运营的。它在70年代中期的问题并不是由于这种基本的经济优势的弱化或消失。    GEICO’s problems at that time put it in a position analogous to that of American Express in 1964 following the salad oil scandal.  Both were one-of-a-kind companies, temporarily reeling from the effects of a fiscal blow that did not destroy their exceptional underlying economics.  The GEICO and American Express situations, extraordinary business franchises with a localized excisable cancer (needing, to be sure, a skilled surgeon), should be distinguished from the true “turnaround” situation in which the managers expect - and need - to pull off a corporate Pygmalion.    GEICO当时的问题与美国运通在1964年色拉油丑闻之后的情形类似。都是独一无二的公司，暂时被财务冲击所席卷，但财务冲击并没有毁掉其优异的内在经济特性。GEICO和美国运通的情况是优异的特许经营权业务，但有局部可切除的癌变（当然，需要一个医术精湛的外科医生）。它们的情况要与真正的“扭亏为盈”情况相区分。在后一种情况中，经理人期望，而且需要做出无米之炊。    （1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）      真实的盈利    盈利的价值不一定会体现在按会计准则报告的数字中，而是体现在对拥有者的价值。盈利虽可贵，自由价更高，只有自由现金流才是对拥有者真正有价值的。    Our own analysis of earnings reality differs somewhat from generally accepted accounting principles, particularly when those principles must be applied in a world of high and uncertain rates of inflation. (But it’s much easier to criticize than to improve such accounting rules.  The inherent problems are monumental.) We have owned 100% of businesses whose reported earnings were not worth close to 100 cents on the dollar to us even though, in an accounting sense, we totally controlled their disposition. (The “control” was theoretical.  Unless we reinvested all earnings, massive deterioration in the value of assets already in place would occur.  But those reinvested earnings had no prospect of earning anything close to a market return on capital.) We have also owned small fractions of businesses with extraordinary reinvestment possibilities whose retained earnings had an economic value to us far in excess of 100 cents on the dollar.    我们自己的真实盈利分析与通用会计准则有所不同，尤其是当那些会计准则必须应用于一个高涨且不确定的通胀世界。（但是批评会计规定比改进会计规定容易多了。固有的问题堆积如山。）有些我们100%拥 有的企业，虽然依据会计准则我们完全控制了他们盈利的处置，但他们报告的每一美元盈利对我们来说并不意味着近似一美元。（这“控制”只是理论上的。除非我 们把全部盈利重新投入，否则现存资产将大规模减值。而且那些重新投入的盈利无望获得任何接近市场资本回报率的回报。）我们同样拥有一些企业的小部分，这些 企业有着优异的投资可能性，其每一美元存留收益对我们的经济价值远超过一美元。    The value to Berkshire Hathaway of retained earnings is not determined by whether we own 100%, 50%, 20% or 1% of the businesses in which they reside.  Rather, the value of those retained earnings is determined by the use to which they are put and the subsequent level of earnings produced by that usage.    存留收益对伯克希尔·哈撒韦的价值不取决于我们是拥有100%，50%，20%，或者1%我们所投资的公司。那些存留收益的价值取决于其具体使用及使用后所产生的盈利水平。    （1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    Our view, we warn you, is non-conventional.  But we would rather have earnings for which we did not get accounting credit put to good use in a 10%-owned company by a management we did not  personally hire, than have earnings for which we did get credit put into projects of more dubious potential by another management - even if we are that management.    我提醒你，我们对盈利的观点是非传统的。但是我们宁愿要在会计上不属于我们，但却能得到良好运用的盈利，即使我们只拥有10%的公司，管理层不是我们亲自雇佣的。我们不愿要在会计上属于我们，但却被另一个管理层投入有疑问项目的盈利，即使我们就是那个管理层。    （1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    We are not at all unhappy when our wholly-owned businesses retain all of their earnings if they can utilize internally those funds at attractive rates.  Why should we feel differently about retention of earnings by companies in which we hold small equity interests, but where the record indicates even better prospects for profitable employment of capital? (This proposition cuts the other way, of course, in industries with low capital requirements, or if management has a record of plowing capital into projects of low profitability; then earnings should be paid out or used to repurchase shares - often by far the most attractive option for capital utilization.)    我 们完全拥有的企业如果能以诱人的回报率内部使用盈利，我们一点儿也不会感到不高兴。如果我们拥有小部分股份的公司，其记录显示他们能以更高的回报使用资 本，我们为什么会感到有所不同呢？（当然，这个主张将在如下情况发生改变：在低资本投入需求的行业，或者如果管理层有把资本投向低盈利性项目的记录。那 么，盈利应该被用来回购股份，这常常是到目前为止资本使用最诱人的选择。）    （1978年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    If you have owned .01 of 1% of Berkshire during the past decade, you have benefited economically in full measure from your share of our retained earnings, no matter what your accounting system.  Proportionately, you have done just as well as if you had owned the magic 20%.  But if you have owned 100% of a great many capital-intensive businesses during the decade, retained earnings that were credited fully and with painstaking precision to you under standard accounting methods have resulted in minor or zero economic value.  This is not a criticism of accounting procedures.  We would not like to have the job of designing a better system.  It’s simply to say that managers and investors alike must understand that accounting numbers are the beginning, not the end, of business valuation.   如果你在过去10年拥有伯克希尔百分之一股份的0.01，无论你的会计系统是什么，你都已经从我们的存留收益中获得了全部的经济收益。按比例，如果你拥有会计规定的神奇的20%的伯克希尔股份，你也能获得同样的收益。但是，如果在过去10年里，你100%拥有很多资本密集型的企业，那么按照标准会计方法详细精确计算的存留收益将全部归你，但却只能产生极少或者零经济价值。这并不是批评会计程序。我们不想承担设计一个更好的系统的任务。这只是说经理人和投资者们必须理解，会计数字只是商业估值的开始，而不是结束。    （1982年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）

 

Our acquisition preferences run toward businesses that generate cash, not those that consume it.  As inflation intensifies, more and more companies find that they must spend all funds they generate internally just to maintain their existing physical volume of business.  There is a certain mirage-like quality to such operations.  However attractive the earnings numbers, we remain leery of businesses that never seem able to convert such pretty numbers into no-strings-attached cash.    我 们的并购偏好于产生现金的企业，而不是消耗现金的企业。当通胀加剧时，越来越多的企业发现他们必须花掉内部产生的所有资金，才能仅仅维持目前的业务量。这 些运营有点儿像海市蜃楼。无论盈利的数字如何诱人，我们对那些永远也不能把美好的数字变成没有任何附带条件的现金的企业抱有疑虑。    （1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）


PermaLink: https://articles.zkiz.com/?id=19130

一个实业家的诞生——读巴菲特的信（11） Barrons

http://blog.caing.com/article/12284/

企业并购    企 业并购为什么很难成功？首先，很多企业并购的动机就不纯，多是管理层为了自己的私利，权力欲，好大喜功，因为盘子越大，高管报酬越高。其次，真正好的并购 目标并不多，好公司少，能够被并购的好公司就更少。最后，很多管理层根本不具备高超的运营管理能力，无法把被并购公司化腐朽为神奇，没有金刚钻却偏要揽瓷 器活。    If our success were to depend upon insights we developed through plant inspections, Berkshire would be in big trouble.  Rather, in considering an acquisition, we attempt to evaluate the economic characteristics of the business - its competitive strengths and weaknesses - and the quality of the people we will be joining.    如果我们的成功依赖于我们在工厂巡视时得到的深入见解，伯克希尔将有大麻烦。与之相反，在考虑并购的时候，我们评估业务的经济特征，即它的竞争优势和弱点，以及将与我们一起工作的人的素质。    （1986年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    Our acquisition decisions will be aimed at maximizing real economic benefits, not at maximizing either managerial domain or reported numbers for accounting purposes. (In the long run, managements stressing accounting appearance over economic substance usually achieve little of either.)    我们的并购决策将以最大化真实经济效益为目标，而不是最大的管理领域，或者最大的汇报会计数字。（在长期，强调表面的会计数字胜过经济实质的管理层通常两者都得不到。）    Regardless of the impact upon immediately reportable earnings, we would rather buy 10% of Wonderful Business T at X per share than 100% of T at 2X per share.  Most corporate managers prefer just the reverse, and have no shortage of stated rationales for their behavior.    不论对马上要汇报的盈利影响如何，我们宁愿以每股X的价格买10%的出色公司T，也不愿以每股2X的价格买下100%的T公司股份。大多数企业的经理人的喜好与我们正好相反，而且他们从来不缺乏解释其行为的理由。    However, we suspect three motivations - usually unspoken - to be, singly or in combination,  the important ones in most high-premium takeovers:    但是我们怀疑有三个通常不便明说的动机，单独或结合在一起，才是大多数高溢价收购的重要原因。    (1)Leaders, business or otherwise, seldom are deficient in animal spirits and often relish increased activity and challenge.  At Berkshire, the corporate pulse never beats faster than when an acquisition is in prospect.    领导者，无论是在商业还是其他领域，从来不缺乏动物精神。他们常从增加的活动和更多的挑战中获得乐趣。在伯克希尔，当有并购可能时，企业的脉搏从来不会因兴奋更快跳动。    (2)Most organizations, business or otherwise, measure themselves, are measured by others, and compensate their managers far more by the yardstick of size than by any other yardstick. (Ask a Fortune 500 manager where his corporation stands on that famous list and, invariably, the number responded will be from the list ranked by size of sales; he may well not even know where his          corporation places on the list Fortune just as faithfully compiles ranking the same 500 corporations by profitability.)    大多数组织，公司和其他机构，更多的用规模大小而不是任何其他尺度来衡量自己，或被别人衡量，而且根据规模大小来给经理人报酬。（问一个财富500强企业的经理，他的公司在榜上的位置，回答的数字总是来自于销售额大小的排名。他可能都不知道他的公司在同样一个财富500强排名的利润榜的地位。）    (3)Many managements apparently were over exposed in impressionable childhood years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad’s body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for the profitability of Company T(arget).    很多管理层明显受到了童年时期童话故事的过度影响。在那些故事里，美丽公主之吻解救了被囚于癞蛤蟆之身的英俊王子。结果是，他们确信他们的管理之吻将对并购目标公司T的盈利状况产生神奇的效果。    Such optimism is essential.  Absent that rosy view, why else should the shareholders of Company A(cquisitor) want to own an interest in T at the 2X takeover cost rather than at the X market price they would pay if they made direct purchases on their own?    这种乐观是必不可少的。如果没有那样美好乐观的看法，为什么并购者A公司的股东想要以2X的价格收购T公司的一部分，与此同时，T公司的市场价格是X，他们为什么不自己直接购买。    In other words, investors can always buy toads at the going price for toads.  If investors instead bankroll princesses who wish to pay double for the right to kiss the toad, those kisses had better pack some real dynamite.  We’ve observed many kisses but very few miracles.  Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses - even after their corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads.    换 句话说，投资者总能以目前的癞蛤蟆市场价来买癞蛤蟆。如果投资者资助那些愿意付双倍价格去吻癞蛤蟆的公主，这些吻得有真正的作用才行。我们观察到很多吻， 但很少有奇迹发生。即便如此，很多管理层的公主仍然沉着地保持自信，自认为其吻具有未来的威力，即使企业的后院已经堆满了没膝深毫无反应的癞蛤蟆。    In fairness, we should acknowledge that some acquisition records have been dazzling.  Two major categories stand out.    公平的说，我们应当认识到有些并购记录是光彩夺目的。主要有两大类。    The first involves companies that, through design or accident, have purchased only businesses that are particularly well adapted to an inflationary environment.  Such favored business must have two characteristics: (1) an ability to increase prices rather easily(even when product demand is flat and capacity is not fully utilized) without fear of significant loss of either market share or unit volume, and (2) an ability to accommodate large dollar volume increases in business (often produced more by inflation than by real growth) with only minor additional investment of capital.  Managers of ordinary ability, focusing solely on acquisition possibilities meeting these tests, have achieved excellent results in recent decades.  However, very few enterprises possess both characteristics, and competition to buy those that do has now become fierce to the point of being self-defeating.    第一类是有些公司，无论是通过有意设计还是碰巧，只并购了些非常适应通胀环境的公司。这些受青睐的公司必须具有两个特性：（1）相当容易的涨价的能力（即使当产品需求持平，产能没有完全利用时），而不必担心市场份额或销量的大幅下跌。（2） 有能力适应业务金额的大量增长（通常是由于通胀而不是真实增长所引起）而只需很少的额外资本投入。在最近几十年，一些能力平平的经理人，由于只关注符合这 些条件的并购可能，已经获得了优异的成果。但是，只有很少的企业同时拥有这两种特性，并购这些企业的竞争现在已经变得过于白热化，以至于不值得买了。    The second category involves the managerial superstars - men who can recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise.  We salute such managers as Ben Heineman at Northwest Industries, Henry Singleton at Teledyne, Erwin Zaban at National Service Industries, and especially Tom Murphy at Capital Cities Communications (a real managerial “twofer”, whose acquisition efforts have been properly focused in Category 1 and whose operating talents also make him a leader of Category 2).  From both direct and vicarious experience, we recognize the difficulty and rarity of these executives’ achievements. (So do they; these champs have made very few deals in recent years, and often have found repurchase of their own shares to be the most sensible employment of corporate capital.)    第二类涉及一些管理超级明星，那些人能识别装扮成癞蛤蟆的稀有王子，而且有管理能力让王子脱下伪装。我们对这样的经理人表示致敬，如Northwest Industries的Ben Heineman，Teledyne的Henry Singleton，National Service Industries的Erwin Zaban，尤其是Capital Cities Communications的Tom Murphy（一 个真正的双料管理人才，他的并购努力一直恰当的关注于第一类公司，而他的运营才能同时让他成为第二类的领袖。）通过直接和间接的经验，我们意识到这些经理 人所取得的成就的困难性和珍贵程度。（他们也意识到了。这些冠军们在最近一些年只做了很少的并购。他们通常发现回购自己的股票是使用企业资本的最合理方 式。）    Your Chairman, unfortunately, does not qualify for Category 2.  And,despite a reasonably good understanding of the economic factors compelling concentration in Category 1, our actual acquisition activity in that category has been sporadic and inadequate.  Our preaching was better than our performance. (We neglected the Noah principle: predicting rain doesn’t count, building arks does.)    你们的董事长，不幸的是，够不上第二类。除了对第一类中非常引人注目的经济因素的理解，我们在第一类的实际并购活动一直是零星而且不足。我们的布道好过我们的业绩。（我们忽视了诺亚的原则：预测下雨不算什么，建造方舟才重要。）    We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports.  Clearly our kisses fell flat.  We have done well with a couple of princes - but they were princes when purchased.  At least our kisses didn’t turn them into toads.  And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.    我 们曾经偶尔尝试用便宜的价格买癞蛤蟆，这在过去的年报中有记录。很明显，我们的吻不管用。我们在几个王子身上取得了成功，但当我们并购时，他们就已经是王 子了。还好，至少我们的吻没把他们变成癞蛤蟆。最后，我们有时能非常成功的以购买癞蛤蟆的价格购买一部分很容易识别的王子的权益。    （1981年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    We will continue to seek the acquisition of businesses in their entirety at prices that will make sense, even should the future of the acquired enterprise develop much along the lines of its past.  We may very well pay a fairly fancy price for a Category 1 business if we are reasonably confident of what we are getting.  But we will not normally pay a lot in any purchase for what we are supposed to bring to the party - for we find that we ordinarily don’t bring a lot.    我们将继续寻找用合理价格购买整个公司的机会，即使被并购的公司未来沿着过去的轨迹发展。如果我们相当确信我们所购买的业务，我们愿意付出相当高的价格购买第一类企业。但是我们一般不会对那些我们必须提供很多东西的并购支付大价钱，因为我们通常无法提供很多东西。    （1981年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    Currently, we find values most easily obtained through the open-market purchase of fractional positions in companies with excellent business franchises and competent, honest managements. We never expect to run these companies, but we do expect to profit from them.    目前，我们发现最容易获得价值的是，在公开市场购买具有商业特许经营而且有着诚实称职的管理层的优秀公司的一部分。我们从来不期望运营这些公司，但我们确实期望从中获利。    We expect that undistributed earnings from such companies will produce full value (subject to tax when realized) for Berkshire and its shareholders.  If they don’t, we have made mistakes as to either:(1) the management we have elected to join; (2) the future economics of the business; or (3) the price we have paid.    我们预期这些公司的未分配利润将给伯克希尔及其股东产生全部价值（受到实现时税务的影响）。如果他们不能产生全部价值，那么我们可能在以下领域犯了错：（1）我们决定合作的管理层。（2）业务的未来经济前景。或者（3）我们付出的价格。    We have made plenty of such mistakes - both in the purchase of non-controlling and controlling interests in businesses.  Category(2) miscalculations are the most common.  Of course, it is necessary to dig deep into our history to find illustrations of such mistakes -sometimes as deep as two or three months back.  For example, last year your Chairman volunteered his expert opinion on the rosy futureof the aluminum business.  Several minor adjustments to that opinion– now aggregating approximately 180 degrees - have since been required.    我们犯过很多这样的错，不论是购买非控股还是控股公司。第（2）类的误判最普遍。当然，必须深入挖掘我们的历史才能找到这些错误的例子，有时候是两三个月前的历史。比如，去年，你们的董事长自告奋勇提出了他对铝业美好未来的意见。对那个意见经过几个小的调整之后，现在必须做180度的改变。    For personal as well as more objective reasons, however, we generally have been able to correct such mistakes far more quickly in the case of non-controlled businesses (marketable securities) than in the case of controlled subsidiaries.  Lack of control, in effect, often has turned out to be an economic plus.    由于个人及客观原因，我们通常能对这种错误进行调整，对非控股公司（可出售证券）的调整远远快于控股子公司。缺乏控制，实际上常常反而变成了经济上的好处。    （1981年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）     十年以后再看并购    对于并购，巴菲特自己的感触很深，因为他也曾亲吻过癞蛤蟆，无功而返。十年以后的信中，再次提及并购，巴菲特说出了著名的“用合理的价格购买好的公司，而不是用好的价格购买一般的公司。”的论断。    Of all our activities at Berkshire, the most exhilarating for Charlie and me is the acquisition of a business with excellent economic characteristics and a management that we like, trust and admire. Such acquisitions are not easy to make but we look for them constantly.  In the search, we adopt the same attitude one might find appropriate in looking for a spouse:  It pays to be active, interested and open-minded, but it does not pay to be in a hurry.    在伯克希尔的所有活动中，查理和我感到最兴奋的是并购具有优秀经济特征以及有着我们喜欢，信任和钦佩的管理层的公司。这些并购并不容易做，但我们一直在寻找。在寻找过程中，我们采用了适合寻找配偶的态度：积极主动，兴趣十足，以及思想开放是值得的，但是仓促行事则不可取。    In the past, I've observed that many acquisition-hungry managers were apparently mesmerized by their childhood reading of the story about the frog-kissing princess.  Remembering her success, they pay dearly for the right to kiss corporate toads, expecting wondrous transfigurations.  Initially, disappointing results only deepen their desire to round up new toads.  ("Fanaticism," said Santyana, "consists of redoubling your effort when you've forgotten your aim.")  Ultimately, even the most optimistic manager must face reality.  Standing knee-deep in unresponsive toads, he then announces an enormous "restructuring" charge.  In this corporate equivalent of a Head Start program, the CEO receives the education but the stockholders pay the tuition.    过 去，我曾注意到很多急于并购的经理人显然是还沉迷于他们童年读的有关亲吻青蛙的公主的故事中。记住了她的成功，这些经理人花大价钱购买亲吻企业界的癞蛤蟆 的权利，期望神奇的转变。刚开始，失望的结果只不过进一步加深了他们的渴望，去获得更多的癞蛤蟆。（桑塔亚那说“狂热”，“包含了当你忘记了你的目标时却 把你的努力加倍”）最终，即使是最乐观的经理人也必须面对现实。站在没膝深毫无反应的癞蛤蟆中，他于是宣布大量的“重组”费用。这相当于企业的幼儿启蒙计 划，CEO受到了教育，股东支付了学费。    In my early days as a manager I, too, dated a few toads.  They were cheap dates - I've never been much of a sport - but my results matched those of acquirers who courted higher-priced toads.  I kissed and they croaked.    在我早年，作为一个经理，我也曾与几个癞蛤蟆约会。他们是便宜的约会对象。我从来都在体育竞赛上不行，但我在约会癞蛤蟆的竞赛中可以与那些购买了高价癞蛤蟆的并购者比肩。我吻了，他们仍呱呱叫。    After several failures of this type, I finally remembered some useful advice I once got from a golf pro (who, like all pros who have had anything to do with my game, wishes to remain anonymous).  Said the pro:  "Practice doesn't make perfect; practice makes permanent." And thereafter I revised my strategy and tried to buy good businesses at fair prices rather than fair businesses at good prices.    几 个这样的失败之后，我终于回忆起曾经从一个职业高尔夫球手那里得到的一些有用的忠告（他与其他与我们有联系的职业人士一样，希望保持匿名）。他说到：“练 习并不能产生完美；练习只造成固定不变。”所以，在那之后，我改变了自己的策略，试着用合理的价格购买好的公司，而不是用好的价格购买一般的公司。    （1992年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）

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一个实业家的诞生——读巴菲特的信（11）

http://blog.caing.com/article/12284/

企业并购    企 业并购为什么很难成功？首先，很多企业并购的动机就不纯，多是管理层为了自己的私利，权力欲，好大喜功，因为盘子越大，高管报酬越高。其次，真正好的并购 目标并不多，好公司少，能够被并购的好公司就更少。最后，很多管理层根本不具备高超的运营管理能力，无法把被并购公司化腐朽为神奇，没有金刚钻却偏要揽瓷 器活。    If our success were to depend upon insights we developed through plant inspections, Berkshire would be in big trouble.  Rather, in considering an acquisition, we attempt to evaluate the economic characteristics of the business - its competitive strengths and weaknesses - and the quality of the people we will be joining.    如果我们的成功依赖于我们在工厂巡视时得到的深入见解，伯克希尔将有大麻烦。与之相反，在考虑并购的时候，我们评估业务的经济特征，即它的竞争优势和弱点，以及将与我们一起工作的人的素质。    （1986年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    Our acquisition decisions will be aimed at maximizing real economic benefits, not at maximizing either managerial domain or reported numbers for accounting purposes. (In the long run, managements stressing accounting appearance over economic substance usually achieve little of either.)    我们的并购决策将以最大化真实经济效益为目标，而不是最大的管理领域，或者最大的汇报会计数字。（在长期，强调表面的会计数字胜过经济实质的管理层通常两者都得不到。）    Regardless of the impact upon immediately reportable earnings, we would rather buy 10% of Wonderful Business T at X per share than 100% of T at 2X per share.  Most corporate managers prefer just the reverse, and have no shortage of stated rationales for their behavior.    不论对马上要汇报的盈利影响如何，我们宁愿以每股X的价格买10%的出色公司T，也不愿以每股2X的价格买下100%的T公司股份。大多数企业的经理人的喜好与我们正好相反，而且他们从来不缺乏解释其行为的理由。    However, we suspect three motivations - usually unspoken - to be, singly or in combination,  the important ones in most high-premium takeovers:    但是我们怀疑有三个通常不便明说的动机，单独或结合在一起，才是大多数高溢价收购的重要原因。    (1)Leaders, business or otherwise, seldom are deficient in animal spirits and often relish increased activity and challenge.  At Berkshire, the corporate pulse never beats faster than when an acquisition is in prospect.    领导者，无论是在商业还是其他领域，从来不缺乏动物精神。他们常从增加的活动和更多的挑战中获得乐趣。在伯克希尔，当有并购可能时，企业的脉搏跳动得最快。    (2)Most organizations, business or otherwise, measure themselves, are measured by others, and compensate their managers far more by the yardstick of size than by any other yardstick. (Ask a Fortune 500 manager where his corporation stands on that famous list and, invariably, the number responded will be from the list ranked by size of sales; he may well not even know where his          corporation places on the list Fortune just as faithfully compiles ranking the same 500 corporations by profitability.)    大多数组织，公司和其他机构，更多的用规模大小而不是任何其他尺度来衡量自己，或被别人衡量，而且根据规模大小来给经理人报酬。（问一个财富500强企业的经理，他的公司在榜上的位置，回答的数字总是来自于销售额大小的排名。他可能都不知道他的公司在同样一个财富500强排名的利润榜的地位。）    (3)Many managements apparently were over exposed in impressionable childhood years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad’s body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for the profitability of Company T(arget).    很多管理层明显受到了童年时期童话故事的过度影响。在那些故事里，美丽公主之吻解救了被囚于癞蛤蟆之身的英俊王子。结果是，他们确信他们的管理之吻将对并购目标公司T的盈利状况产生神奇的效果。    Such optimism is essential.  Absent that rosy view, why else should the shareholders of Company A(cquisitor) want to own an interest in T at the 2X takeover cost rather than at the X market price they would pay if they made direct purchases on their own?    这种乐观是必不可少的。如果没有那样美好乐观的看法，为什么并购者A公司的股东想要以2X的价格收购T公司的一部分，与此同时，T公司的市场价格是X，他们为什么不自己直接购买。    In other words, investors can always buy toads at the going price for toads.  If investors instead bankroll princesses who wish to pay double for the right to kiss the toad, those kisses had better pack some real dynamite.  We’ve observed many kisses but very few miracles.  Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses - even after their corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads.    换 句话说，投资者总能以目前的癞蛤蟆市场价来买癞蛤蟆。如果投资者资助那些愿意付双倍价格去吻癞蛤蟆的公主，这些吻得有真正的作用才行。我们观察到很多吻， 但很少有奇迹发生。即便如此，很多管理层的公主仍然沉着地保持自信，自认为其吻具有未来的威力，即使企业的后院已经堆满了没膝深毫无反应的癞蛤蟆。    In fairness, we should acknowledge that some acquisition records have been dazzling.  Two major categories stand out.    公平的说，我们应当认识到有些并购记录是光彩夺目的。主要有两大类。    The first involves companies that, through design or accident, have purchased only businesses that are particularly well adapted to an inflationary environment.  Such favored business must have two characteristics: (1) an ability to increase prices rather easily(even when product demand is flat and capacity is not fully utilized) without fear of significant loss of either market share or unit volume, and (2) an ability to accommodate large dollar volume increases in business (often produced more by inflation than by real growth) with only minor additional investment of capital.  Managers of ordinary ability, focusing solely on acquisition possibilities meeting these tests, have achieved excellent results in recent decades.  However, very few enterprises possess both characteristics, and competition to buy those that do has now become fierce to the point of being self-defeating.    第一类是有些公司，无论是通过有意设计还是碰巧，只并购了些非常适应通胀环境的公司。这些受青睐的公司必须具有两个特性：（1）相当容易的涨价的能力（即使当产品需求持平，产能没有完全利用时），而不必担心市场份额或销量的大幅下跌。（2） 有能力适应业务金额的大量增长（通常是由于通胀而不是真实增长所引起）而只需很少的额外资本投入。在最近几十年，一些能力平平的经理人，由于只关注符合这 些条件的并购可能，已经获得了优异的成果。但是，只有很少的企业同时拥有这两种特性，并购这些企业的竞争现在已经变得过于白热化，以至于不值得买了。    The second category involves the managerial superstars - men who can recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise.  We salute such managers as Ben Heineman at Northwest Industries, Henry Singleton at Teledyne, Erwin Zaban at National Service Industries, and especially Tom Murphy at Capital Cities Communications (a real managerial “twofer”, whose acquisition efforts have been properly focused in Category 1 and whose operating talents also make him a leader of Category 2).  From both direct and vicarious experience, we recognize the difficulty and rarity of these executives’ achievements. (So do they; these champs have made very few deals in recent years, and often have found repurchase of their own shares to be the most sensible employment of corporate capital.)    第二类涉及一些管理超级明星，那些人能识别装扮成癞蛤蟆的稀有王子，而且有管理能力让王子脱下伪装。我们对这样的经理人表示致敬，如Northwest Industries的Ben Heineman，Teledyne的Henry Singleton，National Service Industries的Erwin Zaban，尤其是Capital Cities Communications的Tom Murphy（一 个真正的双料管理人才，他的并购努力一直恰当的关注于第一类公司，而他的运营才能同时让他成为第二类的领袖。）通过直接和间接的经验，我们意识到这些经理 人所取得的成就的困难性和珍贵程度。（他们也意识到了。这些冠军们在最近一些年只做了很少的并购。他们通常发现回购自己的股票是使用企业资本的最合理方 式。）    Your Chairman, unfortunately, does not qualify for Category 2.  And,despite a reasonably good understanding of the economic factors compelling concentration in Category 1, our actual acquisition activity in that category has been sporadic and inadequate.  Our preaching was better than our performance. (We neglected the Noah principle: predicting rain doesn’t count, building arks does.)    你们的董事长，不幸的是，够不上第二类。除了对第一类中非常引人注目的经济因素的理解，我们在第一类的实际并购活动一直是零星而且不足。我们的布道好过我们的业绩。（我们忽视了诺亚的原则：预测下雨不算什么，建造方舟才重要。）    We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports.  Clearly our kisses fell flat.  We have done well with a couple of princes - but they were princes when purchased.  At least our kisses didn’t turn them into toads.  And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.    我 们曾经偶尔尝试用便宜的价格买癞蛤蟆，这在过去的年报中有记录。很明显，我们的吻不管用。我们在几个王子身上取得了成功，但当我们并购时，他们就已经是王 子了。还好，至少我们的吻没把他们变成癞蛤蟆。最后，我们有时能非常成功的以购买癞蛤蟆的价格购买一部分很容易识别的王子的权益。    （1981年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    We will continue to seek the acquisition of businesses in their entirety at prices that will make sense, even should the future of the acquired enterprise develop much along the lines of its past.  We may very well pay a fairly fancy price for a Category 1 business if we are reasonably confident of what we are getting.  But we will not normally pay a lot in any purchase for what we are supposed to bring to the party - for we find that we ordinarily don’t bring a lot.    我们将继续寻找用合理价格购买整个公司的机会，即使被并购的公司未来沿着过去的轨迹发展。如果我们相当确信我们所购买的业务，我们愿意付出相当高的价格购买第一类企业。但是我们一般不会对那些我们必须提供很多东西的并购支付大价钱，因为我们通常无法提供很多东西。    （1981年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）    Currently, we find values most easily obtained through the open-market purchase of fractional positions in companies with excellent business franchises and competent, honest managements. We never expect to run these companies, but we do expect to profit from them.    目前，我们发现最容易获得价值的是，在公开市场购买具有商业特许经营而且有着诚实称职的管理层的优秀公司的一部分。我们从来不期望运营这些公司，但我们确实期望从中获利。    We expect that undistributed earnings from such companies will produce full value (subject to tax when realized) for Berkshire and its shareholders.  If they don’t, we have made mistakes as to either:(1) the management we have elected to join; (2) the future economics of the business; or (3) the price we have paid.    我们预期这些公司的未分配利润将给伯克希尔及其股东产生全部价值（受到实现时税务的影响）。如果他们不能产生全部价值，那么我们可能在以下领域犯了错：（1）我们决定合作的管理层。（2）业务的未来经济前景。或者（3）我们付出的价格。    We have made plenty of such mistakes - both in the purchase of non-controlling and controlling interests in businesses.  Category(2) miscalculations are the most common.  Of course, it is necessary to dig deep into our history to find illustrations of such mistakes -sometimes as deep as two or three months back.  For example, last year your Chairman volunteered his expert opinion on the rosy futureof the aluminum business.  Several minor adjustments to that opinion– now aggregating approximately 180 degrees - have since been required.    我们犯过很多这样的错，不论是购买非控股还是控股公司。第（2）类的误判最普遍。当然，必须深入挖掘我们的历史才能找到这些错误的例子，有时候是两三个月前的历史。比如，去年，你们的董事长自告奋勇提出了他对铝业美好未来的意见。对那个意见经过几个小的调整之后，现在必须做180度的改变。    For personal as well as more objective reasons, however, we generally have been able to correct such mistakes far more quickly in the case of non-controlled businesses (marketable securities) than in the case of controlled subsidiaries.  Lack of control, in effect, often has turned out to be an economic plus.    由于个人及客观原因，我们通常能对这种错误进行调整，对非控股公司（可出售证券）的调整远远快于控股子公司。缺乏控制，实际上常常反而变成了经济上的好处。    （1981年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）     十年以后再看并购    对于并购，巴菲特自己的感触很深，因为他也曾亲吻过癞蛤蟆，无功而返。十年以后的信中，再次提及并购，巴菲特说出了著名的“用合理的价格购买好的公司，而不是用好的价格购买一般的公司。”的论断。    Of all our activities at Berkshire, the most exhilarating for Charlie and me is the acquisition of a business with excellent economic characteristics and a management that we like, trust and admire. Such acquisitions are not easy to make but we look for them constantly.  In the search, we adopt the same attitude one might find appropriate in looking for a spouse:  It pays to be active, interested and open-minded, but it does not pay to be in a hurry.    在伯克希尔的所有活动中，查理和我感到最兴奋的是并购具有优秀经济特征以及有着我们喜欢，信任和钦佩的管理层的公司。这些并购并不容易做，但我们一直在寻找。在寻找过程中，我们采用了适合寻找配偶的态度：积极主动，兴趣十足，以及思想开放是值得的，但是仓促行事则不可取。    In the past, I've observed that many acquisition-hungry managers were apparently mesmerized by their childhood reading of the story about the frog-kissing princess.  Remembering her success, they pay dearly for the right to kiss corporate toads, expecting wondrous transfigurations.  Initially, disappointing results only deepen their desire to round up new toads.  ("Fanaticism," said Santyana, "consists of redoubling your effort when you've forgotten your aim.")  Ultimately, even the most optimistic manager must face reality.  Standing knee-deep in unresponsive toads, he then announces an enormous "restructuring" charge.  In this corporate equivalent of a Head Start program, the CEO receives the education but the stockholders pay the tuition.    过 去，我曾注意到很多急于并购的经理人显然是还沉迷于他们童年读的有关亲吻青蛙的公主的故事中。记住了她的成功，这些经理人花大价钱购买亲吻企业界的癞蛤蟆 的权利，期望神奇的转变。刚开始，失望的结果只不过进一步加深了他们的渴望，去获得更多的癞蛤蟆。（桑塔亚那说“狂热”，“包含了当你忘记了你的目标时却 把你的努力加倍”）最终，即使是最乐观的经理人也必须面对现实。站在没膝深毫无反应的癞蛤蟆中，他于是宣布大量的“重组”费用。这相当于企业的幼儿启蒙计 划，CEO受到了教育，股东支付了学费。    In my early days as a manager I, too, dated a few toads.  They were cheap dates - I've never been much of a sport - but my results matched those of acquirers who courted higher-priced toads.  I kissed and they croaked.    在我早年，作为一个经理，我也曾与几个癞蛤蟆约会。他们是便宜的约会对象。我从来都在体育竞赛上不行，但我在约会癞蛤蟆的竞赛中可以与那些购买了高价癞蛤蟆的并购者比肩。我吻了，他们仍呱呱叫。    After several failures of this type, I finally remembered some useful advice I once got from a golf pro (who, like all pros who have had anything to do with my game, wishes to remain anonymous).  Said the pro:  "Practice doesn't make perfect; practice makes permanent." And thereafter I revised my strategy and tried to buy good businesses at fair prices rather than fair businesses at good prices.    几 个这样的失败之后，我终于回忆起曾经从一个职业高尔夫球手那里得到的一些有用的忠告（他与其他与我们有联系的职业人士一样，希望保持匿名）。他说到：“练 习并不能产生完美；练习只造成固定不变。”所以，在那之后，我改变了自己的策略，试着用合理的价格购买好的公司，而不是用好的价格购买一般的公司。    （1992年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）

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