一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（3） Barrons
http://blog.caing.com/article/9259/
复利的威力 在投资中，巴菲特逐渐体会到了复利的威力。实际上，巴菲特最终成为首富就是靠长期高速的复利增长。关于复利的威力这一点，巴菲特在32岁的时候就非常清楚。 I have it from unreliable sources that the cost of the voyage Isabella originally underwrote for Columbus was approximately $30,000. This has been considered at least a moderately successful utilization of venture capital. Without attempting to evaluate the psychic income derived from finding a new hemisphere, it must be pointed out that even had squatter's rights prevailed, the whole deal was not exactly another IBM. Figured very roughly, the $30,000 invested at 4% compounded annually would have amounted to something like $2,000,000,000,000 (that's $2 trillion for those of you who are not government statisticians) by 1962. Historical apologists for the Indians of Manhattan may find refuge in similar calculations. Such fanciful geometric progressions illustrate the value of either living a long time, or compounding your money at a decent rate. I have nothing particularly helpful to say on the former point. 我从不太可靠的消息来源得知，当年西班牙女王伊萨贝拉资助哥伦布远航的成本大约是3万美金。这被认为至少是一个相当成功的运用风险资本的例子。不考虑发 现一个新半球的精神上的收获，即使算上强占的土地的权利，这个投资也比不上IBM的例子。简单估算，3万美金投入4%复利增长，到了1962年将会是2万 亿美元。同情曼哈顿岛的印第安人的人们也会找到类似的计算。这种奇异的几何级数增长揭示了两种事物的价值：长寿或者让你的金钱以相当好的速度复利增长。我 对前一个事情没什么可讲的。 The following table indicates the compounded value of $100,000 at 5%, 10% and 15% for 10, 20 and 30 years. It is always startling to see how relatively small differences in rates add up to very significant sums over a period of years. That is why, even though we are shooting for more, we feel that a few percentage points advantage over the Dow is a very worthwhile achievement. It can mean a lot of dollars over adecade or two. 下面的表格显示的是10万美元以5%，10%和15%的速度复利增长10，20和30年。让人吃惊的是，相对较小的速度差别，经过多年的积累，逐渐变为 巨大的数字差异。这就是为什么虽然我们的目标是更高的增长，但我们感觉，对于道指的几个点的优势是非常有价值的成就。假以时日，10年或20年，这意味着 很多钱。
（1962年给合伙人的信） Since the whole subject of compounding has such a crass ring to it, I will attempt to introduce a little class into this discussion by turning to the art world. Francis I of France paid 4,000 ecus in 1540 for Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. On the off chance that a few of you have not kept track of the fluctuations of the ecu 4,000 converted out to about $20,000. 由于复利这个话题牵扯的范围很广，我就试着把这个讨论转向艺术世界，来引入一门小课程。1540年，法国的弗兰西斯一世花了4000克朗把达芬奇的蒙娜丽莎买下。你们可能没关注克朗的波动，这4000克朗相当于今天的2万美金。 If Francis had kept his feet on the ground and he (and his trustees) had been able to find a 6% after-tax investment, the estate now would be worth something over $1,000,000,000,000,000.00. That's $1 quadrillionor over 3,000 times the present national debt, all from 6%. I trust this will end all discussion in our household about any purchase of paintings qualifying as an investment. 如果弗兰西斯还活着，他（和他的受托人）当时能够找到一个税后6%的投资，这笔财产现在会价值超过1000万亿。这是目前国债的3000倍，都是从这6%而来。我相信这将结束所有家庭中关于购买画作算不算投资的讨论。 （1963年给合伙人的信） 基金无法战胜市场 巴菲特发现即使是领先的大基金也无法战胜市场指数。他认为这源于这些投资机构的机制。 The results continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment advice has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue-chip stocks. This in no sense condemns these institutions or the investment advisers and trust departments whose methods, reasoning, and results largely parallel such investment companies. These media perform a substantial service to millions of investors in achieving adequate diversification, providing convenience and peace of mind, avoiding issues of inferior quality,etc. However, their services do not include (and in the great majority of cases, are not represented to include) the compounding of money at a rate greater than that achieved by the general market. 这些结果继续显示，那些获得最高额收入和最受尊敬的投资建议也很难比得上一个无人管理的蓝筹股指数的业绩。这并不是指责这些机构或投资顾问，以及与这些 投资公司有着大体上类似的方法、推理，和结果的信托部门。这些机构给成百万的投资者起到了重要的服务作用，以获得足够的分散投资，提供便利，让人感到踏 实，避免质量低下的问题等。但是，他们的服务不包括（在大部分情况下也不声称包括）以高于市场的速度复利增长金钱。 Our partnership's fundamental reason for existence is to compound funds at a better-than-average rate with less exposure to long-term loss of capital than the above investment media. We certainly can not represent that we will achieve this goal. We can and do say that if we don't achieve this goal over any reasonable period excluding an extensive speculative boom, we will cease operation. 我们的合伙基金存在的根本原因就是要以高于平均水平的速度复利增长基金，而且与上面所说的投资公司相比，我们要有更少的长期资本损失的风险。我们当然无 法声称会达到这一目标。我们能说的而且是确实说的是，除了在长时间的投机性牛市中，如果我们在相当长的一段时期内，达不到这一目标，我们将停止运营。 （1963年上半年给合伙人的信） The repetition of these tables has caused partners to ask: "Why in the world does this happen to very intelligent managements working with (1) bright, energetic staff people, (2) virtually unlimited resources, (3) the most extensive business contacts, and (4)literally centuries of aggregate investment experience?" (The latter qualification brings to mind the fellow who applied for a job and stated he had twenty years of experience - which was corrected by the former employer to read “one year's experience -twenty times.”) 这些重复出现的表格让一些合伙人不禁问道：“这些聪明的投资经理究竟怎么了？他们有（1）聪明而精力充沛的手下（2）几乎无限的资源（3）最广泛的商业 联系（4）加在一起几个世纪的投资经验。”（这最后一点让我想起一个家伙在求职时声称有20年的经验。后来前任雇主纠正说是“1年的经验，20次”。） This question is of enormous importance, and you would expect it to be the subject of considerable study by investment managers and substantial investors. After all, each percentage point on $30 billion is $300 million per year. Curiously enough, there is practically nothing in the literature of Wall Street attacking this problem, and discussion of it is virtually absent at security analyst society meetings, conventions, seminars, etc. My opinion is that the first job of any investment management organization is to analyze its own techniques and results before pronouncing judgment on the managerial abilities and performance of the major corporate entities of the United States. 这个问题极其重要。你可能会认为投资经理和大投资者们对这个议题有着很多的研究。毕竟300亿美元的百分之一就是一年3亿美元。令人好奇的是，实际上在 华尔街没有任何文章探讨这个问题。在证券分析师会议和讲座等活动中也几乎没有讨论。我的想法是，任何一个投资管理机构的首要任务都是分析自己的技术和结 果，而不是判断整个美国的主要投资机构的管理能力和业绩。 In the great majority of cases the lack of performance exceeding or even matching an unmanaged index in no way reflects lack of either intellectual capacity or integrity. I think it is much more the product of: (1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations;(3) an institutional framework whereby average is "safe" and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational;and finally and importantly, (5) inertia. 在大多数情况下，投资机构缺乏超越无人管理的指数的业绩，甚至连与指数一致的业绩都少见。这绝不是由于缺少智慧或者诚信。我认为这主要是以下几个原因的 结果：（1）集体决策-我的可能有些偏颇的看法是：如果所有成员都真正参与决策，出色的投资管理几乎不可能从任何大小的集体中产生。（2）希望与其它备受 尊重的大型投资机构的投资政策保持一致，甚至在某种程度上与其投资组合保持一致。（3）机构的体制让平均成为“安全”。对个人的回报与激励无法补偿独立行 动所带来的全面风险。（4）拘于某些不合理的分散投资做法。最后，也是最重要的是（5）惰性。 （1964年给合伙人的信） 关于保守的问题 那些著名的大型投资公司，号称保守，以传统的方式行事。但巴菲特认为真正的保守来自于事实和逻辑，而不是投资方式。 In looking at the table of investment company performance, the question might be asked: “Yes, but aren't those companies run more conservatively than the Partnership?" If you asked that question of the investment company managements, they, in absolute honesty, would say they were more conservative. If you asked the first hundred security analysts you met, I am sure that a very large majority of them also would answer for the investment companies. I would disagree. I have over 90% of my net worth in BPL, and most of my family have percentages in that area, but of course, that only demonstrates the sincerity of my view - not the validity of it. 阅读那些投资公司的业绩表格，有人可能会问：“确实，你的业绩更好。但是那些投资公司难道不比你的合伙基金运营的更保守吗？”如果你对那些投资公司的经 理问这个问题，他们绝对会诚实的回答他们更保守。如果你问你所碰到的前100个分析师，我确信他们当中的很大一部分也都会认为那些投资公司更保守。但我不 同意。我把我自己超过90%的净值放在巴菲特合伙基金中。我大部分的家庭成员也差不多把90%的净值投入了合伙基金。当然，这只表明了我看法的真诚度，而 不是证明我的看法的正确性。 It is unquestionably true that the investment companies have their money more conventionally invested than we do. To many people conventionality is indistinguishable from conservatism. In my view, this represents erroneous thinking. Neither a conventional nor an unconventional approach, per se, is conservative. 的确，那些投资公司比我们投资的方式更加传统。对许多人来说传统与保守没有区别。但在我看来，这是错误的思维。无论是传统的还是非传统的方式，在本质上都不能说是保守的。 Truly conservative actions arise from intelligent hypotheses, correct facts and sound reasoning. These qualities may lead to conventional acts,but there have been many times when they have led to unorthodoxy. In some corner of the world they are probably still holding regular meetings of the Flat Earth Society. 真正保守的行为来自于聪明的假设，正确的事实和合理的推理。这些特点有可能导致传统的投资行为，但在很多时候也会指向非正统的方式。在世界的某个角落有些人可能仍然坚持曾经的“正统”理念，认为地球是平的，并定期开会。 We derive no comfort because important people, vocal people, or great numbers of people agree with us. Nor do we derive comfort if they don't. A public opinion poll is no substitute for thought. When we really sit back with a smile on our face is when we run into a situation we can understand, where the facts are ascertainable and clear, and the course of action obvious. In that case - whether conventional or unconventional – whether others agree or disagree - we feel - we are progressing in a conservative manner. 仅仅因为重要人物，评论家，或者非常多的人赞同我们，这并不能让我们感到安心。反之，如果他们都不同意我们的做法，也并不能让我们感到安心。民意测验无 法替代思考。只有当我们能理解我们的形势，事实清晰确定，行动方案显而易见的时候，我们才能真正放松，面带笑容。这时候，无论传统与否，无论他人同意与 否，我们都认为自己是以一种保守的方式取得进展。 （1964年给合伙人的信） 耐心与保密 投资需要耐心与保密。 (1)Our business is one requiring patience. It has little in common with a portfolio of high-flying glamour stocks and during periods of popularity for the latter, we may appear quite stodgy. It is to our advantage to have securities do nothing price wise for months, or perhaps years, while we are buying them. This points up the need to measure our results over an adequate period of time. We suggest three years as a minimum. 我们的生意必须耐心。这与满是高高在上的热门股的投资组合不同。在这些热门股票流行的时期，我们会显得非常古板枯燥。 在我们购买股票的时候，这些股票的价格几个月，甚至几年不变，这对我们来说是个优势。这清楚的表明在衡量我们结果的时候，需要足够长的时间。我们建议三年是最短的时间。 (2)We cannot talk about our current investment operations. Such an open-mouth policy could never improveour results and in some situations could seriously hurt us. For this reason, should anyone, including partners, ask us whether we are interested in any security, we must plead the “5th Amendment.” 我们不能谈论我们目前的投资运营。这种公开张扬的政策永远也无法提高我们的结果，在某些时候还可能严重损害我们自己。由于这个原因，如果任何人，包括合伙人，问我们是否对某个股票感兴趣，我们必须援引“宪法第五修正案”，保持沉默。 （1963年给合伙人的信附录）
一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（4） Barrons
http://blog.caing.com/article/9372/
投资的本质
投资的本质是什么？是与自身人性的博弈。只有时时刻刻记住投资的终极目标“最快的长期复利增长”，时时刻刻保持从零开始的态度，不断学习，不断修正自己，才有可能达到目标。 Buying activities during the first half were quite satisfactory. This is of particular satisfaction to me since I consider the buying end to be about 90% of this business. 在上半年我们的买入活动相当令人满意。这对我来说尤其感到满足，因为我认为投资这门生意大约90%在于买入。 （1964年上半年给合伙人的信） More investment sins are probably committed by otherwise quite intelligent people because of "taxconsiderations" than from any other cause. One of my friends - a noted West Coast philosopher maintains that a majority of life's errors are caused by forgetting what one is really trying to do.
更多的由于“税务考虑”，很多其实非常聪明的人犯了太多的投资罪过。我的一个朋友—一个著名的西海岸哲学家认为人一生所犯的大部分错都是由于忘记了自己真正想要做什么。
（1964年给合伙人的信）
It is obvious that the performance of a stock last year or last month is no reason, per se, to either own it or to not own it now. It is obvious that an inability to "get even" in a security that has declined is of no importance. It is obvious that the inner warm glow that results from having held a winner last year is of no importance in making a decision as to whether it belongs in an optimum portfolio this year.
显然，一个股票去年或者上个月的业绩，本质上并不是现在拥有或者不拥有这只股票的原因。同样，不能在一只已经下跌的股票上“翻本”也并不重要。当然，拥有一支去年的赢家股票会让自己的内心感到喜悦，但这在决定这只股票是否属于今年的最优组合时毫不重要。
（1964年给合伙人的信）
I don’t mention this because I am proud of such performance – on the contrary, I would prefer it if we had achieved our gain in the hypothesized manner. Rather, I mention it for two reasons: (1) you are always entitled to know when I am wrong as well as right; and,(2) it demonstrates that although we deal with probabilities and expectations, the actual results can deviate substantially from such expectations, particularly on a short-term basis.
（虽然业绩很好，但实现的方式与我们的预期不一致。）我举这个例子并不是我们对此感到自豪。正好相反，我更希望我们以事先假设的方式获得收益。我提这个是由于两个原因：（1）你有权知道我何时错了，何时对了。（2）这表明虽然我们与概率和预期打交道，但实际的结果有可能大范围的偏离这些预期，在短期内这更是如此。
（1964年上半年给合伙人的信）
After last year the question naturally arises, "What do we do for an encore?” A disadvantage of this business is that it does not possess momentum to any significant degree. If General Motors accounts for 54% of domestic new car registrations in 1965, it is a pretty safe bet that they are going to come fairly close to that figure in 1966 due to owner loyalties, dealer capabilities, productive capacity, consumer image, etc. Not so for BPL. We start from scratch each year with everything valued at market when the gun goes off. Partners in 1966, new or old, benefit to only a very limited extent from the efforts of 1964 and 1965. The success of past methods and ideas does not transfer forward to future ones.
去年的好业绩之后，一个很自然的问题就是：“我们怎么才能重复这一好的业绩？”投资这门生意的坏处就在于无法保持一定的势头。如果通用汽车在1965年占有54%的国内汽车市场，那么很有可能他们在1966年的数字也会非常接近。因为他们有消费者的忠诚，经销商的能力，生产能力，在消费者心中的形象等因素。但巴菲特合伙基金不是这样的。每年我们都是从零开始，由市场估值。在1966年的合伙人，无论新旧，都只能从我们1964年和1965年的努力中获得非常有限的好处。过去的成功方法与想法无法转移到未来。
（1965年给合伙人的信）
复利的悲哀
成也萧何，败也萧何。巴菲特享受到了复利的好处，也很快感受到了复利的悲哀。当基金越来越大，复利增长也就越来越难。到了1965年，巴菲特向新投资者关闭了合伙基金。
Nevertheless,as circumstances presently appear, I feel substantially greater size is more likely to harm future results than to help them. This might not be true for my own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your results.
但是，基于目前的情况，我认为基金越大，则越有可能伤害而不是帮助我们未来的业绩。这对我自己的收入可能不是如此（因为我的管理费和分成会随之增加），但对你的业绩确实如此。
Therefore, unless it appears that circumstances have changed (under some conditions added capital would improve results) or unless new partners can bring some asset to the Partnership other than simply capital, I intend to admit no additional partners to BPL.
所以，除非这种情况得到改变（即在某种情况下增加的资本会改善业绩），或者合伙人不仅能给合伙基金带来资金，我有意停止接收新的合伙人进入巴菲特合伙基金。
（1965年给合伙人的信）
集中投资
这是巴菲特投资理念中极其重要的一部分。与传统的“分散投资”相反，巴菲特崇尚集中投资。在35岁的时候，他就清晰的认识到，要想超越指数，就必须集中投资。这种集中投资不仅与预期的回报高低有关，更与潜在的损失相关。最新的《数学研究
》也表明，巴菲特的这种集中持股方式符合最优的长期复利增长，具有最高的几何平均增长速度。
This year in the material which went out in November, I specifically called your attention to a new Ground Rule reading, "7. We diversify substantially less than most investment operations. We might invest up to 40% of our net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could drastically change the underlying value of the investment."
今年11月发出的材料里，我特意让你注意一条新的基本原则。“7.我们比大部分投资机构都要较少的进行分散投资。如果我们的事实与逻辑推理有极高的可能性是正确的，而且投资的内在价值剧烈变化的可能性极低，我们最多可能把净值的40%投入单支股票。”
We are obviously following a policy regarding diversification which differs markedly from that of practically all public investment operations. Frankly, there is nothing I would like better than to have 50 different investment opportunities, all of which have a mathematical expectation (this term reflects the range of all possible relative performances, including negative ones, adjusted for the probability of each - no yawning, please) of achieving performance surpassing the Dow by, say, fifteen percentage points per annum. If the fifty individual expectations were not intercorrelated(what happens to one is associated with what happens to the other) I could put 2% of our capital into each one and sit back with a very high degree of certainty that our overall results would be very close to such a fifteen percentage point advantage.
很明显，我们的分散投资政策与绝大多数公众投资机构有着显著的不同。坦率的讲，我最愿意拥有50个不同的投资机会，每一个都有每年超过道指15%的数学期望。（这里的数学期望是指所有可能的相对业绩的范围，包括负值，经过概率调整后的结果。）如果这50个期望不是相互关联的（一个的结果与其它结果的联系），我能把2%的资本平均分配给每个机会，然后就能高枕无忧而且非常确信我们的整体业绩将非常接近对道指15%的优势。
It doesn't work that way.
根本不是那么回事。
We have to work extremely hard to find just a very few attractive investment situations. Such a situation by definition is one where my expectation (defined as above) of performance is at least ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. Among the few we do find, the expectations vary substantially. The question always is,“How much do I put in number one (ranked by expectation of relative performance) and how much do I put in number eight?" This depends to a great degree on the wideness of the spread between the mathematical expectation of number one versus number eight. It also depends upon the probability that number one could turn in a really poor relative performance. Two securities could have equal mathematical expectations, but one might have .05 chance of performing fifteen percentage points or more worse than the Dow, and the second might have only .01 chance of such performance. The wider range of expectation in the first case reduces the desirability of heavy concentration in it.
我们必须极其努力才能找到仅有的几个有吸引力的投资机会。这种机会是指我的预期（如上面的定义）是业绩至少每年超过道指10个 百分点。在找到的仅有的几个机会中，我们的预期非常不同。问题总是在于“我在第一个投多少（这里的第一是指按预期的相对业绩排），在第八个投多少？”这取 决于第一和第八的数学期望的差异度有多大。这也取决于第一个会取得非常差的相对业绩的概率。两只股票可能有相同的数学期望，但是一个有0.05的概率低于道指15%或更差的业绩，而第二个则只有0.01的概率会有这样差的业绩。由于第一个例子中数学期望的范围差异度很大，这就减少了重仓集中在这个股票的意愿。
The above may make the whole operation sound very precise. It isn't. Nevertheless, our business is that of ascertaining facts and then applying experience and reason to such facts to reach expectations. Imprecise and emotionally influenced as our attempts may be, that is what the business is all about. The results of many years of decision-making in securities will demonstrate how well you are doing on making such calculations – whether you consciously realize you are making the calculations or not. I believe the investor operates at a distinct advantage when he is aware of what path his thought process is following.
以上的论述让整个过程显得非常精确。其实不是的。但是，我们的投资生意就是搞清事实，然后运用经验和逻辑推理，从而得出预期。我们的努力可能不精确，并受到情感的影响，但这就是投资。多年股票投资决策的结果将证明我们在做那些计算时有多精确— 无论你是否意识到，你都在进行计算估计。我相信当投资者意识到他自己所遵从的思路时，他在投资方面就有了明确的优势。
There is one thing of which I can assure you. If good performance of the fund is even a minor objective, any portfolio encompassing one hundred stocks (whether the manager is handling one thousand dollars or one billion dollars) is not being operated logically. The addition of the one hundredth stock simply can't reduce the potential variance in portfolio performance sufficiently to compensate for the negative effect its inclusion has on the overall portfolio expectation.
我能向你保证一件事。即使基金的业绩表现是一个次要目标，一个有着100支股票的投资组合是不合理的（无论基金经理是管理1千美金或者10亿美金）。增加第100支股票根本无法把投资组合业绩的潜在波动足够降低，反而无法弥补加入这支股票对整个投资组合的预期回报所带来的负面效应。
Anyone owning such numbers of securities after presumably studying their investment merit (and I don't care how prestigious their labels) is following what I call the Noah School of Investing - two of everything. Such investors should be piloting arks. While Noah may have been acting in accord with certain time-tested biological principles, the investors have left the track regarding mathematical principles. (I only made it through plane geometry, but with one exception, I have carefully screened out the mathematicians from our Partnership.)
任何拥有这么多股票的人，估计是学了某种投资价值观（我才不管这些人有多著名），我 称之为诺亚学派的投资哲学，就是任何东西都来一对儿。这种投资者应该去开诺亚方舟。虽然诺亚每种生物都选一对儿的方式是根据了经过时间检验的某种生物规 律，但投资者这么做却是偏离了数学的基本原理。（我只学过平面几何，但是我已经仔细筛选过我们的合伙基金，把数学家排除在外了。）
Of course, the fact that someone else is behaving illogically in owning one hundred securities doesn't prove our case. While they may be wrong in overdiversifying, we have to affirmatively reason through a proper diversification policy in terms of our objectives.
当然，别人不合逻辑的拥有100支股票，这并不能证明我们是对的。他们可能过度分散是错的，而我们则必须确实推理出基于我们自己目标的合适的分散投资策略。
The optimum portfolio depends on the various expectations of choices available and the degree of variance in performance which is tolerable. The greater the number of selections, the less will be the average year-to-year variation in actual versus expected results. Also, the lower will be the expected results, assuming different choices have different expectations of performance.
最优的投资组合取决于现有的不同投资选择的数学期望，以及我们所能容忍的业绩变化的程度。选取的股票越多，平均每年的业绩与预期的结果差异越小。但是，假定不同的投资选择有不同的预期业绩，随着选取股票数量的增加，则预期的业绩也将降低。
I am willing to give up quite a bit in terms of leveling of year-to-year results (remember when I talk of “results,” I am talking of performance relative to the Dow) in order to achieve better overall long-term performance. Simply stated, this means I am willing to concentrate quite heavily in what I believe to be the best investment opportunities recognizing very well that this may cause an occasional very sour year - one somewhat more sour, probably, than if I had diversified more. While this means our results will bounce around more, I think it also means that our long-term margin of superiority should be greater.
为了取得总体更好的长期业绩，我愿意 放弃相当一部分的年度结果（记住当我说“结果”时，我指的是相对于道指的业绩）。简而言之，这意味着我愿意相当集中的重仓持有我坚信是最好的投资机会。与 此同时，我清楚的意识到，与更加分散的投资相比，我这种方式有可能造成偶尔一个业绩非常糟糕的一年。虽然这意味着我们的业绩将上下波动，但我坚信这也意味 着我们长期的优势将更大。
You have already seen some examples of this. Our margin versus the Dow has ranged from 2.4 percentage points in 1958 to 33.0 points in 1965.If you check this against the deviations of the funds listed on page three, you will find our variations have a much wider amplitude. I could have operated in such a manner as to reduce our amplitude, but I would also have reduced our overall performance somewhat although it still would have substantially exceeded that of the investment companies. Looking back, and continuing to think this problem through, I feel that if anything, I should have concentrated slightly more than I have in the past. Hence, the new Ground Rule and this long-winded explanation.
你已经看到了一些例子。我们对道指的优势从1958年的2.4个百分点到1965年的33个 百分点大范围波动。你如果把这个与第三页的投资基金与道指的差异相比，你就会发现我们业绩变化的范围更广。我本来可以按那些基金的方式运营，以减少业绩变 化的范围，但是那样会降低我们的整体业绩，虽然我们也能大范围的超过那些投资基金公司。回顾过去，我对这个问题经过持续深入思考后认为，如果要改变什么的 话，我会比过去的方式稍稍更加集中持股。所以，我就制定了这个新的基本准则，并且花了这么大的篇幅进行解释。
Again let me state that this is somewhat unconventional reasoning (this doesn't make it right or wrong - it does mean you have to do your own thinking on it), and you may well have a different opinion - if you do, the Partnership is not the place for you. We are obviously only going to go to 40% in very rare situations – this rarity, of course, is what makes it necessary that we concentrate so heavily, when we see such an opportunity. We probably have had only five or six situations in the nine-year history of the Partnership where we have exceeded 25%. Any such situations are going to have to promise very significantly superior performance relative to the Dow compared to other opportunities available at the time. They are also going to have to possess such superior qualitative and/or quantitative factors that the chance of serious permanent loss is minimal (anything can happen on a short-term quotational basis which partially explains the greater risk of widened year-to-year variation in results). In selecting the limit to which I will go in anyone investment, I attempt to reduce to a tiny figure the probability that the single investment (or group, if there is intercorrelation) can produce a result for our total portfolio that would be more than ten percentage points poorer than the Dow.
让我再次声明，这是有些反传统的推理思考（这并不决定其对错，但这意味着你必须对此做自己的的思考）。你完全可能有不同的看法。如果你有不同的看法，那么这个合伙基金不适合你。很明显，我们只会在非常罕见的情况下把净值的40%投入单支股票。当然，正是这种罕见的机会才让我们必须如此集中重仓。在合伙基金的9年历史中，我们可能只有5到6次超过25%集中持股的情形。任何这些情况，与当时其他的机会相比，都具有更大幅度超越道指的希望。不仅如此，它们还具有如此优异的定性和/或 定量因素，以至于严重的本金永久损失的机率是最小的。（在短期内，在账面价值上，任何事情都有可能发生。这也是为什么我们的风险更高，年度业绩波动扩大的 部分原因。）在选择任何单一投资的限度时，我意图把单一投资（或者一组投资，如果有内部的相关性）使我们整个投资组合的业绩低于道指10个百分点的概率减到极小。
（1965年给合伙人的信）
Interestingly enough, the literature of investment management is virtually devoid of material relative to deductive calculation of optimal diversification.
有趣的是，有关投资管理的文献几乎没有推理计算最优分散投资的材料。
All texts counsel "adequate" diversification, but the ones who quantify "adequate" virtually never explain how they arrive at their conclusion. Hence, for our summation on overdiversification, we turn to that eminent academician Billy Rose, who says, "You've got a harem of seventy girls; you don't get to know any of them very well.”
所有的教科书都建议“足够”的分散投资。但是量化“足够”的人从来没有解释他们如何得到其结论。所以，为了总结我们关于过度分散投资的论述，我引用知名学者Billy Rose的话“如果你的后宫有70个女孩，那么你对哪一个也不会有深入的了解。”
（1965年给合伙人的信）
一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（5） Barrons
http://blog.caing.com/article/9653/
市场分析与投资
巴菲特的投资原则非常清晰，对公司做分析判断，不对市场进行预测。
Ground Rule No.6 (from our November packet) says: “I am not in the business of predicting general stock market or business fluctuations.If you think I can do this, or think it is essential to an investment program, you should not be in the partnership.”
第六条基本原则（来自于11月份的材料）提到：“我不从事预测整个股票市场或者商业波动的事业。如果你认为我可以做预测，或者认为这对投资是必不可少的，那你不应该在这个合伙基金。”
Of course, this rule can be attacked as fuzzy, complex, ambiguous, vague, etc. Nevertheless, I think the point is well understood by the great majority of our partners. We don't buy and sell stocks based upon what other people think the stock market is going to do (I never have an opinion) but rather upon what we think the company is going to do. The course of the stock market will determine, to a great degree, when we will be right, but the accuracy of our analysis of the company will largely determine whether we will be right. In other words, we tend to concentrate on what should happen, not when it should happen.
当 然这条原则会被人批评是模糊、复杂、含混、不清楚。但是，我认为大多数合伙人都非常理解这一原则。我们不根据其他人所认为的股票市场将如何表现（我从来对 此没有意见）而买入和卖出。我们根据我们认为公司将如何表现而买入和卖出。股票市场的进程将很大程度上决定我们何时会正确。而我们对公司分析的精确程度将 主要决定我们是否正确。换句话说，我们倾向于集中精力分析什么能发生，而不是何时能发生。 （1966年上半年给合伙人的信） I resurrect this "market-guessing" section only because after the Dow declined from 995 at the peak in February to about 865 in May, I received a few calls from partners suggesting that they thought stocks were going a lot lower. This always raises two questions in my mind: (1) if they knew in February that the Dow was going to 865 in May, why didn't they let me in on it then; and, (2)if they didn't know what was going to happen during the ensuing three months back in February, how do they know in May? There is also a voice or two after any hundred point or so decline suggesting we sell and wait until the future is clearer. Let me again suggest two points: (1) the future has never been clear to me (give us a call when the next few months are obvious to you – or, for that matter the next few hours); and, (2) no one ever seems to call after the market has gone up one hundred points to focus my attention on how unclear everything is, even though the view back in February doesn't look so clear in retrospect. 我把“猜测市场”这部分又重新提出来是因为道指从2月份995点的高峰跌到5月的865点，之后我接到了几个合伙人的电话，认为股票还将继续下跌很多。这总会在我脑海里引发两个问题：（1）如果他们在2月份知道，道指将在5月份跌到865点，为什么当时他们不阻止我投资。而且（2）如果他们不知道2月份之后接下来的三个月将发生什么，他们怎么知道5月之后将发生什么？也有几个人在道指大跌百点后建议我们卖出，等待未来更加清晰后再行动。让我再次建议两点：（1）对我来说，未来从没有清晰过（如果未来几个月对你非常显而易见，给我们打个电话，在接下来的几个小时就打）（2）在市场上涨百点后没人给我打电话，让我注意任何事情都是不清晰的，即使回过头来看2月份的情形其实并不清晰。 （1966年上半年给合伙人的信） 十年总结 从10万到5千万，巴菲特的第一个10年是幸运的。他的投资哲学得到了实践，个人财富也大大增长，成为了一个有经验的成功投资人。但是，随着规模的扩大，投资变得越来越难，好的投资想法则越来越少。即便如此，巴菲特还是坚守自己的原则，不随波逐流。 The results of the first ten years have absolutely no chance of being duplicated or even remotely approximated during the next decade. They may well be achieved by some hungry twenty-five year old working with $105,100 initial partnership capital and operating during a ten year business and market environment which is frequently conducive to successful implementation of his investment philosophy. 第一个10年的结果，在下一个10年绝对无法复制，甚至连接近都不可能。这些结果完全有可能由一个25岁，充满渴望，却只有10万5千100美元初始资金的年轻人取得。而且还得有10年常常是有助于成功实施他的投资哲学的商业和市场环境。
They will not be achieved by a better fed thirty-six year old working with our $54,065,345 current partnership capital who presently finds perhaps one-fifth to one-tenth as many really good ideas as previously to implement his investment philosophy.
这些成绩无法由一个相对富足的36岁的人取得。他运营着5千4百万美元的合伙人资金，与以前相比，却可能只有五分之一到十分之一的好想法去实施他的投资哲学。
Buffett Associates. Ltd. (predecessor to Buffett Partnership. Ltd.) was founded on the west banks of the Missouri. May 5. 1956 by a hardy little band consisting of four family members, three close friends and $105,100. (I tried to find some brilliant flash of insight regarding our future or present conditions from my first page and a half annual letter of January, 1957 to insert as a quote here. However, someone evidently doctored my file copy so as to remove the perceptive remarks I must have made.)
巴菲特联合有限公司（巴菲特合伙有限公司的前身）于1956年5月5日，在密苏里河西岸成立，主要由四个家庭成员，三个亲密的朋友组成，外加10万5千100美元。（我曾经想从写于1957年1月的第一份年度信中，找到揭示我们目前或者未来的光辉的闪光点而引用到这。但是，显然有人对我的文件作了手脚，抽走了我当时所做的洞悉未来的评论。）
At that time, and for some years subsequently, there were substantial numbers of securities selling at well below the "value to a private owner" criterion we utilized for selection of general market investments. We also experienced a flow of “workout” opportunities where the percentages were very much to our liking. The problem was always which, not what. Accordingly, we were able to own fifteen to twenty-five issues and be enthusiastic about the probabilities inherent in all holdings.
那时，以及后面的几年里，有相当多股票的价格都远低于我们所用的“私人拥有的价值”衡量的投资标准。在“Workout”类别的投资机会中有很多的百分比都是我们喜欢的。对于我们来说，问题总是选哪一个，而不是选什么。所以，我们能够拥有15到25个投资，对所有机会的内在可能性充满热情。
In the last few years this situation has changed dramatically. We now find very few securities that are understandable to me, available in decent size, and which offer the expectation of investment performance meeting our yardstick of ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. In the last three years we have come up with only two or three new ideas a year that have had such an expectancy of superior performance. Fortunately, in some cases, we have made the most of them. However, in earlier years, a lesser effort produced literally dozens of comparable opportunities. It is difficult to be objective about the causes for such diminution of one's own productivity. Three factors that seem apparent are: (1) a somewhat changed market environment; (2) our increased size; and (3)substantially more competition.
在过去几年，这种情况发生了重大改变。我们现在发现只有很少的股票我能理解，而且规模足够大，能提供满足我们的投资业绩预期，即每年增长高于道指10个百分点。在过去3年里，我们每年只找到了2-3个符合这样出色业绩预期的新的投资想法。幸运的是，在一些情况下，我们充分利用了大部分这些机会。但是，在早些年，很少的努力就能产生几十个类似的投资机会。在探讨一个人自己的生产效率下降的原因时，很难做到客观。有三个因素可能是明显的：（1）市场环境有了相当的改变；（2）我们的规模增加了；（3）大幅度增加的竞争。
It is obvious that a business based upon only a trickle of fine ideas has poorer prospects than one based upon a steady flow of such ideas. To date the trickle has provided as much financial nourishment as the flow. This is true because there is only so much one can digest(million dollar ideas are of no great benefit to thousand dollar bankaccounts - this was impressed on me in my early days) and because a limited number of ideas causes one to utilize those available more intensively. The latter factor has definitely been operative with us in recent years. However, a trickle has considerably more chance of drying up completely than a flow.
显然，一个只是基于涓涓细流式的好想法的生意，其前景比不上有着源源不断的稳定的好 想法的生意。到今天为止，这涓涓细流提供了与滚滚洪流一样的财务营养。这只是因为一个人的消化能力有限（百万美元的想法对只有一千美元的银行账户没什么益 处—这在早期我深有体会）而且正是因为想法有限，才会尽量充分利用这些现有的想法。在最近几年，我们一直在充分利用有限的投资想法。但是，涓涓细流与滚滚 洪流相比，有更大的可能完全枯竭。
These conditions will not cause me to attempt investment decisions outside my sphere of understanding (I don't go for the "If you can'tlick 'em, join 'em” philosophy - my own leaning is toward "If you can't join ‘em, lick 'em”). We will not go into businesses where technology which is away over my head is crucial to the investment decision. I know about as much about semi-conductors or integrated circuits as I do of the mating habits of the chrzaszcz.(That's a Polish May bug, students - if you have trouble pronouncing it, rhyme it with thrzaszcz.)
这些状况并不能让我尝试在我所理解的范围之外进行投资决策。（我的哲学不是“不能战胜他们，就加入他们”。我自己倾向于“不能加入他们，就战胜他们”。）我们不会投资科技对投资决策有决定性作用的业务，科技远远超出了我的理解。我对半导体或芯片的了解与我对chrzaszcz虫子的交配习惯的了解差不多。（这是一种波兰的虫子，发音是thrzaszcz。）
Furthermore, we will not follow the frequently prevalent approach of investing insecurities where an attempt to anticipate market action overrides business valuations. Such so-called "fashion" investing has frequently produced very substantial and quick profits in recent years (and currently as I write this in January). It represents an investment technique whose soundness I can neither affirm nor deny. It does not completely satisfy my intellect (or perhaps my prejudices), and most definitely does not fit my temperament. I will not invest my own money based upon such an approach hence, I will most certainly not do so with your money.
而且，我们不会追寻盛行的投资方式，那些方式意图预测市场而不是业务估值。那些所谓的“流行”投资方式在近些年经常取得了高额而快速的利润（在我写这封信的1月就是如此）。对这种投资方式的可靠性，我无法接受也无法否认。这种方法不能完全达到我的思考的标准（或者是我的偏见），而且绝对不适合我的禀性。所以，我不会用我自己的钱去进行此种投资。我当然也不会用你的钱去进行此种投资。
Finally, we will not seek out activity in investment operations, even if offering splendid profit expectations, where major human problems appear to have a substantial chance of developing.
最后，我们不会寻求投资于有很大可能会造成严重人类问题的机会，即使这些机会能提供无与伦比的利润预期。
What I do promise you, as partners, is that I will work hard to maintain the trickle of ideas and try to get the most out of it that is possible – but if it should dry up completely, you will be informed honestly and promptly so that we may all take alternative action.
我所能向你保证的是，作为合伙人，我将努力工作，保持投资想法的涓涓细流，并从中获得尽可能多的回报。但是，如果投资想法的涓涓细流一旦枯竭，你将及时得到通知，我们都将选择各自的其他出路。
（1966年给合伙人的信）
坚持集中投资
巴菲特式的集中投资，用短期波动换取长期业绩，但绝不冒资本金重大损失的风险。这是典型的符合凯利判据的投资方式。而1966年，凯利判据也正好诞生10年。
The sort of concentration we have in this category is bound to produce wide swings in short term performance – some, most certainly, unpleasant. There have already been some of these applicable to shorter time spans than I use in reporting to partners. This is one reason I think frequent reporting to be foolish and potentially misleading in a long term oriented business such as ours.
我们所进行的集中投资必然导致短期内大范围的业绩波动，这有时候肯定是令人不愉快的。在比我向合伙人汇报的时间段更短的时期里，已经有了一些大范围波动的情况。这就是为什么我认为在我们这种注重长期的生意里，频繁的汇报是愚蠢而且有可能是误导的。
Personally, within the limits expressed in last year's letter on diversification, I am willing to trade the pains (forget about the pleasures) of substantial short term variance in exchange for maximization of long term performance. However, I am not willing to incur risk of substantial permanent capital loss in seeking to better long term performance. To be perfectly clear - under our policy of concentration of holdings, partners should be completely prepared for periods of substantial underperformance (far more likely in sharply rising markets) to offset the occasional over performance such as we have experienced in 1965 and 1966, and as a price we pay for hoped-for good long term performance.
从个人来讲，在去年的信中所说的极限之内，我愿意用短期波动带来的痛苦（忘记快乐 吧）来换取长期的业绩。但是，我不会承担资本金重大永久损失的风险来换取更高的长期业绩。必须明确指出，在我们目前的集中重仓持有的策略下，为了我们所希 望的好的长期业绩，合伙人必须完全准备好迎接业绩严重不佳（在暴涨的牛市更有可能）的时期，虽然我们偶尔也会有像1965和1966年这样的好业绩。
All this talk about the long pull has caused one partner to observe that“even five minutes is a long time if one's head is being held underwater." This is the reason, of course, that we use borrowed money very sparingly in our operation. Average bank borrowings during 1966 were well under 10% of average net worth.
所有这些关于长期的说辞引起了一位合伙人的评论“如果一个人的头被按在水下，即使五分钟也是一段很长的时期。”这就是为什么我们很少借钱投资。在1966年，我们的平均银行贷款远低于平均净值的10%。
（1966年给合伙人的信）
一个投资者的成长——读巴菲特的信（6） Barrons
http://blog.caing.com/article/9761/
坚持原则拒绝投机
当投机盛行，而且获利颇丰的时候，对坚持价值投资原则的人是很大的考验。投机的迅速高额回报是极具诱惑的，而只有内心强大的投资者才能拒绝这种诱惑。
Last year I said:
“A few mutual funds and some private investment operations have compiled records vastly superior to the Dow and, in some cases, substantially superior to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Their investment techniques are usually very dissimilar to ours and not within my capabilities.”
去年我说过：
“有些共同基金和私人投资公司获得了大大超越道指的业绩，有些还大范围的超越了巴菲特合伙基金的业绩。他们的投资技术通常与我们的非常不同，这超越了我的能力范围。”
In 1967 this condition intensified. Many investment organizations performed substantially better than BPL, with gains ranging to over 100%. Because of these spectacular results, money, talent and energy are converging in a maximum effort for the achievement of large and quick stock market profits. It looks to me like greatly intensified speculation with concomitant risks - but many of the advocates insist otherwise.
在1967年，这种情况加剧了。很多投资机构大范围的超越了巴菲特合伙基金，有的收益超过100%。由于这些惊人的业绩，金钱、人才、精力都以最大的程度汇集到一起，来取得大量而迅速的股票市场收益。这在我看来更像是加剧的投机，同时伴随着风险。但很多这些投资方式的倡导者并不这么看。
My mentor, Ben Graham, used to say. “Speculation is neither illegal, immoral nor fattening (financially).” During the past year, it was possible to become fiscally flabby through a steady diet of speculative bonbons. We continue to eat oatmeal but if indigestion should set in generally, it is unrealistic to expect that we won’thave some discomfort.
我的导师，格雷厄姆曾经说。“投机不是非法的，不是不道德的，也不是（金钱上）增肥的。”在过去一年，通过连续吃投机的巧克力夹心可以在金钱上变胖。而我们继续吃燕麦片，但是如果大家整体都消化不良，希望我们不会感到不舒服也是不现实的。
（1967年给合伙人的信）
Essentially I am out of step with present conditions. On one point, however, I am clear. I will not abandon a previous approach whose logic I understand (although I find it difficult to apply) even though it may mean foregoing large and apparently easy, profits to embrace an approach which I don’t fully understand, have not practiced successfully and which, possibly, could lead to substantial permanent loss of capital.
我基本上是跟不上目前的形势了。但是，我非常清楚一点。即使放弃大量而明显的容易挣的利润，我也不会放弃我以前的方法，因为我理解这种方法的逻辑（虽然我发现这种方法难以应用）。我不会接受一种我不完全理解，没有成功实践的方法，因为这有可能导致资本的重大永久损失。
（1967年给合伙人的信）
定性与定量
证券分析与决策总是结合了定性与定量，定性赚大钱，定量赚稳钱，缺一不可。
The evaluation of securities and businesses for investment purposes has always involved a mixture of qualitative and quantitative factors. At the one extreme, the analyst exclusively oriented to qualitative factors would say. "Buy the right company (with the right prospects, inherent industry conditions, management, etc.) and the price will take care of itself.” On the other hand, the quantitative spokesman would say, “Buy at the right price and the company (and stock) will take care of itself.” As is so often the pleasant result in the securities world, money can be made with either approach. And, of course, any analyst combines the two to some extent – his classification in either school would depend on the relative weight he assigns to the various factors and not to his consideration of one group of factors to the exclusion of the other group. 为 了投资目的而对证券与业务进行的估值，向来混合了定性和定量的因素。在一个极端，完全偏向定性因素的分析者会说：“买好的公司（有好的前景，好的内在行业 状况，好的管理等），价格自己会上涨。”在另一个极端，定量分析一方会说：“买在合适的价位，公司（和股票）自己会努力。”在证券世界里，良好的业绩往往 证明，这两种方式都可以赚钱。当然，任何分析师在某种程度上都综合了这两种方式，他对这两种学派的划分要看他对不同因素所给予的权重，而不是只考虑一类因 素而拒绝其他一类因素。
Interestingly enough, although I consider myself to be primarily in the quantitative school (and as I write this no one has come back from recess - I may be the only one left in the class), the really sensational ideas I have had over the years have been heavily weighted toward the qualitative side where I have had a "high-probability insight". This is what causes the cash register to really sing. However, it is an infrequent occurrence, as insights usually are, and, of course, no insight is required on the quantitative side - the figures should hit you over the head with a baseball bat. So the really big money tends to be made by investors who are right on qualitative decisions but, at least in my opinion, the more sure money tends to be made on the obvious quantitative decisions.
有趣的是，虽然我自认为主要是定量这一学派的（在我写这封信的时候，大家都还没从休 假回来，我可能是这一派唯一剩下的一个人），但是在过去这么多年，那些真正绝妙的投资想法都严重倾向于定性一端，对那些想法我有着“高概率的深刻见解”。 这才是赚钱的真正原因。但是，这种机会并不常见。因为洞察、深入见解通常并不是定量分析所必须的。数字是直来直去的，就像你的头被棒球棒击中一样。所以， 至少在我看，真正的大钱是靠投资者在定性分析上决策正确而赚的，而可靠而稳定的赚钱则要靠明显而直接的定量决策。
Such statistical bargains have tended to disappear over the years. This may be due to the constant combing and recombing of investments that has occurred during the past twenty years, without an economic convulsion such as that of the ‘30s to create a negative bias toward equities and spawn hundreds of new bargain securities. It maybe due to the new growing social acceptance, and therefore usage (or maybe it's vice versa - I'll let the behaviorists figure it out) of takeover bids which have a natural tendency to focus on bargain issues. It may be due to the exploding ranks of security analysts bringing forth an intensified scrutiny of issues far beyond what existed some years ago. Whatever the cause, the result has been the virtual disappearance of the bargain issue as determined quantitatively - and thereby of our bread and butter. There still maybe a few from time to time. There will also be the occasional security where I am really competent to make an important qualitative judgment. This will offer our best chance for large profits. Such instances will. however, be rare. Much of our good performance duringthe past three years has been due to a single idea of this sort.
这些便宜的机会在过去一些年逐渐消失。这可能是由于在过去20年里，投资公司不断合并，而且又缺乏像30年 代那样的大的经济震荡来产生对股票的负面偏见，因此无法大量产生成百的便宜股票。这也可能是因为社会的容忍度逐渐增加，所以收购兼并的使用逐渐增加（也可 能是反过来，收购兼并增加而导致社会越来越容忍，让行为学者想明白吧。）这些收购兼并自然集中在便宜的投资机会上。这还可能是由于证券分析师数量的暴增， 对证券的仔细深入研究程度远超过多年前的水平。无论原因是什么，结果是通过量化分析就能判断是便宜的股票几乎消失了，而这是我们投资的基本生计。偶尔，也 会有几个便宜的机会。有时候，有的股票我确实有能力做出重要的定性判断。这将带来巨额盈利的最好机会。但是，这些情况都非常少见。我们过去三年的好业绩很 大一部分都是由于一个这种好的投资想法。
（1967年给合伙人的信）
投资与生活的平衡
投资并不是生活的全部，人需要平衡，巴菲特也不例外。放弃追求最大化，也给自己留出了空间。
Elementary self-analysis tells me that I will not be capable of less than all-out effort to achieve a publicly proclaimed goal to people who have entrusted their capital to me. All-out effort makes progressively less sense. I would like to have an economic goal which allows for considerable non-economic activity. This may mean activity outside the field of investments or it simply may mean pursuing lines within the investment field that do not promise the greatest economic reward. An example of the latter might be the continued investment in a satisfactory (but far from spectacular) controlled business where I liked the people and the nature of the business even though alternative investments offered an expectable higher rate of return. More money would be made buying businesses at attractive prices, then reselling them. However, it may be more enjoyable (particularly when the personal value of incremental capital is less) to continue to own them and hopefully improve their performance, usually in a minor way, through some decisions involving financial strategy.
基本的自我分析告诉我，我无法不全身心投入去实现一个对大家公开宣称的目标，这些人 们把资本托付了给我。但全身心投入的方式越来越不明智了。我希望设立一个容许相当多的非经济活动的经济目标。这有可能意味着投资领域以外的活动，或者只意 味着追寻不具有最大经济回报的投资。后一个的例子，比如持续投资于一个令人满意（但远不是绝妙）的控股业务。即使有其他投资机会能提供预期更高的回报率， 我也会投资于这样的生意，因为我喜欢管理者和生意本身。在好的价位买入业务，然后卖掉能挣更多的钱。但是，持续拥有生意，并通过财务决策有希望稍微改善它 们的业绩，这更有乐趣（尤其当个人不必持续投入精力时）。
Thus, I am likely to limit myself to things which are reasonably easy, safe, profitable and pleasant. This will not make our operation more conservative than in the past since I believe, undoubtedly with some bias, that we have always operated with considerable conservatism. The long-term downside risk will not be less; the upside potential will merely be less.
所以，我将会把我的工作限于比较容易、安全、盈利，而且愉快的业务。这不会让我们的运营比过去更加保守。因为我坚信（毫无疑问这有些我自己的偏见）我们一直以相当保守的方式运营。长期的下行风险不会更少，而向上的潜力将更少。
（1967年给合伙人的信）
一个实业家的诞生——读巴菲特的信（8） Barrons
从投资到实业的转型
从70年代中期开始，巴菲特已经不仅是单纯的股票投资，他开始更多的从企业拥有者的角度思考问题，进行决策。从某种意义上讲，巴菲特更像一个精于投资的实业家。
在早期，巴菲特更注重买入价格和足够的安全边际。而到了这个阶段，他看重的因素是企业的经济前景，管理层，以及购买价格。前面两点在巴菲特早期的投资决策中并没有得到太多的体现。但是，他的投资方式仍然没有变，仍然是对确信度非常高的企业重仓集中投资。
Our equity investments are heavily concentrated in a few companies which are selected based on favorable economic characteristics, competent and honest management, and a purchase price attractive when measured against the yardstick of value to a private owner.
我们的股票投资重仓集中在少数几个公司。我们选择这些公司是基于有利的经济特征，有能力而且诚实的管理层，以及用私人拥有价值衡量有吸引力的购买价格。
When such criteria are maintained, our intention is to hold for a long time; indeed, our largest equity investment is 467,150 shares of Washington Post “B” stock with a cost of $10.6 million, which we expect to hold permanently.
当这些条件都满足时，我们有意长期持有。实际上，我们最大的股票投资是46万7千1百5十股华盛顿邮报的“B”股，成本为1千万美元。我们打算永远持有。
With this approach, stock market fluctuations are of little importance to us — except as they may provide buying opportunities — but business performance is of major importance. On this score we have been delighted with progress made by practically all of the companies in which we now have significant investments. 采用这种方式，股票市场的波动对我们毫无意义，只不过有时能提供买入的机会，但是业务表现对我们极为重要。在这方面，我们对所有我们有重大投资的企业的进展感到高兴。 （1975年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
You will notice that our major equity holdings are relatively few. We select such investments on a long-term basis weighing the same factors as would be involved in the purchase of 100% of an operating business: (1) favorable long-term economic characteristics; (2)competent and honest management; (3) purchase price attractive when measured against the yardstick of value to a private owner; and (4)an industry with which we are familiar and whose long-term business characteristics we feel competent to judge. It is difficult to find investments meeting such a test, and that is one reason for our concentration of holdings. We simply can't find one hundred different securities that conform to our investment requirements. However, we feel quite comfortable concentrating our holdings in the much smaller number that we do identify as attractive.
你会注意到我们的主要股票投资个数较少。我们选择这些投资是基于长期的考虑，按照我们购买100%的业务的情况权衡了各种因素：（1）有利的长期经济特征。（2）有能力而且诚实的管理层。（3）用私人拥有价值衡量有吸引力的购买价格。（4）我们熟悉的行业，而且我们有能力判断其长期业务特征。但是很难找到符合条件的投资，这也是为什么我们集中持股的一个原因。我们根本无法找到100个不同的股票，而且都能满足我们的投资要求。但是，我们对集中投资在如此之少的几个股票感到非常舒服自在，因为这几个股票我们确认是有吸引力的。
（1975年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
We are not concerned with whether the market quickly revalues upward securities that we believe are selling at bargain prices. In fact, we prefer just the opposite since, in most years, we expect to have funds available to be a net buyer of securities. And consistent attractive purchasing is likely to prove to be of more eventual benefit to us than any selling opportunities provided by a short-term run up in stock prices to levels at which we are unwilling to continue buying. 我 们不担心市场能否迅速向上重估我们坚信卖便宜了的股票。实际上，我们希望的正好相反，因为在大多数年份里，我们预期将获得资金，成为股票的净买入者。持续 以诱人的价格购买，这对我们最终的益处多于任何短期股价上涨所带来的卖出机会的好处。因为如果股票上涨到一定程度，我们就不愿继续买入。 Our policy is to concentrate holdings. We try to avoid buying a little of this or that when we are only lukewarm about the business or its price. When we are convinced as to attractiveness, we believe in buying worthwhile amounts. 我们的策略是集中持股。我们避免对业务或价格只是半信半疑，却这买一点儿，那买一点儿。当我们确信一个投资是有吸引力的，我们坚信，要买就要重仓买入。
（1978年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
衡量公司业绩的标准
巴菲特在衡量公司业绩时，更多的是从一个长期拥有者的角度考虑，注重ROE，注重长期。
Most companies define “record” earnings as a new high in earnings per share. Since businesses customarily add from year to year to their equity base, we find nothing particularly noteworthy in a management performance combining, say, a 10% increase in equity capital and a 5% increase in earnings per share. After all, even a totally dormant savings account will produce steadily rising interest earnings each year because of compounding.
很多公司把“创纪录”的盈利定义为每股盈利创新高。由于企业通常年复一年的增加资本基数，我们觉得如果一个管理层的业绩包括了如10%的资本增加和5%的每股盈利增加，那么这没什么值得注意的。毕竟一个完全不动的存款帐户，由于复利的作用，每年还能产生稳定的利息收入增长。
Except for special cases (for example, companies with unusual debt-equity ratios or those with important assets carried at unrealistic balance sheet values), we believe a more appropriate measure of managerial economic performance to be return on equity capital.
除了特殊的情况（如有异常的债务/资本比例，或者有重要的资产以不现实的价值体现在资产负债表上），我们相信权益资本回报率是衡量管理层业绩表现的更合适指标。
（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
“Earnings per share” will rise constantly on a dormant savings account or on a U.S. Savings Bond bearing a fixed rate of return simply because “earnings” (the stated interest rate) are continuously plowed back and added to the capital base. Thus, even a “stopped clock” can look like a growth stock if the dividend payout ratio is low. “每股盈利”将持续稳定增长，即使是一个完全不动的存款帐户，或者固定利率的美国储蓄债券也是如此。因为“盈利”（标称利率）将持续加回到本金中。所以，如果分红率足够低，一个“不走的钟表”也能看起来像一个成长股。 The primary test of managerial economic performance is the achievement of a high earnings rate on equity capital employed (without undue leverage, accounting gimmickry, etc.) and not the achievement of consistent gains in earnings per share. In our view, many businesses would be better understood by their shareholder owners, as well as the general public, if managements and financial analysts modified the primary emphasis they place upon earnings per share, and upon yearly changes in that figure. 衡 量管理层经济业绩的最主要测试就是达到在使用的权益资本之上获得高的回报率（但没有过度的杠杆，会计花招等。），而不是获得每股盈利的持续稳定增长。在我 们看来，如果管理层和金融分析师能改变对每股盈利及每股盈利年度变化的重视，很多业务能被股东拥有者以及公众更好的理解。
（1979年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
In measuring long term economic performance - in contrast to yearly performance - we believe it is appropriate to recognize fully any realized capital gains or losses as well as extraordinary items, and also to utilize financial statements presenting equity securities at market value. Such capital gains or losses, either realized or unrealized, are fully as important to shareholders over a period of years as earnings realized in a more routine manner through operations; it is just that their impact is often extremely capricious in the short run, a characteristic that makes them inappropriate as an indicator of single year managerial performance. 在衡量长期经济表现时，与年度业绩不同，我们相信把所有实现的资本增值/损失，以及特殊项目进行确认，并且用目前的市场价值体现财务报表中股票的价值是合适的。这些资本增值/损失，无论实现的还是未实现的，与日常运营中实现的盈利一样，在多年的时间里，对股东都具有同样重要的价值。只不过在短期内，这些资本增值/损失的影响极为多变，这让它们不适合作为某一年管理层业绩的指标。
（1979年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
As we have noted, we evaluate single-year corporate performance by comparing operating earnings to shareholders’ equity with securities valued at cost. Our long-term yardstick of performance, however, includes all capital gains or losses, realized or unrealized. We continue to achieve a long-term return on equity that considerably exceeds the average of our yearly returns. The major factor causing this pleasant result is a simple one: the retained earnings of those non-controlled holdings we discussed earlier have been translated into gains in market value. 正如我们提到的，我们衡量某一年的企业业绩是用运营利润比上按成本估值的股东权益。但是我们长期的业绩衡量指标包括了所有的资本增值/损失，无论是实现的还是未实现的。我们不断取得显著超过年度平均回报的长期资本回报率。造成这个良好结果的主要的因素在于一个简单的事实：我们前面所讨论的非控股公司的存留收益已经转化为市场价值的增长。 Of course, this translation of retained earnings into market price appreciation is highly uneven (it goes in reverse some years), unpredictable as to timing, and unlikely to materialize on a precise dollar-for-dollar basis. And a silly purchase price for a block of stock in a corporation can negate the effects of a decade of earnings retention by that corporation. But when purchase prices are sensible, some long-term market recognition of the accumulation of retained earnings almost certainly will occur. Periodically you even will receive some frosting on the cake, with market appreciation far exceeding post-purchase retained earnings. 当然，这种将存留收益转化为市场价格上涨的过程是高度不平均的（有时候方向甚至是相反的），在时间上无法预测，无法精确按照一美元兑一美元来实现。而且一个荒谬的股票购买价格能抵消企业10年的存留收益的效果。但是，当购买价格合理时，对存留收益积累的一定程度的长期市场确认几乎肯定会发生。
（1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
买股票如同买整个业务
“买股票如同买整个业务”，这是巴菲特重要的投资哲学，也体现了他从一个纯粹的股票投资者向实业家，企业拥有者的转变。
Most of our large stock positions are going to be held for many years and the scorecard on our investment decisions will be provided by business results over that period, and not by prices on any given day. Just as it would be foolish to focus unduly on short-term prospects when acquiring an entire company, we think it equally unsound to become mesmerized by prospective near term earnings or recent trends in earnings when purchasing small pieces of a company;i.e., marketable common stocks.
我们将长期持有大多数的重大股票投资。因此衡量我们投资决策的记分卡将会是那段时期 的业务表现，而不是任何一天的股价。这就如同并购一整个公司时过分关注短期前景是愚蠢的。同样，我们认为在购买一个公司的一小部分时（即购买股票时），痴 迷于近期盈利前景或者最近的盈利趋势，这也是不明智的。
（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
We select our marketable equity securities in much the same way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be (1) one that we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) available at a very attractive price. We ordinarily make no attempt to buy equities for anticipated favorable stock price behavior in the short term. In fact, if their business experience continues to satisfy us, we welcome lower market prices of stocks we own as an opportunity to acquire even more of a good thing at a better price.
当选择购买股票时，我们用非常类似于评估并购整个业务的方法来进行。我们想要的业务是（1）我们能懂的。（2）有利的长期前景。（3）由诚实而且有能力的人运营。（4）可以用非常诱人的价格获得。我们一般不因为预期的短期股价的良好表现而购买股票。实际上，如果公司的业务持续让我们满意，对拥有的股票，我们欢迎更低的市场价格，我们把这看成是用更好的价格购买更多的好东西。
Our experience has been that pro-rata portions of truly outstanding businesses sometimes sell in the securities markets at very large discounts from the prices they would command in negotiated transactions involving entire companies. Consequently, bargains in business ownership, which simply are not available directly through corporate acquisition, can be obtained indirectly through stock ownership. When prices are appropriate, we are willing to take very large positions in selected companies, not with any intention of taking control and not foreseeing sell-out or merger, but with the expectation that excellent business results by corporations will translate over the long term into correspondingly excellent market value and dividend results for owners, minority as well as majority.
我们的经验表明，相对于谈判并购整个公司的交易价格，真正优秀的业务的一部分有时会 在股票市场有很大的折价。因此，在拥有实业方面，便宜货在企业并购中根本不能直接获得，但却可以通过股票所有权间接获得。当价格合适的时候，我们愿意买入 精心挑选的一些公司很多的股份。我们无意控制公司，或者寻求整体出售及合并。但是我们预期公司优异的业绩将在长期转化为给拥有者的出色的市场价值和股息， 无论拥有者是少数股东还是大股东。
（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
Whatever the appellation, we are delighted with our GEICO holding which, as noted, cost us $47 million. To buy a similar $20 million of earning power in a business with first-class economic characteristics and bright prospects would cost a minimum of $200 million (much more in some industries) if it had to be accomplished through negotiated purchase of an entire company.
无论怎么说，我们都对GEICO的持股感到满意。这耗费了我们4千7百万美元。但如果谈判并购整个公司，要买一个类似的有2千万美元盈利能力的第一流经济特征和光明前景的企业，至少要耗资2亿美金（在某些行业要多得多）。
（1980年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
Since See’s was purchased by Blue Chip Stamps at the beginning of 1972, pre-tax operating earnings have grown from $4.2 million to $12.6 million with little additional capital investment. See’s achieved this record while operating in an industry experiencing practically no unit growth.
喜诗巧克力公司是由Blue Chip Stamps公司在1972年初购买的。其税前运营利润从4百二十万美元增长到了1千2百6十万美元，而仅有非常少的额外资本投入。喜诗巧克力在一个正在经历着毫无数量增长的行业取得了如此的业绩。
（1977年给伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东的信）
