似曾相識的一篇報導-國際資源(1051)

前幾日，看到壹仔的一篇報導，好像很眼熟:

http://realblog.zkiz.com/greatsoup38/10876

不少人對柯清輝肯放下身段，願意投身這炒股覺得十分離奇，但有行內人認為柯此舉屬還人情債，「柯清輝响國際資源年薪先得七十萬，簡直濕濕碎，佢咁做並非為錢，而係幕後有玩家想借佢名氣，營造公司好有規模，實際想趁高位散貨。」其實柯清輝過往與三四線的上市公司主席相當熟落，尤以渝港國際老闆張松橋為甚；

http://realblog.zkiz.com/greatsoup/9865

柯大班入局最後亦隻是民豐的楊主席、威利的王先生那樣的角色吧。

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而七月底有抽水大王之稱的官永義被控串謀勒索案，柯清輝更出錢出力替官永義作人事擔保。

http://realblog.zkiz.com/greatsoup/10553

【本報訊】上市公司永義國際(1218)前主席官永義涉嫌與3人串謀勒索案，昨在東區法院再次提堂，原不獲保釋的官永義，提出由恒生銀行前副董事長兼行政總裁柯清輝和立法會議員林大輝各以現金50萬元作人事擔保，並加上他的500萬元保釋金，4名被告最終同獲準保釋。

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除此以外，現任國源主席的趙渡，在行內可謂聲名狼藉，以前出任寶福及和成國際主席時，曾多次被質疑損害股東利益；○四年更被入稟申請破產訴訟，最終破產令於去年撤銷。

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○二年趙渡成功從九倉手上買入寶福，全靠劉夢熊穿針引線；而劉在○一年亦替九倉找來張松橋買入港通，可見他們三人關係密切。今次劉夢熊再找趙渡埋班，有知情人士表示，背後很可能有人幕後發功，「外邊盛傳趙渡背後仲有老闆。」

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http://realblog.zkiz.com/greatsoup/9865


還有甚麼人和他有關係，亦可以看看這段文章。
http://realblog.zkiz.com/viewpage.php?tid=1849

數最成功的買賣，劉夢熊稱：「於2000年及2001年，替九倉出售兩家公司，一間是寶福集團（股票編號：21），當時市值有六億多，我替買家策劃用2億多元買殼，九龍倉不單可以精簡機構、減低債務，更賺了個殼價；而我的買家用二億多元，就可以掌控一間六億元的公司，實現以小控大；另外，在2001年3月，我替客人以6億多元，收購價值擁有20多億元資產之九龍倉旗下的港通控股（股票編號：32）。」(greatsoup: 該名大股東就是中渝置地(1224，前名確利達)、渝太地產(75，前稱彩星地產，彩星集團)的張先生了。


張先生資料如下述:


http://realblog.zkiz.com/greatsoup38/6156


 


林 孝文本是外科醫生，太太莊月華是李澤楷的姨母，九九年林孝文把太太經營的紙品包裝業務確利達上市，後來因炒燶股而陷入財困。他與中南證券的老闆莊友衡及莊 友堅曾是生意拍檔，而今次莊友衡也有買入一萬股電盈股份。後來，有重慶李嘉誠之稱的張松橋入主確利達，並改名為中渝置地，林孝文淪為張松橋的「馬仔」，擔 任中渝置地副主席。

 

 


 


據知，張松橋透過大福證券亦有炒賣電盈股份，而他與大劉、陳國強等分屬「老友」。有李嘉誠馬仔之稱的陳國強則以其上市公司德祥旗下四間公司，成為電盈的一手股東。這幫人等於同期登記成為電盈股東，而人脈關係又千絲萬縷，令事件更加吊詭。

 

 

 


 可能我只是一時眼花吧。

 

一切似曾相識—–有關蕭條的讀書筆記

http://barrons.blog.caixin.com/archives/45779

在此我推薦Murray Rothbard的《美國大蕭條》（America's GreatDepression)與《經濟蕭條：成因與治癒》(Economic Depressions: Their Cause andCure)。閱讀歷史，傾聽分析，讓人清醒。因為歷史不相信「這次真的不一樣」。

西部的「鬼城」，鐵路的大躍進，城市化促進發展，出口帶動經濟，資本資產及房地產強勁上漲而消費品價格相對穩定。高儲蓄率與高投資加速經濟的發展。在這些一切的背後是銀行信用的大規模擴張，貧富差距加大，腐敗盛行。這是美國發展早期，尤其是1920年代的狀況。

美國在1920年代經濟持續繁榮，處於著名的「RoaringTwenties」時期。而在繁榮的背後，是美國信貸的大規模擴張。從1921年到1929年，美國的M2增加了46%，由於同期流通的貨幣量保持穩定，所以增加的大部分是信用。美國1920年代信貸擴張的一個重要原因是出口導向，支持農產品的出口及農業的就業。胡佛積極支持補貼對外國的貸款，認為即使這些貸款變成壞帳也能幫助美國的出口，是一種廉價的穩定就業的方式。在此時期，美國大量購買外國政府債券，尤其是德國地方政府債券。另一方面，美國實行貿易保護主義，高進口關稅阻礙進口，對外貸款支持出口，造成大量順差。由於美國存在巨額貿易順差，在金本位下黃金大量流入。為了防止黃金大量從國外流入而削弱國外對美國商品的購買能力，美國大量借貸給外國，以支持他們購買自己出口的農產品。美國還與英國協調，用自己本國的通脹來支持英國恢復金本位。

由於大量廉價的信用，極大的促進了美國的經濟發展。從1920年到1929年，美國的真實GNP平均每年增長4.2%，真實人均GNP平均每年增長2.7%，汽車大量普及，軌道交通大發展，城鎮化快速發展，人們的生活水平快速提高。與此同時，美國的物價保持了穩定，CPI的變化一直不大。在此期間，美國經歷了強勁的經濟增長。

但是，大規模的信貸擴張帶來長時間的大繁榮之後，便是可怕的大蕭條。

美國大蕭條對美國，乃至世界的影響巨大，至今仍然讓人膽寒。而歷史上基於對經濟蕭條的分析而產生的理論與決策，無論對錯，都曾經影響了幾十億人的命運。《經濟蕭條：成因與治癒》一文，則回顧了經濟學家，尤其是奧地利學派對蕭條的分析及解決方案。

馬克思是研究經濟週期的先驅。他的很多理論就建立在他對經濟週期，尤其是蕭條的分析之上。馬克思很早就觀察到了經濟週期的現象。他發現在工業革命之前，除了外部因素的衝擊，並沒有反覆出現的有規律的經濟繁榮與蕭條。由於這些經濟週期的現象出現在進入現代工業社會之後，馬克思認為這種經濟週期是資本主義市場經濟內在固有的。他認為資本主義定期發生的蕭條將會越來越嚴重，最終導致資本主義的滅亡，從而進入生產資料公有制及計劃經濟的社會。他對蕭條的分析，以及提出的解決辦法，影響了世界。

與馬克思的觀點不同，奧地利學派不認為經濟週期是市場經濟固有的。如果把一個完整的研究分為提出問題，分析問題，解決問題三個部分，那麼提出問題是最重要的一個開始。對於經濟蕭條，奧地利學派提出了三個問題：

1.為什麼從繁榮到蕭條的經濟週期反覆出現？

2.在經濟蕭條時，為什麼幾乎所有的企業家都同時作出了錯誤的判斷？

3.為什麼在繁榮和蕭條時期，生產者貨物的波動遠遠大於消費品？

奧地利學派對經濟週期的理論始於蘇格蘭哲學家大衛·休謨(DavidHume)和英格蘭經濟學家大衛·李嘉圖(DavidRicardo)。他們發現，在18世紀中期，與工業系統同時出現的，還有一個重要的機構，那就是銀行。他們認為商業銀行由於具有信用擴張和增加貨幣供給的能力，因此在反覆出現的經濟週期中具有至關重要的作用。

李嘉圖對經濟週期的分析認為，在金銀本位的制度下，銀行可以超過所擁有的金銀數量來擴張信用。信用擴張的越多，銀行的利潤越高。信用擴張帶來貨幣供應增加，造成物價上漲，帶來繁榮。但是，當人們用新增的貨幣去購買國外的產品時，黃金或白銀就隨之流出國境，造成這個國家作為貨幣基礎的金銀數量萎縮。由於銀行有義務兌現貨幣所代表的金銀，為了避免擠兌，他們在這種情況下不得不收縮信用。由於信用收縮，蕭條隨之而來。但信用收縮讓價格下跌，促進出口，讓金銀重新回流。這樣以來，銀行用來信用擴張的金銀基礎重新增加，銀行又可以開始下一輪信用擴張。這樣週而復始，造成了經濟週期。

但是，這種最初的分析並不能解釋奧地利學派所提出的第二個和第三個問題。在一個市場經濟裡，企業家的工作就是預測並應對未來。市場經濟的優勝劣汰，讓富有遠見，能夠準確預見未來的企業家發展壯大，而讓無法預見到未來變化的企業家被迫退出競爭。為什麼在這樣的機制下，大量的企業家仍然無法預測反覆出現的週期，同時做出了錯誤的判斷？為什麼在繁榮與蕭條時資本貨物與消費貨物的波動相差如此之大？

基於李嘉圖的理論，奧地利學派的經濟學家米塞斯（Ludwig vonMises）提出了他的經濟週期理論。他認為如果沒有銀行的信用擴張，就不會有經濟的週期起伏。政府通過中央銀行，刺激銀行信用擴張，增加貨幣，推高價格，造成通脹。但是，更險惡的是，大量的信用傾瀉到經濟體中，人為壓低了利率，使利率低於自然的自由市場利率水平。在自由市場中，利率是由人們的時間偏好決定的。「一鳥在手勝過雙鳥在林。」由於人們偏好當前勝過未來，今天拿走現金卻在未來償還的貸款就必須支付利息。但是，如果利率被人為壓低，麻煩就來了。由於利率很低，生意人大量投資於資本資產和貨物，那些之前無法盈利的長期項目也變得有利可圖。資本資產，耐用設備，工業原材料方面的投資快速增加，超過了對消費品產出的投入。資本資產的投資具有自我實現的正反饋，與資本資產相關的價格不斷上漲，進一步推動投資。在這些行業的工作的人們也獲得更多報酬。企業家們被人為壓低的利率所迷惑，集體做出了錯誤的決定。

但是，當人們把多得到的錢花出去時，問題就來了。雖然政府可以人為壓低利率，卻無法改變人們的時間偏好，也就無法改變人們消費/儲蓄的比例。人們把增加的收入更多地投入消費，而不是進行儲蓄。這樣一來儲蓄不足，造成投資不足。沒有了更多的投資，企業也就無法購買那些新產出的機器設備、資本資產和工業原材料。突然間，人們發現產能過剩了，過去的很多投資實際上是不良投資。由於過剩，價格必須下降進行調節。但是，由於成本在信貸膨脹的繁榮時期已經變得過高，大規模的虧損就不可避免。但是，有人會問，人們收入的增長很快就會見效，為什麼信用膨脹帶來的繁榮能持續很久呢？這是因為信貸膨脹不是一次性的，而是不斷進行的。這就如同給賽馬不斷注射興奮劑。「藥不能停！」一旦信用膨脹停止，危機就來臨了。經濟必須進行痛苦的調整，為以前的錯誤付出代價。而在繁榮時期的大量不良投資則暴露無遺，必須進行清理。

蕭條令人不快但卻又是必須的。只有把那些在信用膨脹時期過剩的和扭曲的東西清除掉，經濟才能打下堅實的基礎，繁榮才能重新到來。

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我的幾點思考：

從控制論的角度看，在沒有外部輸入擾動的情況下，一個系統如果進入週期性的震盪，那麼這個系統很有可能存在正反饋。作為一個複雜系統，經濟體系的自組織有可能造成這種正反饋。在市場經濟條件下，優勝劣汰，用價格信號調節供需，這樣的經濟系統更像是有著自適應的負反饋調節，是穩定的。如果由於某種原因，讓系統產生了正反饋，那麼這個系統就會變得不穩定，產生巨幅震盪，甚至崩潰。這時候需要找到產生正反饋的原因，改變正反饋，讓系統重新回到負反饋的穩定狀態。從奧地利學派的分析看，人為壓低利率到低於自由市場利率似乎是開啟整個經濟系統正反饋的關鍵。低利率讓市場經濟參與者行為趨於一致，形成複雜系統的自組織，產生正反饋作用，讓系統發生震盪。在系統延時很長，正反饋作用強烈的子系統，比如需要長期投入大量資金的資本資產投資，震盪強烈。在系統延時不長，正反饋作用不那麼強烈，甚至仍然以負反饋為主的子系統，比如只需要短期投入較少資金的消費品生產，震盪相對較弱。對整個經濟系統來說，由於整個系統的巨大延時作用，系統整體震盪的週期較長，如幾年，甚至幾十年，在上升階段人們感覺不到正反饋的作用，而誤以為是經濟自然的增長與繁榮。當震盪的下降週期到來，正反饋讓下降的幅度非常劇烈，由於大多數市場經濟的參與者都只善於在自己的子系統內進行短週期調節，長週期的震盪讓所有人都措手不及。這就從控制論的角度回答了奧地利學派所提出的三個問題。

而如果重新設計一個系統，不參考反饋信號（如價格），完全靠人為的預測與計劃調節，這相當於一個開環系統。這樣的系統不會有反饋，也就不會有週期震盪。但是，開環系統只能用於非常簡單的控制，控制粗糙，無法自適應，對於複雜的系統，外界的擾動等完全無能為力。這樣的系統總會處於超調或不足狀態，遠遠比不上具有負反饋的系統。

附錄：

美國1920年代統計數據： http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab1901-1950.htm

Economic Depressions:Their Cause and Cure

by Murray N. Rothbard

We live in a world of euphemism. Undertakers havebecome "morticians," press agents are now "public relationscounsellors" and janitors have all been transformed into"superintendents." In every walk of life, plain facts have beenwrapped in cloudy camouflage.

No less has this been true of economics. In theold days, we used to suffer nearly periodic economic crises, thesudden onset of which was called a "panic," and the lingeringtrough period after the panic was called"depression."

The most famous depression in modern times, ofcourse, was the one that began in a typical financial panic in 1929and lasted until the advent of World War II. After the disaster of1929, economists and politicians resolved that this must neverhappen again. The easiest way of succeeding at this resolve was,simply to define "depressions" out of existence. From that pointon, America was to suffer no further depressions. For when the nextsharp depression came along, in 1937–38, the economists simplyrefused to use the dread name, and came up with a new, muchsofter-sounding word: "recession." From that point on, we have beenthrough quite a few recessions, but not a singledepression.

But pretty soon the word "recession" also becametoo harsh for the delicate sensibilities of the American public. Itnow seems that we had our last recession in 1957–58. For sincethen, we have only had "downturns," or, even better, "slowdowns,"or "sidewise movements." So be of good cheer; from now on,depressions and even recessions have been outlawed by the semanticfiat of economists; from now on, the worst that can possibly happento us are "slowdowns." Such are the wonders of the "NewEconomics."

For 30 years, our nation's economists haveadopted the view of the business cycle held by the late Britisheconomist, John Maynard Keynes, who created the Keynesian, or the"New," Economics in his book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, andMoney, published in 1936. Beneath their diagrams,mathematics, and inchoate jargon, the attitude of Keynesians towardbooms and bust is simplicity, even naïveté, itself. If there isinflation, then the cause is supposed to be "excessive spending" onthe part of the public; the alleged cure is for the government, theself-appointed stabilizer and regulator of the nation's economy, tostep in and force people to spend less, "sopping up their excesspurchasing power" through increased taxation. If there is arecession, on the other hand, this has been caused by insufficientprivate spending, and the cure now is for the government toincrease its own spending, preferably through deficits, therebyadding to the nation's aggregate spending stream.

The idea that increased government spending oreasy money is "good for business" and that budget cuts or hardermoney is "bad" permeates even the most conservative newspapers andmagazines. These journals will also take for granted that it is thesacred task of the federal government to steer the economic systemon the narrow road between the abysses of depression on the onehand and inflation on the other, for the free-market economy issupposed to be ever liable to succumb to one of theseevils.

All current schools of economists have the sameattitude. Note, for example, the viewpoint of Dr. Paul W.McCracken, the incoming chairman of President Nixon's Council ofEconomic Advisers. In an interview with the New YorkTimes shortly after taking office [January 24, 1969], Dr.McCracken asserted that one of the major economic problems facingthe new Administration is "how you cool down this inflationaryeconomy without at the same time tripping off unacceptably highlevels of unemployment. In other words, if the only thing we wantto do is cool off the inflation, it could be done. But our socialtolerances on unemployment are narrow." And again: "I think we haveto feel our way along here. We don't really have much experience intrying to cool an economy in orderly fashion. We slammed on thebrakes in 1957, but, of course, we got substantial slack in theeconomy."

Note the fundamental attitude of Dr. McCracken toward the economy –remarkable only in that it is shared by almost all economists ofthe present day. The economy is treated as a potentially workable,but always troublesome and recalcitrant patient, with a continualtendency to hive off into greater inflation or unemployment. Thefunction of the government is to be the wise old manager andphysician, ever watchful, ever tinkering to keep the economicpatient in good working order. In any case, here the economicpatient is clearly supposed to be the subject, and the governmentas "physician" the master.

It was not so long ago that this kind of attitudeand policy was called "socialism"; but we live in a world ofeuphemism, and now we call it by far less harsh labels, such as"moderation" or "enlightened free enterprise." We live andlearn.

What, then, are the causes of periodicdepressions? Must we always remain agnostic about the causes ofbooms and busts? Is it really true that business cycles are rooteddeep within the free-market economy, and that therefore some formof government planning is needed if we wish to keep the economywithin some kind of stable bounds? Do booms and then busts justsimply happen, or does one phase of the cycle flow logically fromthe other?

The currently fashionable attitude toward thebusiness cycle stems, actually, from Karl Marx. Marx saw that,before the Industrial Revolution in approximately the lateeighteenth century, there were no regularly recurring booms anddepressions. There would be a sudden economic crisis whenever someking made war or confiscated the property of his subject; but therewas no sign of the peculiarly modern phenomena of general andfairly regular swings in business fortunes, of expansions andcontractions. Since these cycles also appeared on the scene atabout the same time as modern industry, Marx concluded thatbusiness cycles were an inherent feature of the capitalist marketeconomy. All the various current schools of economic thought,regardless of their other differences and the different causes thatthey attribute to the cycle, agree on this vital point: That thesebusiness cycles originate somewhere deep within the free-marketeconomy. The market economy is to blame. Karl Marx believed thatthe periodic depressions would get worse and worse, until themasses would be moved to revolt and destroy the system, while themodern economists believe that the government can successfullystabilize depressions and the cycle. But all parties agree that thefault lies deep within the market economy and that if anything cansave the day, it must be some form of massive governmentintervention.

There are, however, some critical problems in theassumption that the market economy is the culprit. For "generaleconomic theory" teaches us that supply and demand always tend tobe in equilibrium in the market and that therefore prices ofproducts as well as of the factors that contribute to productionare always tending toward some equilibrium point. Even thoughchanges of data, which are always taking place, prevent equilibriumfrom ever being reached, there is nothing in the general theory ofthe market system that would account for regular and recurringboom-and-bust phases of the business cycle. Modern economists"solve" this problem by simply keeping their general price andmarket theory and their business cycle theory in separate,tightly-sealed compartments, with never the twain meeting, muchless integrated with each other. Economists, unfortunately, haveforgotten that there is only one economy and therefore only oneintegrated economic theory. Neither economic life nor the structureof theory can or should be in watertight compartments; ourknowledge of the economy is either one integrated whole or it isnothing. Yet most economists are content to apply totally separateand, indeed, mutually exclusive, theories for general priceanalysis and for business cycles. They cannot be genuine economicscientists so long as they are content to keep operating in thisprimitive way.

But there are still graver problems with thecurrently fashionable approach. Economists also do not see oneparticularly critical problem because they do not bother to squaretheir business cycle and general price theories: the peculiarbreakdown of the entrepreneurial function at times of economiccrisis and depression. In the market economy, one of the most vitalfunctions of the businessman is to be an "entrepreneur," a man whoinvests in productive methods, who buys equipment and hires laborto produce something which he is not sure will reap him any return.In short, the entrepreneurial function is the function offorecasting the uncertain future. Before embarking on anyinvestment or line of production, the entrepreneur, or"enterpriser," must estimate present and future costs and futurerevenues and therefore estimate whether and how much profits hewill earn from the investment. If he forecasts well andsignificantly better than his business competitors, he will reapprofits from his investment. The better his forecasting, the higherthe profits he will earn. If, on the other hand, he is a poorforecaster and overestimates the demand for his product, he willsuffer losses and pretty soon be forced out of thebusiness.

The market economy, then, is a profit-and-losseconomy, in which the acumen and ability of business entrepreneursis gauged by the profits and losses they reap. The market economy,moreover, contains a built-in mechanism, a kind of naturalselection, that ensures the survival and the flourishing of thesuperior forecaster and the weeding-out of the inferior ones. Forthe more profits reaped by the better forecasters, the greaterbecome their business responsibilities, and the more they will haveavailable to invest in the productive system. On the other hand, afew years of making losses will drive the poorer forecasters andentrepreneurs out of business altogether and push them into theranks of salaried employees.

If, then, the market economy has a built-in natural selectionmechanism for good entrepreneurs, this means that, generally, wewould expect not many business firms to be making losses. And, infact, if we look around at the economy on an average day or year,we will find that losses are not very widespread. But, in thatcase, the odd fact that needs explaining is this: How is it that,periodically, in times of the onset of recessions and especially insteep depressions, the business world suddenly experiences amassive cluster of severe losses? A moment arrives when businessfirms, previously highly astute entrepreneurs in their ability tomake profits and avoid losses, suddenly and dismayingly findthemselves, almost all of them, suffering severe and unaccountablelosses – How come? Here is a momentous fact that any theory ofdepressions must explain. An explanation such as "underconsumption"– a drop in total consumer spending – is not sufficient, for onething, because what needs to be explained is why businessmen, ableto forecast all manner of previous economic changes anddevelopments, proved themselves totally and catastrophically unableto forecast this alleged drop in consumer demand. Why this suddenfailure in forecasting ability?

An adequate theory of depressions, then, mustaccount for the tendency of the economy to move through successivebooms and busts, showing no sign of settling into any sort ofsmoothly moving, or quietly progressive, approximation of anequilibrium situation. In particular, a theory of depression mustaccount for the mammoth cluster of errors which appears swiftly andsuddenly at a moment of economic crisis, and lingers through thedepression period until recovery. And there is a third universalfact that a theory of the cycle must account for. Invariably, thebooms and busts are much more intense and severe in the "capitalgoods industries" – the industries making machines and equipment,the ones producing industrial raw materials or constructingindustrial plants – than in the industries making consumers' goods.Here is another fact of business cycle life that must be explained– and obviously can't be explained by such theories of depressionas the popular underconsumption doctrine: That consumers aren'tspending enough on consumer goods. For if insufficient spending isthe culprit, then how is it that retail sales are the last and theleast to fall in any depression, and thatdepression really hits such industries as machine tools,capital equipment, construction, and raw materials? Conversely, itis these industries that really take off in the inflationary boomphases of the business cycle, and not those businesses serving theconsumer. An adequate theory of the business cycle, then, must alsoexplain the far greater intensity of booms and busts in thenon-consumer goods, or "producers' goods,"industries.

Fortunately, a correct theory of depression andof the business cycle does exist, even though it isuniversally neglected in present-day economics. It, too, has a longtradition in economic thought. This theory began with theeighteenth century Scottish philosopher and economist David Hume,and with the eminent early nineteenth century English classicaleconomist David Ricardo. Essentially, these theorists saw thatanother crucial institution had developed in the mid-eighteenthcentury, alongside the industrial system. This was the institutionof banking, with its capacity to expand credit and the money supply(first, in the form of paper money, or bank notes, and later in theform of demand deposits, or checking accounts, that are instantlyredeemable in cash at the banks). It was the operations of thesecommercial banks which, these economists saw, held the key to themysterious recurrent cycles of expansion and contraction, of boomand bust, that had puzzled observers since the mid-eighteenthcentury.

The Ricardian analysis of the business cycle wentsomething as follows: The natural moneys emerging as such on theworld free market are useful commodities, generally gold andsilver. If money were confined simply to these commodities, thenthe economy would work in the aggregate as it does in particularmarkets: A smooth adjustment of supply and demand, and therefore nocycles of boom and bust. But the injection of bank credit addsanother crucial and disruptive element. For the banks expand creditand therefore bank money in the form of notes or deposits which aretheoretically redeemable on demand in gold, but in practice clearlyare not. For example, if a bank has 1000 ounces of gold in itsvaults, and it issues instantly redeemable warehouse receipts for2500 ounces of gold, then it clearly has issued 1500 ounces morethan it can possibly redeem. But so long as there is no concerted"run" on the bank to cash in these receipts, its warehouse-receiptsfunction on the market as equivalent to gold, and therefore thebank has been able to expand the money supply of the country by1500 gold ounces.

The banks, then, happily begin to expand credit,for the more they expand credit the greater will be their profits.This results in the expansion of the money supply within a country,say England. As the supply of paper and bank money in Englandincreases, the money incomes and expenditures of Englishmen rise,and the increased money bids up prices of English goods. The resultis inflation and a boom within the country. But this inflationaryboom, while it proceeds on its merry way, sows the seeds of its owndemise. For as English money supply and incomes increase,Englishmen proceed to purchase more goods from abroad. Furthermore,as English prices go up, English goods begin to lose theircompetitiveness with the products of other countries which have notinflated, or have been inflating to a lesser degree. Englishmenbegin to buy less at home and more abroad, while foreigners buyless in England and more at home; the result is a deficit in theEnglish balance of payments, with English exports falling sharplybehind imports. But if imports exceed exports, this means thatmoney must flow out of England to foreign countries. And what moneywill this be? Surely not English bank notes or deposits, forFrenchmen or Germans or Italians have little or no interest inkeeping their funds locked up in English banks. These foreignerswill therefore take their bank notes and deposits and present themto the English banks for redemption in gold – and gold will be thetype of money that will tend to flow persistently out of thecountry as the English inflation proceeds on its way. But thismeans that English bank credit money will be, more and more,pyramiding on top of a dwindling gold base in the English bankvaults. As the boom proceeds, our hypothetical bank will expand itswarehouse receipts issued from, say 2500 ounces to 4000 ounces,while its gold base dwindles to, say, 800. As this processintensifies, the banks will eventually become frightened. For thebanks, after all, are obligated to redeem their liabilities incash, and their cash is flowing out rapidly as their liabilitiespile up. Hence, the banks will eventually lose their nerve, stoptheir credit expansion, and in order to save themselves, contracttheir bank loans outstanding. Often, this retreat is precipitatedby bankrupting runs on the banks touched off by the public, who hadalso been getting increasingly nervous about the ever more shakycondition of the nation's banks.

The bank contraction reverses the economic picture; contraction andbust follow boom. The banks pull in their horns, and businessessuffer as the pressure mounts for debt repayment and contraction.The fall in the supply of bank money, in turn, leads to a generalfall in English prices. As money supply and incomes fall, andEnglish prices collapse, English goods become relatively moreattractive in terms of foreign products, and the balance ofpayments reverses itself, with exports exceeding imports. As goldflows into the country, and as bank money contracts on top of anexpanding gold base, the condition of the banks becomes muchsounder.

This, then, is the meaning of the depressionphase of the business cycle. Note that it is a phase that comes outof, and inevitably comes out of, the preceding expansionary boom.It is the preceding inflation that makes the depression phasenecessary. We can see, for example, that the depression is theprocess by which the market economy adjusts, throws off theexcesses and distortions of the previous inflationary boom, andreestablishes a sound economic condition. The depression is theunpleasant but necessary reaction to the distortions and excessesof the previous boom.

Why, then, does the next cycle begin? Why dobusiness cycles tend to be recurrent and continuous? Because whenthe banks have pretty well recovered, and are in a soundercondition, they are then in a confident position to proceed totheir natural path of bank credit expansion, and the next boomproceeds on its way, sowing the seeds for the next inevitablebust.

But if banking is the cause of the businesscycle, aren't the banks also a part of the private market economy,and can't we therefore say that the free marketis still the culprit, if only in the banking segment ofthat free market? The answer is No, for the banks, for one thing,would never be able to expand credit in concert were it not for theintervention and encouragement of government. For if banks weretruly competitive, any expansion of credit by one bank wouldquickly pile up the debts of that bank in its competitors, and itscompetitors would quickly call upon the expanding bank forredemption in cash. In short, a bank's rivals will call upon it forredemption in gold or cash in the same way as do foreigners, exceptthat the process is much faster and would nip any incipientinflation in the bud before it got started. Banks can only expandcomfortably in unison when a Central Bank exists, essentially agovernmental bank, enjoying a monopoly of government business, anda privileged position imposed by government over the entire bankingsystem. It is only when central banking got established that thebanks were able to expand for any length of time and the familiarbusiness cycle got underway in the modern world.

The central bank acquires its control over thebanking system by such governmental measures as: Making its ownliabilities legal tender for all debts and receivable in taxes;granting the central bank monopoly of the issue ofbank notes, as contrasted to deposits (in England the Bankof England, the governmentally established central bank, had alegal monopoly of bank notes in the London area); or through theoutright forcing of banks to use the central bank as their clientfor keeping their reserves of cash (as in the United States and itsFederal Reserve System). Not that the banks complain about thisintervention; for it is the establishment of central banking thatmakes long-term bank credit expansion possible, since the expansionof Central Bank notes provides added cash reserves for the entirebanking system and permits all the commercial banks to expand theircredit together. Central banking works like a cozy compulsory bankcartel to expand the banks' liabilities; and the banks are now ableto expand on a larger base of cash in the form of central banknotes as well as gold.

So now we see, at last, that the business cycle is brought about,not by any mysterious failings of the free market economy, butquite the opposite: By systematic intervention by government in themarket process. Government intervention brings about bank expansionand inflation, and, when the inflation comes to an end, thesubsequent depression-adjustment comes into play.

The Ricardian theory of the business cyclegrasped the essentials of a correct cycle theory: The recurrentnature of the phases of the cycle, depression as adjustmentintervention in the market rather than from the free-marketeconomy. But two problems were as yet unexplained: Why the suddencluster of business error, the sudden failure of theentrepreneurial function, and why the vastly greater fluctuationsin the producers' goods than in the consumers' goods industries?The Ricardian theory only explained movements in the price level,in general business; there was no hint of explanation of the vastlydifferent reactions in the capital and consumers' goodsindustries.

The correct and fully developed theory of thebusiness cycle was finally discovered and set forth by the Austrianeconomist Ludwig von Mises, when he was a professor at theUniversity of Vienna. Mises developed hints of his solution to thevital problem of the business cycle in his monumental Theory of Money and Credit, publishedin 1912, and still, nearly 60 years later, the best book on thetheory of money and banking. Mises developed his cycle theoryduring the 1920s, and it was brought to the English-speaking worldby Mises's leading follower, Friedrich A. von Hayek, who came fromVienna to teach at the London School of Economics in the early1930s, and who published, in German and in English, two books whichapplied and elaborated the Mises cycle theory: Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle,and Prices and Production. Since Mises andHayek were Austrians, and also since they were in the tradition ofthe great nineteenth-century Austrian economists, this theory hasbecome known in the literature as the "Austrian" (or the "monetaryover-investment") theory of the business cycle.

Building on the Ricardians, on general "Austrian"theory, and on his own creative genius, Mises developed thefollowing theory of the business cycle:

Without bank credit expansion, supply and demandtend to be equilibrated through the free price system, and nocumulative booms or busts can then develop. But then governmentthrough its central bank stimulates bank credit expansion byexpanding central bank liabilities and therefore the cash reservesof all the nation's commercial banks. The banks then proceed toexpand credit and hence the nation's money supply in the form ofcheck deposits. As the Ricardians saw, this expansion of bank moneydrives up the prices of goods and hence causes inflation. But,Mises showed, it does something else, and something even moresinister. Bank credit expansion, by pouring new loan funds into thebusiness world, artificially lowers the rate of interest in theeconomy below its free market level.

On the free and unhampered market, the interestrate is determined purely by the "time-preferences" of all theindividuals that make up the market economy. For the essence of aloan is that a "present good" (money which can be used at present)is being exchanged for a "future good" (an IOU which can only beused at some point in the future). Since people always prefer moneyright now to the prospect of getting the same amount of money sometime in the future, the present good always commands a premium inthe market over the future. This premium is the interest rate, andits height will vary according to the degree to which people preferthe present to the future, i.e., the degree of theirtime-preferences.

People's time-preferences also determine theextent to which people will save and invest, as compared to howmuch they will consume. If people's time-preferences should fall,i.e., if their degree of preference for present over future falls,then people will tend to consume less now and save and invest more;at the same time, and for the same reason, the rate of interest,the rate of time-discount, will also fall. Economic growth comesabout largely as the result of falling rates of time-preference,which lead to an increase in the proportion of saving andinvestment to consumption, and also to a falling rate ofinterest.

But what happens when the rate of interest falls,not because of lower time-preferences and higher savings, but fromgovernment interference that promotes the expansion of bank credit?In other words, if the rate of interest falls artificially, due tointervention, rather than naturally, as a result of changes in thevaluations and preferences of the consumingpublic?

What happens is trouble. For businessmen, seeingthe rate of interest fall, react as they always would and must tosuch a change of market signals: They invest more in capital andproducers' goods. Investments, particularly in lengthy andtime-consuming projects, which previously looked unprofitable nowseem profitable, because of the fall of the interest charge. Inshort, businessmen react as they would react if savingshad genuinely increased: They expand their investment indurable equipment, in capital goods, in industrial raw material, inconstruction as compared to their direct production of consumergoods.

Businesses, in short, happily borrow the newlyexpanded bank money that is coming to them at cheaper rates; theyuse the money to invest in capital goods, and eventually this moneygets paid out in higher rents to land, and higher wages to workersin the capital goods industries. The increased business demand bidsup labor costs, but businesses think they can pay these highercosts because they have been fooled by the government-and-bankintervention in the loan market and its decisively importanttampering with the interest-rate signal of themarketplace.

The problem comes as soon as the workers andlandlords – largely the former, since most gross business income ispaid out in wages – begin to spend the new bank money that theyhave received in the form of higher wages. For the time-preferencesof the public have not really gotten lower; the publicdoesn't wantto save more than it has. So the workers setabout to consume most of their new income, in short to reestablishthe old consumer/saving proportions. This means that they redirectthe spending back to the consumer goods industries, and they don'tsave and invest enough to buy the newly-produced machines, capitalequipment, industrial raw materials, etc. This all reveals itselfas a sudden sharp and continuing depression in the producers'goods industries. Once the consumers reestablished theirdesired consumption/investment proportions, it is thus revealedthat business had invested too much in capital goods and hadunderinvested in consumer goods. Business had been seduced by thegovernmental tampering and artificial lowering of the rate ofinterest, and acted as if more savings were available to investthan were really there. As soon as the new bank money filteredthrough the system and the consumers reestablished their oldproportions, it became clear that there were not enough savings tobuy all the producers' goods, and that business had misinvested thelimited savings available. Business had overinvested in capitalgoods and underinvested in consumer products.

The inflationary boom thus leads to distortions of the pricing andproduction system. Prices of labor and raw materials in the capitalgoods industries had been bid up during the boom too high to beprofitable once the consumers reassert their oldconsumption/investment preferences. The "depression" is then seenas the necessary and healthy phase by which the market economysloughs off and liquidates the unsound, uneconomic investments ofthe boom, and reestablishes those proportions between consumptionand investment that are truly desired by the consumers. Thedepression is the painful but necessary process by which the freemarket sloughs off the excesses and errors of the boom andreestablishes the market economy in its function of efficientservice to the mass of consumers. Since prices of factors ofproduction have been bid too high in the boom, this means thatprices of labor and goods in these capital goods industries must beallowed to fall until proper market relations areresumed.

Since the workers receive the increased money inthe form of higher wages fairly rapidly, how is it that booms cango on for years without having their unsound investments revealed,their errors due to tampering with market signals become evident,and the depression-adjustment process begins its work? The answeris that booms would be very short lived if the bank creditexpansion and subsequent pushing of the rate of interest below thefree market level were a one-shot affair. But the point is that thecredit expansion is not one-shot; it proceeds on and on,never giving consumers the chance to reestablish their preferredproportions of consumption and saving, never allowing the rise incosts in the capital goods industries to catch up to theinflationary rise in prices. Like the repeated doping of a horse,the boom is kept on its way and ahead of its inevitablecomeuppance, by repeated doses of the stimulant of bank credit. Itis only when bank credit expansion must finally stop, eitherbecause the banks are getting into a shaky condition or because thepublic begins to balk at the continuing inflation, that retributionfinally catches up with the boom. As soon as credit expansionstops, then the piper must be paid, and the inevitablereadjustments liquidate the unsound over-investments of the boom,with the reassertion of a greater proportionate emphasis onconsumers' goods production.

Thus, the Misesian theory of the business cycleaccounts for all of our puzzles: The repeated and recurrent natureof the cycle, the massive cluster of entrepreneurial error, the fargreater intensity of the boom and bust in the producers' goodsindustries.

Mises, then, pinpoints the blame for the cycle oninflationary bank credit expansion propelled by the intervention ofgovernment and its central bank. What does Mises say should bedone, say by government, once the depression arrives? What is thegovernmental role in the cure of depression? In the first place,government must cease inflating as soon as possible. It is truethat this will, inevitably, bring the inflationary boom abruptly toan end, and commence the inevitable recession or depression. Butthe longer the government waits for this, the worse the necessaryreadjustments will have to be. The sooner thedepression-readjustment is gotten over with, the better. Thismeans, also, that the government must never try to prop up unsoundbusiness situations; it must never bail out or lend money tobusiness firms in trouble. Doing this will simply prolong the agonyand convert a sharp and quick depression phase into a lingering andchronic disease. The government must never try to prop up wagerates or prices of producers' goods; doing so will prolong anddelay indefinitely the completion of the depression-adjustmentprocess; it will cause indefinite and prolonged depression and massunemployment in the vital capital goods industries. The governmentmust not try to inflate again, in order to get out of thedepression. For even if this reinflation succeeds, it will only sowgreater trouble later on. The government must do nothing toencourage consumption, and it must not increase its ownexpenditures, for this will further increase the socialconsumption/investment ratio. In fact, cutting the governmentbudget will improve the ratio. What the economy needs is not moreconsumption spending but more saving, in order to validate some ofthe excessive investments of the boom.

Thus, what the government should do, according tothe Misesian analysis of the depression, is absolutely nothing. Itshould, from the point of view of economic health and ending thedepression as quickly as possible, maintain a strict hands off,"laissez-faire" policy. Anything it does will delay andobstruct the adjustment process of the market; the less it does,the more rapidly will the market adjustment process do its work,and sound economic recovery ensue.

The Misesian prescription is thus the exact opposite of theKeynesian: It is for the government to keep absolute hands off theeconomy and to confine itself to stopping its own inflation and tocutting its own budget.

It has today been completely forgotten, evenamong economists, that the Misesian explanation and analysis of thedepression gained great headway precisely during the GreatDepression of the 1930s – the very depression that is always heldup to advocates of the free market economy as the greatest singleand catastrophic failure of laissez-faire capitalism. Itwas no such thing. 1929 was made inevitable by the vast bank creditexpansion throughout the Western world during the 1920s: A policydeliberately adopted by the Western governments, and mostimportantly by the Federal Reserve System in the United States. Itwas made possible by the failure of the Western world to return toa genuine gold standard after World War I, and thus allowing moreroom for inflationary policies by government. Everyone now thinksof President Coolidge as a believer in laissez-faire andan unhampered market economy; he was not, and tragically, nowhereless so than in the field of money and credit. Unfortunately, thesins and errors of the Coolidge intervention were laid to the doorof a non-existent free market economy.

If Coolidge made 1929 inevitable, it wasPresident Hoover who prolonged and deepened the depression,transforming it from a typically sharp but swiftly-disappearingdepression into a lingering and near-fatal malady, a malady "cured"only by the holocaust of World War II. Hoover, not FranklinRoosevelt, was the founder of the policy of the "New Deal":essentially the massive use of the State to do exactly whatMisesian theory would most warn against – to prop up wage ratesabove their free-market levels, prop up prices, inflate credit, andlend money to shaky business positions. Roosevelt only advanced, toa greater degree, what Hoover had pioneered. The result for thefirst time in American history, was a nearly perpetual depressionand nearly permanent mass unemployment. The Coolidge crisis hadbecome the unprecedentedly prolonged Hoover-Rooseveltdepression.

Ludwig von Mises had predicted the depressionduring the heyday of the great boom of the 1920s – a time, justlike today, when economists and politicians, armed with a "neweconomics" of perpetual inflation, and with new "tools" provided bythe Federal Reserve System, proclaimed a perpetual "New Era" ofpermanent prosperity guaranteed by our wise economic doctors inWashington. Ludwig von Mises, alone armed with a correct theory ofthe business cycle, was one of the very few economists to predictthe Great Depression, and hence the economic world was forced tolisten to him with respect. F. A. Hayek spread the word in England,and the younger English economists were all, in the early 1930s,beginning to adopt the Misesian cycle theory for their analysis ofthe depression – and also to adopt, of course, the strictlyfree-market policy prescription that flowed with this theory.Unfortunately, economists have now adopted the historical notion ofLord Keynes: That no "classical economists" had a theory of thebusiness cycle until Keynes came along in 1936.There was a theory of the depression; it was the classicaleconomic tradition; its prescription was strict hard moneyand laissez-faire; and it was rapidly being adopted, inEngland and even in the United States, as the accepted theory ofthe business cycle. (A particular irony is that the major"Austrian" proponent in the United States in the early andmid-1930s was none other than Professor Alvin Hansen, very soon tomake his mark as the outstanding Keynesian disciple in thiscountry.)

What swamped the growing acceptance of Misesiancycle theory was simply the "Keynesian Revolution" – the amazingsweep that Keynesian theory made of the economic world shortlyafter the publication of the General Theory in 1936. It isnot that Misesian theory was refuted successfully; it wasjust forgotten in the rush to climb on the suddenlyfashionable Keynesian bandwagon. Some of the leading adherents ofthe Mises theory – who clearly knew better – succumbed to the newlyestablished winds of doctrine, and won leading American universityposts as a consequence.

But now the once arch-KeynesianLondon Economist has recently proclaimed that "Keynes isDead." After over a decade of facing trenchant theoreticalcritiques and refutation by stubborn economic facts, the Keynesiansare now in general and massive retreat. Once again, the moneysupply and bank credit are being grudgingly acknowledged to play aleading role in the cycle. The time is ripe – for a rediscovery, arenaissance, of the Mises theory of the business cycle. It can comenone too soon; if it ever does, the whole concept of a Council ofEconomic Advisors would be swept away, and we would see a massiveretreat of government from the economic sphere. But for all this tohappen, the world of economics, and the public at large, must bemade aware of the existence of an explanation of the business cyclethat has lain neglected on the shelf for all too many tragicyears.

This essay was originally published as aminibook by the Constitutional Alliance of Lansing, Michigan,1969.

期權首發日和紅廟子的故事：時曾相識的瘋狂與當下的風險

來源: http://www.gelonghui.com/portal.php?mod=view&aid=1367

滬指2850點似曾相識

來源: http://www.yicai.com/news/2015/08/4678248.html

滬指2850點似曾相識

一財網 李雋 2015-08-27 21:10:00

有市場人士認為2010年7月2日的2319點，其實跟當前的2850點，圖形走勢上已經有一定類似，宏觀環境上也有一定相似之處。

似曾相識---為了昨天的南京 Nainital的碎片哥

來源: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6a54e96a0102wh43.html

無奈離去，在“烈火”中重生 

　　1881年，南海蠶繭歉收，絲織業因缺土絲而停產，絲織工人在絲織行會的調唆下，將不幸歸罪於機器繅絲廠多購了蠶繭，斷了手工繅絲業者的生路，於是搗毀機器繅絲廠。因蠶繭失收導致當地手工業行會會員暴動，積聚了多年的新舊生產力和生產關系的矛盾終於以一種極端的形式爆發，滋事者搗毀機囂，三名機繅工人被殺。一直夾在官府和封建勢力之中艱難求存的陳啟沅眼見多年的心血毀於一旦，心痛異常。他組織工人護廠，收效不大，事態發展嚴重失控，無奈之中，他放下了多年來對官府所存的戒備之心，請求官府派兵平亂，結果卻出人意料之外，清政府不但沒有派兵，反而在幾天後頒布停工封廠令，腐敗的清政府下令所有絲廠“克日齊停工作”，南海縣知縣也頒布了《禁止絲偈曉諭機工示》，並且派兵查封全部機械繅絲廠。清政府為什麽這樣做？原因很複雜……絕望至極，繼昌隆被迫遷往澳門。

陳啟沅 我國第一家機器繅絲廠創始人

潛行A股五年攜手鮮言：李勇鴻資本玩法似曾相識

遊刃市場多年，潛行數家上市公司，卻始終深藏行跡。若非一場喧囂的跨國並購，資本玩家李勇鴻的廬山真面目，恐怕依舊無人能識。

今年8月初，名不見經傳的中歐體育投資管理長興有限公司（下稱“中歐體育”），因主導收購AC米蘭，陡然間聲名鵲起。而主導收購的神秘買家即為中歐體育主席李勇鴻。

李勇鴻初次在資本市場嶄露頭角，是在五年前控制多倫股份。而除了已更名匹凸匹(600696.SH)的多倫股份，李勇鴻的身影還在數家上市公司出現過。但出入資本市場多年，李勇鴻卻一直藏影匿形。《第一財經日報》調查發現，除多倫股份外，包括中歐體育在內，李勇鴻染指A股上市公司並不直接現身或持有股權，而是通過種種方式隱身幕後。

蹊蹺的是，雖然退出多倫股份多年，但李勇鴻與此後控制人鮮言，至今在業務、人員等多個層面仍在發生聯系。

神秘收購者李勇鴻

今年6月，永大集團（002622.SZ）公告稱，全資子公司永大創新金融服務（深圳）有限公司（下稱“永大創新”）擬參與發起產業並購基金，總規模不超過45億元人民幣，其中永大創新作為劣後級投資人，擬認繳不超過3億元。 
 
8月13日，永大集團再次公告，此前一天，中歐體育向其發出告知函，該公司以5.2億歐元的對價，向Fininvest收購AC米蘭99.93%的股權，並向AC米蘭提供1億歐元貸款。8月29日，永大集團就參與發起產業基金簽訂了確認函。

根據媒體報道，Fininvest新聞發言人曾公開表示，主導此次收購的李勇鴻，正是原多倫股份實控人李勇鴻。

多倫股份2011年年報披露，李勇鴻出生於1969年，祖籍廣東茂名， 1994年移居香港。1994年至1997年任香港安順企業有限公司總經理，1997年至2005年任重慶愛普科技總經理；2005年開始擔任在香港註冊的龍浩國際集團有限公司董事局主席兼首席執行官。

2011年12月 ，李勇鴻以3.6億元的代價，從福建地產大佬陳隆基手上，收購了多倫股份控股股東多倫投資（香港）有限公司全部股權，由此成為持有多倫股份4000萬股股份、持股比例達到11.75%的控股股東。

出乎意料的是，入主多倫股份僅半年，李勇鴻便將其所持股份轉讓給鮮言，交易作價僅3.4億元。由於沒有及時披露信息以及違反此前公開承諾，李勇鴻2012年受到上證所公開譴責，並被證監會處以60萬元罰款。

經此一役，李勇鴻此後在A股市場少有公開露臉。但記者調查發現，李勇鴻並未就此“銷聲匿跡”，反而先後染指數家公司。2013年，借名下企業廣東鴻遠能源投資有限公司（下稱“廣東鴻遠”）入股深圳凱雷股權投資基金 (下稱“深圳凱雷”)，進而舉牌新潮實業（現“新潮能源”），再次在資本市場拋頭露面。

公開資料顯示，2012年11月21日，天津信托成立“沐雪巴菲特一號證券投資集合資金信托計劃”（下稱“沐雪一號”），募集資金6億元，由中國銀行上海分行、深圳凱雷作為優先級、次級委托人，分別認購4億元、2億元。信托計劃成立後，由於深圳凱雷的普通合夥人涉嫌股票交易違規，一度引發“江蘇沐雪信托詐騙案”。

根據新潮能源2012年12月3日披露，深圳凱雷受托以沐雪一號名義，在二級市場上買入新潮能源2365萬股，買入均價4.89元。同時，自然人張拾根也在此期間買入764萬股，並與其構成一致行動人，成為新潮能源當時持股5%的股東。

李勇鴻染指的另一家上市公司便是珠海中富。

據財新此前報道，上市公司珠海中富也出現在收購AC米蘭的財團名單中。報道還稱，早在兩年前，深圳市捷安德實業有限公司（下稱“捷安德”）就在謀求收購AC米蘭，而捷安德的實際控制人為李勇鴻。

捷安德是珠海中富的第一大股東。公告顯示，2014年3月，陷入困境的珠海中富原大股東與張旭、捷安德簽訂協議，將所持珠海中富5.1%和11.39%的股份分別轉讓給後兩者。截至去年底，捷安德持有珠海中富1.46億股，持股比例為11.39%，為第一大股東。

捷安德成立於2009年，是一家個人獨資企業，法定代表人為李嘉傑，實際控制人為劉錦鐘，李勇鴻並不持有其股權。但據《第一財經日報》記者調查，有一家李勇鴻旗下企業的法定代表人，與最近一年曾與珠海中富發生資金往來的企業法定代表人同名。

2014年5月，捷安德的法定代表人變更為李艷。巧合的是，在鮮言接手匹凸匹後，亦有名為“李艷”的關鍵人物擔任過多個要職。據此前公告，匹凸匹股東深圳柯塞威的法定代表人、執行董事名為李艷。此外，匹凸匹金融信息服務(深圳)有限公司的法定代表人、總經理均為李艷。2014年10月，捷安德法人代表和董事成員再次變更，李艷在捷安德短暫露臉後即消失，李嘉傑成為新的法人代表並延續至今。

收購AC米蘭之前，李勇鴻行事一貫低調神秘，除了多倫股份外，幾乎從未直接在其他上市公司現身。

收購AC米蘭雖然名聲大躁，但李勇鴻在股權上卻與中歐體育沒有任何關系。工商登記資料顯示，中歐體育成立於2016年5月26日，註冊資金1億元，為自然人獨資企業，由陳華山一人出資，法定代表人、執行董事兼總經理均由其擔任，監事則為一個名為姬將的人。

而無論是向珠海中富提供借款的廣東長洲投資有限公司（下稱“廣東長洲”），還是曾舉牌新潮能源的沐雪一號，李勇鴻也都沒有直接現身，而是假手他人完成操作。

根據珠海中富此前披露，2015年10月20日，為償還已逾期的公司債本息、補充流動資金，珠海中富曾計劃向廣東長洲借款1.85億元，珠海中富以總面積不超過17萬平方米的土地使用權作為抵押。

工商資料顯示，廣東長洲成立於2012年，註冊資金5000萬元，登記住所為廣州市天河區天河北路233號中信廣場第四層401之26房，法定代表人為陳建勇，股東為陳建勇、李尚松兩名自然人，由陳建勇擔任執行董事兼總經理。

從股權關系上看，李勇鴻與珠海中富、廣東長洲沒有任何關聯。但李勇鴻、陳建勇之間卻存在千絲萬縷的聯系。2013年初，沐雪一號引發的“詐騙案”曾轟動一時。而作為沐雪一號次級委托人的深圳凱雷的出資人，有一名自然人出資人名為陳建勇。

資料顯示，深圳凱雷共有9名出資人，除了6名自然人出資人外，還有湖北精九投資有限公司（下稱湖北精九）、廣東鴻遠、深圳沐雪股權投資管理有限公司三家法人出資人，而廣東鴻遠還是深圳凱雷執行合夥人之一。

根據此前多家媒體報道，廣東鴻遠法定代表人亦名為陳建勇，兩者或為同一人。而廣東鴻遠的實際控制人則名為李勇鴻的自然人。

攜手鮮言的資本迷局

李勇鴻、鮮言這兩名多倫股份原實際控制人，在脫身而去之後，仍然以各種隱秘管道糾結在一起，甚至在今年5月，雙方還通過人員交叉持股而緊密聯系在一起。

而李勇鴻、鮮言之間的隱秘關系，在2012年多倫股份股權轉讓時就已初露端倪。收購之初，李勇鴻在權益變動書中稱，收購是為了實現個人財富增值。但實際上，其向鮮言轉讓多倫股份股權的價格為3.4億元，出現了2000萬元的賬面虧損，與“增值”不符。

除交接多倫股份的控股權外，二者還在多處出現關聯。其中，尤其以李勇鴻掌舵過的“重慶愛普系”與鮮言掌控的“精九系”最為曖昧。

2012年6月，上市公司尚未公告李勇鴻向鮮言轉讓所持股份，而上市公司子公司荊門漢通與精九貿易此時曾簽訂一筆3000萬元的鋼材購銷合同。隨後合同解除，但精九貿易未歸還此筆款項，上市公司也未及時公告。證監會還因此要求多倫股份進行整改。而資料顯示，精九貿易法人代表為方紅星，鮮言2011年至2012年任精九資產管理（上海）有限公司董事。

2013年7月，已將多倫股份控股權脫手的李勇鴻再次現身。鮮言將此前的股權質押解除後，質押給李勇鴻。此舉也引發監管層關註，上證所就在問詢中要求上市公司披露該筆質押的質押的原因和詳細情況。多倫股份隨後公告稱，鮮言與李勇鴻在股權轉讓項目中有過合作，故後續擬與其合作與本公司無關的其他項目，產生上述質押。但因合作項目無後續進展，雙方已解除該質押。

資料顯示，深圳凱雷的出資人之一湖北精九，正是鮮言的關聯方。湖北精九成立於1999年，註冊資金1億元，註冊地為武漢市洪山區工農灣櫻花大廈，股東為饒玉秀、鮮勇，出資比例分別為90%、10%，總經理為鮮栗。

有媒體報道稱，鮮勇、鮮栗與鮮言三者之間存在親屬關系。匹凸匹8月19日公告稱，計劃以1億元的價格，向鮮言控制的匹凸匹網絡科技(上海)有限公司(下稱“匹凸匹網絡”)，轉讓匹凸匹金融信息服務(深圳)有限公司100%股權。

匹凸匹網絡的註冊資金3.4億元，股東為北京柯塞威資產管理有限公司(下稱“北京柯塞威”)、深圳柯塞威基金管理有限公司(下稱“深圳柯塞威”)。其中，北京柯塞威註冊資金1000萬元，股東為鮮勇、鮮栗，深圳柯塞威註冊資金10億元，股東為鮮言，法定代表人李艷，實際控制人為鮮言。

深圳凱雷舉牌新潮能源，即是受湖北精九委托。湖北精九2012年12月4日通過新潮能源披露的公告顯示，湖北精九為深圳凱雷普通合夥人，深圳凱雷則以沐雪一號次級委托人加入信托計劃，並受湖北精九委托，以該信托名義在二級市場買入新潮能源。

雙方最近的聯系，發生在今年5月。根據工商資料，2016年5月之前，湖北精九的股東已變更為馮多倫、冷虹、譚躍群，而鮮勇、饒玉秀已經消失。5月20日，湖北精九股東再次變更，譚躍群退出，鮮栗加入，馮多倫、冷虹仍為股東。

2012年4月，重慶愛普科技有限公司（下稱“重慶愛普”）耗資2.1億元，受讓東平焦化70%股權，而李勇鴻在1997年—2005年間，曾擔任愛普科技董事兼總經理。

將鮮言、李勇鴻聯系起來的，正是馮多倫。“天眼查”顯示，馮多倫現為重慶愛普科技的董事、經理，並在重慶愛普參股的多家關聯公司任職。江蘇張家港渝農商村鎮銀行的一名監事，也名為馮多倫。據其2015年年報，該公司也是重慶農商行股東。

今年7月份以來，瑞萊嘉譽投資企業（下稱“瑞萊嘉譽”）通過多次增持和兩次舉牌，成為ST慧球持股10.46%的第一大股東，在此期間，鮮言也開始在出現ST慧球，並被聘為證券事務代表，曾引發外界關於鮮言與瑞萊嘉譽可能存在關聯關系的猜測。此後，卻發生了ST慧球阻止瑞萊嘉譽信披之事。9月21日，瑞萊嘉譽又提議罷免新近擔任ST慧球董事長的董文亮等全體董事。使得鮮言與瑞萊嘉譽的關系變得迷霧重重。

鮮言以堂堂上市公司前實際控制人的身份，“下嫁”ST慧球任職證券事務代表，而馮多倫、鮮栗進入與鮮言、李勇鴻均有關聯的同一企業，是否與收購AC米蘭有關？也引人遐想。

有市場人士稱，從操作手法上，董文亮、鮮言等進入ST慧球後，公司管理層幾乎集體失聯，與李勇鴻當初在多倫股份所作所為幾乎如出一轍。

不同玩家的同種玩法

在多倫股份大股東位上的半年多時間，是李勇鴻難得的公開露面；但僅以公告來看，其並未發起較大資產重組和運作。然而，就在這半年的時間里其推進未遂的一起重組，卻成為決定多倫股份命運的關鍵轉折點。

2011年12月，李勇鴻在接手多倫股份控股權後就改選了高管成員，並隨即推進了對新疆東平焦化的投資。董事會決議顯示，多倫股份擬以1.8億元入股和增資新疆東平焦化，交易完成後公司持有東平焦化45%的股權。這是家一期工程一年前才剛剛建成的新公司，2011年前11月的凈利潤為731萬元。但審計機構同時發表了保留意見，主要因新疆東平焦化自稱6月及以前的會計原始憑證資料因被盜丟失。

在當年12月30日的股東大會上，此次對外投資被否決。而就在多倫股份擬投資東平焦化失敗後，後者的企業登記信息出現極為頻繁的變更；與李勇鴻關系密切的“重慶愛普系”多位股東露臉，東平焦化的真實背景也逐漸顯現。

2012年，重慶愛普、重慶市新城開發建設公司等先後出現在投資人一欄中，關鍵人物馮多倫也一度擔任東平焦化的法人代表。此外，2012年被李勇鴻帶進多倫股份高管團隊的廖克難、蔣躍中也均在愛普科技、重慶新城開發、焦化東平等公司內任職。

按照李勇鴻當時推進增資東平焦化時的設想，此次對外投資里上市公司將使用自有資金支付對價。若此次投資獲得通過，這或意味著，近2億元的對外投資實際將流進李勇鴻自己人密布的公司中。

事實上，在李勇鴻之前，前任實際控制人陳隆基就曾上演類似的“騰挪大法”；而在其之後接棒控股權的鮮言，而今還正積極奔走運作。利用上市平臺向個別資產輸血、再轉移或剝離相關業務、進而實現套利變現甚至掏空上市公司的玩法，成為了維系在多倫股份三任大股東之間的關鍵邏輯。。

多倫股份早在2008年9月時，以1.2億元出資參股上海惟遠投資，占後者40%股權；參股而不控股的思路，與李勇鴻此後擬收購東平焦化45%股權極為相似。在2010年2月，多倫股份董事會以1.05億元將惟遠投資40%股權出售給北京森隆投資有限公司，即最初的出讓方。

而在陳隆基手上，類似“賠本”的買賣並不只這一筆。2011年9月，多倫股份出售了旗下51%的股權，資產作價5500萬轉讓給北京富成源投資有限公司。公開資料顯示，多倫建設擁有上海市虹口區多倫路二期1號地塊的開發權；正是由上市公司在2005年以6.5億元拍下改地塊，並因此而改名“多倫股份”。這起離奇的低價出售優質資產的同時，陳隆基也持續大手筆減持，並最終在當年年底清倉離場。

值得註意的是，這種玩法還在繼續蔓延和擴張。利用上市公司“滋養”資產再進行轉移，鮮言對此也熟稔於心。

在2012年從李勇鴻手里受讓多倫股份後，子公司荊門漢通就成為鮮言手下的關鍵棋子。一方面，多個優質資產被轉移、主業經營混亂的多倫股份，需要借助荊門漢通的“漢通•楚天城”項目來繼續講故事；另一方面，鮮言通過上市公司對荊門漢通進行增資、提供資金使用，將這塊資產悄然餵養壯大。而後再通過對外擔保、轉讓資產等種種方式，將匹凸匹吃幹榨凈。巧妙的騰挪，就出現在鮮言2015年底將匹凸匹脫手後。荊門漢通於今年3月28日成立荊門漢達公司、湖北漢佳置業兩家全資子公司，並隨後將自己名下兩幅土地過戶至兩家子公司。6月，荊門漢通再次召開董事會，同意鮮言控制的柯塞威大數據公司、柯塞威網絡對漢達公司、漢佳公司進行增資並控制75%股權。

然而，鮮言的這一步當前遭遇麻煩。今年7月，匹凸匹發布涉訴公告稱，已將鮮言、荊門漢通、荊門漢達、柯塞威大數據告上法庭，認為上述增資嚴重損害了該公司利益；要求法院判令確認荊門漢通、漢達公司等股東決定無效，並撤銷股東變更登記等要求。根據最新公告，該案將於2016年12月1日開庭審理
 

張雨綺又閃婚！ 自曝相識70天領證

來源: http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2016-10-26/1047944.html

張雨綺

近日，據全明星探爆料，張雨綺與神秘男子在上海同居，並且相伴看房。在爆料照片中，張雨綺穿著熱褲，一雙長腿分外搶鏡，惹網友直呼：“女神還是女神，不過還是希望她能夠找到真的幸福！”

據爆料稱，10月5日，張雨綺在助理的陪伴下出現在上海機場，緩步慢行，長腿吸睛。然而，除張雨綺與助理二人相伴外，在兩人到達車庫後，還有一位神秘男子出現，更是一同乘車與張雨綺來到一處高檔小區華府天地。進入小區不久，張雨綺換裝之後便再次出行。而此時的她身邊已經沒有了神秘男子的身影，而是與助理同行。不過，她們來到某商場後，張雨綺卻丟下助理獨自行動，在超市中，再次看到機場同行的那位神秘男子，二人在超市之中購物交談。

張雨綺兩人同框照片

兩人同框照片爆出後，網友直呼：“這明顯就是要搞事情啊，都一起去逛超市了！”在兩人被拍到一起逛超市的第二天，張雨綺與神秘男一同乘車來到湯臣一品，似乎是要買房的節奏，一言不合就要買房，還是在上海最貴的住宅區，網友也直呼：“看來這位神秘男還是一位隱藏的土豪呢，看來張雨綺也算是找到了一個極好的歸宿。”張雨綺在與王全安離婚之後似乎將生活的重心放在了事業上，粉絲也就此爆料喊話：“姐姐，找個好人家嫁了吧！”

隨後，張雨綺工作室迅速做出反應，於今日中午在微博承認了這段戀情，並透露了一個爆炸性消息，那就是張雨綺已經與這位先生領證結婚了。

微博原文：

原本沒有向全世界交代人生方向的計劃，但既然已經“被曝光”，那索性直接走在“新聞”的前面。正式公布一下：貝拉公主張雨綺小姐已經找到了她的野獸王子 ，兩個單身的人相識十天相戀，相識七十天結婚，這是一段恰到好處的相遇，相信愛的人會一直得到命運的眷顧。謝謝大家的關心和祝福，唯願安安靜靜的攜手，平平淡淡的生活。

張雨綺工作室承認戀情

（綜合來源：新浪娛樂、網易娛樂專稿）

兩前高官讚曾蔭權「為港人做到最好」相識30年　劉吳惠蘭稱不知曾擬租深圳大宅

1 : GS(14)@2017-01-26 15:51:33

■曾蔭權在庭上獲兩名前下屬稱讚，離開法院時表現從容。朱永倫攝



【審訊第11日】【本報訊】前特首曾蔭權涉受賄案昨續審，兩名出庭任控方證人的高官、包括跟曾共事30年的商務及經濟發展局前局長劉吳惠蘭，及前常任秘書長謝曼怡，均稱讚曾蔭權在位時非常投入及盡心盡力工作，為香港人做到最好，指曾處理雄濤廣播的數碼廣播牌照申請時，沒有不尋常舉動。劉太更重申，是在公開、透明、公平的情況下處理雄濤的申請，惟她承認並不知相識多年的曾退休後擬租住深圳大宅，亦不知他與雄濤股東黃楚標的關係。記者：黃幗慧控方證人劉吳惠蘭昨繼續接受辯方盤問，承認2010年9月中與已獲AM電台牌照的雄濤廣播股東鄭經翰見面，鄭向她講述計劃在坪洲興建發謝器卻遇居民反對，要求修改AM牌照的條件，轉為數碼廣播牌照，惟局方不接受建議，因局方立場是重新發出數碼廣播牌照。最後因各種問題都得以解決，行會最終在2010年11月原則上向雄濤批牌。



前商經局長劉吳惠蘭

前商經局常秘謝曼怡


不知曾與黃楚標關係

辯方問劉太，她是否沒向雄濤說要付賄款才可獲發數碼廣播牌照，劉太確認，並補充指審批過程公開、透明、公平，是因雄濤符合要求才批牌照，而曾蔭權亦沒有不尋常的行為。劉太稱認識曾蔭權超過30年，形容曾工作「非常投入」，為香港人做到最好。惟她接受控方提問時承認，雖然以往每天都會與曾開會見面，但對於他擬於退休後租住深圳東海花園大宅，她也是看報紙時才知，而曾亦沒向她透露與雄濤股東黃楚標的關係、亦沒有講過黃找設計師替大宅裝修。劉太向控方確認，公開及透明的審批過程包括申報利益衝突，這要求也適用於特首。


謝曼怡指無優待雄濤

緊隨劉太作供的商經局前常秘謝曼怡接受盤問時亦讚曾「極度投入、盡心盡力工作，非常認真」，她早於曾蔭權在1993年任職庫務司時，已與曾共事，謝形容他「為人率直、有堅強信念，在反應過大後會致歉」。謝後來接受控方提問，稱小心審視牌照申請，要嚴格跟足法例去做，有利益衝突便要申報，主控官問她若不申報會否影響公眾信心？謝回應「觀感會不好」。此外，謝曼怡稱雄濤當時獲7條頻道，比另外兩間申請公司的3條、及港台的5條頻道都多，但謝指並非優待雄濤，因投資數碼廣播涉及風險，新加坡有數碼廣播機構經營幾年便結業。謝亦確認有政府文件指出，數碼廣播共涉及4,000至5,000萬元資本投資。另曾蔭權前私人秘書、及行政長官辦公室前常秘麥靖宇作供指，曾蔭權租住深圳東海花園大宅一事在2012年2月曝光，政府在2月26日發新聞稿交代單位的資料，惟控方昨指新聞稿內沒有提及何時簽租約、曾妻曾向單位業主的相關公司支付80萬元人民幣、單位由著名設計師何周禮設計等資料，麥認為這些資料在當時都不重要，故不用提及，但麥承認他根本不知道這些資料，而新聞稿內容是由曾蔭權提供。聆訊今續。案件編號：HCCC484/15




來源: http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20170125/19907810

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【飛圖之星】《相逢何必曾相識》成經典

1 : GS(14)@2017-04-09 10:49:37

除了梁雁翎，飛圖亦捧過不少歌手，更帶起合唱K歌潮流，包括張智霖、許秋怡《現代愛情故事》、蔣志光和韋綺姍的《相逢何必曾相識》。曾為飛圖拍MV的導演蔡錦源表示，MV甚有旅遊節目水準，全因老闆葉志銘識做，多以海外取景為名，請員工去遊埠為實。



葉玉卿《擋不住的風情》

葉玉卿

飛圖作品：《擋不住的風情》、《男人是否都一樣》、《卿卿我我》等



張智霖、許秋怡《現代愛情故事》

張智霖、許秋怡

飛圖作品：《現代愛情故事》、《片片楓葉情》等



謝霆鋒《如果只得一星期》

謝霆鋒

飛圖作品：《如果只得一星期》、《壞習慣》、《無聲仿有聲》等


蔣志光、韋綺姍

飛圖作品：《相逢何必曾相識》



趙學而《每隔兩秒》

趙學而

飛圖作品：《每隔兩秒》、《我恨我是女人》、《尋開心》等



黃凱芹《傾心》

黃凱芹

飛圖作品：《傾心》、《晚秋》、《哪裡的天空不下雨》等




來源: http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/entertainment/art/20170409/19984223

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相識20年35歲宋慧喬少女look會老友

1 : GS(14)@2017-05-27 08:54:28

現年35歲嘅韓國女星宋慧喬，自拍完神劇《太陽的後裔》後就未有新作，不過喬妹亦間唔中有現身品牌活動，本月初訪港出席服裝品牌活動後，上周六就現身免稅店活動，但就算幾忙都好，喬妹都會抽空見下好友。喬妹前日喺Instagram上載與元祖女團Fin.K.L.37歲成員李真嘅合照，雖然張合照被喬妹秒刪，但已經有唔少粉絲有留底。相中喬妹及李真身穿輕便造型並都素顏出鏡，少女味十足，一啲都唔似已經30幾歲。據知李真去年下嫁圈外人之後就隨老公喺美國紐約定居，估計係李真返韓後約喬妹聚舊。雖然喬妹同李真同樣畢業於銀光女子高中，但兩人係合作韓劇《順風婦產科》先認識成為好友，認識近20年感情依然咁好。而喬妹、李真以及韓劇《濟眾院》女星韓惠珍被稱為「銀光女子高中三大美女」。




來源: http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/entertainment/art/20170527/20035149

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